def make_dhfield(self, modp_options, sigmai):
dhs = []
for modp in modp_options:
p = dh.primes[modp]
g = dh.generators[modp]
x = crypto.srand(2**(2 * self.n - 1), p - 1)
# FIXME this may be a source of performance issues
e = crypto.powmod(g, x, p)
self.xes[modp] = x
self.es[modp] = e
if sigmai:
dhs.append(
base64.b64encode(crypto.encode_mpi(e)).decode('utf-8'))
name = 'dhkeys'
else:
He = crypto.sha256(crypto.encode_mpi(e))
dhs.append(base64.b64encode(He).decode('utf-8'))
name = 'dhhashes'
return nbxmpp.DataField(name=name, typ='hidden', value=dhs)
def make_identity(self, form, dh_i):
if self.negotiated['send_pubkey']:
if self.negotiated['sign_algs'] == (XmlDsig + 'rsa-sha256'):
pubkey = secrets.secrets().my_pubkey(self.conn.name)
fields = (pubkey.n, pubkey.e)
cb_fields = [
base64.b64encode(crypto.encode_mpi(f)) for f in fields
]
pubkey_s = b'<RSAKeyValue xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"'
'><Modulus>%s</Modulus><Exponent>%s</Exponent></RSAKeyValue>' % \
tuple(cb_fields)
else:
pubkey_s = b''
form_s2 = ''.join(nbxmpp.c14n.c14n(el, self._is_buggy_gajim()) for el \
in form.getChildren())
old_c_s = self.c_s
content = self.n_o + self.n_s + crypto.encode_mpi(dh_i) + pubkey_s + \
self.form_s.encode('utf-8') + form_s2.encode('utf-8')
mac_s = self.hmac(self.ks_s, content)
if self.negotiated['send_pubkey']:
signature = self.sign(mac_s)
sign_s = '<SignatureValue xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">'
'%s</SignatureValue>' % base64.b64encode(signature)
if self.negotiated['send_pubkey'] == 'hash':
b64ed = base64.b64encode(self.hash(pubkey_s))
pubkey_s = '<fingerprint>%s</fingerprint>' % b64ed
id_s = self.encrypt(pubkey_s + sign_s)
else:
id_s = self.encrypt(mac_s)
m_s = self.hmac(self.km_s, crypto.encode_mpi(old_c_s) + id_s)
if self.status == 'requested-e2e' and self.sas_algs == 'sas28x5':
# we're alice; check for a retained secret
# if none exists, prompt the user with the SAS
self.sas = crypto.sas_28x5(m_s, self.form_o.encode('utf-8'))
if self.sigmai:
# FIXME save retained secret?
self.check_identity(tuple)
return (nbxmpp.DataField(name='identity',
value=base64.b64encode(id_s).decode('utf-8')),
nbxmpp.DataField(name='mac',
value=base64.b64encode(m_s).decode('utf-8')))
def make_identity(self, form, dh_i):
if self.negotiated['send_pubkey']:
if self.negotiated['sign_algs'] == (XmlDsig + 'rsa-sha256'):
pubkey = secrets.secrets().my_pubkey(self.conn.name)
fields = (pubkey.n, pubkey.e)
cb_fields = [base64.b64encode(crypto.encode_mpi(f)) for f in
fields]
pubkey_s = b'<RSAKeyValue xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"'
'><Modulus>%s</Modulus><Exponent>%s</Exponent></RSAKeyValue>' % \
tuple(cb_fields)
else:
pubkey_s = b''
form_s2 = ''.join(nbxmpp.c14n.c14n(el, self._is_buggy_gajim()) for el \
in form.getChildren())
old_c_s = self.c_s
content = self.n_o + self.n_s + crypto.encode_mpi(dh_i) + pubkey_s + \
self.form_s.encode('utf-8') + form_s2.encode('utf-8')
mac_s = self.hmac(self.ks_s, content)
if self.negotiated['send_pubkey']:
signature = self.sign(mac_s)
sign_s = '<SignatureValue xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">'
'%s</SignatureValue>' % base64.b64encode(signature)
if self.negotiated['send_pubkey'] == 'hash':
b64ed = base64.b64encode(self.hash(pubkey_s))
pubkey_s = '<fingerprint>%s</fingerprint>' % b64ed
id_s = self.encrypt(pubkey_s + sign_s)
else:
id_s = self.encrypt(mac_s)
m_s = self.hmac(self.km_s, crypto.encode_mpi(old_c_s) + id_s)
if self.status == 'requested-e2e' and self.sas_algs == 'sas28x5':
# we're alice; check for a retained secret
# if none exists, prompt the user with the SAS
self.sas = crypto.sas_28x5(m_s, self.form_o.encode('utf-8'))
if self.sigmai:
# FIXME save retained secret?
self.check_identity(tuple)
return (nbxmpp.DataField(name='identity',
value=base64.b64encode(id_s).decode('utf-8')),
nbxmpp.DataField(name='mac',
value=base64.b64encode(m_s).decode('utf-8')))
def make_identity(self, form, dh_i):
if self.negotiated["send_pubkey"]:
if self.negotiated["sign_algs"] == (XmlDsig + "rsa-sha256"):
pubkey = secrets.secrets().my_pubkey(self.conn.name)
fields = (pubkey.n, pubkey.e)
cb_fields = map(lambda f: base64.b64encode(crypto.encode_mpi(f)), fields)
pubkey_s = '<RSAKeyValue xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"'
"><Modulus>%s</Modulus><Exponent>%s</Exponent></RSAKeyValue>" % tuple(cb_fields)
else:
pubkey_s = ""
form_s2 = "".join(map(lambda el: xmpp.c14n.c14n(el), form.getChildren()))
old_c_s = self.c_s
content = self.n_o + self.n_s + crypto.encode_mpi(dh_i) + pubkey_s + self.form_s + form_s2
mac_s = self.hmac(self.ks_s, content)
if self.negotiated["send_pubkey"]:
signature = self.sign(mac_s)
sign_s = '<SignatureValue xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">'
"%s</SignatureValue>" % base64.b64encode(signature)
if self.negotiated["send_pubkey"] == "hash":
b64ed = base64.b64encode(self.hash(pubkey_s))
pubkey_s = "<fingerprint>%s</fingerprint>" % b64ed
id_s = self.encrypt(pubkey_s + sign_s)
else:
id_s = self.encrypt(mac_s)
m_s = self.hmac(self.km_s, crypto.encode_mpi(old_c_s) + id_s)
if self.status == "requested-e2e" and self.sas_algs == "sas28x5":
# we're alice; check for a retained secret
# if none exists, prompt the user with the SAS
self.sas = crypto.sas_28x5(m_s, self.form_o)
if self.sigmai:
# XXX save retained secret?
self.check_identity(lambda: ())
return (
xmpp.DataField(name="identity", value=base64.b64encode(id_s)),
xmpp.DataField(name="mac", value=base64.b64encode(m_s)),
)
def make_dhfield(self, modp_options, sigmai):
dhs = []
for modp in modp_options:
p = dh.primes[modp]
g = dh.generators[modp]
x = crypto.srand(2 ** (2 * self.n - 1), p - 1)
# FIXME this may be a source of performance issues
e = crypto.powmod(g, x, p)
self.xes[modp] = x
self.es[modp] = e
if sigmai:
dhs.append(base64.b64encode(crypto.encode_mpi(e)))
name = 'dhkeys'
else:
He = crypto.sha256(crypto.encode_mpi(e))
dhs.append(base64.b64encode(He))
name = 'dhhashes'
return nbxmpp.DataField(name=name, typ='hidden', value=dhs)
def encrypt_stanza(self, stanza):
encryptable = [
x for x in stanza.getChildren()
if x.getName() not in ('error', 'amp', 'thread')
]
# FIXME can also encrypt contents of <error/> elements in stanzas @type =
# 'error'
# (except for <defined-condition
# xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'/> child elements)
old_en_counter = self.c_s
for element in encryptable:
stanza.delChild(element)
plaintext = ''.join(map(str, encryptable))
m_compressed = self.compress(plaintext)
m_final = self.encrypt(m_compressed)
c = stanza.NT.c
c.setNamespace('http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0200.html#ns')
c.NT.data = base64.b64encode(m_final).decode('utf-8')
# FIXME check for rekey request, handle <key/> elements
m_content = (''.join(map(str, c.getChildren()))).encode('utf-8')
c.NT.mac = base64.b64encode(self.hmac(self.km_s, m_content + \
crypto.encode_mpi(old_en_counter))).decode('utf-8')
msgtxt = '[This is part of an encrypted session. ' \
'If you see this message, something went wrong.]'
lang = os.getenv('LANG')
if lang is not None and lang != 'en': # we're not english
msgtxt = _('[This is part of an encrypted session. '
'If you see this message, something went wrong.]') + ' (' + \
msgtxt + ')'
stanza.setBody(msgtxt)
return stanza
def encrypt_stanza(self, stanza):
encryptable = [x for x in stanza.getChildren() if x.getName() not in
('error', 'amp', 'thread')]
# FIXME can also encrypt contents of <error/> elements in stanzas @type =
# 'error'
# (except for <defined-condition
# xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'/> child elements)
old_en_counter = self.c_s
for element in encryptable:
stanza.delChild(element)
plaintext = ''.join(map(str, encryptable))
m_compressed = self.compress(plaintext)
m_final = self.encrypt(m_compressed)
c = stanza.NT.c
c.setNamespace('http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0200.html#ns')
c.NT.data = base64.b64encode(m_final)
# FIXME check for rekey request, handle <key/> elements
m_content = ''.join(map(str, c.getChildren()))
c.NT.mac = base64.b64encode(self.hmac(self.km_s, m_content + \
crypto.encode_mpi(old_en_counter)))
msgtxt = '[This is part of an encrypted session. ' \
'If you see this message, something went wrong.]'
lang = os.getenv('LANG')
if lang is not None and lang != 'en': # we're not english
msgtxt = _('[This is part of an encrypted session. '
'If you see this message, something went wrong.]') + ' (' + \
msgtxt + ')'
stanza.setBody(msgtxt)
return stanza
def encrypt_stanza(self, stanza):
encryptable = filter(lambda x: x.getName() not in ("error", "amp", "thread"), stanza.getChildren())
# XXX can also encrypt contents of <error/> elements in stanzas @type =
# 'error'
# (except for <defined-condition
# xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'/> child elements)
old_en_counter = self.c_s
for element in encryptable:
stanza.delChild(element)
plaintext = "".join(map(str, encryptable))
m_compressed = self.compress(plaintext)
m_final = self.encrypt(m_compressed)
c = stanza.NT.c
c.setNamespace("http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0200.html#ns")
c.NT.data = base64.b64encode(m_final)
# XXX check for rekey request, handle <key/> elements
m_content = "".join(map(str, c.getChildren()))
c.NT.mac = base64.b64encode(self.hmac(self.km_s, m_content + crypto.encode_mpi(old_en_counter)))
msgtxt = "[This is part of an encrypted session. " "If you see this message, something went wrong.]"
lang = os.getenv("LANG")
if lang is not None and lang != "en": # we're not english
msgtxt = (
_("[This is part of an encrypted session. " "If you see this message, something went wrong.]")
+ " ("
+ msgtxt
+ ")"
)
stanza.setBody(msgtxt)
return stanza
def accept_e2e_bob(self, form):
"""
4.5 esession accept (bob)
"""
response = nbxmpp.Message()
init = response.NT.init
init.setNamespace(nbxmpp.NS_ESESSION_INIT)
x = nbxmpp.DataForm(typ='result')
for field in ('nonce', 'dhkeys', 'rshashes', 'identity', 'mac'):
# FIXME: will do nothing in real world...
assert field in form.asDict(), "alice's form didn't have a %s field" \
% field
# 4.5.1 generating provisory session keys
e = crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(form['dhkeys']))
p = dh.primes[self.modp]
if crypto.sha256(crypto.encode_mpi(e)) != self.negotiated['He']:
raise NegotiationError('SHA256(e) != He')
k = self.get_shared_secret(e, self.y, p)
self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_initiator_keys(k)
# 4.5.2 verifying alice's identity
self.verify_identity(form, e, False, 'a')
# 4.5.4 generating bob's final session keys
srs = ''
srses = secrets.secrets().retained_secrets(self.conn.name,
self.jid.getStripped())
rshashes = [base64.b64decode(rshash) for rshash in form.getField(
'rshashes').getValues()]
for s in srses:
secret = s[0]
if self.hmac(self.n_o, secret) in rshashes:
srs = secret
break
# other shared secret
# (we're not using one)
oss = ''
k = crypto.sha256(k + srs + oss)
self.kc_s, self.km_s, self.ks_s = self.generate_responder_keys(k)
self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_initiator_keys(k)
# 4.5.5
if srs:
srshash = self.hmac(srs, 'Shared Retained Secret')
else:
srshash = crypto.random_bytes(32)
x.addChild(node=nbxmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE',
value='urn:xmpp:ssn'))
x.addChild(node=nbxmpp.DataField(name='nonce', value=base64.b64encode(
self.n_o)))
x.addChild(node=nbxmpp.DataField(name='srshash', value=base64.b64encode(
srshash)))
for datafield in self.make_identity(x, self.d):
x.addChild(node=datafield)
init.addChild(node=x)
self.send(response)
self.do_retained_secret(k, srs)
if self.negotiated['logging'] == 'mustnot':
self.loggable = False
self.status = 'active'
self.enable_encryption = True
if self.control:
self.control.print_esession_details()
self.stop_archiving_for_session()
def accept_e2e_alice(self, form, negotiated):
"""
'Alice Accepts', continued
"""
self.encryptable_stanzas = ['message']
self.sas_algs = 'sas28x5'
self.cipher = AES
self.hash_alg = sha256
self.compression = None
self.negotiated = negotiated
accept = nbxmpp.Message()
feature = accept.NT.feature
feature.setNamespace(nbxmpp.NS_FEATURE)
result = nbxmpp.DataForm(typ='result')
self.c_s = crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(form['counter']))
self.c_o = self.c_s ^ (2 ** (self.n - 1))
self.n_o = base64.b64decode(form['my_nonce'])
mod_p = int(form['modp'])
p = dh.primes[mod_p]
x = self.xes[mod_p]
e = self.es[mod_p]
self.d = crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(form['dhkeys']))
self.k = self.get_shared_secret(self.d, x, p)
result.addChild(node=nbxmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE',
value='urn:xmpp:ssn'))
result.addChild(node=nbxmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='1'))
result.addChild(node=nbxmpp.DataField(name='nonce',
value=base64.b64encode(self.n_o)))
self.kc_s, self.km_s, self.ks_s = self.generate_initiator_keys(self.k)
if self.sigmai:
self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_responder_keys(self.k)
self.verify_identity(form, self.d, True, 'b')
else:
srses = secrets.secrets().retained_secrets(self.conn.name,
self.jid.getStripped())
rshashes = [self.hmac(self.n_s, rs[0]) for rs in srses]
if not rshashes:
# we've never spoken before, but we'll pretend we have
rshash_size = self.hash_alg().digest_size
rshashes.append(crypto.random_bytes(rshash_size))
rshashes = [base64.b64encode(rshash) for rshash in rshashes]
result.addChild(node=nbxmpp.DataField(name='rshashes',
value=rshashes))
result.addChild(node=nbxmpp.DataField(name='dhkeys',
value=base64.b64encode(crypto.encode_mpi(e))))
self.form_o = ''.join(nbxmpp.c14n.c14n(el, self._is_buggy_gajim()) \
for el in form.getChildren())
# MUST securely destroy K unless it will be used later to generate the
# final shared secret
for datafield in self.make_identity(result, e):
result.addChild(node=datafield)
feature.addChild(node=result)
self.send(accept)
if self.sigmai:
self.status = 'active'
self.enable_encryption = True
else:
self.status = 'identified-alice'
def respond_e2e_bob(self, form, negotiated, not_acceptable):
"""
4.3 esession response (bob)
"""
response = nbxmpp.Message()
feature = response.NT.feature
feature.setNamespace(nbxmpp.NS_FEATURE)
x = nbxmpp.DataForm(typ='submit')
x.addChild(node=nbxmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE',
value='urn:xmpp:ssn'))
x.addChild(node=nbxmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='true'))
for name in negotiated:
# some fields are internal and should not be sent
if not name in ('send_pubkey', 'recv_pubkey'):
x.addChild(node=nbxmpp.DataField(name=name,
value=negotiated[name]))
self.negotiated = negotiated
# the offset of the group we chose (need it to match up with the dhhash)
group_order = 0
modp_f = form.getField('modp')
if not modp_f:
return
self.modp = int(modp_f.getOptions()[group_order][1])
x.addChild(node=nbxmpp.DataField(name='modp', value=self.modp))
g = dh.generators[self.modp]
p = dh.primes[self.modp]
self.n_o = base64.b64decode(form['my_nonce'])
dhhashes_f = form.getField('dhhashes')
if not dhhashes_f:
return
dhhashes = dhhashes_f.getValues()
self.negotiated['He'] = base64.b64decode(dhhashes[group_order].encode(
'utf8'))
bytes = int(self.n / 8)
self.n_s = crypto.generate_nonce()
# n-bit random number
self.c_o = crypto.decode_mpi(crypto.random_bytes(bytes))
self.c_s = self.c_o ^ (2 ** (self.n - 1))
self.y = crypto.srand(2 ** (2 * self.n - 1), p - 1)
self.d = crypto.powmod(g, self.y, p)
to_add = {'my_nonce': self.n_s,
'dhkeys': crypto.encode_mpi(self.d),
'counter': crypto.encode_mpi(self.c_o),
'nonce': self.n_o}
for name in to_add:
b64ed = base64.b64encode(to_add[name])
x.addChild(node=nbxmpp.DataField(name=name, value=b64ed))
self.form_o = ''.join(nbxmpp.c14n.c14n(el, self._is_buggy_gajim()) for \
el in form.getChildren())
self.form_s = ''.join(nbxmpp.c14n.c14n(el, self._is_buggy_gajim()) for \
el in x.getChildren())
self.status = 'responded-e2e'
feature.addChild(node=x)
if not_acceptable:
response = nbxmpp.Error(response, nbxmpp.ERR_NOT_ACCEPTABLE)
feature = nbxmpp.Node(nbxmpp.NS_FEATURE + ' feature')
for f in not_acceptable:
n = nbxmpp.Node('field')
n['var'] = f
feature.addChild(node=n)
response.T.error.addChild(node=feature)
self.send(response)
def verify_identity(self, form, dh_i, sigmai, i_o):
m_o = base64.b64decode(form['mac'])
id_o = base64.b64decode(form['identity'])
m_o_calculated = self.hmac(self.km_o, crypto.encode_mpi(self.c_o) + id_o)
if m_o_calculated != m_o:
raise NegotiationError('calculated m_%s differs from received m_%s' %
(i_o, i_o))
if i_o == 'a' and self.sas_algs == 'sas28x5':
# we don't need to calculate this if there's a verified retained secret
# (but we do anyways)
self.sas = crypto.sas_28x5(m_o, self.form_s)
if self.negotiated['recv_pubkey']:
plaintext = self.decrypt(id_o)
parsed = nbxmpp.Node(node='<node>' + plaintext + '</node>')
if self.negotiated['recv_pubkey'] == 'hash':
# fingerprint = parsed.getTagData('fingerprint')
# FIXME find stored pubkey or terminate session
raise NotImplementedError()
else:
if self.negotiated['sign_algs'] == (XmlDsig + 'rsa-sha256'):
keyvalue = parsed.getTag(name='RSAKeyValue', namespace=XmlDsig)
n, e = (crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(
keyvalue.getTagData(x))) for x in ('Modulus', 'Exponent'))
eir_pubkey = RSA.construct((n, long(e)))
pubkey_o = nbxmpp.c14n.c14n(keyvalue, self._is_buggy_gajim())
else:
# FIXME DSA, etc.
raise NotImplementedError()
enc_sig = parsed.getTag(name='SignatureValue',
namespace=XmlDsig).getData()
signature = (crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(enc_sig)), )
else:
mac_o = self.decrypt(id_o)
pubkey_o = ''
c7l_form = self.c7lize_mac_id(form)
content = self.n_s + self.n_o + crypto.encode_mpi(dh_i) + pubkey_o
if sigmai:
self.form_o = c7l_form
content += self.form_o
else:
form_o2 = c7l_form
content += self.form_o + form_o2
mac_o_calculated = self.hmac(self.ks_o, content)
if self.negotiated['recv_pubkey']:
hash_ = crypto.sha256(mac_o_calculated)
if not eir_pubkey.verify(hash_, signature):
raise NegotiationError('public key signature verification failed!')
elif mac_o_calculated != mac_o:
raise NegotiationError('calculated mac_%s differs from received mac_%s'
% (i_o, i_o))
def get_shared_secret(self, e, y, p):
if (not 1 < e < (p - 1)):
raise NegotiationError('invalid DH value')
return crypto.sha256(crypto.encode_mpi(crypto.powmod(e, y, p)))
def accept_e2e_alice(self, form, negotiated):
self.encryptable_stanzas = ["message"]
self.sas_algs = "sas28x5"
self.cipher = AES
self.hash_alg = SHA256
self.compression = None
self.negotiated = negotiated
accept = xmpp.Message()
feature = accept.NT.feature
feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE)
result = xmpp.DataForm(typ="result")
self.c_s = crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(form["counter"]))
self.c_o = self.c_s ^ (2 ** (self.n - 1))
self.n_o = base64.b64decode(form["my_nonce"])
mod_p = int(form["modp"])
p = dh.primes[mod_p]
x = self.xes[mod_p]
e = self.es[mod_p]
self.d = crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(form["dhkeys"]))
self.k = self.get_shared_secret(self.d, x, p)
result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name="FORM_TYPE", value="urn:xmpp:ssn"))
result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name="accept", value="1"))
result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name="nonce", value=base64.b64encode(self.n_o)))
self.kc_s, self.km_s, self.ks_s = self.generate_initiator_keys(self.k)
if self.sigmai:
self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_responder_keys(self.k)
self.verify_identity(form, self.d, True, "b")
else:
srses = secrets.secrets().retained_secrets(self.conn.name, self.jid.getStripped())
rshashes = [self.hmac(self.n_s, rs) for (rs, v) in srses]
if not rshashes:
# we've never spoken before, but we'll pretend we have
rshash_size = self.hash_alg.digest_size
rshashes.append(crypto.random_bytes(rshash_size))
rshashes = [base64.b64encode(rshash) for rshash in rshashes]
result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name="rshashes", value=rshashes))
result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name="dhkeys", value=base64.b64encode(crypto.encode_mpi(e))))
self.form_o = "".join(map(lambda el: xmpp.c14n.c14n(el), form.getChildren()))
# MUST securely destroy K unless it will be used later to generate the
# final shared secret
for datafield in self.make_identity(result, e):
result.addChild(node=datafield)
feature.addChild(node=result)
self.send(accept)
if self.sigmai:
self.status = "active"
self.enable_encryption = True
else:
self.status = "identified-alice"
def accept_e2e_alice(self, form, negotiated):
self.encryptable_stanzas = ['message']
self.sas_algs = 'sas28x5'
self.cipher = AES
self.hash_alg = SHA256
self.compression = None
self.negotiated = negotiated
accept = xmpp.Message()
feature = accept.NT.feature
feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE)
result = xmpp.DataForm(typ='result')
self.c_s = crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(form['counter']))
self.c_o = self.c_s ^ (2**(self.n - 1))
self.n_o = base64.b64decode(form['my_nonce'])
mod_p = int(form['modp'])
p = dh.primes[mod_p]
x = self.xes[mod_p]
e = self.es[mod_p]
self.d = crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(form['dhkeys']))
self.k = self.get_shared_secret(self.d, x, p)
result.addChild(
node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn'))
result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='1'))
result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='nonce',
value=base64.b64encode(self.n_o)))
self.kc_s, self.km_s, self.ks_s = self.generate_initiator_keys(self.k)
if self.sigmai:
self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_responder_keys(
self.k)
self.verify_identity(form, self.d, True, 'b')
else:
srses = secrets.secrets().retained_secrets(self.conn.name,
self.jid.getStripped())
rshashes = [self.hmac(self.n_s, rs) for (rs, v) in srses]
if not rshashes:
# we've never spoken before, but we'll pretend we have
rshash_size = self.hash_alg.digest_size
rshashes.append(crypto.random_bytes(rshash_size))
rshashes = [base64.b64encode(rshash) for rshash in rshashes]
result.addChild(
node=xmpp.DataField(name='rshashes', value=rshashes))
result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(
name='dhkeys', value=base64.b64encode(crypto.encode_mpi(e))))
self.form_o = ''.join(
map(lambda el: xmpp.c14n.c14n(el), form.getChildren()))
# MUST securely destroy K unless it will be used later to generate the
# final shared secret
for datafield in self.make_identity(result, e):
result.addChild(node=datafield)
feature.addChild(node=result)
self.send(accept)
if self.sigmai:
self.status = 'active'
self.enable_encryption = True
else:
self.status = 'identified-alice'
def verify_identity(self, form, dh_i, sigmai, i_o):
m_o = base64.b64decode(form['mac'])
id_o = base64.b64decode(form['identity'])
m_o_calculated = self.hmac(self.km_o,
crypto.encode_mpi(self.c_o) + id_o)
if m_o_calculated != m_o:
raise exceptions.NegotiationError, 'calculated m_%s differs from received m_%s' % (
i_o, i_o)
if i_o == 'a' and self.sas_algs == 'sas28x5':
# we don't need to calculate this if there's a verified retained secret
# (but we do anyways)
self.sas = crypto.sas_28x5(m_o, self.form_s)
if self.negotiated['recv_pubkey']:
plaintext = self.decrypt(id_o)
parsed = xmpp.Node(node='<node>' + plaintext + '</node>')
if self.negotiated['recv_pubkey'] == 'hash':
fingerprint = parsed.getTagData('fingerprint')
# XXX find stored pubkey or terminate session
raise 'unimplemented'
else:
if self.negotiated['sign_algs'] == (XmlDsig + 'rsa-sha256'):
keyvalue = parsed.getTag(name='RSAKeyValue',
namespace=XmlDsig)
n, e = map(
lambda x: crypto.decode_mpi(
base64.b64decode(keyvalue.getTagData(x))),
('Modulus', 'Exponent'))
eir_pubkey = RSA.construct((n, long(e)))
pubkey_o = xmpp.c14n.c14n(keyvalue)
else:
# XXX DSA, etc.
raise 'unimplemented'
enc_sig = parsed.getTag(name='SignatureValue',
namespace=XmlDsig).getData()
signature = (crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(enc_sig)), )
else:
mac_o = self.decrypt(id_o)
pubkey_o = ''
c7l_form = self.c7lize_mac_id(form)
content = self.n_s + self.n_o + crypto.encode_mpi(dh_i) + pubkey_o
if sigmai:
self.form_o = c7l_form
content += self.form_o
else:
form_o2 = c7l_form
content += self.form_o + form_o2
mac_o_calculated = self.hmac(self.ks_o, content)
if self.negotiated['recv_pubkey']:
hash = crypto.sha256(mac_o_calculated)
if not eir_pubkey.verify(hash, signature):
raise exceptions.NegotiationError, 'public key signature verification failed!'
elif mac_o_calculated != mac_o:
raise exceptions.NegotiationError, 'calculated mac_%s differs from received mac_%s' % (
i_o, i_o)
def get_shared_secret(self, e, y, p):
if not 1 < e < (p - 1):
raise exceptions.NegotiationError, "invalid DH value"
return crypto.sha256(crypto.encode_mpi(crypto.powmod(e, y, p)))
def verify_identity(self, form, dh_i, sigmai, i_o):
m_o = base64.b64decode(form["mac"])
id_o = base64.b64decode(form["identity"])
m_o_calculated = self.hmac(self.km_o, crypto.encode_mpi(self.c_o) + id_o)
if m_o_calculated != m_o:
raise exceptions.NegotiationError, "calculated m_%s differs from received m_%s" % (i_o, i_o)
if i_o == "a" and self.sas_algs == "sas28x5":
# we don't need to calculate this if there's a verified retained secret
# (but we do anyways)
self.sas = crypto.sas_28x5(m_o, self.form_s)
if self.negotiated["recv_pubkey"]:
plaintext = self.decrypt(id_o)
parsed = xmpp.Node(node="<node>" + plaintext + "</node>")
if self.negotiated["recv_pubkey"] == "hash":
fingerprint = parsed.getTagData("fingerprint")
# XXX find stored pubkey or terminate session
raise "unimplemented"
else:
if self.negotiated["sign_algs"] == (XmlDsig + "rsa-sha256"):
keyvalue = parsed.getTag(name="RSAKeyValue", namespace=XmlDsig)
n, e = map(
lambda x: crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(keyvalue.getTagData(x))), ("Modulus", "Exponent")
)
eir_pubkey = RSA.construct((n, long(e)))
pubkey_o = xmpp.c14n.c14n(keyvalue)
else:
# XXX DSA, etc.
raise "unimplemented"
enc_sig = parsed.getTag(name="SignatureValue", namespace=XmlDsig).getData()
signature = (crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(enc_sig)),)
else:
mac_o = self.decrypt(id_o)
pubkey_o = ""
c7l_form = self.c7lize_mac_id(form)
content = self.n_s + self.n_o + crypto.encode_mpi(dh_i) + pubkey_o
if sigmai:
self.form_o = c7l_form
content += self.form_o
else:
form_o2 = c7l_form
content += self.form_o + form_o2
mac_o_calculated = self.hmac(self.ks_o, content)
if self.negotiated["recv_pubkey"]:
hash = crypto.sha256(mac_o_calculated)
if not eir_pubkey.verify(hash, signature):
raise exceptions.NegotiationError, "public key signature verification failed!"
elif mac_o_calculated != mac_o:
raise exceptions.NegotiationError, "calculated mac_%s differs from received mac_%s" % (i_o, i_o)
def accept_e2e_bob(self, form):
response = xmpp.Message()
init = response.NT.init
init.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_ESESSION_INIT)
x = xmpp.DataForm(typ="result")
for field in ("nonce", "dhkeys", "rshashes", "identity", "mac"):
assert field in form.asDict(), "alice's form didn't have a %s field" % field
# 4.5.1 generating provisory session keys
e = crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(form["dhkeys"]))
p = dh.primes[self.modp]
if crypto.sha256(crypto.encode_mpi(e)) != self.negotiated["He"]:
raise exceptions.NegotiationError, "SHA256(e) != He"
k = self.get_shared_secret(e, self.y, p)
self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_initiator_keys(k)
# 4.5.2 verifying alice's identity
self.verify_identity(form, e, False, "a")
# 4.5.4 generating bob's final session keys
srs = ""
srses = secrets.secrets().retained_secrets(self.conn.name, self.jid.getStripped())
rshashes = [base64.b64decode(rshash) for rshash in form.getField("rshashes").getValues()]
for (secret, verified) in srses:
if self.hmac(self.n_o, secret) in rshashes:
srs = secret
break
# other shared secret
# (we're not using one)
oss = ""
k = crypto.sha256(k + srs + oss)
self.kc_s, self.km_s, self.ks_s = self.generate_responder_keys(k)
self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_initiator_keys(k)
# 4.5.5
if srs:
srshash = self.hmac(srs, "Shared Retained Secret")
else:
srshash = crypto.random_bytes(32)
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name="FORM_TYPE", value="urn:xmpp:ssn"))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name="nonce", value=base64.b64encode(self.n_o)))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name="srshash", value=base64.b64encode(srshash)))
for datafield in self.make_identity(x, self.d):
x.addChild(node=datafield)
init.addChild(node=x)
self.send(response)
self.do_retained_secret(k, srs)
if self.negotiated["logging"] == "mustnot":
self.loggable = False
self.status = "active"
self.enable_encryption = True
if self.control:
self.control.print_esession_details()
def sign(self, string):
if self.negotiated['sign_algs'] == (XmlDsig + 'rsa-sha256'):
hash = crypto.sha256(string)
return crypto.encode_mpi(gajim.pubkey.sign(hash, '')[0])
def get_shared_secret(self, e, y, p):
if (not 1 < e < (p - 1)):
raise exceptions.NegotiationError, 'invalid DH value'
return crypto.sha256(crypto.encode_mpi(crypto.powmod(e, y, p)))
def respond_e2e_bob(self, form, negotiated, not_acceptable):
response = xmpp.Message()
feature = response.NT.feature
feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE)
x = xmpp.DataForm(typ="submit")
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name="FORM_TYPE", value="urn:xmpp:ssn"))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name="accept", value="true"))
for name in negotiated:
# some fields are internal and should not be sent
if not name in ("send_pubkey", "recv_pubkey"):
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name=name, value=negotiated[name]))
self.negotiated = negotiated
# the offset of the group we chose (need it to match up with the dhhash)
group_order = 0
self.modp = int(form.getField("modp").getOptions()[group_order][1])
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name="modp", value=self.modp))
g = dh.generators[self.modp]
p = dh.primes[self.modp]
self.n_o = base64.b64decode(form["my_nonce"])
dhhashes = form.getField("dhhashes").getValues()
self.negotiated["He"] = base64.b64decode(dhhashes[group_order].encode("utf8"))
bytes = int(self.n / 8)
self.n_s = crypto.generate_nonce()
# n-bit random number
self.c_o = crypto.decode_mpi(crypto.random_bytes(bytes))
self.c_s = self.c_o ^ (2 ** (self.n - 1))
self.y = crypto.srand(2 ** (2 * self.n - 1), p - 1)
self.d = crypto.powmod(g, self.y, p)
to_add = {
"my_nonce": self.n_s,
"dhkeys": crypto.encode_mpi(self.d),
"counter": crypto.encode_mpi(self.c_o),
"nonce": self.n_o,
}
for name in to_add:
b64ed = base64.b64encode(to_add[name])
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name=name, value=b64ed))
self.form_o = "".join(map(lambda el: xmpp.c14n.c14n(el), form.getChildren()))
self.form_s = "".join(map(lambda el: xmpp.c14n.c14n(el), x.getChildren()))
self.status = "responded-e2e"
feature.addChild(node=x)
if not_acceptable:
response = xmpp.Error(response, xmpp.ERR_NOT_ACCEPTABLE)
feature = xmpp.Node(xmpp.NS_FEATURE + " feature")
for f in not_acceptable:
n = xmpp.Node("field")
n["var"] = f
feature.addChild(node=n)
response.T.error.addChild(node=feature)
self.send(response)
def respond_e2e_bob(self, form, negotiated, not_acceptable):
response = xmpp.Message()
feature = response.NT.feature
feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE)
x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='submit')
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn'))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='true'))
for name in negotiated:
# some fields are internal and should not be sent
if not name in ('send_pubkey', 'recv_pubkey'):
x.addChild(
node=xmpp.DataField(name=name, value=negotiated[name]))
self.negotiated = negotiated
# the offset of the group we chose (need it to match up with the dhhash)
group_order = 0
self.modp = int(form.getField('modp').getOptions()[group_order][1])
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='modp', value=self.modp))
g = dh.generators[self.modp]
p = dh.primes[self.modp]
self.n_o = base64.b64decode(form['my_nonce'])
dhhashes = form.getField('dhhashes').getValues()
self.negotiated['He'] = base64.b64decode(
dhhashes[group_order].encode('utf8'))
bytes = int(self.n / 8)
self.n_s = crypto.generate_nonce()
# n-bit random number
self.c_o = crypto.decode_mpi(crypto.random_bytes(bytes))
self.c_s = self.c_o ^ (2**(self.n - 1))
self.y = crypto.srand(2**(2 * self.n - 1), p - 1)
self.d = crypto.powmod(g, self.y, p)
to_add = {
'my_nonce': self.n_s,
'dhkeys': crypto.encode_mpi(self.d),
'counter': crypto.encode_mpi(self.c_o),
'nonce': self.n_o
}
for name in to_add:
b64ed = base64.b64encode(to_add[name])
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name=name, value=b64ed))
self.form_o = ''.join(
map(lambda el: xmpp.c14n.c14n(el), form.getChildren()))
self.form_s = ''.join(
map(lambda el: xmpp.c14n.c14n(el), x.getChildren()))
self.status = 'responded-e2e'
feature.addChild(node=x)
if not_acceptable:
response = xmpp.Error(response, xmpp.ERR_NOT_ACCEPTABLE)
feature = xmpp.Node(xmpp.NS_FEATURE + ' feature')
for f in not_acceptable:
n = xmpp.Node('field')
n['var'] = f
feature.addChild(node=n)
response.T.error.addChild(node=feature)
self.send(response)
def sign(self, string):
if self.negotiated['sign_algs'] == (XmlDsig + 'rsa-sha256'):
hash_ = crypto.sha256(string)
return crypto.encode_mpi(gajim.pubkey.sign(hash_, '')[0])
def accept_e2e_bob(self, form):
response = xmpp.Message()
init = response.NT.init
init.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_ESESSION_INIT)
x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='result')
for field in ('nonce', 'dhkeys', 'rshashes', 'identity', 'mac'):
assert field in form.asDict(), "alice's form didn't have a %s field" \
% field
# 4.5.1 generating provisory session keys
e = crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(form['dhkeys']))
p = dh.primes[self.modp]
if crypto.sha256(crypto.encode_mpi(e)) != self.negotiated['He']:
raise exceptions.NegotiationError, 'SHA256(e) != He'
k = self.get_shared_secret(e, self.y, p)
self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_initiator_keys(k)
# 4.5.2 verifying alice's identity
self.verify_identity(form, e, False, 'a')
# 4.5.4 generating bob's final session keys
srs = ''
srses = secrets.secrets().retained_secrets(self.conn.name,
self.jid.getStripped())
rshashes = [
base64.b64decode(rshash)
for rshash in form.getField('rshashes').getValues()
]
for (secret, verified) in srses:
if self.hmac(self.n_o, secret) in rshashes:
srs = secret
break
# other shared secret
# (we're not using one)
oss = ''
k = crypto.sha256(k + srs + oss)
self.kc_s, self.km_s, self.ks_s = self.generate_responder_keys(k)
self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_initiator_keys(k)
# 4.5.5
if srs:
srshash = self.hmac(srs, 'Shared Retained Secret')
else:
srshash = crypto.random_bytes(32)
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn'))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='nonce',
value=base64.b64encode(self.n_o)))
x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='srshash',
value=base64.b64encode(srshash)))
for datafield in self.make_identity(x, self.d):
x.addChild(node=datafield)
init.addChild(node=x)
self.send(response)
self.do_retained_secret(k, srs)
if self.negotiated['logging'] == 'mustnot':
self.loggable = False
self.status = 'active'
self.enable_encryption = True
if self.control:
self.control.print_esession_details()
def sign(self, string):
if self.negotiated["sign_algs"] == (XmlDsig + "rsa-sha256"):
hash = crypto.sha256(string)
return crypto.encode_mpi(gajim.pubkey.sign(hash, "")[0])
