def identify_ble(accessory_mac, adapter='hci0'):
"""
This call can be used to trigger the identification of an accessory, that was not yet paired. A successful call
should cause the accessory to perform some specific action by which it can be distinguished from others (blink a
LED for example).
It uses the /identify url as described on page 88 of the spec.
:param accessory_mac: the accessory's mac address (e.g. retrieved via discover)
:raises AccessoryNotFoundError: if the accessory could not be looked up via Bonjour
:param adapter: the bluetooth adapter to be used (defaults to hci0)
:raises AlreadyPairedError: if the accessory is already paired
"""
if not BLE_TRANSPORT_SUPPORTED:
raise TransportNotSupportedError('BLE')
from .ble_impl.device import DeviceManager
manager = DeviceManager(adapter)
device = manager.make_device(accessory_mac)
device.connect()
disco_info = device.get_homekit_discovery_data()
if disco_info.get('flags', 'unknown') == 'paired':
raise AlreadyPairedError(
'identify of {mac_address} failed not allowed as device already paired'
.format(mac_address=accessory_mac), )
identify, identify_iid = find_characteristic_by_uuid(
device,
ServicesTypes.ACCESSORY_INFORMATION_SERVICE,
CharacteristicsTypes.IDENTIFY,
)
if not identify:
raise AccessoryNotFoundError(
'Device with address {mac_address} exists but did not find IDENTIFY characteristic'
.format(mac_address=accessory_mac))
value = TLV.encode_list([(1, b'\x01')])
body = len(value).to_bytes(length=2, byteorder='little') + value
tid = random.randrange(0, 255)
request = bytearray([0x00, HapBleOpCodes.CHAR_WRITE, tid])
request.extend(identify_iid.to_bytes(length=2, byteorder='little'))
request.extend(body)
identify.write_value(request)
response = bytearray(identify.read_value())
if not response or not response[2] == 0x00:
raise UnknownError('Unpaired identify failed')
return True
def test_reorder_3(self):
val = [
[TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.M3],
[TLV.kTLVType_Salt, (16 * 'a').encode()],
[TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey, (384 * 'b').encode()],
]
tmp = TLV.reorder(
val, [TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.kTLVType_Error, TLV.kTLVType_Salt])
self.assertEqual(tmp[0][0], TLV.kTLVType_State)
self.assertEqual(tmp[0][1], TLV.M3)
self.assertEqual(tmp[1][0], TLV.kTLVType_Salt)
self.assertEqual(tmp[1][1], (16 * 'a').encode())
def check_convert_value(val, target_type):
"""
Checks if the given value is of the given type or is convertible into the type. If the value is not convertible, a
HomeKitTypeException is thrown.
:param val: the original value
:param target_type: the target type of the conversion
:return: the converted value
:raises FormatError: if the input value could not be converted to the target type
"""
if target_type == CharacteristicFormats.bool:
try:
val = strtobool(str(val))
except ValueError:
raise FormatError('"{v}" is no valid "{t}"!'.format(v=val, t=target_type))
if target_type in [CharacteristicFormats.uint64, CharacteristicFormats.uint32,
CharacteristicFormats.uint16, CharacteristicFormats.uint8,
CharacteristicFormats.int]:
try:
val = int(val)
except ValueError:
raise FormatError('"{v}" is no valid "{t}"!'.format(v=val, t=target_type))
if target_type == CharacteristicFormats.float:
try:
val = float(val)
except ValueError:
raise FormatError('"{v}" is no valid "{t}"!'.format(v=val, t=target_type))
if target_type == CharacteristicFormats.data:
try:
base64.decodebytes(val.encode())
except binascii.Error:
raise FormatError('"{v}" is no valid "{t}"!'.format(v=val, t=target_type))
if target_type == CharacteristicFormats.tlv8:
try:
tmp_bytes = base64.decodebytes(val.encode())
TLV.decode_bytes(tmp_bytes)
except (binascii.Error, TlvParseException):
raise FormatError('"{v}" is no valid "{t}"!'.format(v=val, t=target_type))
return val
def list_pairings(self):
if not self.session:
self.session = BleSession(self.pairing_data, self.adapter)
request_tlv = TLV.encode_list([(TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.M1),
(TLV.kTLVType_Method, TLV.ListPairings)
])
request_tlv = TLV.encode_list([(TLV.kTLVHAPParamParamReturnResponse,
bytearray(b'\x01')),
(TLV.kTLVHAPParamValue, request_tlv)])
body = len(request_tlv).to_bytes(length=2,
byteorder='little') + request_tlv
cid = -1
for a in self.pairing_data['accessories']:
for s in a['services']:
for c in s['characteristics']:
if CharacteristicsTypes.get_short_uuid(c['type'].upper(
)) == CharacteristicsTypes.PAIRING_PAIRINGS:
cid = c['iid']
fc, _ = self.session.find_characteristic_by_iid(cid)
response = self.session.request(fc, cid, HapBleOpCodes.CHAR_WRITE,
body)
response = TLV.decode_bytes(response[1])
tmp = []
r = {}
for d in response[1:]:
if d[0] == TLV.kTLVType_Identifier:
r = {}
tmp.append(r)
r['pairingId'] = d[1].decode()
if d[0] == TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey:
r['publicKey'] = d[1].hex()
if d[0] == TLV.kTLVType_Permissions:
controller_type = 'regular'
if d[1] == b'\x01':
controller_type = 'admin'
r['permissions'] = int.from_bytes(d[1], byteorder='little')
r['controllerType'] = controller_type
return tmp
def test_to_string_for_list(self):
example = [
(
1,
'hello',
),
]
res = TLV.to_string(example)
self.assertEqual(res, '[\n 1: (5 bytes) hello\n]\n')
example = [
(
1,
'hello',
),
(
2,
'world',
),
]
res = TLV.to_string(example)
self.assertEqual(res,
'[\n 1: (5 bytes) hello\n 2: (5 bytes) world\n]\n')
def add_pairing(self, additional_controller_pairing_identifier,
ios_device_ltpk, permissions):
if not self.session:
self.session = BleSession(self.pairing_data, self.adapter)
if permissions == 'User':
permissions = TLV.kTLVType_Permission_RegularUser
elif permissions == 'Admin':
permissions = TLV.kTLVType_Permission_AdminUser
else:
print('UNKNOWN')
request_tlv = TLV.encode_list([
(TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.M1),
(TLV.kTLVType_Method, TLV.AddPairing),
(TLV.kTLVType_Identifier,
additional_controller_pairing_identifier.encode()),
(TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey, bytes.fromhex(ios_device_ltpk)),
(TLV.kTLVType_Permissions, permissions)
])
request_tlv = TLV.encode_list([(TLV.kTLVHAPParamParamReturnResponse,
bytearray(b'\x01')),
(TLV.kTLVHAPParamValue, request_tlv)])
body = len(request_tlv).to_bytes(length=2,
byteorder='little') + request_tlv
cid = -1
for a in self.pairing_data['accessories']:
for s in a['services']:
for c in s['characteristics']:
if CharacteristicsTypes.get_short_uuid(c['type'].upper(
)) == CharacteristicsTypes.PAIRING_PAIRINGS:
cid = c['iid']
fc, _ = self.session.find_characteristic_by_iid(cid)
response = self.session.request(fc, cid, HapBleOpCodes.CHAR_WRITE,
body)
# TODO handle response properly
print('unhandled response:', response)
def add_pairing(self, additional_controller_pairing_identifier, ios_device_ltpk, permissions):
if not self.session:
self.session = IpSession(self.pairing_data)
if permissions == 'User':
permissions = TLV.kTLVType_Permission_RegularUser
elif permissions == 'Admin':
permissions = TLV.kTLVType_Permission_AdminUser
else:
print('UNKNOWN')
request_tlv = TLV.encode_list([
(TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.M1),
(TLV.kTLVType_Method, TLV.AddPairing),
(TLV.kTLVType_Identifier, additional_controller_pairing_identifier.encode()),
(TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey, bytes.fromhex(ios_device_ltpk)),
(TLV.kTLVType_Permissions, permissions)
])
response = self.session.sec_http.post('/pairings', request_tlv)
data = response.read()
data = TLV.decode_bytes(data)
# TODO handle the response properly
self.session.close()
def put_characteristics(self, characteristics, do_conversion=False):
"""
Update the values of writable characteristics. The characteristics have to be identified by accessory id (aid),
instance id (iid). If do_conversion is False (the default), the value must be of proper format for the
characteristic since no conversion is done. If do_conversion is True, the value is converted.
:param characteristics: a list of 3-tupels of accessory id, instance id and the value
:param do_conversion: select if conversion is done (False is default)
:return: a dict from (aid, iid) onto {status, description}
:raises FormatError: if the input value could not be converted to the target type and conversion was
requested
"""
if not self.session:
self.session = BleSession(self.pairing_data, self.adapter)
results = {}
for aid, cid, value in characteristics:
# reply with an error if the characteristic does not exist
if not self._find_characteristic_in_pairing_data(aid, cid):
results[(aid, cid)] = {
'status':
HapBleStatusCodes.INVALID_REQUEST,
'description':
HapBleStatusCodes[HapBleStatusCodes.INVALID_REQUEST]
}
continue
value = TLV.encode_list([
(1, self._convert_from_python(aid, cid, value))
])
body = len(value).to_bytes(length=2, byteorder='little') + value
try:
fc, fc_info = self.session.find_characteristic_by_iid(cid)
response = self.session.request(fc, cid,
HapBleOpCodes.CHAR_WRITE, body)
logger.debug('response %s', response)
# TODO does the response contain useful information here?
except RequestRejected as e:
results[(aid, cid)] = {
'status': e.status,
'description': e.message,
}
except Exception as e:
self.session.close()
self.session = None
raise e
return results
def remove_pairing(self, alias):
"""
Remove a pairing between the controller and the accessory. The pairing data is delete on both ends, on the
accessory and the controller.
Important: no automatic saving of the pairing data is performed. If you don't do this, the accessory seems still
to be paired on the next start of the application.
:param alias: the controller's alias for the accessory
:raises AuthenticationError: if the controller isn't authenticated to the accessory.
:raises AccessoryNotFoundError: if the device can not be found via zeroconf
:raises UnknownError: on unknown errors
"""
# package visibility like in java would be nice here
pairing_data = self.pairings[alias]._get_pairing_data()
request_tlv = TLV.encode_list([
(TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.M1),
(TLV.kTLVType_Method, TLV.RemovePairing),
(TLV.kTLVType_Identifier, pairing_data['iOSPairingId'].encode())
]).decode(
) # decode is required because post needs a string representation
session = Session(pairing_data)
response = session.post('/pairings', request_tlv)
session.close()
data = response.read()
data = TLV.decode_bytes(data)
# handle the result, spec says, if it has only one entry with state == M2 we unpaired, else its an error.
if len(data) == 1 and data[0][0] == TLV.kTLVType_State and data[0][
1] == TLV.M2:
del self.pairings[alias]
else:
if data[TLV.kTLVType_Error] == TLV.kTLVError_Authentication:
raise AuthenticationError(
'Remove pairing failed: missing authentication')
else:
raise UnknownError('Remove pairing failed: unknown error')
def perform_pair_setup_part1():
"""
Performs a pair setup operation as described in chapter 4.7 page 39 ff.
:return: a tuple of salt and server's public key
:raises UnavailableError: if the device is already paired
:raises MaxTriesError: if the device received more than 100 unsuccessful pairing attempts
:raises BusyError: if a parallel pairing is ongoing
:raises AuthenticationError: if the verification of the device's SRP proof fails
:raises MaxPeersError: if the device cannot accept an additional pairing
:raises IllegalData: if the verification of the accessory's data fails
"""
#
# Step #1 ios --> accessory (send SRP start Request) (see page 39)
#
logging.debug('#1 ios -> accessory: send SRP start request')
request_tlv = [(TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.M1),
(TLV.kTLVType_Method, TLV.PairSetup)]
step2_expectations = [
TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.kTLVType_Error, TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey,
TLV.kTLVType_Salt
]
response_tlv = yield (request_tlv, step2_expectations)
#
# Step #3 ios --> accessory (send SRP verify request) (see page 41)
#
logging.debug('#3 ios -> accessory: send SRP verify request')
response_tlv = TLV.reorder(response_tlv, step2_expectations)
assert response_tlv[0][0] == TLV.kTLVType_State and response_tlv[0][
1] == TLV.M2, 'perform_pair_setup: State not M2'
# the errors here can be:
# * kTLVError_Unavailable: Device is paired
# * kTLVError_MaxTries: More than 100 unsuccessful attempts
# * kTLVError_Busy: There is already a pairing going on
if response_tlv[1][0] == TLV.kTLVType_Error:
error_handler(response_tlv[1][1], 'step 3')
assert response_tlv[1][
0] == TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey, 'perform_pair_setup: Not a public key'
assert response_tlv[2][
0] == TLV.kTLVType_Salt, 'perform_pair_setup: Not a salt'
return response_tlv[2][1], response_tlv[1][1]
def write(request, expected):
# TODO document me
body = TLV.encode_list(request)
logger.debug('entering write function %s',
TLV.to_string(TLV.decode_bytes(body)))
request_tlv = TLV.encode_list([(TLV.kTLVHAPParamParamReturnResponse,
bytearray(b'\x01')),
(TLV.kTLVHAPParamValue, body)])
transaction_id = random.randrange(0, 255)
data = bytearray([0x00, HapBleOpCodes.CHAR_WRITE, transaction_id])
data.extend(characteristic_id.to_bytes(length=2, byteorder='little'))
data.extend(len(request_tlv).to_bytes(length=2, byteorder='little'))
data.extend(request_tlv)
logger.debug('sent %s', bytes(data).hex())
characteristic.write_value(value=data)
data = []
while len(data) == 0:
time.sleep(1)
logger.debug('reading characteristic')
data = characteristic.read_value()
resp_data = [b for b in data]
expected_length = int.from_bytes(bytes(resp_data[3:5]),
byteorder='little')
logger.debug(
'control field: {c:x}, tid: {t:x}, status: {s:x}, length: {length}'
.format(c=resp_data[0],
t=resp_data[1],
s=resp_data[2],
length=expected_length))
while len(resp_data[3:]) < expected_length:
time.sleep(1)
logger.debug('reading characteristic')
data = characteristic.read_value()
resp_data.extend([b for b in data])
logger.debug('data %s of %s', len(resp_data[3:]), expected_length)
logger.debug('received %s', bytes(resp_data).hex())
logger.debug('decode %s', bytes(resp_data[5:]).hex())
resp_tlv = TLV.decode_bytes(bytes([int(a) for a in resp_data[5:]]),
expected=[TLV.kTLVHAPParamValue])
result = TLV.decode_bytes(resp_tlv[0][1], expected)
logger.debug('leaving write function %s', TLV.to_string(result))
return result
def test_to_string_for_list_bytearray(self):
example = [[1, bytearray([0x42, 0x23])]]
res = TLV.to_string(example)
self.assertEqual(res, '[\n 1: (2 bytes) 0x4223\n]\n')
def test_to_string_for_dict_bytearray(self):
example = {1: bytearray([0x42, 0x23])}
res = TLV.to_string(example)
self.assertEqual(res, '{\n 1: (2 bytes) 0x4223\n}\n')
def remove_pairing(self, alias, pairingId=None):
"""
Remove a pairing between the controller and the accessory. The pairing data is delete on both ends, on the
accessory and the controller.
Important: no automatic saving of the pairing data is performed. If you don't do this, the accessory seems still
to be paired on the next start of the application.
:param alias: the controller's alias for the accessory
:param pairingId: the pairing id to be removed
:raises AuthenticationError: if the controller isn't authenticated to the accessory.
:raises AccessoryNotFoundError: if the device can not be found via zeroconf
:raises UnknownError: on unknown errors
"""
# package visibility like in java would be nice here
pairing_data = self.pairings[alias]._get_pairing_data()
connection_type = pairing_data['Connection']
if not pairingId:
pairingIdToDelete = pairing_data['iOSPairingId']
else:
pairingIdToDelete = pairingId
# Prepare the common (for IP and BLE) request data
request_tlv = TLV.encode_list([
(TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.M1),
(TLV.kTLVType_Method, TLV.RemovePairing),
(TLV.kTLVType_Identifier, pairingIdToDelete.encode())
])
if connection_type == 'IP':
if not IP_TRANSPORT_SUPPORTED:
raise TransportNotSupportedError('IP')
session = IpSession(pairing_data)
# decode is required because post needs a string representation
response = session.post('/pairings', request_tlv)
session.close()
data = response.read()
data = TLV.decode_bytes(data)
elif connection_type == 'BLE':
if not BLE_TRANSPORT_SUPPORTED:
raise TransportNotSupportedError('BLE')
inner = TLV.encode_list([(TLV.kTLVHAPParamParamReturnResponse,
bytearray(b'\x01')),
(TLV.kTLVHAPParamValue, request_tlv)])
body = len(inner).to_bytes(length=2, byteorder='little') + inner
from .ble_impl.device import DeviceManager
manager = DeviceManager(self.ble_adapter)
device = manager.make_device(pairing_data['AccessoryMAC'])
device.connect()
logging.debug('resolved %d services', len(device.services))
pair_remove_char, pair_remove_char_id = find_characteristic_by_uuid(
device, ServicesTypes.PAIRING_SERVICE,
CharacteristicsTypes.PAIRING_PAIRINGS)
logging.debug('setup char: %s %s', pair_remove_char,
pair_remove_char.service.device)
session = BleSession(pairing_data, self.ble_adapter)
response = session.request(pair_remove_char, pair_remove_char_id,
HapBleOpCodes.CHAR_WRITE, body)
data = TLV.decode_bytes(response[1])
else:
raise Exception('not implemented (neither IP nor BLE)')
# act upon the response (the same is returned for IP and BLE accessories)
# handle the result, spec says, if it has only one entry with state == M2 we unpaired, else its an error.
logging.debug('response data: %s', data)
if len(data) == 1 and data[0][0] == TLV.kTLVType_State and data[0][
1] == TLV.M2:
if not pairingId:
del self.pairings[alias]
else:
if data[1][0] == TLV.kTLVType_Error and data[1][
1] == TLV.kTLVError_Authentication:
raise AuthenticationError(
'Remove pairing failed: missing authentication')
else:
raise UnknownError('Remove pairing failed: unknown error')
def get_session_keys(conn, pairing_data):
"""
HomeKit Controller side call to perform a pair verify operation as described in chapter 4.8 page 47 ff.
:param conn: the http_impl connection to the target accessory
:param pairing_data: the paring data as returned by perform_pair_setup
:return: tuple of the session keys (controller_to_accessory_key and accessory_to_controller_key)
:raises InvalidAuthTagError: if the auth tag could not be verified,
:raises IncorrectPairingIdError: if the accessory's LTPK could not be found
:raises InvalidSignatureError: if the accessory's signature could not be verified
:raises AuthenticationError: if the secured session could not be established
"""
headers = {'Content-Type': 'application/pairing+tlv8'}
#
# Step #1 ios --> accessory (send verify start Request) (page 47)
#
ios_key = py25519.Key25519()
request_tlv = TLV.encode_list([(TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.M1),
(TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey, ios_key.pubkey)])
conn.request('POST', '/pair-verify', request_tlv, headers)
resp = conn.getresponse()
response_tlv = TLV.decode_bytes(resp.read())
#
# Step #3 ios --> accessory (send SRP verify request) (page 49)
#
response_tlv = TLV.reorder(response_tlv, [
TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey, TLV.kTLVType_EncryptedData
])
assert response_tlv[0][0] == TLV.kTLVType_State and response_tlv[0][
1] == TLV.M2, 'get_session_keys: not M2'
assert response_tlv[1][
0] == TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey, 'get_session_keys: no public key'
assert response_tlv[2][
0] == TLV.kTLVType_EncryptedData, 'get_session_keys: no encrypted data'
# 1) generate shared secret
accessorys_session_pub_key_bytes = response_tlv[1][1]
shared_secret = ios_key.get_ecdh_key(
py25519.Key25519(pubkey=bytes(accessorys_session_pub_key_bytes),
verifyingkey=bytes()))
# 2) derive session key
hkdf_inst = hkdf.Hkdf('Pair-Verify-Encrypt-Salt'.encode(),
shared_secret,
hash=hashlib.sha512)
session_key = hkdf_inst.expand('Pair-Verify-Encrypt-Info'.encode(), 32)
# 3) verify auth tag on encrypted data and 4) decrypt
encrypted = response_tlv[2][1]
decrypted = chacha20_aead_decrypt(bytes(),
session_key, 'PV-Msg02'.encode(),
bytes([0, 0, 0, 0]), encrypted)
if type(decrypted) == bool and not decrypted:
raise InvalidAuthTagError('step 3')
d1 = TLV.decode_bytes(decrypted)
d1 = TLV.reorder(d1, [TLV.kTLVType_Identifier, TLV.kTLVType_Signature])
assert d1[0][
0] == TLV.kTLVType_Identifier, 'get_session_keys: no identifier'
assert d1[1][0] == TLV.kTLVType_Signature, 'get_session_keys: no signature'
# 5) look up pairing by accessory name
accessory_name = d1[0][1].decode()
if pairing_data['AccessoryPairingID'] != accessory_name:
raise IncorrectPairingIdError('step 3')
accessory_ltpk = py25519.Key25519(pubkey=bytes(),
verifyingkey=bytes.fromhex(
pairing_data['AccessoryLTPK']))
# 6) verify accessory's signature
accessory_sig = d1[1][1]
accessory_session_pub_key_bytes = response_tlv[1][1]
accessory_info = accessory_session_pub_key_bytes + accessory_name.encode(
) + ios_key.pubkey
if not accessory_ltpk.verify(bytes(accessory_sig), bytes(accessory_info)):
raise InvalidSignatureError('step 3')
# 7) create iOSDeviceInfo
ios_device_info = ios_key.pubkey + pairing_data['iOSPairingId'].encode(
) + accessorys_session_pub_key_bytes
# 8) sign iOSDeviceInfo with long term secret key
ios_device_ltsk_h = pairing_data['iOSDeviceLTSK']
ios_device_ltsk = py25519.Key25519(
secretkey=bytes.fromhex(ios_device_ltsk_h))
ios_device_signature = ios_device_ltsk.sign(ios_device_info)
# 9) construct sub tlv
sub_tlv = TLV.encode_list([(TLV.kTLVType_Identifier,
pairing_data['iOSPairingId'].encode()),
(TLV.kTLVType_Signature, ios_device_signature)])
# 10) encrypt and sign
encrypted_data_with_auth_tag = chacha20_aead_encrypt(
bytes(), session_key, 'PV-Msg03'.encode(), bytes([0, 0, 0, 0]),
sub_tlv)
tmp = bytearray(encrypted_data_with_auth_tag[0])
tmp += encrypted_data_with_auth_tag[1]
# 11) create tlv
request_tlv = TLV.encode_list([(TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.M3),
(TLV.kTLVType_EncryptedData, tmp)])
# 12) send to accessory
conn.request('POST', '/pair-verify', request_tlv, headers)
resp = conn.getresponse()
response_tlv = TLV.decode_bytes(resp.read())
#
# Post Step #4 verification (page 51)
#
response_tlv = TLV.reorder(response_tlv,
[TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.kTLVType_Error])
assert response_tlv[0][0] == TLV.kTLVType_State and response_tlv[0][
1] == TLV.M4, 'get_session_keys: not M4'
if len(response_tlv) == 2 and response_tlv[1][0] == TLV.kTLVType_Error:
error_handler(response_tlv[1][1], 'verification')
# calculate session keys
hkdf_inst = hkdf.Hkdf('Control-Salt'.encode(),
shared_secret,
hash=hashlib.sha512)
controller_to_accessory_key = hkdf_inst.expand(
'Control-Write-Encryption-Key'.encode(), 32)
hkdf_inst = hkdf.Hkdf('Control-Salt'.encode(),
shared_secret,
hash=hashlib.sha512)
accessory_to_controller_key = hkdf_inst.expand(
'Control-Read-Encryption-Key'.encode(), 32)
return controller_to_accessory_key, accessory_to_controller_key
def get_session_keys(pairing_data):
"""
HomeKit Controller state machine to perform a pair verify operation as described in chapter 4.8 page 47 ff.
:param pairing_data: the paring data as returned by perform_pair_setup
:return: tuple of the session keys (controller_to_accessory_key and accessory_to_controller_key)
:raises InvalidAuthTagError: if the auth tag could not be verified,
:raises IncorrectPairingIdError: if the accessory's LTPK could not be found
:raises InvalidSignatureError: if the accessory's signature could not be verified
:raises AuthenticationError: if the secured session could not be established
"""
#
# Step #1 ios --> accessory (send verify start Request) (page 47)
#
ios_key = x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate()
ios_key_pub = ios_key.public_key().public_bytes(
encoding=serialization.Encoding.Raw,
format=serialization.PublicFormat.Raw)
request_tlv = [(TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.M1),
(TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey, ios_key_pub)]
step2_expectations = [
TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey, TLV.kTLVType_EncryptedData
]
response_tlv = yield (request_tlv, step2_expectations)
#
# Step #3 ios --> accessory (send SRP verify request) (page 49)
#
response_tlv = TLV.reorder(response_tlv, step2_expectations)
assert response_tlv[0][0] == TLV.kTLVType_State and response_tlv[0][
1] == TLV.M2, 'get_session_keys: not M2'
assert response_tlv[1][
0] == TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey, 'get_session_keys: no public key'
assert response_tlv[2][
0] == TLV.kTLVType_EncryptedData, 'get_session_keys: no encrypted data'
# 1) generate shared secret
accessorys_session_pub_key_bytes = bytes(response_tlv[1][1])
accessorys_session_pub_key = x25519.X25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(
accessorys_session_pub_key_bytes)
shared_secret = ios_key.exchange(accessorys_session_pub_key)
# 2) derive session key
hkdf_inst = hkdf.Hkdf('Pair-Verify-Encrypt-Salt'.encode(),
shared_secret,
hash=hashlib.sha512)
session_key = hkdf_inst.expand('Pair-Verify-Encrypt-Info'.encode(), 32)
# 3) verify auth tag on encrypted data and 4) decrypt
encrypted = response_tlv[2][1]
decrypted = chacha20_aead_decrypt(bytes(),
session_key, 'PV-Msg02'.encode(),
bytes([0, 0, 0, 0]), encrypted)
if type(decrypted) == bool and not decrypted:
raise InvalidAuthTagError('step 3')
d1 = TLV.decode_bytes(decrypted)
d1 = TLV.reorder(d1, [TLV.kTLVType_Identifier, TLV.kTLVType_Signature])
assert d1[0][
0] == TLV.kTLVType_Identifier, 'get_session_keys: no identifier'
assert d1[1][0] == TLV.kTLVType_Signature, 'get_session_keys: no signature'
# 5) look up pairing by accessory name
accessory_name = d1[0][1].decode()
if pairing_data['AccessoryPairingID'] != accessory_name:
raise IncorrectPairingIdError('step 3')
accessory_ltpk = ed25519.VerifyingKey(
bytes.fromhex(pairing_data['AccessoryLTPK']))
# 6) verify accessory's signature
accessory_sig = d1[1][1]
accessory_session_pub_key_bytes = response_tlv[1][1]
accessory_info = accessory_session_pub_key_bytes + accessory_name.encode(
) + ios_key_pub
try:
accessory_ltpk.verify(bytes(accessory_sig), bytes(accessory_info))
except ed25519.BadSignatureError:
raise InvalidSignatureError('step 3')
# 7) create iOSDeviceInfo
ios_device_info = ios_key_pub + pairing_data['iOSPairingId'].encode(
) + accessorys_session_pub_key_bytes
# 8) sign iOSDeviceInfo with long term secret key
ios_device_ltsk_h = pairing_data['iOSDeviceLTSK']
ios_device_ltpk_h = pairing_data['iOSDeviceLTPK']
ios_device_ltsk = ed25519.SigningKey(
bytes.fromhex(ios_device_ltsk_h) + bytes.fromhex(ios_device_ltpk_h))
ios_device_signature = ios_device_ltsk.sign(ios_device_info)
# 9) construct sub tlv
sub_tlv = TLV.encode_list([(TLV.kTLVType_Identifier,
pairing_data['iOSPairingId'].encode()),
(TLV.kTLVType_Signature, ios_device_signature)])
# 10) encrypt and sign
encrypted_data_with_auth_tag = chacha20_aead_encrypt(
bytes(), session_key, 'PV-Msg03'.encode(), bytes([0, 0, 0, 0]),
sub_tlv)
tmp = bytearray(encrypted_data_with_auth_tag[0])
tmp += encrypted_data_with_auth_tag[1]
# 11) create tlv
request_tlv = [(TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.M3),
(TLV.kTLVType_EncryptedData, tmp)]
step3_expectations = [TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.kTLVType_Error]
response_tlv = yield (request_tlv, step3_expectations)
#
# Post Step #4 verification (page 51)
#
response_tlv = TLV.reorder(response_tlv, step3_expectations)
assert response_tlv[0][0] == TLV.kTLVType_State and response_tlv[0][
1] == TLV.M4, 'get_session_keys: not M4'
if len(response_tlv) == 2 and response_tlv[1][0] == TLV.kTLVType_Error:
error_handler(response_tlv[1][1], 'verification')
# calculate session keys
hkdf_inst = hkdf.Hkdf('Control-Salt'.encode(),
shared_secret,
hash=hashlib.sha512)
controller_to_accessory_key = hkdf_inst.expand(
'Control-Write-Encryption-Key'.encode(), 32)
hkdf_inst = hkdf.Hkdf('Control-Salt'.encode(),
shared_secret,
hash=hashlib.sha512)
accessory_to_controller_key = hkdf_inst.expand(
'Control-Read-Encryption-Key'.encode(), 32)
return controller_to_accessory_key, accessory_to_controller_key
def perform_pair_setup_part2(pin, ios_pairing_id, write_fun, salt,
server_public_key):
"""
Performs a pair setup operation as described in chapter 4.7 page 39 ff.
:param pin: the setup code from the accessory
:param ios_pairing_id: the id of the simulated ios device
:param write_fun: a function that takes a bytes representation of a TLV, the expected keys as list and returns
decoded TLV as list
:return: a dict with the ios device's part of the pairing information
:raises UnavailableError: if the device is already paired
:raises MaxTriesError: if the device received more than 100 unsuccessful pairing attempts
:raises BusyError: if a parallel pairing is ongoing
:raises AuthenticationError: if the verification of the device's SRP proof fails
:raises MaxPeersError: if the device cannot accept an additional pairing
:raises IllegalData: if the verification of the accessory's data fails
"""
srp_client = SrpClient('Pair-Setup', pin)
srp_client.set_salt(salt)
srp_client.set_server_public_key(server_public_key)
client_pub_key = srp_client.get_public_key()
client_proof = srp_client.get_proof()
response_tlv = TLV.encode_list([
(TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.M3),
(TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey, SrpClient.to_byte_array(client_pub_key)),
(TLV.kTLVType_Proof, SrpClient.to_byte_array(client_proof)),
])
step4_expectations = [
TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.kTLVType_Error, TLV.kTLVType_Proof
]
response_tlv = write_fun(response_tlv, step4_expectations)
#
# Step #5 ios --> accessory (Exchange Request) (see page 43)
#
logging.debug('#5 ios -> accessory: send SRP exchange request')
# M4 Verification (page 43)
response_tlv = TLV.reorder(response_tlv, step4_expectations)
assert response_tlv[0][0] == TLV.kTLVType_State and response_tlv[0][1] == TLV.M4, \
'perform_pair_setup: State not M4'
if response_tlv[1][0] == TLV.kTLVType_Error:
error_handler(response_tlv[1][1], 'step 5')
assert response_tlv[1][
0] == TLV.kTLVType_Proof, 'perform_pair_setup: Not a proof'
if not srp_client.verify_servers_proof(response_tlv[1][1]):
raise AuthenticationError('Step #5: wrong proof!')
# M5 Request generation (page 44)
session_key = srp_client.get_session_key()
ios_device_ltsk, ios_device_ltpk = ed25519.create_keypair()
# reversed:
# Pair-Setup-Encrypt-Salt instead of Pair-Setup-Controller-Sign-Salt
# Pair-Setup-Encrypt-Info instead of Pair-Setup-Controller-Sign-Info
hkdf_inst = hkdf.Hkdf('Pair-Setup-Controller-Sign-Salt'.encode(),
SrpClient.to_byte_array(session_key),
hash=hashlib.sha512)
ios_device_x = hkdf_inst.expand('Pair-Setup-Controller-Sign-Info'.encode(),
32)
hkdf_inst = hkdf.Hkdf('Pair-Setup-Encrypt-Salt'.encode(),
SrpClient.to_byte_array(session_key),
hash=hashlib.sha512)
session_key = hkdf_inst.expand('Pair-Setup-Encrypt-Info'.encode(), 32)
ios_device_pairing_id = ios_pairing_id.encode()
ios_device_info = ios_device_x + ios_device_pairing_id + ios_device_ltpk.to_bytes(
)
ios_device_signature = ios_device_ltsk.sign(ios_device_info)
sub_tlv = [(TLV.kTLVType_Identifier, ios_device_pairing_id),
(TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey, ios_device_ltpk.to_bytes()),
(TLV.kTLVType_Signature, ios_device_signature)]
sub_tlv_b = TLV.encode_list(sub_tlv)
# taking tge iOSDeviceX as key was reversed from
# https://github.com/KhaosT/HAP-NodeJS/blob/2ea9d761d9bd7593dd1949fec621ab085af5e567/lib/HAPServer.js
# function handlePairStepFive calling encryption.encryptAndSeal
encrypted_data_with_auth_tag = chacha20_aead_encrypt(
bytes(), session_key, 'PS-Msg05'.encode(), bytes([0, 0, 0, 0]),
sub_tlv_b)
tmp = bytearray(encrypted_data_with_auth_tag[0])
tmp += encrypted_data_with_auth_tag[1]
response_tlv = [(TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.M5),
(TLV.kTLVType_EncryptedData, tmp)]
body = TLV.encode_list(response_tlv)
step6_expectations = [
TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.kTLVType_Error, TLV.kTLVType_EncryptedData
]
response_tlv = write_fun(body, step6_expectations)
#
# Step #7 ios (Verification) (page 47)
#
response_tlv = TLV.reorder(response_tlv, step6_expectations)
assert response_tlv[0][0] == TLV.kTLVType_State and response_tlv[0][
1] == TLV.M6, 'perform_pair_setup: State not M6'
if response_tlv[1][0] == TLV.kTLVType_Error:
error_handler(response_tlv[1][1], 'step 7')
assert response_tlv[1][
0] == TLV.kTLVType_EncryptedData, 'perform_pair_setup: No encrypted data'
decrypted_data = chacha20_aead_decrypt(bytes(), session_key,
'PS-Msg06'.encode(),
bytes([0, 0, 0,
0]), response_tlv[1][1])
if decrypted_data is False:
raise homekit.exception.IllegalData('step 7')
response_tlv = TLV.decode_bytearray(decrypted_data)
response_tlv = TLV.reorder(response_tlv, [
TLV.kTLVType_Identifier, TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey, TLV.kTLVType_Signature
])
assert response_tlv[2][
0] == TLV.kTLVType_Signature, 'perform_pair_setup: No signature'
accessory_sig = response_tlv[2][1]
assert response_tlv[0][
0] == TLV.kTLVType_Identifier, 'perform_pair_setup: No identifier'
accessory_pairing_id = response_tlv[0][1]
assert response_tlv[1][
0] == TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey, 'perform_pair_setup: No public key'
accessory_ltpk = response_tlv[1][1]
hkdf_inst = hkdf.Hkdf('Pair-Setup-Accessory-Sign-Salt'.encode(),
SrpClient.to_byte_array(
srp_client.get_session_key()),
hash=hashlib.sha512)
accessory_x = hkdf_inst.expand('Pair-Setup-Accessory-Sign-Info'.encode(),
32)
accessory_info = accessory_x + accessory_pairing_id + accessory_ltpk
e25519s = ed25519.VerifyingKey(bytes(response_tlv[1][1]))
try:
e25519s.verify(bytes(accessory_sig), bytes(accessory_info))
except AssertionError:
raise InvalidSignatureError('step #7')
return {
'AccessoryPairingID': response_tlv[0][1].decode(),
'AccessoryLTPK': hexlify(response_tlv[1][1]).decode(),
'iOSPairingId': ios_pairing_id,
'iOSDeviceLTSK':
ios_device_ltsk.to_ascii(encoding='hex').decode()[:64],
'iOSDeviceLTPK': hexlify(ios_device_ltpk.to_bytes()).decode()
}
def parse_sig_read_response(data, expected_tid):
# TODO document me
# parse header and check stuff
logger.debug('parse sig read response %s', bytes([int(a) for a in data]).hex())
# handle the header data
cf = data[0]
logger.debug('control field %d', cf)
tid = data[1]
logger.debug('transaction id %d (expected was %d)', tid, expected_tid)
status = data[2]
logger.debug('status code %d (%s)', status, HapBleStatusCodes[status])
assert cf == 0x02
assert tid == expected_tid
assert status == HapBleStatusCodes.SUCCESS
# get body length
length = int.from_bytes(data[3:5], byteorder='little')
logger.debug('expected body length %d (got %d)', length, len(data[5:]))
# parse tlvs and analyse information
tlv = TLV.decode_bytes(data[5:])
description = ''
characteristic_format = ''
characteristic_range = None
characteristic_step = None
for t in tlv:
if t[0] == TLV.kTLVHAPParamCharacteristicType:
chr_type = [int(a) for a in t[1]]
chr_type.reverse()
chr_type = str(uuid.UUID(''.join('%02x' % b for b in chr_type)))
if t[0] == TLV.kTLVHAPParamServiceInstanceId:
svc_id = int.from_bytes(t[1], byteorder='little')
if t[0] == TLV.kTLVHAPParamServiceType:
svc_type = [int(a) for a in t[1]]
svc_type.reverse()
svc_type = str(uuid.UUID(''.join('%02x' % b for b in svc_type)))
if t[0] == TLV.kTLVHAPParamHAPCharacteristicPropertiesDescriptor:
chr_prop_int = int.from_bytes(t[1], byteorder='little')
if t[0] == TLV.kTLVHAPParamGATTUserDescriptionDescriptor:
description = t[1].decode()
if t[0] == TLV.kTLVHAPParamHAPValidValuesDescriptor:
print('valid values', t[1])
if t[0] == TLV.kTLVHAPParamHAPValidValuesRangeDescriptor:
print('valid values range', t[1])
if t[0] == TLV.kTLVHAPParamGATTPresentationFormatDescriptor:
unit_bytes = t[1][2:4]
unit_bytes.reverse()
characteristic_format = BleCharacteristicFormats.get(int(t[1][0]), 'unknown')
unit = BleCharacteristicUnits.get(int.from_bytes(unit_bytes, byteorder='big'), 'unknown')
if t[0] == TLV.kTLVHAPParamGATTValidRange:
logger.debug('range: %s', t[1].hex())
lower = None
upper = None
if characteristic_format == 'int32' or characteristic_format == 'int':
(lower, upper) = struct.unpack('ii', t[1])
if characteristic_format == 'uint8':
(lower, upper) = struct.unpack('BB', t[1])
if characteristic_format == 'float':
(lower, upper) = struct.unpack('ff', t[1])
# TODO include all formats!
characteristic_range = (lower, upper)
if t[0] == TLV.kTLVHAPParamHAPStepValueDescriptor:
characteristic_step = None
if characteristic_format == 'int32':
characteristic_step = struct.unpack('i', t[1])[0]
if characteristic_format == 'uint8':
characteristic_step = struct.unpack('B', t[1])[0]
# TODO include all formats!
# parse permissions
# TODO refactor!
perms = []
if (chr_prop_int & 0x0001) > 0:
perms.append('r')
if (chr_prop_int & 0x0002) > 0:
perms.append('w')
if (chr_prop_int & 0x0004) > 0:
perms.append('aad')
if (chr_prop_int & 0x0008) > 0:
perms.append('tw')
if (chr_prop_int & 0x0010) > 0:
perms.append('pr')
if (chr_prop_int & 0x0020) > 0:
perms.append('pw')
if (chr_prop_int & 0x0040) > 0:
perms.append('hd')
if (chr_prop_int & 0x0080) > 0:
perms.append('evc')
if (chr_prop_int & 0x0100) > 0:
perms.append('evd')
result = {'description': description, 'perms': perms, 'format': characteristic_format, 'unit': unit,
'range': characteristic_range, 'step': characteristic_step,
'type': chr_type.upper(), 'sid': svc_id, 'service_type': svc_type}
logger.debug('result: %s', str(result))
return result
def write(request, expected):
return pair_setup_write(TLV.encode_list(request), expected)
def request(self, feature_char, feature_char_id, op, body=None):
transaction_id = random.randrange(0, 255)
data = bytearray([0x00, op, transaction_id])
data.extend(feature_char_id.to_bytes(length=2, byteorder='little'))
if body:
logger.debug('body: %s', body)
data.extend(body)
logger.debug('data: %s', data)
cnt_bytes = self.c2a_counter.to_bytes(8, byteorder='little')
cipher_and_mac = chacha20_aead_encrypt(bytes(), self.c2a_key, cnt_bytes, bytes([0, 0, 0, 0]), data)
cipher_and_mac[0].extend(cipher_and_mac[1])
data = cipher_and_mac[0]
logger.debug('cipher and mac %s', cipher_and_mac[0].hex())
result = feature_char.write_value(value=data)
logger.debug('write resulted in: %s', result)
self.c2a_counter += 1
data = []
while not data or len(data) == 0:
time.sleep(1)
logger.debug('reading characteristic')
data = feature_char.read_value()
if not data and not self.device.is_connected():
raise AccessoryDisconnectedError('Characteristic read failed')
resp_data = bytearray([b for b in data])
logger.debug('read: %s', bytearray(resp_data).hex())
data = chacha20_aead_decrypt(bytes(), self.a2c_key, self.a2c_counter.to_bytes(8, byteorder='little'),
bytes([0, 0, 0, 0]), resp_data)
logger.debug('decrypted: %s', bytearray(data).hex())
if not data:
return {}
# parse header and check stuff
logger.debug('parse sig read response %s', bytes([int(a) for a in data]).hex())
# handle the header data
cf = data[0]
logger.debug('control field %d', cf)
tid = data[1]
logger.debug('transaction id %d (expected was %d)', tid, transaction_id)
status = data[2]
logger.debug('status code %d (%s)', status, HapBleStatusCodes[status])
assert cf == 0x02
assert tid == transaction_id
if status != HapBleStatusCodes.SUCCESS:
raise RequestRejected(status, HapBleStatusCodes[status])
self.a2c_counter += 1
# get body length
length = int.from_bytes(data[3:5], byteorder='little')
logger.debug('expected body length %d (got %d)', length, len(data[5:]))
# parse tlvs and analyse information
tlv = TLV.decode_bytes(data[5:])
logger.debug('received TLV: %s', TLV.to_string(tlv))
return dict(tlv)
def test__convert_from_python__tlv__proper_values(self):
pairing_data = self._create_pairing_data()
pairing = BlePairing(pairing_data)
data = TLV.encode_list([(6, bytearray(b'\x03'))])
self.assertEqual(b'\x06\x01\x03', pairing._convert_from_python(1, 10, data))
def request_pin_setup(connection, pin):
"""
Requests a Pin from device
"""
headers = {'Content-Type': 'application/pairing+tlv8'}
#
# Step #1 ios --> accessory (send SRP start Request) (see page 39)
#
request_tlv = TLV.encode_list([(TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.M1),
(TLV.kTLVType_Method, TLV.PairSetup)])
#
# Step #3 ios --> accessory (send SRP verify request) (see page 41)
#
connection.request('POST', '/pair-setup', request_tlv, headers)
resp = connection.getresponse()
response_tlv = TLV.decode_bytes(resp.read())
response_tlv = TLV.reorder(response_tlv, [
TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.kTLVType_Error, TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey,
TLV.kTLVType_Salt
])
assert response_tlv[0][0] == TLV.kTLVType_State and response_tlv[0][
1] == TLV.M2, 'perform_pair_setup: State not M2'
# the errors here can be:
# * kTLVError_Unavailable: Device is paired
# * kTLVError_MaxTries: More than 100 unsuccessfull attempts
# * kTLVError_Busy: There is already a pairing going on
# if response_tlv[1][0] == TLV.kTLVType_Error:
# error_handler(response_tlv[1][1], 'step 3')
assert response_tlv[1][
0] == TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey, 'perform_pair_setup: Not a public key'
assert response_tlv[2][
0] == TLV.kTLVType_Salt, 'perform_pair_setup: Not a salt'
srp_client = SrpClient('Pair-Setup', pin)
srp_client.set_salt(response_tlv[2][1])
srp_client.set_server_public_key(response_tlv[1][1])
client_pub_key = srp_client.get_public_key()
client_proof = srp_client.get_proof()
response_tlv = TLV.encode_list([
(TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.M3),
(TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey, SrpClient.to_byte_array(client_pub_key)),
(TLV.kTLVType_Proof, SrpClient.to_byte_array(client_proof)),
])
connection.request('POST', '/pair-setup', response_tlv, headers)
resp = connection.getresponse()
response_tlv = TLV.decode_bytes(resp.read())
#
# Step #5 ios --> accessory (Exchange Request) (see page 43)
#
# M4 Verification (page 43)
# response_tlv = TLV.reorder(response_tlv, [TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.kTLVType_Error, TLV.kTLVType_Proof])
# assert response_tlv[0][0] == TLV.kTLVType_State and response_tlv[0][1] == TLV.M4, \
# 'perform_pair_setup: State not M4'
# if response_tlv[1][0] == TLV.kTLVType_Error:
# error_handler(response_tlv[1][1], 'step 5')
# assert response_tlv[1][0] == TLV.kTLVType_Proof, 'perform_pair_setup: Not a proof'
# if not srp_client.verify_servers_proof(response_tlv[1][1]):
# raise AuthenticationError('Step #5: wrong proof!')
# M5 Request generation (page 44)
session_key = srp_client.get_session_key()
ios_device_ltsk, ios_device_ltpk = ed25519.create_keypair()
# reversed:
# Pair-Setup-Encrypt-Salt instead of Pair-Setup-Controller-Sign-Salt
# Pair-Setup-Encrypt-Info instead of Pair-Setup-Controller-Sign-Info
hkdf_inst = hkdf.Hkdf('Pair-Setup-Controller-Sign-Salt'.encode(),
SrpClient.to_byte_array(session_key),
hash=hashlib.sha512)
ios_device_x = hkdf_inst.expand('Pair-Setup-Controller-Sign-Info'.encode(),
32)
hkdf_inst = hkdf.Hkdf('Pair-Setup-Encrypt-Salt'.encode(),
SrpClient.to_byte_array(session_key),
hash=hashlib.sha512)
session_key = hkdf_inst.expand('Pair-Setup-Encrypt-Info'.encode(), 32)
# ios_device_pairing_id = ios_pairing_id.encode()
ios_device_info = ios_device_x + ios_device_ltpk.to_bytes()
ios_device_signature = ios_device_ltsk.sign(ios_device_info)
sub_tlv = [
# (TLV.kTLVType_Identifier, ios_device_pairing_id),
(TLV.kTLVType_PublicKey, ios_device_ltpk.to_bytes()),
(TLV.kTLVType_Signature, ios_device_signature)
]
sub_tlv_b = TLV.encode_list(sub_tlv)
# taking tge iOSDeviceX as key was reversed from
# https://github.com/KhaosT/HAP-NodeJS/blob/2ea9d761d9bd7593dd1949fec621ab085af5e567/lib/HAPServer.js
# function handlePairStepFive calling encryption.encryptAndSeal
encrypted_data_with_auth_tag = chacha20_aead_encrypt(
bytes(), session_key, 'PS-Msg05'.encode(), bytes([0, 0, 0, 0]),
sub_tlv_b)
tmp = bytearray(encrypted_data_with_auth_tag[0])
tmp += encrypted_data_with_auth_tag[1]
response_tlv = [(TLV.kTLVType_State, TLV.M5),
(TLV.kTLVType_EncryptedData, tmp)]
body = TLV.encode_list(response_tlv)
connection.request('POST', '/pair-setup', body, headers)
resp = connection.getresponse()
response_tlv = TLV.decode_bytes(resp.read())
