def test_compactblock_reconstruction_multiple_peers(self, stalling_peer, delivery_peer):
node = self.nodes[0]
assert len(self.utxos)
def announce_cmpct_block(node, peer):
utxo = self.utxos.pop(0)
block = self.build_block_with_transactions(node, utxo, 5)
cmpct_block = HeaderAndShortIDs()
cmpct_block.initialize_from_block(block)
msg = msg_cmpctblock(cmpct_block.to_p2p())
peer.send_and_ping(msg)
with mininode_lock:
assert "getblocktxn" in peer.last_message
return block, cmpct_block
block, cmpct_block = announce_cmpct_block(node, stalling_peer)
for tx in block.vtx[1:]:
delivery_peer.send_message(msg_tx(tx))
delivery_peer.sync_with_ping()
mempool = node.getrawmempool()
for tx in block.vtx[1:]:
assert tx.hash in mempool
delivery_peer.send_and_ping(msg_cmpctblock(cmpct_block.to_p2p()))
assert_equal(int(node.getbestblockhash(), 16), block.sha256)
self.utxos.append([block.vtx[-1].sha256, 0, block.vtx[-1].vout[0].nValue])
# Now test that delivering an invalid compact block won't break relay
block, cmpct_block = announce_cmpct_block(node, stalling_peer)
for tx in block.vtx[1:]:
delivery_peer.send_message(msg_tx(tx))
delivery_peer.sync_with_ping()
cmpct_block.prefilled_txn[0].tx.wit.vtxinwit = [CTxInWitness()]
cmpct_block.prefilled_txn[0].tx.wit.vtxinwit[0].scriptWitness.stack = [ser_uint256(0)]
cmpct_block.use_witness = True
delivery_peer.send_and_ping(msg_cmpctblock(cmpct_block.to_p2p()))
assert int(node.getbestblockhash(), 16) != block.sha256
msg = msg_blocktxn()
msg.block_transactions.blockhash = block.sha256
msg.block_transactions.transactions = block.vtx[1:]
stalling_peer.send_and_ping(msg)
assert_equal(int(node.getbestblockhash(), 16), block.sha256)
def send_txs_and_test(self, txs, node, *, success=True, expect_disconnect=False, reject_reason=None):
"""Send txs to test node and test whether they're accepted to the mempool.
- add all txs to our tx_store
- send tx messages for all txs
- if success is True/False: assert that the txs are/are not accepted to the mempool
- if expect_disconnect is True: Skip the sync with ping
- if reject_reason is set: assert that the correct reject message is logged."""
with mininode_lock:
for tx in txs:
self.tx_store[tx.sha256] = tx
reject_reason = [reject_reason] if reject_reason else []
with node.assert_debug_log(expected_msgs=reject_reason):
for tx in txs:
self.send_message(msg_tx(tx))
if expect_disconnect:
self.wait_for_disconnect()
else:
self.sync_with_ping()
raw_mempool = node.getrawmempool()
if success:
# Check that all txs are now in the mempool
for tx in txs:
assert tx.hash in raw_mempool, "{} not found in mempool".format(tx.hash)
else:
# Check that none of the txs are now in the mempool
for tx in txs:
assert tx.hash not in raw_mempool, "{} tx found in mempool".format(tx.hash)
def on_getdata(self, message):
"""Check for the tx/block in our stores and if found, reply with an inv message."""
for inv in message.inv:
self.getdata_requests.append(inv.hash)
if (inv.type & MSG_TYPE_MASK) == MSG_TX and inv.hash in self.tx_store.keys():
self.send_message(msg_tx(self.tx_store[inv.hash]))
elif (inv.type & MSG_TYPE_MASK) == MSG_BLOCK and inv.hash in self.block_store.keys():
self.send_message(msg_block(self.block_store[inv.hash]))
else:
logger.debug('getdata message type {} received.'.format(hex(inv.type)))
def test_incorrect_blocktxn_response(self, node, test_node, version):
if (len(self.utxos) == 0):
self.make_utxos()
utxo = self.utxos.pop(0)
block = self.build_block_with_transactions(node, utxo, 10)
self.utxos.append([block.vtx[-1].sha256, 0, block.vtx[-1].vout[0].nValue])
# Relay the first 5 transactions from the block in advance
for tx in block.vtx[1:6]:
test_node.send_message(msg_tx(tx))
test_node.sync_with_ping()
# Make sure all transactions were accepted.
mempool = node.getrawmempool()
for tx in block.vtx[1:6]:
assert(tx.hash in mempool)
# Send compact block
comp_block = HeaderAndShortIDs()
comp_block.initialize_from_block(block, prefill_list=[0], use_witness=(version == 2))
test_node.send_and_ping(msg_cmpctblock(comp_block.to_p2p()))
absolute_indexes = []
with mininode_lock:
assert("getblocktxn" in test_node.last_message)
absolute_indexes = test_node.last_message["getblocktxn"].block_txn_request.to_absolute()
assert_equal(absolute_indexes, [6, 7, 8, 9, 10])
# Now give an incorrect response.
# Note that it's possible for bitcoind to be smart enough to know we're
# lying, since it could check to see if the shortid matches what we're
# sending, and eg disconnect us for misbehavior. If that behavior
# change was made, we could just modify this test by having a
# different peer provide the block further down, so that we're still
# verifying that the block isn't marked bad permanently. This is good
# enough for now.
msg = msg_blocktxn()
if version==2:
msg = msg_witness_blocktxn()
msg.block_transactions = BlockTransactions(block.sha256, [block.vtx[5]] + block.vtx[7:])
test_node.send_and_ping(msg)
# Tip should not have updated
assert_equal(int(node.getbestblockhash(), 16), block.hashPrevBlock)
# We should receive a getdata request
wait_until(lambda: "getdata" in test_node.last_message, timeout=10, lock=mininode_lock)
assert_equal(len(test_node.last_message["getdata"].inv), 1)
assert(test_node.last_message["getdata"].inv[0].type == 2 or test_node.last_message["getdata"].inv[0].type == 2|MSG_WITNESS_FLAG)
assert_equal(test_node.last_message["getdata"].inv[0].hash, block.sha256)
# Deliver the block
if version==2:
test_node.send_and_ping(msg_witness_block(block))
else:
test_node.send_and_ping(msg_block(block))
assert_equal(int(node.getbestblockhash(), 16), block.sha256)
def send_txs_and_test(self, txs, node, *, success=True, expect_disconnect=False, reject_code=None, reject_reason=None):
"""Send txs to test node and test whether they're accepted to the mempool.
- add all txs to our tx_store
- send tx messages for all txs
- if success is True/False: assert that the txs are/are not accepted to the mempool
- if expect_disconnect is True: Skip the sync with ping
- if reject_code and reject_reason are set: assert that the correct reject message is received."""
with mininode_lock:
self.reject_code_received = None
self.reject_reason_received = None
for tx in txs:
self.tx_store[tx.sha256] = tx
for tx in txs:
self.send_message(msg_tx(tx))
if expect_disconnect:
self.wait_for_disconnect()
else:
self.sync_with_ping()
raw_mempool = node.getrawmempool()
if success:
# Check that all txs are now in the mempool
for tx in txs:
assert tx.hash in raw_mempool, "{} not found in mempool".format(tx.hash)
else:
# Check that none of the txs are now in the mempool
for tx in txs:
assert tx.hash not in raw_mempool, "{} tx found in mempool".format(tx.hash)
if reject_code is not None:
wait_until(lambda: self.reject_code_received == reject_code, lock=mininode_lock)
if reject_reason is not None:
wait_until(lambda: self.reject_reason_received == reject_reason, lock=mininode_lock)
def run_test(self):
self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
self.log.info('Check that txs from p2p are rejected')
prevtx = self.nodes[0].getblock(self.nodes[0].getblockhash(1), 2)['tx'][0]
rawtx = self.nodes[0].createrawtransaction(
inputs=[{
'txid': prevtx['txid'],
'vout': 0
}],
outputs=[{
self.nodes[0].get_deterministic_priv_key().address: 50 - 0.00125
}],
)
sigtx = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithkey(
hexstring=rawtx,
privkeys=[self.nodes[0].get_deterministic_priv_key().key],
prevtxs=[{
'txid': prevtx['txid'],
'vout': 0,
'scriptPubKey': prevtx['vout'][0]['scriptPubKey']['hex'],
}],
)['hex']
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getnetworkinfo()['localrelay'], False)
with self.nodes[0].assert_debug_log(['transaction sent in violation of protocol peer=0']):
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_message(msg_tx(FromHex(CTransaction(), sigtx)))
self.nodes[0].p2p.sync_with_ping()
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getmempoolinfo()['size'], 0)
self.log.info('Check that txs from rpc are not rejected and relayed to other peers')
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getpeerinfo()[0]['relaytxes'], True)
txid = self.nodes[0].testmempoolaccept([sigtx])[0]['txid']
with self.nodes[0].assert_debug_log(['received getdata for: tx {} peer=0'.format(txid)]):
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(sigtx)
self.nodes[0].p2p.wait_for_tx(txid)
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getmempoolinfo()['size'], 1)
def test_getblocktxn_requests(self, node, test_node, version):
with_witness = (version==2)
def test_getblocktxn_response(compact_block, peer, expected_result):
msg = msg_cmpctblock(compact_block.to_p2p())
peer.send_and_ping(msg)
with mininode_lock:
assert("getblocktxn" in peer.last_message)
absolute_indexes = peer.last_message["getblocktxn"].block_txn_request.to_absolute()
assert_equal(absolute_indexes, expected_result)
def test_tip_after_message(node, peer, msg, tip):
peer.send_and_ping(msg)
assert_equal(int(node.getbestblockhash(), 16), tip)
# First try announcing compactblocks that won't reconstruct, and verify
# that we receive getblocktxn messages back.
utxo = self.utxos.pop(0)
block = self.build_block_with_transactions(node, utxo, 5)
self.utxos.append([block.vtx[-1].sha256, 0, block.vtx[-1].vout[0].nValue])
comp_block = HeaderAndShortIDs()
comp_block.initialize_from_block(block, use_witness=with_witness)
test_getblocktxn_response(comp_block, test_node, [1, 2, 3, 4, 5])
msg_bt = msg_blocktxn()
if with_witness:
msg_bt = msg_witness_blocktxn() # serialize with witnesses
msg_bt.block_transactions = BlockTransactions(block.sha256, block.vtx[1:])
test_tip_after_message(node, test_node, msg_bt, block.sha256)
utxo = self.utxos.pop(0)
block = self.build_block_with_transactions(node, utxo, 5)
self.utxos.append([block.vtx[-1].sha256, 0, block.vtx[-1].vout[0].nValue])
# Now try interspersing the prefilled transactions
comp_block.initialize_from_block(block, prefill_list=[0, 1, 5], use_witness=with_witness)
test_getblocktxn_response(comp_block, test_node, [2, 3, 4])
msg_bt.block_transactions = BlockTransactions(block.sha256, block.vtx[2:5])
test_tip_after_message(node, test_node, msg_bt, block.sha256)
# Now try giving one transaction ahead of time.
utxo = self.utxos.pop(0)
block = self.build_block_with_transactions(node, utxo, 5)
self.utxos.append([block.vtx[-1].sha256, 0, block.vtx[-1].vout[0].nValue])
test_node.send_and_ping(msg_tx(block.vtx[1]))
assert(block.vtx[1].hash in node.getrawmempool())
# Prefill 4 out of the 6 transactions, and verify that only the one
# that was not in the mempool is requested.
comp_block.initialize_from_block(block, prefill_list=[0, 2, 3, 4], use_witness=with_witness)
test_getblocktxn_response(comp_block, test_node, [5])
msg_bt.block_transactions = BlockTransactions(block.sha256, [block.vtx[5]])
test_tip_after_message(node, test_node, msg_bt, block.sha256)
# Now provide all transactions to the node before the block is
# announced and verify reconstruction happens immediately.
utxo = self.utxos.pop(0)
block = self.build_block_with_transactions(node, utxo, 10)
self.utxos.append([block.vtx[-1].sha256, 0, block.vtx[-1].vout[0].nValue])
for tx in block.vtx[1:]:
test_node.send_message(msg_tx(tx))
test_node.sync_with_ping()
# Make sure all transactions were accepted.
mempool = node.getrawmempool()
for tx in block.vtx[1:]:
assert(tx.hash in mempool)
# Clear out last request.
with mininode_lock:
test_node.last_message.pop("getblocktxn", None)
# Send compact block
comp_block.initialize_from_block(block, prefill_list=[0], use_witness=with_witness)
test_tip_after_message(node, test_node, msg_cmpctblock(comp_block.to_p2p()), block.sha256)
with mininode_lock:
# Shouldn't have gotten a request for any transaction
assert("getblocktxn" not in test_node.last_message)
def test_getblocktxn_requests(self, node, test_node, version):
with_witness = (version == 2)
def test_getblocktxn_response(compact_block, peer, expected_result):
msg = msg_cmpctblock(compact_block.to_p2p())
peer.send_and_ping(msg)
with mininode_lock:
assert ("getblocktxn" in peer.last_message)
absolute_indexes = peer.last_message[
"getblocktxn"].block_txn_request.to_absolute()
assert_equal(absolute_indexes, expected_result)
def test_tip_after_message(node, peer, msg, tip):
peer.send_and_ping(msg)
assert_equal(int(node.getbestblockhash(), 16), tip)
# First try announcing compactblocks that won't reconstruct, and verify
# that we receive getblocktxn messages back.
utxo = self.utxos.pop(0)
block = self.build_block_with_transactions(node, utxo, 5)
self.utxos.append(
[block.vtx[-1].sha256, 0, block.vtx[-1].vout[0].nValue])
comp_block = HeaderAndShortIDs()
comp_block.initialize_from_block(block, use_witness=with_witness)
test_getblocktxn_response(comp_block, test_node, [1, 2, 3, 4, 5])
msg_bt = msg_blocktxn()
if with_witness:
msg_bt = msg_witness_blocktxn() # serialize with witnesses
msg_bt.block_transactions = BlockTransactions(block.sha256,
block.vtx[1:])
test_tip_after_message(node, test_node, msg_bt, block.sha256)
utxo = self.utxos.pop(0)
block = self.build_block_with_transactions(node, utxo, 5)
self.utxos.append(
[block.vtx[-1].sha256, 0, block.vtx[-1].vout[0].nValue])
# Now try interspersing the prefilled transactions
comp_block.initialize_from_block(block,
prefill_list=[0, 1, 5],
use_witness=with_witness)
test_getblocktxn_response(comp_block, test_node, [2, 3, 4])
msg_bt.block_transactions = BlockTransactions(block.sha256,
block.vtx[2:5])
test_tip_after_message(node, test_node, msg_bt, block.sha256)
# Now try giving one transaction ahead of time.
utxo = self.utxos.pop(0)
block = self.build_block_with_transactions(node, utxo, 5)
self.utxos.append(
[block.vtx[-1].sha256, 0, block.vtx[-1].vout[0].nValue])
test_node.send_and_ping(msg_tx(block.vtx[1]))
assert (block.vtx[1].hash in node.getrawmempool())
# Prefill 4 out of the 6 transactions, and verify that only the one
# that was not in the mempool is requested.
comp_block.initialize_from_block(block,
prefill_list=[0, 2, 3, 4],
use_witness=with_witness)
test_getblocktxn_response(comp_block, test_node, [5])
msg_bt.block_transactions = BlockTransactions(block.sha256,
[block.vtx[5]])
test_tip_after_message(node, test_node, msg_bt, block.sha256)
# Now provide all transactions to the node before the block is
# announced and verify reconstruction happens immediately.
utxo = self.utxos.pop(0)
block = self.build_block_with_transactions(node, utxo, 10)
self.utxos.append(
[block.vtx[-1].sha256, 0, block.vtx[-1].vout[0].nValue])
for tx in block.vtx[1:]:
test_node.send_message(msg_tx(tx))
test_node.sync_with_ping()
# Make sure all transactions were accepted.
mempool = node.getrawmempool()
for tx in block.vtx[1:]:
assert (tx.hash in mempool)
# Clear out last request.
with mininode_lock:
test_node.last_message.pop("getblocktxn", None)
# Send compact block
comp_block.initialize_from_block(block,
prefill_list=[0],
use_witness=with_witness)
test_tip_after_message(node, test_node,
msg_cmpctblock(comp_block.to_p2p()),
block.sha256)
with mininode_lock:
# Shouldn't have gotten a request for any transaction
assert ("getblocktxn" not in test_node.last_message)
def test_incorrect_blocktxn_response(self, node, test_node, version):
if (len(self.utxos) == 0):
self.make_utxos()
utxo = self.utxos.pop(0)
block = self.build_block_with_transactions(node, utxo, 10)
self.utxos.append(
[block.vtx[-1].sha256, 0, block.vtx[-1].vout[0].nValue])
# Relay the first 5 transactions from the block in advance
for tx in block.vtx[1:6]:
test_node.send_message(msg_tx(tx))
test_node.sync_with_ping()
# Make sure all transactions were accepted.
mempool = node.getrawmempool()
for tx in block.vtx[1:6]:
assert (tx.hash in mempool)
# Send compact block
comp_block = HeaderAndShortIDs()
comp_block.initialize_from_block(block,
prefill_list=[0],
use_witness=(version == 2))
test_node.send_and_ping(msg_cmpctblock(comp_block.to_p2p()))
absolute_indexes = []
with mininode_lock:
assert ("getblocktxn" in test_node.last_message)
absolute_indexes = test_node.last_message[
"getblocktxn"].block_txn_request.to_absolute()
assert_equal(absolute_indexes, [6, 7, 8, 9, 10])
# Now give an incorrect response.
# Note that it's possible for bitcoind to be smart enough to know we're
# lying, since it could check to see if the shortid matches what we're
# sending, and eg disconnect us for misbehavior. If that behavior
# change was made, we could just modify this test by having a
# different peer provide the block further down, so that we're still
# verifying that the block isn't marked bad permanently. This is good
# enough for now.
msg = msg_blocktxn()
if version == 2:
msg = msg_witness_blocktxn()
msg.block_transactions = BlockTransactions(
block.sha256, [block.vtx[5]] + block.vtx[7:])
test_node.send_and_ping(msg)
# Tip should not have updated
assert_equal(int(node.getbestblockhash(), 16), block.hashPrevBlock)
# We should receive a getdata request
wait_until(lambda: "getdata" in test_node.last_message,
timeout=10,
lock=mininode_lock)
assert_equal(len(test_node.last_message["getdata"].inv), 1)
assert (test_node.last_message["getdata"].inv[0].type == 2
or test_node.last_message["getdata"].inv[0].type
== 2 | MSG_WITNESS_FLAG)
assert_equal(test_node.last_message["getdata"].inv[0].hash,
block.sha256)
# Deliver the block
if version == 2:
test_node.send_and_ping(msg_witness_block(block))
else:
test_node.send_and_ping(msg_block(block))
assert_equal(int(node.getbestblockhash(), 16), block.sha256)
def run_test(self):
self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
self.log.info(
'Check that txs from p2p are rejected and result in disconnect')
prevtx = self.nodes[0].getblock(self.nodes[0].getblockhash(1),
2)['tx'][0]
rawtx = self.nodes[0].createrawtransaction(
inputs=[{
'txid': prevtx['txid'],
'vout': 0
}],
outputs=[{
self.nodes[0].get_deterministic_priv_key().address:
50 - 0.00125
}],
)
sigtx = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithkey(
hexstring=rawtx,
privkeys=[self.nodes[0].get_deterministic_priv_key().key],
prevtxs=[{
'txid': prevtx['txid'],
'vout': 0,
'scriptPubKey': prevtx['vout'][0]['scriptPubKey']['hex'],
}],
)['hex']
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getnetworkinfo()['localrelay'], False)
with self.nodes[0].assert_debug_log(
['transaction sent in violation of protocol peer=0']):
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_message(
msg_tx(FromHex(CTransaction(), sigtx)))
self.nodes[0].p2p.wait_for_disconnect()
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getmempoolinfo()['size'], 0)
# Remove the disconnected peer and add a new one.
del self.nodes[0].p2ps[0]
self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
self.log.info(
'Check that txs from rpc are not rejected and relayed to other peers'
)
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getpeerinfo()[0]['relaytxes'], True)
txid = self.nodes[0].testmempoolaccept([sigtx])[0]['txid']
with self.nodes[0].assert_debug_log(
['received getdata for: wtx {} peer=1'.format(txid)]):
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(sigtx)
self.nodes[0].p2p.wait_for_tx(txid)
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getmempoolinfo()['size'], 1)
self.log.info(
'Check that txs from forcerelay peers are not rejected and relayed to others'
)
self.log.info(
"Restarting node 0 with forcerelay permission and blocksonly")
self.restart_node(0, [
"-persistmempool=0", "-whitelist=127.0.0.1",
"-whitelistforcerelay", "-blocksonly"
])
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getrawmempool(), [])
first_peer = self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
second_peer = self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
peer_1_info = self.nodes[0].getpeerinfo()[0]
assert_equal(peer_1_info['whitelisted'], True)
assert_equal(peer_1_info['permissions'],
['noban', 'forcerelay', 'relay', 'mempool', 'download'])
peer_2_info = self.nodes[0].getpeerinfo()[1]
assert_equal(peer_2_info['whitelisted'], True)
assert_equal(peer_2_info['permissions'],
['noban', 'forcerelay', 'relay', 'mempool', 'download'])
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].testmempoolaccept([sigtx])[0]['allowed'],
True)
txid = self.nodes[0].testmempoolaccept([sigtx])[0]['txid']
self.log.info(
'Check that the tx from forcerelay first_peer is relayed to others (ie.second_peer)'
)
with self.nodes[0].assert_debug_log(["received getdata"]):
first_peer.send_message(msg_tx(FromHex(CTransaction(), sigtx)))
self.log.info(
'Check that the forcerelay peer is still connected after sending the transaction'
)
assert_equal(first_peer.is_connected, True)
second_peer.wait_for_tx(txid)
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getmempoolinfo()['size'], 1)
self.log.info("Forcerelay peer's transaction is accepted and relayed")
def run_test(self):
protected_peers = set(
) # peers that we expect to be protected from eviction
current_peer = -1
node = self.nodes[0]
self.generatetoaddress(node, COINBASE_MATURITY + 1,
node.get_deterministic_priv_key().address)
self.log.info(
"Create 4 peers and protect them from eviction by sending us a block"
)
for _ in range(4):
block_peer = node.add_p2p_connection(SlowP2PDataStore())
current_peer += 1
block_peer.sync_with_ping()
best_block = node.getbestblockhash()
tip = int(best_block, 16)
best_block_time = node.getblock(best_block)['time']
block = create_block(tip,
create_coinbase(node.getblockcount() + 1),
best_block_time + 1)
block.solve()
block_peer.send_blocks_and_test([block], node, success=True)
protected_peers.add(current_peer)
self.log.info(
"Create 5 slow-pinging peers, making them eviction candidates")
for _ in range(5):
node.add_p2p_connection(SlowP2PInterface())
current_peer += 1
self.log.info(
"Create 4 peers and protect them from eviction by sending us a tx")
for i in range(4):
txpeer = node.add_p2p_connection(SlowP2PInterface())
current_peer += 1
txpeer.sync_with_ping()
prevtx = node.getblock(node.getblockhash(i + 1), 2)['tx'][0]
rawtx = node.createrawtransaction(
inputs=[{
'txid': prevtx['txid'],
'vout': 0
}],
outputs=[{
node.get_deterministic_priv_key().address:
50 - 0.00125
}],
)
sigtx = node.signrawtransactionwithkey(
hexstring=rawtx,
privkeys=[node.get_deterministic_priv_key().key],
prevtxs=[{
'txid':
prevtx['txid'],
'vout':
0,
'scriptPubKey':
prevtx['vout'][0]['scriptPubKey']['hex'],
}],
)['hex']
txpeer.send_message(msg_tx(tx_from_hex(sigtx)))
protected_peers.add(current_peer)
self.log.info(
"Create 8 peers and protect them from eviction by having faster pings"
)
for _ in range(8):
fastpeer = node.add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
current_peer += 1
self.wait_until(lambda: "ping" in fastpeer.last_message,
timeout=10)
# Make sure by asking the node what the actual min pings are
peerinfo = node.getpeerinfo()
pings = {}
for i in range(len(peerinfo)):
pings[i] = peerinfo[i]['minping'] if 'minping' in peerinfo[
i] else 1000000
sorted_pings = sorted(pings.items(), key=lambda x: x[1])
# Usually the 8 fast peers are protected. In rare case of unreliable pings,
# one of the slower peers might have a faster min ping though.
for i in range(8):
protected_peers.add(sorted_pings[i][0])
self.log.info("Create peer that triggers the eviction mechanism")
node.add_p2p_connection(SlowP2PInterface())
# One of the non-protected peers must be evicted. We can't be sure which one because
# 4 peers are protected via netgroup, which is identical for all peers,
# and the eviction mechanism doesn't preserve the order of identical elements.
evicted_peers = []
for i in range(len(node.p2ps)):
if not node.p2ps[i].is_connected:
evicted_peers.append(i)
self.log.info("Test that one peer was evicted")
self.log.debug("{} evicted peer: {}".format(len(evicted_peers),
set(evicted_peers)))
assert_equal(len(evicted_peers), 1)
self.log.info("Test that no peer expected to be protected was evicted")
self.log.debug("{} protected peers: {}".format(len(protected_peers),
protected_peers))
assert evicted_peers[0] not in protected_peers
def run_test(self):
block_relay_peer = self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
self.log.info(
'Check that txs from p2p are rejected and result in disconnect')
prevtx = self.nodes[0].getblock(self.nodes[0].getblockhash(1),
2)['tx'][0]
rawtx = self.nodes[0].createrawtransaction(
inputs=[{
'txid': prevtx['txid'],
'vout': 0
}],
outputs=[{
self.nodes[0].get_deterministic_priv_key().address:
50 - 0.00125
}],
)
sigtx = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithkey(
hexstring=rawtx,
privkeys=[self.nodes[0].get_deterministic_priv_key().key],
prevtxs=[{
'txid': prevtx['txid'],
'vout': 0,
'scriptPubKey': prevtx['vout'][0]['scriptPubKey']['hex'],
}],
)['hex']
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getnetworkinfo()['localrelay'], False)
with self.nodes[0].assert_debug_log(
['transaction sent in violation of protocol peer=0']):
block_relay_peer.send_message(
msg_tx(FromHex(CTransaction(), sigtx)))
block_relay_peer.wait_for_disconnect()
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getmempoolinfo()['size'], 0)
# Remove the disconnected peer and add a new one.
del self.nodes[0].p2ps[0]
tx_relay_peer = self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
self.log.info(
'Check that txs from rpc are not rejected and relayed to other peers'
)
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getpeerinfo()[0]['relaytxes'], True)
txid = self.nodes[0].testmempoolaccept([sigtx])[0]['txid']
with self.nodes[0].assert_debug_log(
['received getdata for: wtx {} peer=1'.format(txid)]):
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(sigtx)
tx_relay_peer.wait_for_tx(txid)
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getmempoolinfo()['size'], 1)
self.log.info(
'Check that txs from peers with relay-permission are not rejected and relayed to others'
)
self.log.info("Restarting node 0 with relay permission and blocksonly")
self.restart_node(0, [
"-persistmempool=0", "[email protected]", "-blocksonly",
'-deprecatedrpc=whitelisted'
])
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getrawmempool(), [])
first_peer = self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
second_peer = self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
peer_1_info = self.nodes[0].getpeerinfo()[0]
assert_equal(peer_1_info['permissions'], ['relay'])
peer_2_info = self.nodes[0].getpeerinfo()[1]
assert_equal(peer_2_info['permissions'], ['relay'])
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].testmempoolaccept([sigtx])[0]['allowed'],
True)
txid = self.nodes[0].testmempoolaccept([sigtx])[0]['txid']
self.log.info(
'Check that the tx from first_peer with relay-permission is relayed to others (ie.second_peer)'
)
with self.nodes[0].assert_debug_log(["received getdata"]):
# Note that normally, first_peer would never send us transactions since we're a blocksonly node.
# By activating blocksonly, we explicitly tell our peers that they should not send us transactions,
# and TNGC Core respects that choice and will not send transactions.
# But if, for some reason, first_peer decides to relay transactions to us anyway, we should relay them to
# second_peer since we gave relay permission to first_peer.
# See https://github.com/tngc/tngc/issues/19943 for details.
first_peer.send_message(msg_tx(FromHex(CTransaction(), sigtx)))
self.log.info(
'Check that the peer with relay-permission is still connected after sending the transaction'
)
assert_equal(first_peer.is_connected, True)
second_peer.wait_for_tx(txid)
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getmempoolinfo()['size'], 1)
self.log.info(
"Relay-permission peer's transaction is accepted and relayed")
def run_test(self):
self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
self.log.info("Mining {} blocks".format(CLTV_HEIGHT - 2))
self.coinbase_txids = [
self.nodes[0].getblock(b)['tx'][0]
for b in self.nodes[0].generate(CLTV_HEIGHT - 2)
]
self.nodeaddress = self.nodes[0].getnewaddress()
self.log.info(
"Test that an invalid-according-to-CLTV transaction can still appear in a block"
)
fundtx = create_transaction(self.nodes[0], self.coinbase_txids[0],
self.nodeaddress, 49.99)
fundtx, spendtx = cltv_lock_to_height(self.nodes[0], fundtx,
self.nodeaddress, 49.98)
tip = self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash()
block_time = self.nodes[0].getblockheader(tip)['mediantime'] + 1
block = create_block(int(tip, 16), create_coinbase(CLTV_HEIGHT - 1),
block_time)
block.nVersion = 3
block.vtx.append(fundtx)
# include the -1 CLTV in block
block.vtx.append(spendtx)
make_conform_to_ctor(block)
block.hashMerkleRoot = block.calc_merkle_root()
block.solve()
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_block(block))
# This block is valid
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), block.hash)
self.log.info("Test that blocks must now be at least version 4")
tip = block.sha256
block_time += 1
block = create_block(tip, create_coinbase(CLTV_HEIGHT), block_time)
block.nVersion = 3
block.solve()
with self.nodes[0].assert_debug_log(expected_msgs=[
'{}, bad-version(0x00000003)'.format(block.hash)
]):
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_block(block))
assert_equal(int(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), 16), tip)
self.nodes[0].p2p.sync_with_ping()
self.log.info(
"Test that invalid-according-to-cltv transactions cannot appear in a block"
)
block.nVersion = 4
fundtx = create_transaction(self.nodes[0], self.coinbase_txids[1],
self.nodeaddress, 49.99)
fundtx, spendtx = cltv_lock_to_height(self.nodes[0], fundtx,
self.nodeaddress, 49.98)
# The funding tx only has unexecuted bad CLTV, in scriptpubkey; this is valid.
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_tx(fundtx))
assert fundtx.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
# Mine a block containing the funding transaction
block.vtx.append(fundtx)
block.hashMerkleRoot = block.calc_merkle_root()
block.solve()
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_block(block))
# This block is valid
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), block.hash)
# We show that this tx is invalid due to CLTV by getting it
# rejected from the mempool for exactly that reason.
assert_equal([{
'txid':
spendtx.hash,
'allowed':
False,
'reject-reason':
'64: non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (Negative locktime)'
}], self.nodes[0].testmempoolaccept(rawtxs=[spendtx.serialize().hex()],
allowhighfees=True))
rejectedtx_signed = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithwallet(
ToHex(spendtx))
# Couldn't complete signature due to CLTV
assert rejectedtx_signed['errors'][0]['error'] == 'Negative locktime'
tip = block.hash
block_time += 1
block = create_block(block.sha256, create_coinbase(CLTV_HEIGHT + 1),
block_time)
block.nVersion = 4
block.vtx.append(spendtx)
block.hashMerkleRoot = block.calc_merkle_root()
block.solve()
with self.nodes[0].assert_debug_log(expected_msgs=[
'ConnectBlock {} failed (blk-bad-inputs'.format(block.hash)
]):
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_block(block))
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), tip)
self.nodes[0].p2p.sync_with_ping()
self.log.info(
"Test that a version 4 block with a valid-according-to-CLTV transaction is accepted"
)
fundtx = create_transaction(self.nodes[0], self.coinbase_txids[2],
self.nodeaddress, 49.99)
fundtx, spendtx = cltv_lock_to_height(self.nodes[0], fundtx,
self.nodeaddress, 49.98,
CLTV_HEIGHT)
# make sure sequence is nonfinal and locktime is good
spendtx.vin[0].nSequence = 0xfffffffe
spendtx.nLockTime = CLTV_HEIGHT
# both transactions are fully valid
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(ToHex(fundtx))
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(ToHex(spendtx))
# Modify the transactions in the block to be valid against CLTV
block.vtx.pop(1)
block.vtx.append(fundtx)
block.vtx.append(spendtx)
make_conform_to_ctor(block)
block.hashMerkleRoot = block.calc_merkle_root()
block.solve()
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_block(block))
# This block is now valid
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), block.hash)
def run_test(self):
self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
network_thread_start()
# wait_for_verack ensures that the P2P connection is fully up.
self.nodes[0].p2p.wait_for_verack()
self.log.info("Mining {} blocks".format(CLTV_HEIGHT - 2))
self.coinbase_blocks = self.nodes[0].generate(CLTV_HEIGHT - 2)
self.nodeaddress = self.nodes[0].getnewaddress()
self.log.info(
"Test that an invalid-according-to-CLTV transaction can still appear in a block"
)
fundtx = spend_from_coinbase(self.nodes[0], self.coinbase_blocks[0],
self.nodeaddress, 49.99)
fundtx, spendtx = cltv_lock_to_height(self.nodes[0], fundtx,
self.nodeaddress, 49.98)
tip = self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash()
block_time = self.nodes[0].getblockheader(tip)['mediantime'] + 1
block = create_block(int(tip, 16), create_coinbase(CLTV_HEIGHT - 1),
block_time)
block.nVersion = 3
block.vtx.append(fundtx)
# include the -1 CLTV in block
block.vtx.append(spendtx)
make_conform_to_ctor(block)
block.hashMerkleRoot = block.calc_merkle_root()
block.solve()
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_block(block))
# This block is valid
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), block.hash)
self.log.info("Test that blocks must now be at least version 4")
tip = block.sha256
block_time += 1
block = create_block(tip, create_coinbase(CLTV_HEIGHT), block_time)
block.nVersion = 3
block.solve()
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_block(block))
assert_equal(int(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), 16), tip)
wait_until(lambda: "reject" in self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message.keys(),
lock=mininode_lock)
with mininode_lock:
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message["reject"].code,
REJECT_OBSOLETE)
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message["reject"].reason,
b'bad-version(0x00000003)')
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message["reject"].data,
block.sha256)
del self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message["reject"]
self.log.info(
"Test that invalid-according-to-cltv transactions cannot appear in a block"
)
block.nVersion = 4
fundtx = spend_from_coinbase(self.nodes[0], self.coinbase_blocks[1],
self.nodeaddress, 49.99)
fundtx, spendtx = cltv_lock_to_height(self.nodes[0], fundtx,
self.nodeaddress, 49.98)
# The funding tx only has unexecuted bad CLTV, in scriptpubkey; this is valid.
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_tx(fundtx))
assert fundtx.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
# Mine a block containing the funding transaction
block.vtx.append(fundtx)
block.hashMerkleRoot = block.calc_merkle_root()
block.solve()
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_block(block))
# This block is valid
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), block.hash)
# We show that this tx is invalid due to CLTV by getting it
# rejected from the mempool for exactly that reason.
assert_equal([{
'txid':
spendtx.hash,
'allowed':
False,
'reject-reason':
'64: non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (Negative locktime)'
}], self.nodes[0].testmempoolaccept(rawtxs=[spendtx.serialize().hex()],
allowhighfees=True))
rejectedtx_signed = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithwallet(
ToHex(spendtx))
# Couldn't complete signature due to CLTV
assert (rejectedtx_signed['errors'][0]['error'] == 'Negative locktime')
tip = block.hash
block_time += 1
block = create_block(block.sha256, create_coinbase(CLTV_HEIGHT + 1),
block_time)
block.nVersion = 4
block.vtx.append(spendtx)
block.hashMerkleRoot = block.calc_merkle_root()
block.solve()
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_block(block))
# This block is invalid
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), tip)
wait_until(lambda: "reject" in self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message.keys(),
lock=mininode_lock)
with mininode_lock:
assert self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message["reject"].code in [
REJECT_INVALID, REJECT_NONSTANDARD
]
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message["reject"].data,
block.sha256)
if self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message["reject"].code == REJECT_INVALID:
# Generic rejection when a block is invalid
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message["reject"].reason,
b'blk-bad-inputs')
else:
assert b'Negative locktime' in self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message[
"reject"].reason
self.log.info(
"Test that a version 4 block with a valid-according-to-CLTV transaction is accepted"
)
fundtx = spend_from_coinbase(self.nodes[0], self.coinbase_blocks[2],
self.nodeaddress, 49.99)
fundtx, spendtx = cltv_lock_to_height(self.nodes[0], fundtx,
self.nodeaddress, 49.98,
CLTV_HEIGHT)
# make sure sequence is nonfinal and locktime is good
spendtx.vin[0].nSequence = 0xfffffffe
spendtx.nLockTime = CLTV_HEIGHT
# both transactions are fully valid
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(ToHex(fundtx))
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(ToHex(spendtx))
# Modify the transactions in the block to be valid against CLTV
block.vtx.pop(1)
block.vtx.append(fundtx)
block.vtx.append(spendtx)
make_conform_to_ctor(block)
block.hashMerkleRoot = block.calc_merkle_root()
block.solve()
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_block(block))
# This block is now valid
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), block.hash)
def run_test(self):
self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
network_thread_start()
# wait_for_verack ensures that the P2P connection is fully up.
self.nodes[0].p2p.wait_for_verack()
self.log.info("Mining {} blocks".format(CLTV_HEIGHT - 2))
self.coinbase_blocks = self.nodes[0].generate(CLTV_HEIGHT - 2)
self.nodeaddress = self.nodes[0].getnewaddress()
self.log.info(
"Test that an invalid-according-to-CLTV transaction can still appear in a block"
)
spendtx = spend_from_coinbase(self.nodes[0], self.coinbase_blocks[0],
self.nodeaddress, 50.0)
spendtx = cltv_lock_to_height(self.nodes[0], spendtx)
# Make sure the tx is valid
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(ToHex(spendtx))
tip = self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash()
block_time = self.nodes[0].getblockheader(tip)['mediantime'] + 1
block = create_block(int(tip, 16), create_coinbase(CLTV_HEIGHT - 1),
block_time)
block.nVersion = 3
block.vtx.append(spendtx)
block.hashMerkleRoot = block.calc_merkle_root()
block.solve()
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_block(block))
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), block.hash)
self.log.info("Test that blocks must now be at least version 4")
tip = block.sha256
block_time += 1
block = create_block(tip, create_coinbase(CLTV_HEIGHT), block_time)
block.nVersion = 3
block.solve()
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_block(block))
assert_equal(int(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), 16), tip)
wait_until(lambda: "reject" in self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message.keys(),
lock=mininode_lock)
with mininode_lock:
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message["reject"].code,
REJECT_OBSOLETE)
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message["reject"].reason,
b'bad-version(0x00000003)')
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message["reject"].data,
block.sha256)
del self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message["reject"]
self.log.info(
"Test that invalid-according-to-cltv transactions cannot appear in a block"
)
block.nVersion = 4
spendtx = spend_from_coinbase(self.nodes[0], self.coinbase_blocks[1],
self.nodeaddress, 49.99)
spendtx = cltv_lock_to_height(self.nodes[0], spendtx)
# First we show that this tx is valid except for CLTV by getting it
# accepted to the mempool (which we can achieve with
# -promiscuousmempoolflags).
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_tx(spendtx))
assert spendtx.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
# Mine a block containing the funding transaction
block.vtx.append(spendtx)
block.hashMerkleRoot = block.calc_merkle_root()
block.solve()
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_block(block))
# This block is valid
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), block.hash)
# But a block containing a transaction spending this utxo is not
rawspendtx = self.nodes[0].decoderawtransaction(ToHex(spendtx))
inputs = [{
"txid": rawspendtx['txid'],
"vout": rawspendtx['vout'][0]['n']
}]
output = {self.nodeaddress: 49.98}
rejectedtx_raw = self.nodes[0].createrawtransaction(inputs, output)
rejectedtx_signed = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithwallet(
rejectedtx_raw)
# Couldn't complete signature due to CLTV
assert (rejectedtx_signed['errors'][0]['error'] == 'Negative locktime')
rejectedtx = FromHex(CTransaction(), rejectedtx_signed['hex'])
pad_tx(rejectedtx)
rejectedtx.rehash()
tip = block.hash
block_time += 1
block = create_block(block.sha256, create_coinbase(CLTV_HEIGHT + 1),
block_time)
block.nVersion = 4
block.vtx.append(rejectedtx)
block.hashMerkleRoot = block.calc_merkle_root()
block.solve()
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_block(block))
# This block is invalid
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), tip)
wait_until(lambda: "reject" in self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message.keys(),
lock=mininode_lock)
with mininode_lock:
assert self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message["reject"].code in [
REJECT_INVALID, REJECT_NONSTANDARD
]
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message["reject"].data,
block.sha256)
if self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message["reject"].code == REJECT_INVALID:
# Generic rejection when a block is invalid
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message["reject"].reason,
b'blk-bad-inputs')
else:
assert b'Negative locktime' in self.nodes[0].p2p.last_message[
"reject"].reason
self.log.info(
"Test that a version 4 block with a valid-according-to-CLTV transaction is accepted"
)
spendtx = spend_from_coinbase(self.nodes[0], self.coinbase_blocks[2],
self.nodeaddress, 49.99)
spendtx = cltv_lock_to_height(self.nodes[0], spendtx, CLTV_HEIGHT - 1)
# Modify the transaction in the block to be valid against CLTV
block.vtx.pop(1)
block.vtx.append(spendtx)
block.hashMerkleRoot = block.calc_merkle_root()
block.solve()
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_block(block))
# This block is now valid
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), block.hash)
# A block containing a transaction spending this utxo is also valid
# Build this transaction
rawspendtx = self.nodes[0].decoderawtransaction(ToHex(spendtx))
inputs = [{
"txid": rawspendtx['txid'],
"vout": rawspendtx['vout'][0]['n'],
"sequence": 0
}]
output = {self.nodeaddress: 49.98}
validtx_raw = self.nodes[0].createrawtransaction(
inputs, output, CLTV_HEIGHT)
validtx = FromHex(CTransaction(), validtx_raw)
# Signrawtransaction won't sign a non standard tx.
# But the prevout being anyone can spend, scriptsig can be left empty
validtx.vin[0].scriptSig = CScript()
pad_tx(validtx)
validtx.rehash()
tip = block.sha256
block_time += 1
block = create_block(tip, create_coinbase(CLTV_HEIGHT + 3), block_time)
block.nVersion = 4
block.vtx.append(validtx)
block.hashMerkleRoot = block.calc_merkle_root()
block.solve()
self.nodes[0].p2p.send_and_ping(msg_block(block))
# This block is valid
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), block.hash)
def test_instantsend_publishers(self):
instantsend_publishers = [
ZMQPublisher.hash_tx_lock,
ZMQPublisher.raw_tx_lock,
ZMQPublisher.raw_tx_lock_sig,
ZMQPublisher.hash_instantsend_doublespend,
ZMQPublisher.raw_instantsend_doublespend
]
self.log.info("Testing %d InstantSend publishers" % len(instantsend_publishers))
# Subscribe to InstantSend messages
self.subscribe(instantsend_publishers)
# Initialize test node
self.test_node = self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(TestP2PConn())
network_thread_start()
self.nodes[0].p2p.wait_for_verack()
# Make sure all nodes agree
self.wait_for_chainlocked_block_all_nodes(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash())
# Create two raw TXs, they will conflict with each other
rpc_raw_tx_1 = self.create_raw_tx(self.nodes[0], self.nodes[0], 1, 1, 100)
rpc_raw_tx_2 = self.create_raw_tx(self.nodes[0], self.nodes[0], 1, 1, 100)
# Send the first transaction and wait for the InstantLock
rpc_raw_tx_1_hash = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(rpc_raw_tx_1['hex'])
self.wait_for_instantlock(rpc_raw_tx_1_hash, self.nodes[0])
# Validate hashtxlock
zmq_tx_lock_hash = bytes_to_hex_str(self.receive(ZMQPublisher.hash_tx_lock).read(32))
assert_equal(zmq_tx_lock_hash, rpc_raw_tx_1['txid'])
# Validate rawtxlock
zmq_tx_lock_raw = CTransaction()
zmq_tx_lock_raw.deserialize(self.receive(ZMQPublisher.raw_tx_lock))
assert(zmq_tx_lock_raw.is_valid())
assert_equal(zmq_tx_lock_raw.hash, rpc_raw_tx_1['txid'])
# Validate rawtxlocksig
zmq_tx_lock_sig_stream = self.receive(ZMQPublisher.raw_tx_lock_sig)
zmq_tx_lock_tx = CTransaction()
zmq_tx_lock_tx.deserialize(zmq_tx_lock_sig_stream)
assert(zmq_tx_lock_tx.is_valid())
assert_equal(zmq_tx_lock_tx.hash, rpc_raw_tx_1['txid'])
zmq_tx_lock = msg_islock()
zmq_tx_lock.deserialize(zmq_tx_lock_sig_stream)
assert_equal(uint256_to_string(zmq_tx_lock.txid), rpc_raw_tx_1['txid'])
# Try to send the second transaction. This must throw an RPC error because it conflicts with rpc_raw_tx_1
# which already got the InstantSend lock.
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "tx-txlock-conflict", self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, rpc_raw_tx_2['hex'])
# Validate hashinstantsenddoublespend
zmq_double_spend_hash2 = bytes_to_hex_str(self.receive(ZMQPublisher.hash_instantsend_doublespend).read(32))
zmq_double_spend_hash1 = bytes_to_hex_str(self.receive(ZMQPublisher.hash_instantsend_doublespend).read(32))
assert_equal(zmq_double_spend_hash2, rpc_raw_tx_2['txid'])
assert_equal(zmq_double_spend_hash1, rpc_raw_tx_1['txid'])
# Validate rawinstantsenddoublespend
zmq_double_spend_tx_2 = CTransaction()
zmq_double_spend_tx_2.deserialize(self.receive(ZMQPublisher.raw_instantsend_doublespend))
assert (zmq_double_spend_tx_2.is_valid())
assert_equal(zmq_double_spend_tx_2.hash, rpc_raw_tx_2['txid'])
zmq_double_spend_tx_1 = CTransaction()
zmq_double_spend_tx_1.deserialize(self.receive(ZMQPublisher.raw_instantsend_doublespend))
assert(zmq_double_spend_tx_1.is_valid())
assert_equal(zmq_double_spend_tx_1.hash, rpc_raw_tx_1['txid'])
# No islock notifications when tx is not received yet
self.nodes[0].generate(1)
rpc_raw_tx_3 = self.create_raw_tx(self.nodes[0], self.nodes[0], 1, 1, 100)
islock = self.create_islock(rpc_raw_tx_3['hex'])
self.test_node.send_islock(islock)
# Validate NO hashtxlock
time.sleep(1)
try:
self.receive(ZMQPublisher.hash_tx_lock, zmq.NOBLOCK)
assert(False)
except zmq.ZMQError:
# this is expected
pass
# Now send the tx itself
self.test_node.send_tx(FromHex(msg_tx(), rpc_raw_tx_3['hex']))
self.wait_for_instantlock(rpc_raw_tx_3['txid'], self.nodes[0])
# Validate hashtxlock
zmq_tx_lock_hash = bytes_to_hex_str(self.receive(ZMQPublisher.hash_tx_lock).read(32))
assert_equal(zmq_tx_lock_hash, rpc_raw_tx_3['txid'])
# Drop test node connection
self.nodes[0].disconnect_p2ps()
# Unsubscribe from InstantSend messages
self.unsubscribe(instantsend_publishers)