def sign(self):
logger.debug('certificate.sign')
assert self.cert != None
assert self.issuerSubject != None
assert self.issuerKey != None
self.cert.set_issuer(self.issuerSubject)
self.cert.sign(self.issuerKey.get_openssl_pkey(), self.digest)
def sign(self):
logger.debug('certificate.sign')
assert self.cert != None
assert self.issuerSubject != None
assert self.issuerKey != None
self.cert.set_issuer(self.issuerSubject)
self.cert.sign(self.issuerKey.get_openssl_pkey(), self.digest)
def get_extensions(self):
# pyOpenSSL does not have a way to get extensions
triples=[]
m2x509 = X509.load_cert_string(self.save_to_string())
nb_extensions=m2x509.get_ext_count()
logger.debug("X509 had %d extensions"%nb_extensions)
for i in range(nb_extensions):
ext=m2x509.get_ext_at(i)
triples.append( (ext.get_name(), ext.get_value(), ext.get_critical(),) )
return triples
def __init__(self, create=False, subject=None, string=None, filename=None, uuid=None, hrn=None, urn=None, lifeDays=1825):
Certificate.__init__(self, lifeDays, create, subject, string, filename)
if subject:
logger.debug("Creating GID for subject: %s" % subject)
if uuid:
self.uuid = int(uuid)
if hrn:
self.hrn = hrn
self.urn = hrn_to_urn(hrn, 'unknown')
if urn:
self.urn = urn
self.hrn, type = urn_to_hrn(urn)
def get_extensions(self):
# pyOpenSSL does not have a way to get extensions
triples = []
m2x509 = X509.load_cert_string(self.save_to_string())
nb_extensions = m2x509.get_ext_count()
logger.debug("X509 had %d extensions" % nb_extensions)
for i in range(nb_extensions):
ext = m2x509.get_ext_at(i)
triples.append((
ext.get_name(),
ext.get_value(),
ext.get_critical(),
))
return triples
def __init__(self,
create=False,
subject=None,
string=None,
filename=None,
uuid=None,
hrn=None,
urn=None,
lifeDays=1825):
Certificate.__init__(self, lifeDays, create, subject, string, filename)
if subject:
logger.debug("Creating GID for subject: %s" % subject)
if uuid:
self.uuid = int(uuid)
if hrn:
self.hrn = hrn
self.urn = hrn_to_urn(hrn, 'unknown')
if urn:
self.urn = urn
self.hrn, type = urn_to_hrn(urn)
def verify_issuer(self, trusted_gids):
root_cred = self.get_credential_list()[-1]
root_target_gid = root_cred.get_gid_object()
root_cred_signer = root_cred.get_signature().get_issuer_gid()
# Case 1:
# Allow non authority to sign target and cred about target.
#
# Why do we need to allow non authorities to sign?
# If in the target gid validation step we correctly
# checked that the target is only signed by an authority,
# then this is just a special case of case 3.
# This short-circuit is the common case currently -
# and cause GID validation doesn't check 'authority',
# this allows users to generate valid slice credentials.
if root_target_gid.is_signed_by_cert(root_cred_signer):
# cred signer matches target signer, return success
return
# Case 2:
# Allow someone to sign credential about themeselves. Used?
# If not, remove this.
#root_target_gid_str = root_target_gid.save_to_string()
#root_cred_signer_str = root_cred_signer.save_to_string()
#if root_target_gid_str == root_cred_signer_str:
# # cred signer is target, return success
# return
# Case 3:
# root_cred_signer is not the target_gid
# So this is a different gid that we have not verified.
# xmlsec1 verified the cert chain on this already, but
# it hasn't verified that the gid meets the HRN namespace
# requirements.
# Below we'll ensure that it is an authority.
# But we haven't verified that it is _signed by_ an authority
# We also don't know if xmlsec1 requires that cert signers
# are marked as CAs.
# Note that if verify() gave us no trusted_gids then this
# call will fail. So skip it if we have no trusted_gids
if trusted_gids and len(trusted_gids) > 0:
root_cred_signer.verify_chain(trusted_gids)
else:
logger.debug(
"No trusted gids. Cannot verify that cred signer is signed by a trusted authority. Skipping that check."
)
# See if the signer is an authority over the domain of the target.
# There are multiple types of authority - accept them all here
# Maybe should be (hrn, type) = urn_to_hrn(root_cred_signer.get_urn())
root_cred_signer_type = root_cred_signer.get_type()
if (root_cred_signer_type.find('authority') == 0):
#logger.debug('Cred signer is an authority')
# signer is an authority, see if target is in authority's domain
signerhrn = root_cred_signer.get_hrn()
if hrn_authfor_hrn(signerhrn, root_target_gid.get_hrn()):
return
# We've required that the credential be signed by an authority
# for that domain. Reasonable and probably correct.
# A looser model would also allow the signer to be an authority
# in my control framework - eg My CA or CH. Even if it is not
# the CH that issued these, eg, user credentials.
# Give up, credential does not pass issuer verification
raise CredentialNotVerifiable(
"Could not verify credential owned by %s for object %s. Cred signer %s not the trusted authority for Cred target %s"
% (self.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidObject.get_urn(),
root_cred_signer.get_hrn(), root_target_gid.get_hrn()))
def verify_chain(self, trusted_certs=None):
# Verify a chain of certificates. Each certificate must be signed by
# the public key contained in it's parent. The chain is recursed
# until a certificate is found that is signed by a trusted root.
# verify expiration time
if self.cert.has_expired():
logger.debug("verify_chain: NO, Certificate %s has expired" %
self.get_printable_subject())
raise CertExpired(self.get_printable_subject(), "client cert")
# if this cert is signed by a trusted_cert, then we are set
for trusted_cert in trusted_certs:
if self.is_signed_by_cert(trusted_cert):
# verify expiration of trusted_cert ?
if not trusted_cert.cert.has_expired():
logger.debug(
"verify_chain: YES. Cert %s signed by trusted cert %s"
% (self.get_printable_subject(),
trusted_cert.get_printable_subject()))
return trusted_cert
else:
logger.debug(
"verify_chain: NO. Cert %s is signed by trusted_cert %s, but that signer is expired..."
% (self.get_printable_subject(),
trusted_cert.get_printable_subject()))
raise CertExpired(
self.get_printable_subject(),
" signer trusted_cert %s" %
trusted_cert.get_printable_subject())
# if there is no parent, then no way to verify the chain
if not self.parent:
logger.debug(
"verify_chain: NO. %s has no parent and issuer %s is not in %d trusted roots"
% (self.get_printable_subject(), self.get_issuer(),
len(trusted_certs)))
raise CertMissingParent(
self.get_printable_subject() +
": Issuer %s is not one of the %d trusted roots, and cert has no parent."
% (self.get_issuer(), len(trusted_certs)))
# if it wasn't signed by the parent...
if not self.is_signed_by_cert(self.parent):
logger.debug("verify_chain: NO. %s is not signed by parent %s, but by %s"%\
(self.get_printable_subject(),
self.parent.get_printable_subject(),
self.get_issuer()))
raise CertNotSignedByParent("%s: Parent %s, issuer %s"\
% (self.get_printable_subject(),
self.parent.get_printable_subject(),
self.get_issuer()))
# Confirm that the parent is a CA. Only CAs can be trusted as
# signers.
# Note that trusted roots are not parents, so don't need to be
# CAs.
# Ugly - cert objects aren't parsed so we need to read the
# extension and hope there are no other basicConstraints
if not self.parent.isCA and not (
self.parent.get_extension('basicConstraints') == 'CA:TRUE'):
logger.warn("verify_chain: cert %s's parent %s is not a CA" % \
(self.get_printable_subject(), self.parent.get_printable_subject()))
raise CertNotSignedByParent("%s: Parent %s not a CA" %
(self.get_printable_subject(),
self.parent.get_printable_subject()))
# if the parent isn't verified...
logger.debug("verify_chain: .. %s, -> verifying parent %s"%\
(self.get_printable_subject(),self.parent.get_printable_subject()))
self.parent.verify_chain(trusted_certs)
return
def verify_chain(self, trusted_certs = None):
# Verify a chain of certificates. Each certificate must be signed by
# the public key contained in it's parent. The chain is recursed
# until a certificate is found that is signed by a trusted root.
# verify expiration time
if self.cert.has_expired():
logger.debug("verify_chain: NO, Certificate %s has expired" % self.get_printable_subject())
raise CertExpired(self.get_printable_subject(), "client cert")
# if this cert is signed by a trusted_cert, then we are set
for trusted_cert in trusted_certs:
if self.is_signed_by_cert(trusted_cert):
# verify expiration of trusted_cert ?
if not trusted_cert.cert.has_expired():
logger.debug("verify_chain: YES. Cert %s signed by trusted cert %s"%(
self.get_printable_subject(), trusted_cert.get_printable_subject()))
return trusted_cert
else:
logger.debug("verify_chain: NO. Cert %s is signed by trusted_cert %s, but that signer is expired..."%(
self.get_printable_subject(),trusted_cert.get_printable_subject()))
raise CertExpired(self.get_printable_subject()," signer trusted_cert %s"%trusted_cert.get_printable_subject())
# if there is no parent, then no way to verify the chain
if not self.parent:
logger.debug("verify_chain: NO. %s has no parent and issuer %s is not in %d trusted roots"%(self.get_printable_subject(), self.get_issuer(), len(trusted_certs)))
raise CertMissingParent(self.get_printable_subject() + ": Issuer %s is not one of the %d trusted roots, and cert has no parent." % (self.get_issuer(), len(trusted_certs)))
# if it wasn't signed by the parent...
if not self.is_signed_by_cert(self.parent):
logger.debug("verify_chain: NO. %s is not signed by parent %s, but by %s"%\
(self.get_printable_subject(),
self.parent.get_printable_subject(),
self.get_issuer()))
raise CertNotSignedByParent("%s: Parent %s, issuer %s"\
% (self.get_printable_subject(),
self.parent.get_printable_subject(),
self.get_issuer()))
# Confirm that the parent is a CA. Only CAs can be trusted as
# signers.
# Note that trusted roots are not parents, so don't need to be
# CAs.
# Ugly - cert objects aren't parsed so we need to read the
# extension and hope there are no other basicConstraints
if not self.parent.isCA and not (self.parent.get_extension('basicConstraints') == 'CA:TRUE'):
logger.warn("verify_chain: cert %s's parent %s is not a CA" % \
(self.get_printable_subject(), self.parent.get_printable_subject()))
raise CertNotSignedByParent("%s: Parent %s not a CA" % (self.get_printable_subject(),
self.parent.get_printable_subject()))
# if the parent isn't verified...
logger.debug("verify_chain: .. %s, -> verifying parent %s"%\
(self.get_printable_subject(),self.parent.get_printable_subject()))
self.parent.verify_chain(trusted_certs)
return
def verify_issuer(self, trusted_gids):
root_cred = self.get_credential_list()[-1]
root_target_gid = root_cred.get_gid_object()
root_cred_signer = root_cred.get_signature().get_issuer_gid()
# Case 1:
# Allow non authority to sign target and cred about target.
#
# Why do we need to allow non authorities to sign?
# If in the target gid validation step we correctly
# checked that the target is only signed by an authority,
# then this is just a special case of case 3.
# This short-circuit is the common case currently -
# and cause GID validation doesn't check 'authority',
# this allows users to generate valid slice credentials.
if root_target_gid.is_signed_by_cert(root_cred_signer):
# cred signer matches target signer, return success
return
# Case 2:
# Allow someone to sign credential about themeselves. Used?
# If not, remove this.
#root_target_gid_str = root_target_gid.save_to_string()
#root_cred_signer_str = root_cred_signer.save_to_string()
#if root_target_gid_str == root_cred_signer_str:
# # cred signer is target, return success
# return
# Case 3:
# root_cred_signer is not the target_gid
# So this is a different gid that we have not verified.
# xmlsec1 verified the cert chain on this already, but
# it hasn't verified that the gid meets the HRN namespace
# requirements.
# Below we'll ensure that it is an authority.
# But we haven't verified that it is _signed by_ an authority
# We also don't know if xmlsec1 requires that cert signers
# are marked as CAs.
# Note that if verify() gave us no trusted_gids then this
# call will fail. So skip it if we have no trusted_gids
if trusted_gids and len(trusted_gids) > 0:
root_cred_signer.verify_chain(trusted_gids)
else:
logger.debug("No trusted gids. Cannot verify that cred signer is signed by a trusted authority. Skipping that check.")
# See if the signer is an authority over the domain of the target.
# There are multiple types of authority - accept them all here
# Maybe should be (hrn, type) = urn_to_hrn(root_cred_signer.get_urn())
root_cred_signer_type = root_cred_signer.get_type()
if (root_cred_signer_type.find('authority') == 0):
#logger.debug('Cred signer is an authority')
# signer is an authority, see if target is in authority's domain
signerhrn = root_cred_signer.get_hrn()
if hrn_authfor_hrn(signerhrn, root_target_gid.get_hrn()):
return
# We've required that the credential be signed by an authority
# for that domain. Reasonable and probably correct.
# A looser model would also allow the signer to be an authority
# in my control framework - eg My CA or CH. Even if it is not
# the CH that issued these, eg, user credentials.
# Give up, credential does not pass issuer verification
raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Could not verify credential owned by %s for object %s. Cred signer %s not the trusted authority for Cred target %s" % (self.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidObject.get_urn(), root_cred_signer.get_hrn(), root_target_gid.get_hrn()))
