def before_send(self, apdu):
self.last_vanilla_c_apdu = C_APDU(apdu)
if (apdu.cla & 0x80 != 0x80) and (apdu.CLA & 0x0C != 0x0C):
# Transform for SM
apdu.CLA = apdu.CLA | 0x0C
apdu_string = binascii.b2a_hex(apdu.render())
new_apdu = [apdu_string[:8]]
new_apdu.append("YY")
if apdu.case() in (3,4):
new_apdu.append("87[01")
new_apdu.append(binascii.b2a_hex(apdu.data))
new_apdu.append("]")
if apdu.case() in (2,4):
if apdu.Le == 0:
apdu.Le = 0xe7 # FIXME: Probably not the right way
new_apdu.append("97(%02x)" % apdu.Le)
new_apdu.append("8E()00")
new_apdu_string = "".join(new_apdu)
apdu = C_APDU.parse_fancy(new_apdu_string)
return TCOS_Security_Environment.before_send(self, apdu)
def before_send(self, apdu):
self.last_vanilla_c_apdu = C_APDU(apdu)
if (apdu.cla & 0x80 != 0x80) and (apdu.CLA & 0x0C != 0x0C):
# Transform for SM
apdu.CLA = apdu.CLA | 0x0C
apdu_string = binascii.b2a_hex(apdu.render())
new_apdu = [apdu_string[:8]]
new_apdu.append("YY")
if apdu.case() in (3, 4):
new_apdu.append("87[01")
new_apdu.append(binascii.b2a_hex(apdu.data))
new_apdu.append("]")
if apdu.case() in (2, 4):
if apdu.Le == 0:
apdu.Le = 0xdf # FIXME: Probably not the right way
new_apdu.append("97(%02x)" % apdu.Le)
new_apdu.append("8E()00")
new_apdu_string = "".join(new_apdu)
apdu = C_APDU.parse_fancy(new_apdu_string)
return TCOS_Security_Environment.before_send(self, apdu)
def _send_with_retry(self, apdu):
result = self._real_send(apdu)
if self.check_sw(result.sw, self.PURPOSE_GET_RESPONSE):
## Need to call GetResponse
gr_apdu = C_APDU(self.COMMAND_GET_RESPONSE,
le=result.sw2,
cla=apdu.cla) # FIXME
result = R_APDU(self._real_send(gr_apdu))
elif self.check_sw(result.sw, self.PURPOSE_RETRY) and apdu.Le == 0:
## Retry with correct Le
gr_apdu = C_APDU(apdu, le=result.sw2)
result = R_APDU(self._real_send(gr_apdu))
return result
class Card_with_80_aa(Card_with_ls):
APDU_LIST_X = C_APDU("\x80\xaa\x01\x00\x00")
LIST_X_DF = 1
LIST_X_EF = 2
LS_L_SIZE_TAG = 0x81
def list_x(self, x):
"Get a list of x objects, where x is one of 1 (DFs) or 2 (EFs) or 3 (DFs and EFs)"
result = self.send_apdu(C_APDU(self.APDU_LIST_X, p1=x))
tail = result.data
result_list = []
while len(tail) > 0:
head, tail = tail[:2], tail[2:]
result_list.append(head)
return result_list
def cmd_listdirs(self):
"List DFs in current DF"
result = self.list_x(1)
print "DFs: " + ", ".join(
[utils.hexdump(a, short=True) for a in result])
def cmd_listfiles(self):
"List EFs in current DF"
result = self.list_x(2)
print "EFs: " + ", ".join(
[utils.hexdump(a, short=True) for a in result])
def read_binary_file(self, offset=0):
"""Read from the currently selected EF.
Repeat calls to READ BINARY as necessary to get the whole EF."""
if offset >= 1 << 15:
raise ValueError, "offset is limited to 15 bits"
contents = ""
had_one = False
self.last_size = -1
while True:
command = C_APDU(self.APDU_READ_BINARY,
p1=offset >> 8,
p2=(offset & 0xff))
result = self.send_apdu(command)
if len(result.data) > 0:
contents = contents + result.data
offset = offset + (len(result.data) / self.DATA_UNIT_SIZE)
if self.last_size == len(contents):
break
else:
self.last_size = len(contents)
if not self.check_sw(result.sw):
break
else:
had_one = True
if had_one: ## If there was at least one successful pass, ignore any error SW. It probably only means "end of file"
self.sw_changed = False
self.last_delta = None
return contents, result.sw
def list_x(self, x):
"Get a list of x objects, where x is one of 1 (DFs) or 2 (EFs) or 3 (DFs and EFs)"
result = self.send_apdu(C_APDU(self.APDU_LIST_X, p1=x))
tail = result.data
result_list = []
while len(tail) > 0:
head, tail = tail[:2], tail[2:]
result_list.append(head)
return result_list
class Passport_Security_Environment(TCOS_Security_Environment):
def __init__(self, card):
TCOS_Security_Environment.__init__(self, card)
self.last_vanilla_c_apdu = None
# Set up a fake SE config to be able to reuse the TCOS code
self.set_key( 1, self.card.KSenc)
enc_config = "\x80\x01\x0d\x83\x01\x01\x85\x00"
self.set_key( 2, self.card.KSmac)
mac_config = "\x80\x01\x0d\x83\x01\x02\x85\x00"
self.set_config( tcos_card.SE_APDU, tcos_card.TEMPLATE_CCT, SE_Config(mac_config) )
self.set_config( tcos_card.SE_RAPDU, tcos_card.TEMPLATE_CCT, SE_Config(mac_config) )
self.set_config( tcos_card.SE_APDU, tcos_card.TEMPLATE_CT, SE_Config(enc_config) )
self.set_config( tcos_card.SE_RAPDU, tcos_card.TEMPLATE_CT, SE_Config(enc_config) )
def before_send(self, apdu):
self.last_vanilla_c_apdu = C_APDU(apdu)
if (apdu.cla & 0x80 != 0x80) and (apdu.CLA & 0x0C != 0x0C):
# Transform for SM
apdu.CLA = apdu.CLA | 0x0C
apdu_string = binascii.b2a_hex(apdu.render())
new_apdu = [apdu_string[:8]]
new_apdu.append("YY")
if apdu.case() in (3,4):
new_apdu.append("87[01")
new_apdu.append(binascii.b2a_hex(apdu.data))
new_apdu.append("]")
if apdu.case() in (2,4):
if apdu.Le == 0:
apdu.Le = 0xe7 # FIXME: Probably not the right way
new_apdu.append("97(%02x)" % apdu.Le)
new_apdu.append("8E()00")
new_apdu_string = "".join(new_apdu)
apdu = C_APDU.parse_fancy(new_apdu_string)
return TCOS_Security_Environment.before_send(self, apdu)
def after_send(self, result):
if (self.last_vanilla_c_apdu.cla & 0x80 != 0x80) and (self.last_vanilla_c_apdu.CLA & 0x0C != 0x0C):
# Inject fake response descriptor so that TCOS_Security_Environment.after_send sees the need to authenticate/decrypt
response_descriptor = "\x99\x00\x8e\x00"
if self.last_vanilla_c_apdu.case() in (2,4):
response_descriptor = "\x87\x00" + response_descriptor
response_descriptor = "\xba" + chr(len(response_descriptor)) + response_descriptor
self.last_c_apdu.data = self.last_c_apdu.data + response_descriptor
return TCOS_Security_Environment.after_send(self, result)
def _mac(self, config, data):
(ssc,) = struct.unpack(">Q", self.card.ssc)
ssc = ssc + 1
self.card.ssc = struct.pack(">Q", ssc)
return Passport_Application._mac(self.card.KSmac, data, self.card.ssc, dopad=False)
class Passport_Application(Application):
DRIVER_NAME = ["Passport"]
APDU_GET_RANDOM = C_APDU(CLA=0, INS=0x84, Le=0x08)
APDU_MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATE = C_APDU(CLA=0, INS=0x82, Le=0x28)
APDU_SELECT_FILE = C_APDU(INS=0xa4)
DEFAULT_CONTEXT = context_mrtd
SELECT_FILE_LE = None
AID_LIST = ["a0000002471001"]
STATUS_MAP = {Card.PURPOSE_SM_OK: ("6282", "6982", "6A82")}
INTERESTING_FILES = [
(
"COM",
"\x01\x1e",
),
(
"SOD",
"\x01\x1d",
),
] + [("DG%s" % e, "\x01" + chr(e)) for e in range(1, 19)] + [
(
"CVCA",
"\x01\x1c",
),
]
def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
self.ssc = None
self.KSenc = None
self.KSmac = None
self.se = None
def derive_key(Kseed, c):
"""Derive a key according to TR-PKI mrtds ICC read-only access v1.1 annex E.1.
c is either 1 for encryption or 2 for MAC computation.
Returns: Ka + Kb
Note: Does not adjust parity. Nobody uses that anyway ..."""
D = Kseed + struct.pack(">i", c)
H = sha1(D).digest()
Ka = H[0:8]
Kb = H[8:16]
return Ka + Kb
derive_key = staticmethod(derive_key)
def derive_seed(mrz2, verbose=0):
"""Derive Kseed from the second line of the MRZ according to TR-PKI mrtds ICC read-only access v1.1 annex F.1.1"""
if verbose:
print "MRZ_information: '%s' + '%s' + '%s'" % (
mrz2[0:10], mrz2[13:20], mrz2[21:28])
MRZ_information = mrz2[0:10] + mrz2[13:20] + mrz2[21:28]
H = sha1(MRZ_information).digest()
Kseed = H[:16]
if verbose:
print "SHA1('%s')[:16] =\nKseed = %s" % (MRZ_information,
hexdump(Kseed))
return Kseed
derive_seed = staticmethod(derive_seed)
def cmd_perform_bac(self, mrz2, verbose=1):
"Perform the Basic Acess Control authentication and establishment of session keys"
mrz2 = mrz2.upper()
Kseed = self.derive_seed(mrz2, verbose)
Kenc = self.derive_key(Kseed, 1)
Kmac = self.derive_key(Kseed, 2)
if verbose:
print "Kenc = %s" % hexdump(Kenc)
print "Kmac = %s" % hexdump(Kmac)
print
result = self.send_apdu(self.APDU_GET_RANDOM)
if not self.check_sw(result.sw):
raise BACError, "SW after GET RANDOM was %02x%02x. Card refused to send rcd_icc. Should NEVER happen." % (
result.sw1, result.sw2)
rnd_icc = result.data
if verbose:
print "RND.icc = %s" % hexdump(rnd_icc)
rndtmp = self._make_random(8 + 16)
rnd_ifd = rndtmp[:8]
Kifd = rndtmp[8:]
if verbose:
print "RND.ifd = %s" % hexdump(rnd_ifd)
print "Kifd = %s" % hexdump(Kifd, indent=10)
S = rnd_ifd + rnd_icc + Kifd
Eifd = crypto_utils.cipher(True, "des3-cbc", Kenc, S, "\x00" * 8)
Mifd = self._mac(Kmac, Eifd)
if verbose:
print "Eifd = %s" % hexdump(Eifd, indent=10)
print "Mifd = %s" % hexdump(Mifd)
print
auth_apdu = C_APDU(self.APDU_MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATE, data=Eifd + Mifd)
result = self.send_apdu(auth_apdu)
if not self.check_sw(result.sw):
raise BACError, "SW after MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE was %02x%02x. Card did not accept our BAC attempt" % (
result.sw1, result.sw2)
resp_data = result.data
Eicc = resp_data[:-8]
Micc = self._mac(Kmac, Eicc)
if not Micc == resp_data[-8:]:
raise ValueError, "Passport authentication failed: Wrong MAC on incoming data during Mutual Authenticate"
if verbose:
print "Eicc = %s" % hexdump(Eicc, indent=10)
print "Micc = %s" % hexdump(Micc)
print "Micc verified OK"
R = crypto_utils.cipher(False, "des3-cbc", Kenc, Eicc, "\x00" * 8)
if verbose:
print "R = %s" % hexdump(R, indent=10)
if not R[:8] == rnd_icc:
raise BACError, "Passport authentication failed: Wrong RND.icc on incoming data during Mutual Authenticate"
if not R[8:16] == rnd_ifd:
raise BACError, "Passport authentication failed: Wrong RND.ifd on incoming data during Mutual Authenticate"
Kicc = R[16:]
if verbose:
print "Kicc = %s" % hexdump(Kicc)
print
KSseed = crypto_utils.operation_on_string(Kicc, Kifd,
lambda a, b: a ^ b)
self.KSenc = self.derive_key(KSseed, 1)
self.KSmac = self.derive_key(KSseed, 2)
self.ssc = rnd_icc[-4:] + rnd_ifd[-4:]
if False:
self.KSenc = binascii.a2b_hex("979EC13B1CBFE9DCD01AB0FED307EAE5")
self.KSmac = binascii.a2b_hex("F1CB1F1FB5ADF208806B89DC579DC1F8")
self.ssc = binascii.a2b_hex("887022120C06C226")
if verbose:
print "KSseed = %s" % hexdump(KSseed)
print "KSenc = %s" % hexdump(self.KSenc)
print "KSmac = %s" % hexdump(self.KSmac)
print "ssc = %s" % hexdump(self.ssc)
self.se = Passport_Security_Environment(self)
def verify_cms(self, data):
"""Verify a pkcs7 SMIME message"""
from M2Crypto import SMIME, X509, BIO
import base64, TLV_utils, os
data3 = "-----BEGIN PKCS7-----\n"
data3 += base64.encodestring(data)
data3 += "-----END PKCS7-----"
#print data3
p7_bio = BIO.MemoryBuffer(data3)
# Instantiate an SMIME object.
s = SMIME.SMIME()
# TODO: ugly hack for M2Crypto
body = TLV_utils.tlv_find_tag(TLV_utils.unpack(data), 0xA0, 1)[0][2]
thecert = TLV_utils.tlv_find_tag(body, 0xA0, 2)[1][2]
cert_bio = BIO.MemoryBuffer(TLV_utils.pack(thecert))
# Load the signer's cert.
x509 = X509.load_cert_bio(cert_bio, format=0)
sk = X509.X509_Stack()
sk.push(x509)
s.set_x509_stack(sk)
country = str(x509.get_issuer()).split('/')[1][2:]
#print country
cacert = country + "-cacert.der"
#print cacert
msgErr = "couldn't parse certificate to determine URL for CACert, search the intertubes,"
msg = "download CACert (convert to DER if necessary) and save it as \n\"%s\"" % cacert
if not os.path.isfile(cacert):
try:
v = x509.get_ext("certificatePolicies").get_value()
start = v.find("CPS: ")
if start != -1:
url = v[start + 5:-1]
print "visit %s" % url, msg
else:
print msgErr, msg
except Exception:
print msgErr, msg
return ""
# Load the signer's CA cert.
st = X509.X509_Store()
#st.load_info('main')
x509CA = X509.load_cert(cacert, format=0)
st.add_x509(x509CA)
s.set_x509_store(st)
# Load the data, verify it.
#p7, data = SMIME.smime_load_pkcs7_bio(p7_bio)
p7 = SMIME.load_pkcs7_bio(p7_bio)
v = s.verify(p7)
return v
def cmd_passive_auth(self, verbose=1):
"Perform passive authentication"
hashes = {}
result = ""
i = 0
for name in ("DG1", "DG2", "SOD"):
fid = None
for n, f in self.INTERESTING_FILES:
if n == name:
fid = f
break
if fid is None:
return
i += 1
result = self.open_file(fid, 0x0c)
if self.check_sw(result.sw):
contents, sw = self.read_binary_file()
#self.last_result = R_APDU(contents + self.last_sw)
if name != "SOD":
hashes[i] = crypto_utils.hash("SHA", contents)
else:
result = self.verify_cms(contents[4:])
#print hexdump(result)
#print "DG1: %s" % hexdump(hashes[i])
#print "DG2: %s" % hexdump(hashes[2])
res = TLV_utils.tlv_find_tag(TLV_utils.unpack(result), 0x04)
if len(res) == 0:
print "failed to verify EF.SOD"
return
else:
print "verified EF.SOD"
i = 0
for tag, length, hash in res:
i += 1
if hexdump(hashes[i]) == hexdump(hash):
print "DG%d hash verified: %s" % (i, binascii.b2a_hex(hash))
else:
print "DG%d hash failed:" % i
print "was: %s" % binascii.b2a_hex(hashes[i])
print "expected: %s" % binascii.b2a_hex(hash)
return
def before_send(self, apdu):
if self.se:
apdu = self.se.before_send(apdu)
return apdu
def after_send(self, result):
if self.se:
result = self.se.after_send(result)
return result
def _mac(key, data, ssc=None, dopad=True):
if ssc:
data = ssc + data
if dopad:
topad = 8 - len(data) % 8
data = data + "\x80" + ("\x00" * (topad - 1))
a = crypto_utils.cipher(True, "des-cbc", key[:8], data, "\x00" * 8)
b = crypto_utils.cipher(False, "des-ecb", key[8:16], a[-8:])
c = crypto_utils.cipher(True, "des-ecb", key[:8], b)
return c
_mac = staticmethod(_mac)
def _make_random(len):
"Get len random bytes"
return os.urandom(len)
_make_random = staticmethod(_make_random)
def get_prompt(self):
return "(%s)%s" % (self.get_driver_name(), self.se and "[SM]" or "")
def check_sw(self, sw, purpose=None):
if purpose is not Card.PURPOSE_SM_OK:
return Card.check_sw(self, sw, purpose)
else:
return sw not in ("\x69\x87", "\x69\x88")
def cmd_parse_biometrics(self):
"Parse the biometric information contained in the last result."
cbeff = CBEFF.from_data(self.last_result.data)
basename = datetime.datetime.now().isoformat()
for index, biometric in enumerate(cbeff.biometrics):
biometric.store(basename="biometric_%s_%02i" % (basename, index))
def cmd_parse_passport(self, mrz2=None):
"Test the Passport class"
if mrz2 is None:
p = Passport.from_card(self)
else:
p = Passport.from_card(self, ["", mrz2])
def _read_ef(self, name):
fid = None
for n, f in self.INTERESTING_FILES:
if n == name:
fid = f
break
if fid is None:
return
result = self.open_file(fid, 0x0c)
if self.check_sw(result.sw):
self.cmd_cat()
self.cmd_parsetlv()
def cmd_read_com(self):
"Read EF.COM"
return self._read_ef("COM")
def cmd_read_sod(self):
"Read EF.SOD"
return self._read_ef("SOD")
def cmd_read_cvca(self):
"Read EF.CVCA"
return self._read_ef("CVCA")
def cmd_read_dg(self, dg):
"Read EF.DGx"
return self._read_ef("DG%s" % int(dg, 0))
COMMANDS = {
"perform_bac": cmd_perform_bac,
"read_com": cmd_read_com,
"read_sod": cmd_read_sod,
"read_cvca": cmd_read_cvca,
"read_dg": cmd_read_dg,
"parse_biometrics": cmd_parse_biometrics,
"parse_passport": cmd_parse_passport,
"passive_authenticate": cmd_passive_auth,
}
DATA_GROUPS = {
0x61: (1, "Machine readable zone information"),
0x75: (2, "Encoded face"),
0x63: (3, "Encoded finger(s)"),
0x76: (4, "Encoded iris(s)"),
0x65: (5, "Displayed portrait"),
0x66: (6, "Reserved for future use"),
0x67: (7, "Displayed signature or usual mark"),
0x68: (8, "Data feature(s)"),
0x69: (9, "Structure feature(s)"),
0x6A: (10, "Substance feature(s)"),
0x6B: (11, "Additional personal data elements"),
0x6C: (12, "Additional document data elements"),
0x6D: (13, "Discretionary data elements"),
0x6E: (14, "Reserved for future use"),
0x6F: (15, "Active authentication public key info"),
0x70: (16, "Persons to notify data element(s)"),
}
TLV_OBJECTS = {
context_mrtd: {
0x60: (TLV_utils.recurse, "EF.COM - Common data elements",
context_EFcom),
0x77: (TLV_utils.recurse, "EF.SOD - Security Data", context_EFsod),
}
}
for _key, (_a, _b) in DATA_GROUPS.items():
TLV_OBJECTS[context_mrtd][_key] = (TLV_utils.recurse,
"EF.DG%i - %s" % (_a, _b),
globals()["context_EFdg%i" % _a])
del _key, _a, _b
def decode_version_number(value):
#print "|||||||", value, "|", repr(value), "|"
try:
result = []
while len(value) > 0:
v, value = value[:2], value[2:]
result.append(str(int(v)))
return " " + ".".join(result)
except:
return "".join(["|||||||", value, "|", repr(value), "|"])
def decode_tag_list(value):
result = []
for t in value:
e = Passport_Application.DATA_GROUPS.get(ord(t))
hex = "0x%02x: " % ord(t)
if e is None:
result.append(hex +
"Error: '%02X' is an unknown Data Group tag" %
ord(t))
else:
result.append(hex + "DG%-2i - %s" % e)
return "\n" + "\n".join(result)
TLV_OBJECTS[context_EFcom] = {
0x5F01: (decode_version_number, "LDS version number"),
0x5F36: (decode_version_number, "Unicode version number"),
0x5C: (decode_tag_list, "List of all data groups present")
}
def decode_mrz(value):
l = len(value) / 2
return "\n" + value[:l] + "\n" + value[l:]
TLV_OBJECTS[context_EFdg1] = {
0x5F1F: (decode_mrz, "Machine Readable Zone data"),
}
identifier("context_biometric_group")
identifier("context_biometric")
identifier("context_biometric_header")
TLV_OBJECTS[context_EFdg2] = {
0x7F61: (TLV_utils.recurse, "Biometric Information Group",
context_biometric_group)
}
TLV_OBJECTS[context_biometric_group] = {
0x02: (TLV_utils.number, "Number of instances of this biometric"),
0x7f60: (TLV_utils.recurse, "Biometric Information Template",
context_biometric),
}
TLV_OBJECTS[context_biometric] = {
0xA1: (TLV_utils.recurse, "Biometric Header Template (BHT)",
context_biometric_header),
0x5F2E: (TLV_utils.binary, "Biometric data"),
}
TLV_OBJECTS[context_biometric_header] = {
0x80: (decode_version_number, "ICAO header version"),
0x81:
(TLV_utils.binary, "Biometric type"), # FIXME parse these datafields
0x82: (TLV_utils.binary, "Biometric feature"),
0x83: (TLV_utils.binary, "Creation date and time"),
0x84: (TLV_utils.binary, "Validity period"),
0x86:
(TLV_utils.binary, "Creator of the biometric reference data (PID)"),
0x87: (TLV_utils.binary, "Format owner"),
0x88: (TLV_utils.binary, "Format type"),
}
class Passport_Security_Environment(TCOS_Security_Environment):
def __init__(self, card):
TCOS_Security_Environment.__init__(self, card)
self.last_vanilla_c_apdu = None
# Set up a fake SE config to be able to reuse the TCOS code
self.set_key(1, self.card.KSenc)
enc_config = "\x80\x01\x0d\x83\x01\x01\x85\x00"
self.set_key(2, self.card.KSmac)
mac_config = "\x80\x01\x0d\x83\x01\x02\x85\x00"
self.set_config(tcos_card.SE_APDU, tcos_card.TEMPLATE_CCT,
SE_Config(mac_config))
self.set_config(tcos_card.SE_RAPDU, tcos_card.TEMPLATE_CCT,
SE_Config(mac_config))
self.set_config(tcos_card.SE_APDU, tcos_card.TEMPLATE_CT,
SE_Config(enc_config))
self.set_config(tcos_card.SE_RAPDU, tcos_card.TEMPLATE_CT,
SE_Config(enc_config))
def before_send(self, apdu):
self.last_vanilla_c_apdu = C_APDU(apdu)
if (apdu.cla & 0x80 != 0x80) and (apdu.CLA & 0x0C != 0x0C):
# Transform for SM
apdu.CLA = apdu.CLA | 0x0C
apdu_string = binascii.b2a_hex(apdu.render())
new_apdu = [apdu_string[:8]]
new_apdu.append("YY")
if apdu.case() in (3, 4):
new_apdu.append("87[01")
new_apdu.append(binascii.b2a_hex(apdu.data))
new_apdu.append("]")
if apdu.case() in (2, 4):
if apdu.Le == 0:
apdu.Le = 0xdf # FIXME: Probably not the right way
new_apdu.append("97(%02x)" % apdu.Le)
new_apdu.append("8E()00")
new_apdu_string = "".join(new_apdu)
apdu = C_APDU.parse_fancy(new_apdu_string)
return TCOS_Security_Environment.before_send(self, apdu)
def after_send(self, result):
if (self.last_vanilla_c_apdu.cla & 0x80 !=
0x80) and (self.last_vanilla_c_apdu.CLA & 0x0C != 0x0C):
# Inject fake response descriptor so that TCOS_Security_Environment.after_send sees the need to authenticate/decrypt
response_descriptor = "\x99\x00\x8e\x00"
if self.last_vanilla_c_apdu.case() in (2, 4):
response_descriptor = "\x87\x00" + response_descriptor
response_descriptor = "\xba" + chr(
len(response_descriptor)) + response_descriptor
self.last_c_apdu.data = self.last_c_apdu.data + response_descriptor
return TCOS_Security_Environment.after_send(self, result)
def _mac(self, config, data):
(ssc, ) = struct.unpack(">Q", self.card.ssc)
ssc = ssc + 1
self.card.ssc = struct.pack(">Q", ssc)
return Passport_Application._mac(self.card.KSmac,
data,
self.card.ssc,
dopad=False)
def cmd_perform_bac(self, mrz2, verbose=1):
"Perform the Basic Acess Control authentication and establishment of session keys"
mrz2 = mrz2.upper()
Kseed = self.derive_seed(mrz2, verbose)
Kenc = self.derive_key(Kseed, 1)
Kmac = self.derive_key(Kseed, 2)
if verbose:
print "Kenc = %s" % hexdump(Kenc)
print "Kmac = %s" % hexdump(Kmac)
print
result = self.send_apdu(self.APDU_GET_RANDOM)
if not self.check_sw(result.sw):
raise BACError, "SW after GET RANDOM was %02x%02x. Card refused to send rcd_icc. Should NEVER happen." % (
result.sw1, result.sw2)
rnd_icc = result.data
if verbose:
print "RND.icc = %s" % hexdump(rnd_icc)
rndtmp = self._make_random(8 + 16)
rnd_ifd = rndtmp[:8]
Kifd = rndtmp[8:]
if verbose:
print "RND.ifd = %s" % hexdump(rnd_ifd)
print "Kifd = %s" % hexdump(Kifd, indent=10)
S = rnd_ifd + rnd_icc + Kifd
Eifd = crypto_utils.cipher(True, "des3-cbc", Kenc, S, "\x00" * 8)
Mifd = self._mac(Kmac, Eifd)
if verbose:
print "Eifd = %s" % hexdump(Eifd, indent=10)
print "Mifd = %s" % hexdump(Mifd)
print
auth_apdu = C_APDU(self.APDU_MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATE, data=Eifd + Mifd)
result = self.send_apdu(auth_apdu)
if not self.check_sw(result.sw):
raise BACError, "SW after MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE was %02x%02x. Card did not accept our BAC attempt" % (
result.sw1, result.sw2)
resp_data = result.data
Eicc = resp_data[:-8]
Micc = self._mac(Kmac, Eicc)
if not Micc == resp_data[-8:]:
raise ValueError, "Passport authentication failed: Wrong MAC on incoming data during Mutual Authenticate"
if verbose:
print "Eicc = %s" % hexdump(Eicc, indent=10)
print "Micc = %s" % hexdump(Micc)
print "Micc verified OK"
R = crypto_utils.cipher(False, "des3-cbc", Kenc, Eicc, "\x00" * 8)
if verbose:
print "R = %s" % hexdump(R, indent=10)
if not R[:8] == rnd_icc:
raise BACError, "Passport authentication failed: Wrong RND.icc on incoming data during Mutual Authenticate"
if not R[8:16] == rnd_ifd:
raise BACError, "Passport authentication failed: Wrong RND.ifd on incoming data during Mutual Authenticate"
Kicc = R[16:]
if verbose:
print "Kicc = %s" % hexdump(Kicc)
print
KSseed = crypto_utils.operation_on_string(Kicc, Kifd,
lambda a, b: a ^ b)
self.KSenc = self.derive_key(KSseed, 1)
self.KSmac = self.derive_key(KSseed, 2)
self.ssc = rnd_icc[-4:] + rnd_ifd[-4:]
if False:
self.KSenc = binascii.a2b_hex("979EC13B1CBFE9DCD01AB0FED307EAE5")
self.KSmac = binascii.a2b_hex("F1CB1F1FB5ADF208806B89DC579DC1F8")
self.ssc = binascii.a2b_hex("887022120C06C226")
if verbose:
print "KSseed = %s" % hexdump(KSseed)
print "KSenc = %s" % hexdump(self.KSenc)
print "KSmac = %s" % hexdump(self.KSmac)
print "ssc = %s" % hexdump(self.ssc)
self.se = Passport_Security_Environment(self)
class ISO_Card(Card):
DRIVER_NAME = ["ISO"]
COMMAND_GET_RESPONSE = C_APDU(ins=0xc0)
COMMAND_CLASS = C_APDU
APDU_VERIFY_PIN = C_APDU(ins=0x20)
## Map for check_sw()
STATUS_MAP = {
Card.PURPOSE_SUCCESS: ("\x90\x00", ),
Card.PURPOSE_GET_RESPONSE:
("61??",
), ## If this is received then GET RESPONSE should be called with SW2
Card.PURPOSE_SM_OK: ("\x90\x00", ),
Card.PURPOSE_RETRY: (
), ## Theoretically this would contain "6C??", but I dare not automatically resending a command for _all_ card types
## Instead, card types for which this is safe should set it in their own STATUS_MAP
}
ATRS = list(Card.ATRS)
STOP_ATRS = list(Card.STOP_ATRS)
## Note: a key in this dictionary may either be a one- or two-byte string containing
## a binary status word, or a two or four-byte string containing a hexadecimal
## status word, possibly with ? characters marking variable nibbles.
## Hexadecimal characters MUST be in uppercase. The values that two- or four-byte
## strings map to may be either format strings, that can make use of the
## keyword substitutions for SW1 and SW2 or a callable accepting two arguments
## (SW1, SW2) that returns a string.
STATUS_WORDS = {
'\x90\x00':
"Normal execution",
'61??':
"%(SW2)i (0x%(SW2)02x) bytes of response data can be retrieved with GetResponse.",
'6C??':
"Bad value for LE, 0x%(SW2)02x is the correct value.",
'63C?':
lambda SW1, SW2: "The counter has reached the value '%i'" % (SW2 % 16)
}
## For the format of this dictionary of dictionaries see TLV_utils.tags
TLV_OBJECTS = dict(Card.TLV_OBJECTS)
DEFAULT_CONTEXT = None
## Format: "AID (binary)": ("name", [optional: description, {more information}])
APPLICATIONS = {
"\xa0\x00\x00\x01\x67\x45\x53\x49\x47\x4e": ("DF.ESIGN", ),
"\xa0\x00\x00\x00\x63\x50\x4b\x43\x53\x2d\x31\x35": ("DF_PKCS15", ),
"\xD2\x76\x00\x01\x24\x01": ("DF_OpenPGP", "OpenPGP card", {
"significant_length": 6
}),
"\xa0\x00\x00\x02\x47\x10\x01":
("DF_LDS", "Machine Readable Travel Document", {
"alias": ("mrtd", )
}),
## The following are from 0341a.pdf: BSI-DSZ-CC-0341-2006
"\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x66\x01": ("DF_SIG", "Signature application", {
"fid": "\xAB\x00"
}),
"\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x25\x5A\x41\x02\x00":
("ZA_MF_NEU", "Zusatzanwendungen", {
"fid": "\xA7\x00"
}),
"\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x25\x45\x43\x02\x00": ("DF_EC_CASH_NEU", "ec-Cash", {
"fid": "\xA1\x00"
}),
"\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x25\x45\x50\x02\x00":
("DF_BOERSE_NEU", "Geldkarte", {
"fid": "\xA2\x00",
"alias": ("geldkarte", )
}),
"\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x25\x47\x41\x01\x00":
("DF_GA_MAESTRO", "GA-Maestro", {
"fid": "\xAC\x00"
}),
"\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x25\x54\x44\x01\x00": ("DF_TAN", "TAN-Anwendung", {
"fid": "\xAC\x02"
}),
"\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x25\x4D\x01\x02\x00": ("DF_MARKTPLATZ_NEU",
"Marktplatz", {
"fid": "\xB0\x01"
}),
"\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x25\x46\x53\x02\x00": ("DF_FAHRSCHEIN_NEU",
"Fahrschein", {
"fid": "\xB0\x00"
}),
"\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x25\x48\x42\x02\x00": ("DF_BANKING_20", "HBCI", {
"fid": "\xA6\x00"
}),
"\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x25\x4E\x50\x01\x00": ("DF_NOTEPAD", "Notepad", {
"fid": "\xA6\x10"
}),
"\xd2\x76\x00\x00\x85\x01\x00": (
"NFC_TYPE_4",
"NFC NDEF Application on tag type 4",
{
"alias": ("nfc", )
},
),
# From TR-03110_v201_pdf.pdf
"\xE8\x07\x04\x00\x7f\x00\x07\x03\x02": ("DF_eID", "eID application"),
"\xd2\x76\x00\x00\x25\x4b\x41\x4e\x4d\x30\x31\x00": (
"VRS_TICKET",
"VRS Ticket",
{
"fid": "\xad\x00",
"alias": ("vrs", )
},
),
"\xd2\x76\x00\x01\x35\x4b\x41\x4e\x4d\x30\x31\x00": (
"VRS_TICKET",
"VRS Ticket",
{
"fid": "\xad\x00",
},
),
}
# Alias for DF_BOERSE_NEU
APPLICATIONS[
"\xA0\x00\x00\x00\x59\x50\x41\x43\x45\x01\x00"] = APPLICATIONS[
"\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x25\x45\x50\x02\x00"]
# Alias for DF_GA_MAESTRO
APPLICATIONS["\xA0\x00\x00\x00\x04\x30\x60"] = APPLICATIONS[
"\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x25\x47\x41\x01\x00"]
## Format: "RID (binary)": ("vendor name", [optional: {more information}])
VENDORS = {
"\xD2\x76\x00\x01\x24": ("Free Software Foundation Europe", ),
"\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x25": ("Bankenverlag", ),
"\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x60": ("Wolfgang Rankl", ),
"\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x05": ("Giesecke & Devrient", ),
"\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x40":
("Zentralinstitut fuer die Kassenaerztliche Versorgung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland",
), # hpc-use-cases-01.pdf
"\xa0\x00\x00\x02\x47": ("ICAO", ),
"\xa0\x00\x00\x03\x06": ("PC/SC Workgroup", ),
}
TLV_OBJECTS[TLV_utils.context_FCP] = {
0x84: (Card.decode_df_name, "DF name"),
}
TLV_OBJECTS[TLV_utils.context_FCI] = TLV_OBJECTS[TLV_utils.context_FCP]
def __init__(self, reader):
Card.__init__(self, reader)
self.last_sw = None
self.sw_changed = False
def post_merge(self):
## Called after cards.__init__.Cardmultiplexer._merge_attributes
self.TLV_OBJECTS[TLV_utils.context_FCP][0x84] = (self._decode_df_name,
"DF name")
self.TLV_OBJECTS[TLV_utils.context_FCI][0x84] = (self._decode_df_name,
"DF name")
def decode_statusword(self):
if self.last_sw is None:
return "No command executed so far"
else:
retval = None
matched_sw = self.match_statusword(self.STATUS_WORDS.keys(),
self.last_sw)
if matched_sw is not None:
retval = self.STATUS_WORDS.get(matched_sw)
if isinstance(retval, str):
retval = retval % {
"SW1": ord(self.last_sw[0]),
"SW2": ord(self.last_sw[1])
}
elif callable(retval):
retval = retval(ord(self.last_sw[0]), ord(self.last_sw[1]))
if retval is None:
return "Unknown SW (SW %s)" % binascii.b2a_hex(self.last_sw)
else:
return "%s (SW %s)" % (retval, binascii.b2a_hex(self.last_sw))
def _real_send(self, apdu):
result = Card._real_send(self, apdu)
self.last_sw = result.sw
self.sw_changed = True
return result
def _send_with_retry(self, apdu):
result = self._real_send(apdu)
if self.check_sw(result.sw, self.PURPOSE_GET_RESPONSE):
## Need to call GetResponse
gr_apdu = C_APDU(self.COMMAND_GET_RESPONSE,
le=result.sw2,
cla=apdu.cla) # FIXME
result = R_APDU(self._real_send(gr_apdu))
elif self.check_sw(result.sw, self.PURPOSE_RETRY) and apdu.Le == 0:
## Retry with correct Le
gr_apdu = C_APDU(apdu, le=result.sw2)
result = R_APDU(self._real_send(gr_apdu))
return result
def verify_pin(self, pin_number, pin_value):
apdu = C_APDU(self.APDU_VERIFY_PIN, P2=pin_number, data=pin_value)
result = self.send_apdu(apdu)
return self.check_sw(result.sw)
def cmd_verify(self, pin_number, pin_value):
"""Verify a PIN."""
pin_number = int(pin_number, 0)
pin_value = binascii.a2b_hex("".join(pin_value.split()))
self.verify_pin(pin_number, pin_value)
COMMANDS = {
"verify": cmd_verify,
}
def verify_pin(self, pin_number, pin_value):
apdu = C_APDU(self.APDU_VERIFY_PIN, P2=pin_number, data=pin_value)
result = self.send_apdu(apdu)
return self.check_sw(result.sw)