def graph(self, equilibria, graph_options):
setupGraph(graph_options)
graph_options[GraphOptions.LEGEND_LABELS_KEY] = lambda i: equilibria[i]
x = self.independent_parameters[0]
y = self.independent_parameters[1]
x_values = list(x)
y_values = list(y)
nx = len(x_values)
ny = len(y_values)
n_equilibria = len(equilibria)
data = numpy.zeros((nx, ny, n_equilibria))
for i in range(nx):
for j in range(ny):
data[i, j, :] = self.data[i][j]
if graph_options['type'] == '3d':
plot_3d_data_set(
data, x.key, x_values, y.key, y_values,
"Equilibrium Proportion",
"%s:(%.3f ... %.3f), %s:(%.3f ... %.3f) " %
(x.key, x.lb, x.ub, y.key, y.lb, y.ub), n_equilibria,
graph_options)
elif graph_options['type'] == 'contour':
plot_contour_data_set(
data, x.key, x_values, y.key, y_values,
"Equilibrium Proportion",
"%s:(%.3f ... %.3f), %s:(%.3f ... %.3f) " %
(x.key, x.lb, x.ub, y.key, y.lb, y.ub), n_equilibria,
graph_options)
else:
print(graph_type)
def graph(self, equilibria, graph_options):
setupGraph(graph_options)
graph_options[GraphOptions.LEGEND_LABELS_KEY] = lambda i: equilibria[i]
x = self.independent_parameters[0]
x_values = list(x)
n_equilibria = len(equilibria)
data = numpy.array(self.data)
plot_single_data_set(data, x.key, x_values, "Equilibrium Proportion",
"%s:(%.3f ... %.3f)" % (x.key, x.lb, x.ub),
n_equilibria, graph_options)
def graph(self, equilibria, graph_options):
setupGraph(graph_options)
graph_options[GraphOptions.LEGEND_LABELS_KEY] = lambda i: equilibria[i]
x = self.independent_parameters[0]
y = self.independent_parameters[1]
x_values = list(x)
y_values = list(y)
nx = len(x_values)
ny = len(y_values)
n_equilibria = len(equilibria)
data = numpy.zeros((nx, ny, n_equilibria))
for i in range(nx):
for j in range(ny):
data[i, j, :] = self.data[i][j]
# Don’t include the unclassified equilibrium if it’s proportion is always zero (i.e. unclassified takes the value False)
unclassified = False
for i in range(len(data)):
for j in range(len(data[i])):
if data[i][j][-1] == 0.0:
unclassified = unclassified or False
else:
unclassified = unclassified or True
if not unclassified:
n_equilibria = n_equilibria - 1
final_data = numpy.zeros((nx, ny, n_equilibria))
for i in range(nx):
for j in range(ny):
final_data[i, j, :] = data[i][j][:-1]
else:
final_data = data
if graph_options['type'] == '3d':
plot_3d_data_set(
final_data, x.key, x_values, y.key, y_values,
"Equilibrium Proportion",
"%s:(%.3f ... %.3f), %s:(%.3f ... %.3f) " %
(x.key, x.lb, x.ub, y.key, y.lb, y.ub), n_equilibria,
graph_options)
elif graph_options['type'] == 'contour':
plot_contour_data_set(
final_data, x.key, x_values, y.key, y_values,
"Equilibrium Proportion",
"%s:(%.3f ... %.3f), %s:(%.3f ... %.3f) " %
(x.key, x.lb, x.ub, y.key, y.lb, y.ub), n_equilibria,
graph_options)
else:
print(graph_type)
def graph(self, equilibria, graph_options):
setupGraph(graph_options)
graph_options[GraphOptions.LEGEND_LABELS_KEY] = lambda i: equilibria[i]
x = self.independent_parameters[0]
x_values = list(x)
n_equilibria = len(equilibria)
data = numpy.array(self.data)
# Don’t include the unclassified equilibrium if it’s proportion is zero
if not data[:, -1].all():
n_equilibria = n_equilibria - 1
data = data[:, :-1]
# Plot the 2D data
plot_single_data_set(data, x.key, x_values, "Equilibrium Proportion",
"%s:(%.3f ... %.3f)" % (x.key, x.lb, x.ub),
n_equilibria, graph_options)
def simulate(self,
num_gens=DEFAULT_GENERATIONS,
pop_size=100,
start_state=None,
graph=True,
return_labeled=True,
burn=0,
class_end=False,
frac_invasions=False,
strategy_indx=0):
"""
Simulate a game in the presence of group selection for a specific number of generations optionally
graphing the results
@param num_gens: the number of iterations of the simulation.
@type num_gens: int
@param group_size: Fixed population in each group.
@type group_size: int
@param rate: Rate of group selection vs individual selection
@type rate: float
@param start_state: whether the starting state is to be predetermined
@type start_state: list
@param graph: the type of graph (false if no graph is wished)
@type graph: dict, bool
@param return_labeled: whether the distribution of classified equilibria that are returned should be labelled
or simply listed with their keys inferred by their order
@type return_labeled: bool
@param class_end: if False the equilibria are classified at all generations and if True only the last generation is classified.
@type class_end: bool
@param frac_invasions: Whether the given simulation is to compute the fraction of invasions for a strategy.
@type: bool
@param strategy_indx: The index of the strategy whose fraction of invasions is to be computed
@type strategy_indx: int
@return: the frequency of time spent in each equilibria, defined by the game
@rtype: numpy.ndarray or dict
TO DO: Explain what 'burn' does
"""
game = self.game_cls(**self.game_kwargs)
dyn = self.dynamics_cls(payoff_matrix=game.pm,
player_frequencies=game.player_frequencies,
pop_size=pop_size,
**self.dynamics_kwargs)
# Group Selection simulation for a given number of generations.
results_total, payoffs_total = dyn.simulate(num_gens, start_state,
frac_invasions,
strategy_indx)
# Classify the equilibria and plot the results
params = Obj(**self.game_kwargs)
frequencies = np.zeros(self.game_cls.num_equilibria()
) # one extra for the Unclassified key
if dyn.stochastic:
classifications = []
if class_end: # Only classify the final generation
lastGenerationState = [
np.zeros(len(player[0])) for player in results_total
]
for playerIdx, player in enumerate(results_total):
for stratIdx, strat in enumerate(player[-1]):
lastGenerationState[playerIdx][stratIdx] = strat
lastGenerationState[playerIdx] /= lastGenerationState[
playerIdx].sum()
equi = game.classify(params, lastGenerationState,
game.equilibrium_tolerance)
frequencies = np.zeros(self.game_cls.num_equilibria())
frequencies[equi] = 1
else: # Classify every generation
for state in zip(*results_total):
state = [x / x.sum() for x in state]
equi = game.classify(params, state,
game.equilibrium_tolerance)
# note, if equi returns -1, then the -1 index gets the last entry in the array
classifications.append(equi)
frequencies[equi] += 1
else:
last_generation_state = [results_total[-1][-1]]
classification = game.classify(params, last_generation_state,
game.equilibrium_tolerance)
frequencies[classification] = 1
if graph:
setupGraph(graph, game, dyn, burn, num_gens, results_total,
payoffs_total)
else:
if return_labeled:
return self._convert_equilibria_frequencies(frequencies)
else:
return frequencies, results_total, payoffs_total
def simulate_many(self,
num_iterations=DEFAULT_ITERATIONS,
num_gens=DEFAULT_GENERATIONS,
pop_size=100,
start_state=None,
graph=False,
histogram=False,
return_labeled=True,
burn=0,
parallelize=True,
class_end=True,
frac_invasions=False,
strategy_indx=0):
"""
A helper method to call the simulate methods num_iterations times simulating num_gens generations each time,
and then averaging the frequency of the resulting equilibria. Method calls are parallelized and attempt to
use all available cores on the machine.
@param num_iterations: the number of times to iterate the simulation
@type num_iterations: int
@param num_gens: the number of generations to run each simulation with
@type num_gens: int
@param pop_size: total population size
@type pop_size: int
@param start_state: An optional list of distributions of strategies for each player
@type start_state: list or None
@param graph: the type of graph (false if no graph is wished)
@type graph: dict, bool
@param histogram: if True plots the histogram of final population sizes over iterations. Both graph and histogram can't be True at the same time.
@type histogram: bool
@param return_labeled: whether the distribution of classified equilibria that are returned should be labelled
or simply listed with their keys inferred by their order
@type return_labeled: bool
@param parallelize: whether or not to parallelize the computation, defaults to true, but an override when
varying the parameters, as seen in the L{VariedGame} class to achieve coarser parallelization
@type parallelize: bool
@param class_end: if False the equilibria are classified at all generations and if True only the last generation is classified.
@type class_end: bool
@param frac_invasions: Whether the given simulation is to compute the fraction of invasions for a strategy.
@type: bool
@param strategy_indx: The index of the strategy whose fraction of invasions is to be computed
@type strategy_indx: int
@return: the frequency of time spent in each equilibria, defined by the game
@rtype: np.ndarray or dict
"""
# TODO move this graphing into graphSetup and link it to extra options
game = self.game_cls(**self.game_kwargs)
dyn = self.dynamics_cls(payoff_matrix=game.pm,
player_frequencies=game.player_frequencies,
pop_size=pop_size,
**self.dynamics_kwargs)
frequencies = np.zeros(self.game_cls.num_equilibria())
output = par_for(parallelize)(
delayed(wrapper_simulate)(self,
num_gens=num_gens,
pop_size=pop_size,
frac_invasions=frac_invasions,
strategy_indx=strategy_indx,
start_state=start_state,
class_end=class_end)
for iteration in range(num_iterations))
equilibria = []
strategies = [0] * num_iterations
payoffs = [0] * num_iterations
for idx, sim in enumerate(output):
equilibria.append(sim[0])
strategies[idx] = sim[1]
payoffs[idx] = sim[2]
#TODO move these averages or only compile them if appropriate simulation type
stratAvg = [
np.zeros(shape=(num_gens, dyn.pm.num_strats[playerIdx]))
for playerIdx in range(dyn.pm.num_player_types)
]
# Storing the final strategy populations per iteration
strat_final = [
np.zeros(shape=(num_iterations, dyn.pm.num_strats[playerIdx]))
for playerIdx in range(dyn.pm.num_player_types)
]
for iteration in range(num_iterations):
for player in range(dyn.pm.num_player_types):
for gen in range(num_gens - burn):
for strat in range(dyn.pm.num_strats[player]):
stratAvg[player][gen][strat] += strategies[iteration][
player][gen][strat]
if histogram and gen == num_gens - burn - 1:
strat_final[player][iteration][
strat] += strategies[iteration][player][gen][
strat]
for playerIdx, player in enumerate(stratAvg):
for genIdx, gen in enumerate(player):
if gen.sum() != 0:
gen /= gen.sum()
gen *= dyn.num_players[playerIdx]
payoffsAvg = [
np.zeros(shape=(num_gens - 1, dyn.pm.num_strats[playerIdx]))
for playerIdx in range(dyn.pm.num_player_types)
]
for iteration in range(num_iterations):
for player in range(dyn.pm.num_player_types):
for gen in range(num_gens - 1 - burn):
for strat in range(dyn.pm.num_strats[player]):
payoffsAvg[player][gen][strat] += payoffs[iteration][
player][gen][strat]
for playerIdx, player in enumerate(payoffsAvg):
for genIdx, gen in enumerate(player):
if gen.sum() != 0:
gen /= gen.sum()
gen *= dyn.num_players[playerIdx]
if graph:
assert histogram == False, (
"Can't plot graph and histogram at the same time")
setupGraph(graph, game, dyn, burn, num_gens, stratAvg, payoffs[0])
elif histogram:
setupHistogram(histogram, game, dyn, num_iterations,
dyn.num_players, strat_final)
for x in equilibria:
frequencies += x
frequencies /= frequencies.sum()
if return_labeled:
return self._convert_equilibria_frequencies(frequencies)
else:
return frequencies
def simulate(self,
num_gens=DEFAULT_GENERATIONS,
graph=True,
burn=0,
return_labeled=True,
start_state=None,
class_end=False):
"""
Simulate the game for the given number of generations with the specified dynamics class and optionally graph the results
@param num_gens: the number of iterations of the simulation.
@type num_gens: int
@param graph: the type of graph (false if no graph is wished)
@type graph: dict, bool
@param return_labeled: whether the distribution of classified equilibria that are returned should be labelled
or simply listed with their keys inferred by their order
@type return_labeled: bool
@param start_state: whether the starting state is to be predeterined
@type start_state: list
@param graph_payoffs: to graph the payoffs for each generation
@type graph_payoffs: bool
@param graph_payoff_line: to show the dominate strategy for each generation of the game underneath the graph
@type graph_payoff_line: bool
@return: the frequency of time spent in each equilibria, defined by the game
@rtype: numpy.ndarray or dict
"""
game = self.game_cls(**self.game_kwargs)
dyn = self.dynamics_cls(payoff_matrix=game.pm,
player_frequencies=game.player_frequencies,
**self.dynamics_kwargs)
results, payoffs = dyn.simulate(num_gens=num_gens,
debug_state=start_state)
# results_obj = SingleSimulationOutcome(self.dynamics_cls, self.dynamics_kwargs, self.game_cls, self.game_kwargs, results)
# TODO: serialize results to file
params = Obj(**self.game_kwargs)
frequencies = numpy.zeros(self.game_cls.num_equilibria()
) # one extra for the Unclassified key
for playerIdx, player in enumerate(payoffs):
payoffs[playerIdx] = numpy.delete(player, (0), axis=0)
if burn:
for index, array in enumerate(results):
results[index] = array[burn:]
if dyn.stochastic:
classifications = []
if class_end: # Only classify the final generation
lastGenerationState = [
numpy.zeros(len(player[0])) for player in results
]
for playerIdx, player in enumerate(results):
for stratIdx, strat in enumerate(player[-1]):
lastGenerationState[playerIdx][stratIdx] = strat
lastGenerationState[playerIdx] /= lastGenerationState[
playerIdx].sum()
equi = game.classify(params, lastGenerationState,
game.equilibrium_tolerance)
frequencies = numpy.zeros(self.game_cls.num_equilibria())
frequencies[equi] = 1
else: # Classify every generation
for state in zip(*results):
state = [x / x.sum() for x in state]
equi = game.classify(params, state,
game.equilibrium_tolerance)
# note, if equi returns -1, then the -1 index gets the last entry in the array
classifications.append(equi)
frequencies[equi] += 1
else:
last_generation_state = results[-1]
classification = game.classify(params, last_generation_state,
game.equilibrium_tolerance)
frequencies[classification] = 1
if graph:
setupGraph(graph, game, dyn, burn, num_gens, results, payoffs)
else:
if return_labeled:
return self._convert_equilibria_frequencies(frequencies)
else:
return frequencies, results, payoffs
def simulate_many(self,
num_iterations=DEFAULT_ITERATIONS,
num_gens=DEFAULT_GENERATIONS,
return_labeled=True,
burn=0,
parallelize=True,
graph=False,
start_state=None,
class_end=False):
"""
A helper method to call the simulate methods num_iterations times simulating num_gens generations each time,
and then averaging the frequency of the resulting equilibria. Method calls are parallelized and attempt to
use all available cores on the machine.
@param num_iterations: the number of times to iterate the simulation
@type num_iterations: int
@param num_gens: the number of generations to run each simulation witu
@type num_gens: int
@param return_labeled: whether the distribution of classified equilibria that are returned should be labelled
or simply listed with their keys inferred by their order
@type return_labeled: bool
@param parallelize: whether or not to parallelize the computation, defaults to true, but an override when
varying the parameters, as seen in the L{VariedGame} class to achieve coarser parallelization
@type parallelize: bool
@return: the frequency of time spent in each equilibria, defined by the game
@rtype: numpy.ndarray or dict
"""
# TODO move this graphing into graphSetup and link it to extra options
game = self.game_cls(**self.game_kwargs)
dyn = self.dynamics_cls(payoff_matrix=game.pm,
player_frequencies=game.player_frequencies,
**self.dynamics_kwargs)
frequencies = numpy.zeros(self.game_cls.num_equilibria())
output = par_for(parallelize)(
delayed(wrapper_simulate)(self,
num_gens=num_gens,
burn=burn,
start_state=start_state,
class_end=class_end)
for iteration in range(num_iterations))
equilibria = []
strategies = [0] * num_iterations
payoffs = [0] * num_iterations
for idx, sim in enumerate(output):
equilibria.append(sim[0])
strategies[idx] = sim[1]
payoffs[idx] = sim[2]
#TODO move these averages or only compile them if appropriate simulation type
stratAvg = [
numpy.zeros(shape=(num_gens, dyn.pm.num_strats[playerIdx]))
for playerIdx in range(dyn.pm.num_player_types)
]
for iteration in range(num_iterations):
for player in range(dyn.pm.num_player_types):
for gen in range(num_gens - burn):
for strat in range(dyn.pm.num_strats[player]):
stratAvg[player][gen][strat] += strategies[iteration][
player][gen][strat]
for playerIdx, player in enumerate(stratAvg):
for genIdx, gen in enumerate(player):
if gen.sum() != 0:
gen /= gen.sum()
gen *= dyn.num_players
payoffsAvg = [
numpy.zeros(shape=(num_gens - 1, dyn.pm.num_strats[playerIdx]))
for playerIdx in range(dyn.pm.num_player_types)
]
for iteration in range(num_iterations):
for player in range(dyn.pm.num_player_types):
for gen in range(num_gens - 1 - burn):
for strat in range(dyn.pm.num_strats[player]):
payoffsAvg[player][gen][strat] += payoffs[iteration][
player][gen][strat]
for playerIdx, player in enumerate(payoffsAvg):
for genIdx, gen in enumerate(player):
if gen.sum() != 0:
gen /= gen.sum()
gen *= dyn.num_players
if graph:
setupGraph(graph, game, dyn, burn, num_gens, stratAvg, payoffs[0])
for x in equilibria:
frequencies += x
frequencies /= frequencies.sum()
if return_labeled:
return self._convert_equilibria_frequencies(frequencies)
else:
return frequencies
