def initialize_bob(bob_privkeys):
ursula = Ursula.from_seed_and_stake_info(seed_uri=SEEDNODE_URI,
federated_only=True,
minimum_stake=0)
TEMP_DOCTOR_DIR = "{}/listener-files".format(
os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
# Remove previous demo files and create new ones
shutil.rmtree(TEMP_DOCTOR_DIR, ignore_errors=True)
bob_enc_keypair = DecryptingKeypair(private_key=bob_privkeys["enc"])
bob_sig_keypair = SigningKeypair(private_key=bob_privkeys["sig"])
enc_power = DecryptingPower(keypair=bob_enc_keypair)
sig_power = SigningPower(keypair=bob_sig_keypair)
power_ups = [enc_power, sig_power]
print("Creating the Listener ...")
listener = Bob(
domains={TEMPORARY_DOMAIN},
federated_only=True,
crypto_power_ups=power_ups,
start_learning_now=True,
abort_on_learning_error=True,
known_nodes=[ursula],
save_metadata=False,
network_middleware=RestMiddleware(),
)
print("Listener = ", listener)
return listener
def act_as_bob(self, name):
print("act_as_bob")
dirname = "accounts/" + name + "/"
fname = dirname+"recipent.private.json"
with open(fname) as data_file:
data = json.load(data_file)
enc_privkey = UmbralPrivateKey.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(data["enc"]))
sig_privkey = UmbralPrivateKey.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(data["sig"]))
bob_enc_keypair = DecryptingKeypair(private_key=enc_privkey)
bob_sig_keypair = SigningKeypair(private_key=sig_privkey)
enc_power = DecryptingPower(keypair=bob_enc_keypair)
sig_power = SigningPower(keypair=bob_sig_keypair)
power_ups = [enc_power, sig_power]
bob = Bob(
is_me=True,
federated_only=True,
crypto_power_ups=power_ups,
start_learning_now=True,
abort_on_learning_error=True,
known_nodes=[self.ursula],
save_metadata=False,
network_middleware=RestMiddleware(),
)
return bob
def test_bob_can_follow_treasure_map_even_if_he_only_knows_of_one_node(
enacted_federated_policy, federated_ursulas, certificates_tempdir):
"""
Similar to above, but this time, we'll show that if Bob can connect to a single node, he can
learn enough to follow the TreasureMap.
Also, we'll get the TreasureMap from the hrac alone (ie, not via a side channel).
"""
from nucypher.characters.lawful import Bob
bob = Bob(network_middleware=MockRestMiddleware(),
domain=TEMPORARY_DOMAIN,
start_learning_now=False,
abort_on_learning_error=True,
federated_only=True)
# Again, let's assume that he received the TreasureMap via a side channel.
hrac, treasure_map = enacted_federated_policy.hrac(
), enacted_federated_policy.treasure_map
map_id = treasure_map.public_id()
bob.treasure_maps[map_id] = treasure_map
# Now, let's create a scenario in which Bob knows of only one node.
assert len(bob.known_nodes) == 0
first_ursula = list(federated_ursulas).pop(0)
bob.remember_node(first_ursula)
assert len(bob.known_nodes) == 1
# This time, when he follows the TreasureMap...
unknown_nodes, known_nodes = bob.peek_at_treasure_map(map_id=map_id)
# Bob already knew about one node; the rest are unknown.
assert len(unknown_nodes) == len(treasure_map) - 1
# He needs to actually follow the treasure map to get the rest.
bob.follow_treasure_map(map_id=map_id)
# The nodes in the learning loop are now his top target, but he's not learning yet.
assert not bob._learning_task.running
# ...so he hasn't learned anything (ie, Bob still knows of just one node).
assert len(bob.known_nodes) == 1
# Now, we'll start his learning loop.
bob.start_learning_loop()
# ...and block until the unknown_nodes have all been found.
d = threads.deferToThread(bob.block_until_specific_nodes_are_known,
unknown_nodes)
yield d
# ...and he now has no more unknown_nodes.
assert len(bob.known_nodes) == len(treasure_map)
bob.disenchant()
def test_anybody_can_encrypt():
"""
Similar to anybody_can_verify() above; we show that anybody can encrypt.
"""
someone = Character(start_learning_now=False, federated_only=True, crypto_power_ups=[SigningPower])
bob = Bob(is_me=False, federated_only=True,)
cleartext = b"This is Officer Rod Farva. Come in, Ursula! Come in Ursula!"
ciphertext = someone.encrypt_for(bob, cleartext)
assert ciphertext is not None
def test_anybody_can_encrypt():
"""
Similar to anybody_can_verify() above; we show that anybody can encrypt.
"""
someone = Character(start_learning_now=False, federated_only=True)
bob = Bob(is_me=False, federated_only=True)
cleartext = b"This is Officer Rod Farva. Come in, Ursula! Come in Ursula!"
ciphertext, signature = someone.encrypt_for(bob, cleartext, sign=False)
assert signature == constants.NOT_SIGNED
assert ciphertext is not None
def test_characters_use_keyring(tmpdir):
keyring = NucypherKeyring.generate(checksum_address=FEDERATED_ADDRESS,
password=INSECURE_DEVELOPMENT_PASSWORD,
encrypting=True,
rest=False,
keyring_root=tmpdir)
keyring.unlock(password=INSECURE_DEVELOPMENT_PASSWORD)
Alice(federated_only=True, start_learning_now=False, keyring=keyring)
Bob(federated_only=True, start_learning_now=False, keyring=keyring)
Ursula(federated_only=True,
start_learning_now=False,
keyring=keyring,
rest_host='127.0.0.1',
rest_port=12345)
def get(self):
"User should send Bob password to decrypt files"
try:
user = request.args.get("user")
pw = request.args.get("password")
label = request.args.get("label")
frmt = request.args.get("frmt")
except:
response = {'message': "Insufficient Query Params"}
return make_response(jsonify(response)), 404
keyringBob = NucypherKeyring(account=user)
keyringBob.unlock(password=pw)
bob = Bob(keyring=keyringBob,
known_nodes=[ursula],
federated_only=True,
learn_on_same_thread=True,
domain=TEMPORARY_DOMAIN)
bob.join_policy(label.encode(), alice_sig_pubkey)
from nucypher.characters.lawful import Enrico
global globalStorage
enrico1 = Enrico.from_public_keys(
verifying_key=globalStorage[label]["data_source_public_key"],
policy_encrypting_key=globalStorage[label]["policy_pubkey"])
imgUrl = base_uri + label + "." + frmt
response = requests.get(imgUrl)
ciphertext = UmbralMessageKit.from_bytes(response.content)
decrypted_plaintext = bob.retrieve(
ciphertext,
label=label.encode(),
enrico=enrico1,
alice_verifying_key=alice_sig_pubkey)
return send_file(io.BytesIO(decrypted_plaintext[0]),
mimetype="image/" + frmt,
as_attachment=False,
attachment_filename='{}.'.format(label) + frmt), 200
def generate_charlie():
shutil.rmtree(TEMP_CHARLIE_DIR, ignore_errors=True)
ursula = Ursula.from_seed_and_stake_info(seed_uri=SEEDNODE_URL,
federated_only=True,
minimum_stake=0)
# To create a Bob, we need the charlie's private keys previously generated.
from charlie_keys import get_charlie_privkeys
charlie_keys = get_charlie_privkeys()
bob_enc_keypair = DecryptingKeypair(private_key=charlie_keys["enc"])
bob_sig_keypair = SigningKeypair(private_key=charlie_keys["sig"])
enc_power = DecryptingPower(keypair=bob_enc_keypair)
sig_power = SigningPower(keypair=bob_sig_keypair)
power_ups = [enc_power, sig_power]
print("Creating the Charlie ...")
charlie = Bob(
is_me=True,
federated_only=True,
crypto_power_ups=power_ups,
start_learning_now=True,
abort_on_learning_error=True,
known_nodes=[ursula],
save_metadata=False,
network_middleware=RestMiddleware(),
)
print("Charlie = ", charlie)
# Join policy generated by alice
with open("policy-metadata.json", 'r') as f:
policy_data = json.load(f)
policy_pubkey = UmbralPublicKey.from_bytes(
bytes.fromhex(policy_data["policy_pubkey"]))
alices_sig_pubkey = UmbralPublicKey.from_bytes(
bytes.fromhex(policy_data["alice_sig_pubkey"]))
label = policy_data["label"].encode()
print("The Charlie joins policy for label '{}'".format(
label.decode("utf-8")))
charlie.join_policy(label, alices_sig_pubkey)
return charlie, policy_pubkey, alices_sig_pubkey, label
def test_characters_use_keystore(temp_dir_path):
keystore = Keystore.generate(password=INSECURE_DEVELOPMENT_PASSWORD,
keystore_dir=temp_dir_path)
keystore.unlock(password=INSECURE_DEVELOPMENT_PASSWORD)
alice = Alice(federated_only=True,
start_learning_now=False,
keystore=keystore)
Bob(federated_only=True, start_learning_now=False, keystore=keystore)
Ursula(federated_only=True,
start_learning_now=False,
keystore=keystore,
rest_host=LOOPBACK_ADDRESS,
rest_port=12345,
db_filepath=tempfile.mkdtemp(),
domain=TEMPORARY_DOMAIN)
alice.disenchant(
) # To stop Alice's publication threadpool. TODO: Maybe only start it at first enactment?
def downloadFile(self, username, receipt, policy_info):
hash = receipt['hash_key']
input = self.ipfs_gateway_api.cat(hash)
enc_privkey, sig_privkey = self.reveal_private_keys(username)
bob_enc_key = DecryptingKeypair(private_key=enc_privkey)
bob_sig_keyp = SigningKeypair(private_key=sig_privkey)
enc_power = DecryptingPower(keypair=bob_enc_key)
sig_power = SigningPower(keypair=bob_sig_keyp)
power_ups = [enc_power, sig_power]
self.Bob = Bob(
federated_only=True,
crypto_power_ups=power_ups,
start_learning_now=True,
abort_on_learning_error=True,
known_nodes=[self.ursula],
save_metadata=False,
network_middleware=RestMiddleware(),
)
policy_pubkey = UmbralPublicKey.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(policy_info["policy_pubkey"]))
enrico = Enrico.from_public_keys(
{SigningPower: UmbralPublicKey.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(receipt['data_source_public_key']))},
policy_encrypting_key=policy_pubkey
)
alice_pubkey_restored = UmbralPublicKey.from_bytes(base58.b58decode(policy_info['alice_sig_pubkey']))
self.Bob.join_policy(policy_info['label'].encode(), alice_pubkey_restored)
data = msgpack.loads(input, raw=False)
message_kits = (UmbralMessageKit.from_bytes(k) for k in data['kits'])
message_kit = next(message_kits)
retrieved_plaintexts = self.Bob.retrieve(
message_kit,
enrico=enrico,
alice_verifying_key=alice_pubkey_restored,
label=policy_info['label'].encode(),
)
plaintext = msgpack.loads(retrieved_plaintexts[0], raw=False)
print(plaintext)
decrypted_data = plaintext['data']
return decrypted_data
def test_characters_use_keyring(tmpdir):
keyring = NucypherKeyring.generate(checksum_address=FEDERATED_ADDRESS,
password=INSECURE_DEVELOPMENT_PASSWORD,
encrypting=True,
rest=False,
keyring_root=tmpdir)
keyring.unlock(password=INSECURE_DEVELOPMENT_PASSWORD)
a = Alice(federated_only=True, start_learning_now=False, keyring=keyring)
Bob(federated_only=True, start_learning_now=False, keyring=keyring)
Ursula(federated_only=True,
start_learning_now=False,
keyring=keyring,
rest_host='127.0.0.1',
rest_port=12345,
db_filepath=tempfile.mkdtemp())
a.disenchant(
) # To stop Alice's publication threadpool. TODO: Maybe only start it at first enactment?
def post(self):
keys = request.json['keys']
path = self.writeKeys(keys)
password = request.json['password']
address = request.json['address']
passwd = PBKDF2(password,
address.encode(),
20,
count=30000,
hmac_hash_module=SHA256).hex()
keyring = NucypherKeyring(account=address, keyring_root="./keys")
keyring.unlock(password=passwd)
bob = Bob(known_nodes=[self.URSULA],
checksum_address=address,
domain='lynx',
keyring=keyring)
enrico_key = request.json['enrico_key']
policy_key = request.json['policy_key']
data_source = Enrico.from_public_keys(
verifying_key=bytes.fromhex(enrico_key),
policy_encrypting_key=UmbralPublicKey.from_bytes(
bytes.fromhex(policy_key)))
ciphertext = request.json['ciphertext']
message_kit = UmbralMessageKit.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(ciphertext))
label = request.json['label']
alice_pubkey = request.json['alice_pubkey']
alice_pubkey_umbral = UmbralPublicKey.from_bytes(
bytes.fromhex(alice_pubkey))
print("Retrieving...")
retrieved_plaintexts = bob.retrieve(
message_kit,
label=label.encode(),
enrico=data_source,
alice_verifying_key=alice_pubkey_umbral)
print("Retrieved.")
result = retrieved_plaintexts[0].decode("utf-8")
self.readAndDeleteKeys(address, keyring) #delete keys
return result
def post(self):
keys = request.json['keys']
password = request.json['password']
address = request.json['address']
alice_pubkey = request.json['alice_pubkey']
label = request.json['label']
path = self.writeKeys(keys)
passwd = PBKDF2(password,
address.encode(),
20,
count=30000,
hmac_hash_module=SHA256).hex()
keyring = NucypherKeyring(account=address, keyring_root="./keys")
keyring.unlock(password=passwd)
bob = Bob(known_nodes=[self.URSULA],
checksum_address=address,
domain='lynx',
keyring=keyring)
alice_pubkey_umbral = UmbralPublicKey.from_bytes(
bytes.fromhex(alice_pubkey))
bob.join_policy(label.encode(),
alice_verifying_key=alice_pubkey_umbral,
block=True)
self.readAndDeleteKeys(address, keyring) # delete keys
bob_privkeys = demo_keys.get_recipient_privkeys("bob")
bob_enc_keypair = DecryptingKeypair(private_key=bob_privkeys["enc"])
bob_sig_keypair = SigningKeypair(private_key=bob_privkeys["sig"])
enc_power = DecryptingPower(keypair=bob_enc_keypair)
sig_power = SigningPower(keypair=bob_sig_keypair)
power_ups = [enc_power, sig_power]
print("Creating Bob ...")
bob = Bob(
is_me=True,
federated_only=True,
crypto_power_ups=power_ups,
start_learning_now=True,
abort_on_learning_error=True,
known_nodes=[ursula],
save_metadata=False,
network_middleware=RestMiddleware(),
)
print("Bob = ", bob)
joined = list()
def get_layout():
unique_id = 'bob'
layout = html.Div([
html.Div([
ALICE = Alice(network_middleware=RestMiddleware(),
known_nodes=(URSULA,),
federated_only=True,
always_be_learning=True,
known_certificates_dir=CERTIFICATE_DIR,
)
# Here are our Policy details.
policy_end_datetime = maya.now() + datetime.timedelta(days=5)
m = 2
n = 3
label = b"secret/files/and/stuff"
# Alice grants to Bob.
BOB = Bob(known_nodes=(URSULA,),
federated_only=True,
always_be_learning=True,
known_certificates_dir=CERTIFICATE_DIR)
ALICE.start_learning_loop(now=True)
policy = ALICE.grant(BOB, label, m=m, n=n,
expiration=policy_end_datetime)
# Alice puts her public key somewhere for Bob to find later...
alices_pubkey_bytes_saved_for_posterity = bytes(ALICE.stamp)
# ...and then disappears from the internet.
del ALICE
# (this is optional of course - she may wish to remain in order to create
# new policies in the future. The point is - she is no longer obligated.
#####################
# some time passes. #
def decryptDelegated():
# Fetch Request Data
# {
# "bobKeys": "{\"enc\": \"40f05590a27491caf37049366fefd43e46034e4308f4f1fd233c166bc3980ab4\", \"sig\": \"3bcf21d3cb160118b499a883023569c60476f8731bd9eade11016c5030c1ca5d\"}",
# "policy_public_key": "02aef01b40c0a62a9a1f650dd9a8381695e21a7b3826c748a5b64831aa0dd9862c",
# "alice_sig_pubkey": "036c5d361000e6fbf3c4a84c98f924a3206e8a72c758a67e8300b5bee111b5fa97",
# "label": "1stlabel",
# "message": "messagekit",
# "data_source": "03a38eef9fd09c9841585dea93791e139a3003d540539673c8c719af55e46c0c1b",
# }
json_data = json.loads(request.data.decode('utf-8'))
bob_private_keys = json.loads(json_data['bobKeys'])
policy_public_key = json_data['policy_public_key']
alice_signing_key = json_data['alice_sig_pubkey']
label = json_data['label']
# username = json_data['username']
message = json_data['message']
data_source = json_data['data_source']
data_source = bytes.fromhex(data_source)
print (bob_private_keys['enc'])
enc = UmbralPrivateKey.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(bob_private_keys["enc"]))
sig = UmbralPrivateKey.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(bob_private_keys["sig"]))
# signingPublic = sig.get_pubkey()
# bobFilePath = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), 'bob/' + username + '.json')
# doctor_pubkeys = _get_keys(bobFilePath, UmbralPublicKey)
# print (signingPublic == doctor_pubkeys['sig'])
# print (signingPublic)
# print (doctor_pubkeys['sig'])
print ('\n\n\n')
bob_enc_keypair = DecryptingKeypair(private_key=enc)
bob_sig_keypair = SigningKeypair(private_key=sig)
enc_power = DecryptingPower(keypair=bob_enc_keypair)
sig_power = SigningPower(keypair=bob_sig_keypair)
power_ups = [enc_power, sig_power]
doctor = Bob(
domains={'TEMPORARY_DOMAIN'},
is_me=True,
federated_only=True,
crypto_power_ups=power_ups,
start_learning_now=True,
abort_on_learning_error=True,
known_nodes={ursula},
save_metadata=False,
network_middleware=RestMiddleware()
)
policy_pubkey = UmbralPublicKey.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(policy_public_key))
alices_sig_pubkey = UmbralPublicKey.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(alice_signing_key))
label = label.encode()
doctor.join_policy(label, alices_sig_pubkey)
message_kit = UmbralMessageKit.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(message))
print (message_kit == MessageKit)
print (message_kit)
print (MessageKit)
print ('\n\n\n')
data_source = Enrico.from_public_keys(
{SigningPower: data_source},
policy_encrypting_key=policy_pubkey
)
retrieved_plaintexts = doctor.retrieve(
label=label,
message_kit=message_kit,
data_source=data_source,
alice_verifying_key=alices_sig_pubkey
)
# the object to be sent back to front end
# {
# "fileFieldCount": 2,
# "textFieldCount": 2,
# "files (stringified)": {
# "fileKey1": "fileUrl1",
# "fileKey2": "fileUrl2"
# },
# "textFields (stringified)": {
# "age": "18",
# "name": "arvind"
# }
# }
plaintext = msgpack.loads(retrieved_plaintexts[0], raw=False)
# the object from plaintext
data_obj = createDataObject(plaintext, json_data['label'])
return jsonify(data_obj)
def test_bob_joins_policy_and_retrieves(federated_alice,
federated_ursulas,
certificates_tempdir,
):
# Let's partition Ursulas in two parts
a_couple_of_ursulas = list(federated_ursulas)[:2]
rest_of_ursulas = list(federated_ursulas)[2:]
# Bob becomes
bob = Bob(federated_only=True,
domains={TEMPORARY_DOMAIN},
start_learning_now=True,
network_middleware=MockRestMiddleware(),
abort_on_learning_error=True,
known_nodes=a_couple_of_ursulas,
)
# Bob only knows a couple of Ursulas initially
assert len(bob.known_nodes) == 2
# Alice creates a policy granting access to Bob
# Just for fun, let's assume she distributes KFrags among Ursulas unknown to Bob
n = NUMBER_OF_URSULAS_IN_DEVELOPMENT_NETWORK - 2
label = b'label://' + os.urandom(32)
contract_end_datetime = maya.now() + datetime.timedelta(days=5)
policy = federated_alice.grant(bob=bob,
label=label,
m=3,
n=n,
expiration=contract_end_datetime,
handpicked_ursulas=set(rest_of_ursulas),
)
assert bob == policy.bob
assert label == policy.label
# Now, Bob joins the policy
bob.join_policy(label=label,
alice_verifying_key=federated_alice.stamp,
block=True)
# In the end, Bob should know all the Ursulas
assert len(bob.known_nodes) == len(federated_ursulas)
# Enrico becomes
enrico = Enrico(policy_encrypting_key=policy.public_key)
plaintext = b"What's your approach? Mississippis or what?"
message_kit, _signature = enrico.encrypt_message(plaintext)
alices_verifying_key = federated_alice.stamp.as_umbral_pubkey()
# Bob takes the message_kit and retrieves the message within
delivered_cleartexts = bob.retrieve(message_kit,
enrico=enrico,
alice_verifying_key=alices_verifying_key,
label=policy.label,
retain_cfrags=True)
assert plaintext == delivered_cleartexts[0]
# Bob tries to retrieve again, but without using the cached CFrags, it fails.
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
delivered_cleartexts = bob.retrieve(message_kit,
enrico=enrico,
alice_verifying_key=alices_verifying_key,
label=policy.label)
cleartexts_delivered_a_second_time = bob.retrieve(message_kit,
enrico=enrico,
alice_verifying_key=alices_verifying_key,
label=policy.label,
use_attached_cfrags=True)
# Indeed, they're the same cleartexts.
assert delivered_cleartexts == cleartexts_delivered_a_second_time
# Let's try retrieve again, but Alice revoked the policy.
failed_revocations = federated_alice.revoke(policy)
assert len(failed_revocations) == 0
# One thing to note here is that Bob *can* still retrieve with the cached CFrags, even though this Policy has been revoked. #892
_cleartexts = bob.retrieve(message_kit,
enrico=enrico,
alice_verifying_key=alices_verifying_key,
label=policy.label,
use_precedent_work_orders=True,
)
assert _cleartexts == delivered_cleartexts # TODO: 892
# OK, but we imagine that the message_kit is fresh here.
message_kit.capsule.clear_cfrags()
with pytest.raises(Ursula.NotEnoughUrsulas):
_cleartexts = bob.retrieve(message_kit,
enrico=enrico,
alice_verifying_key=alices_verifying_key,
label=policy.label,
)
# Alice gets policy keys #
##########################
policy_pubkey_A = ALICE.get_policy_encrypting_key_from_label(label_A)
policy_pubkey_D = ALICE.get_policy_encrypting_key_from_label(label_D)
######################################
# Creating our data consumers/Bobs #
######################################
print(
"Starting Bob researchers looking for patients to participate in their trials."
)
print("One researcher is malicious, one is honest!")
BOB_A = Bob(known_nodes=[ursula],
domains={TEMPORARY_DOMAIN},
network_middleware=RestMiddleware(),
federated_only=True,
start_learning_now=True,
learn_on_same_thread=True)
BOB_B = Bob(known_nodes=[ursula],
domains={TEMPORARY_DOMAIN},
network_middleware=RestMiddleware(),
federated_only=True,
start_learning_now=True,
learn_on_same_thread=True)
BOB_D = Bob(known_nodes=[ursula],
domains={TEMPORARY_DOMAIN},
network_middleware=RestMiddleware(),
federated_only=True,
start_learning_now=True,
def test_bob_joins_policy_and_retrieves(federated_alice,
federated_ursulas,
certificates_tempdir,
):
# Let's partition Ursulas in two parts
a_couple_of_ursulas = list(federated_ursulas)[:2]
rest_of_ursulas = list(federated_ursulas)[2:]
# Bob becomes
bob = Bob(federated_only=True,
domain=TEMPORARY_DOMAIN,
start_learning_now=True,
network_middleware=MockRestMiddleware(),
abort_on_learning_error=True,
known_nodes=a_couple_of_ursulas,
)
# Bob has only connected to - at most - 2 nodes.
assert sum(node.verified_node for node in bob.known_nodes) <= 2
# Alice creates a policy granting access to Bob
# Just for fun, let's assume she distributes KFrags among Ursulas unknown to Bob
n = NUMBER_OF_URSULAS_IN_DEVELOPMENT_NETWORK - 2
label = b'label://' + os.urandom(32)
contract_end_datetime = maya.now() + datetime.timedelta(days=5)
policy = federated_alice.grant(bob=bob,
label=label,
m=3,
n=n,
expiration=contract_end_datetime,
handpicked_ursulas=set(rest_of_ursulas),
)
assert bob == policy.bob
assert label == policy.label
try:
# Now, Bob joins the policy
bob.join_policy(label=label,
alice_verifying_key=federated_alice.stamp,
block=True)
except policy.treasure_map.NowhereToBeFound:
maps = []
for ursula in federated_ursulas:
for map in ursula.treasure_maps.values():
maps.append(map)
if policy.treasure_map in maps:
# This is a nice place to put a breakpoint to examine Bob's failure to join a policy.
bob.join_policy(label=label,
alice_verifying_key=federated_alice.stamp,
block=True)
pytest.fail(f"Bob didn't find map {policy.treasure_map} even though it was available. Come on, Bob.")
else:
pytest.fail(f"It seems that Alice didn't publish {policy.treasure_map}. Come on, Alice.")
# In the end, Bob should know all the Ursulas
assert len(bob.known_nodes) == len(federated_ursulas)
# Enrico becomes
enrico = Enrico(policy_encrypting_key=policy.public_key)
plaintext = b"What's your approach? Mississippis or what?"
message_kit, _signature = enrico.encrypt_message(plaintext)
alices_verifying_key = federated_alice.stamp.as_umbral_pubkey()
# Bob takes the message_kit and retrieves the message within
delivered_cleartexts = bob.retrieve(message_kit,
enrico=enrico,
alice_verifying_key=alices_verifying_key,
label=policy.label,
retain_cfrags=True)
assert plaintext == delivered_cleartexts[0]
# Bob tries to retrieve again, but without using the cached CFrags, it fails.
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
delivered_cleartexts = bob.retrieve(message_kit,
enrico=enrico,
alice_verifying_key=alices_verifying_key,
label=policy.label)
cleartexts_delivered_a_second_time = bob.retrieve(message_kit,
enrico=enrico,
alice_verifying_key=alices_verifying_key,
label=policy.label,
use_attached_cfrags=True)
# Indeed, they're the same cleartexts.
assert delivered_cleartexts == cleartexts_delivered_a_second_time
# Let's try retrieve again, but Alice revoked the policy.
failed_revocations = federated_alice.revoke(policy)
assert len(failed_revocations) == 0
# One thing to note here is that Bob *can* still retrieve with the cached CFrags, even though this Policy has been revoked. #892
_cleartexts = bob.retrieve(message_kit,
enrico=enrico,
alice_verifying_key=alices_verifying_key,
label=policy.label,
use_precedent_work_orders=True,
)
assert _cleartexts == delivered_cleartexts # TODO: 892
# OK, but we imagine that the message_kit is fresh here.
message_kit.capsule.clear_cfrags()
with pytest.raises(Ursula.NotEnoughUrsulas):
_cleartexts = bob.retrieve(message_kit,
enrico=enrico,
alice_verifying_key=alices_verifying_key,
label=policy.label,
)
bob.disenchant()
seed_nodes=[ursula_seed_node],
learn_on_same_thread=True,
federated_only=True,
known_certificates_dir=CERTIFICATE_DIR,
)
# Here are our Policy details.
policy_end_datetime = maya.now() + datetime.timedelta(days=5)
m = 2
n = 3
label = b"secret/files/and/stuff"
# Alice grants to Bob.
BOB = Bob(seed_nodes=[ursula_seed_node],
network_middleware=RestMiddleware(),
federated_only=True,
start_learning_now=True,
learn_on_same_thread=True,
known_certificates_dir=CERTIFICATE_DIR)
ALICE.start_learning_loop(now=True)
policy = ALICE.grant(BOB, label, m=m, n=n, expiration=policy_end_datetime)
# Alice puts her public key somewhere for Bob to find later...
alices_pubkey_bytes_saved_for_posterity = bytes(ALICE.stamp)
# ...and then disappears from the internet.
del ALICE
# (this is optional of course - she may wish to remain in order to create
# new policies in the future. The point is - she is no longer obligated.
######################################
ALICE = Alice(network_middleware=RestMiddleware(),
known_nodes=[ursula],
learn_on_same_thread=True,
federated_only=True)
# Alice can get the public key even before creating the policy.
# From this moment on, any Data Source that knows the public key
# can encrypt data originally intended for Alice, but that can be shared with
# any Bob that Alice grants access.
policy_pubkey = ALICE.get_policy_pubkey_from_label(label)
BOB = Bob(known_nodes=[ursula],
network_middleware=RestMiddleware(),
federated_only=True,
start_learning_now=True,
learn_on_same_thread=True)
ALICE.start_learning_loop(now=True)
policy = ALICE.grant(BOB, label, m=m, n=n, expiration=policy_end_datetime)
assert policy.public_key == policy_pubkey
# Alice puts her public key somewhere for Bob to find later...
alices_pubkey_bytes_saved_for_posterity = bytes(ALICE.stamp)
# ...and then disappears from the internet.
del ALICE
print("\n************** Setup **************\n")
####################
# NuCypher Network #
####################
L1_NETWORK = 'mainnet' # or 'ibex'
L2_NETWORK = 'polygon' # or 'mumbai'
#####################
# Bob the BUIDLer ##
#####################
# Then, there was bob. Bob learns about the
# rest of the network from the seednode.
bob = Bob(domain=L1_NETWORK)
# Bob puts his public keys somewhere alice can find them.
verifying_key = bob.public_keys(SigningPower)
encrypting_key = bob.public_keys(DecryptingPower)
######################################
# Alice, the Authority of the Policy #
######################################
# Connect to the ethereum provider.
connect_web3_provider(eth_provider_uri=L1_PROVIDER)
# Connect to the layer 2 provider.
connect_web3_provider(eth_provider_uri=L2_PROVIDER)
# Setup and unlock alice's ethereum wallet.
doctor_keys = get_doctor_privkeys()
bob_enc_keypair = DecryptingKeypair(private_key=doctor_keys["enc"])
bob_sig_keypair = SigningKeypair(private_key=doctor_keys["sig"])
enc_power = DecryptingPower(keypair=bob_enc_keypair)
sig_power = SigningPower(keypair=bob_sig_keypair)
power_ups = [enc_power, sig_power]
print("Creating the Doctor ...")
doctor = Bob(
domain=TEMPORARY_DOMAIN,
federated_only=True,
crypto_power_ups=power_ups,
start_learning_now=True,
abort_on_learning_error=True,
known_nodes=[ursula],
save_metadata=False,
network_middleware=RestMiddleware(),
)
print("Doctor = ", doctor)
# Let's join the policy generated by Alicia. We just need some info about it.
with open("policy-metadata.json", 'r') as f:
policy_data = json.load(f)
policy_pubkey = PublicKey.from_bytes(
bytes.fromhex(policy_data["policy_pubkey"]))
alices_sig_pubkey = PublicKey.from_bytes(
bytes.fromhex(policy_data["alice_sig_pubkey"]))
def run_doc():
globalLogPublisher.addObserver(SimpleObserver())
######################
# Boring setup stuff #
######################
SEEDNODE_URL = 'localhost:11501'
# TODO: path joins?
TEMP_DOCTOR_DIR = "{}/doctor-files".format(
os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
# Remove previous demo files and create new ones
shutil.rmtree(TEMP_DOCTOR_DIR, ignore_errors=True)
ursula = Ursula.from_seed_and_stake_info(seed_uri=SEEDNODE_URL,
federated_only=True,
minimum_stake=0)
# To create a Bob, we need the doctor's private keys previously generated.
doctor_keys = get_doctor_privkeys()
bob_enc_keypair = DecryptingKeypair(private_key=doctor_keys["enc"])
bob_sig_keypair = SigningKeypair(private_key=doctor_keys["sig"])
enc_power = DecryptingPower(keypair=bob_enc_keypair)
sig_power = SigningPower(keypair=bob_sig_keypair)
power_ups = [enc_power, sig_power]
print("Creating the Doctor ...")
doctor = Bob(
is_me=True,
federated_only=True,
crypto_power_ups=power_ups,
start_learning_now=True,
abort_on_learning_error=True,
known_nodes=[ursula],
save_metadata=False,
network_middleware=RestMiddleware(),
)
print("Doctor = ", doctor)
# Let's join the policy generated by Alicia. We just need some info about it.
with open("policy-metadata.json", 'r') as f:
policy_data = json.load(f)
policy_pubkey = UmbralPublicKey.from_bytes(
bytes.fromhex(policy_data["policy_pubkey"]))
alices_sig_pubkey = UmbralPublicKey.from_bytes(
bytes.fromhex(policy_data["alice_sig_pubkey"]))
label = policy_data["label"].encode()
print("The Doctor joins policy for label '{}'".format(
label.decode("utf-8")))
doctor.join_policy(label, alices_sig_pubkey)
# Now that the Doctor joined the policy in the NuCypher network,
# he can retrieve encrypted data which he can decrypt with his private key.
# But first we need some encrypted data!
# Let's read the file produced by the heart monitor and unpack the MessageKits,
# which are the individual ciphertexts.
data = msgpack.load(open("heart_data.msgpack", "rb"), raw=False)
message_kits = (UmbralMessageKit.from_bytes(k) for k in data['kits'])
# The doctor also needs to create a view of the Data Source from its public keys
data_source = Enrico.from_public_keys({SigningPower: data['data_source']},
policy_encrypting_key=policy_pubkey)
# Now he can ask the NuCypher network to get a re-encrypted version of each MessageKit.
for message_kit in message_kits:
try:
start = timer()
retrieved_plaintexts = doctor.retrieve(
label=label,
message_kit=message_kit,
data_source=data_source,
alice_verifying_key=alices_sig_pubkey)
end = timer()
plaintext = msgpack.loads(retrieved_plaintexts[0], raw=False)
# Now we can get the heart rate and the associated timestamp,
# generated by the heart rate monitor.
heart_rate = plaintext['heart_rate']
timestamp = maya.MayaDT(plaintext['timestamp'])
# This code block simply pretty prints the heart rate info
terminal_size = shutil.get_terminal_size().columns
max_width = min(terminal_size, 120)
columns = max_width - 12 - 27
scale = columns / 40
scaled_heart_rate = int(scale * (heart_rate - 60))
retrieval_time = "Retrieval time: {:8.2f} ms".format(1000 *
(end - start))
line = ("-" * scaled_heart_rate) + "❤︎ ({} BPM)".format(heart_rate)
line = line.ljust(max_width - 27, " ") + retrieval_time
print(line)
except Exception as e:
# We just want to know what went wrong and continue the demo
traceback.print_exc()
def test_alices_powers_are_persistent(federated_ursulas, tmpdir):
passphrase = TEST_URSULA_INSECURE_DEVELOPMENT_PASSWORD
# Let's create an Alice from a Configuration.
# This requires creating a local storage for her first.
node_storage = LocalFileBasedNodeStorage(
federated_only=True,
character_class=Ursula, # Alice needs to store some info about Ursula
known_metadata_dir=os.path.join(tmpdir, "known_metadata"),
)
alice_config = AliceConfiguration(
config_root=os.path.join(tmpdir, "config_root"),
node_storage=node_storage,
auto_initialize=True,
auto_generate_keys=True,
passphrase=passphrase,
is_me=True,
network_middleware=MockRestMiddleware(),
known_nodes=federated_ursulas,
start_learning_now=False,
federated_only=True,
save_metadata=False,
load_metadata=False
)
alice = alice_config(passphrase=passphrase)
# We will save Alice's config to a file for later use
alice_config_file = alice_config.to_configuration_file()
# Let's save Alice's public keys too to check they are correctly restored later
alices_verifying_key = alice.public_keys(SigningPower)
alices_receiving_key = alice.public_keys(EncryptingPower)
# Next, let's fix a label for all the policies we will create later.
label = b"this_is_the_path_to_which_access_is_being_granted"
# Even before creating the policies, we can know what will be its public key.
# This can be used by DataSources to encrypt messages before Alice grants access to Bobs
policy_pubkey = alice.get_policy_pubkey_from_label(label)
# Now, let's create a policy for some Bob.
m, n = 3, 4
policy_end_datetime = maya.now() + datetime.timedelta(days=5)
bob = Bob(federated_only=True,
start_learning_now=False,
network_middleware=MockRestMiddleware(),
)
bob_policy = alice.grant(bob, label, m=m, n=n, expiration=policy_end_datetime)
assert policy_pubkey == bob_policy.public_key
# ... and Alice and her configuration disappear.
del alice
del alice_config
###################################
# Some time passes. #
# ... #
# (jmyles plays the Song of Time) #
# ... #
# Alice appears again. #
###################################
# A new Alice is restored from the configuration file
new_alice_config = AliceConfiguration.from_configuration_file(
filepath=alice_config_file,
network_middleware=MockRestMiddleware(),
known_nodes=federated_ursulas,
start_learning_now=False,
)
new_alice = new_alice_config(passphrase=passphrase)
# First, we check that her public keys are correctly restored
assert alices_verifying_key == new_alice.public_keys(SigningPower)
assert alices_receiving_key == new_alice.public_keys(EncryptingPower)
# Bob's eldest brother, Roberto, appears too
roberto = Bob(federated_only=True,
start_learning_now=False,
network_middleware=MockRestMiddleware(),
)
# Alice creates a new policy for Roberto. Note how all the parameters
# except for the label (i.e., recipient, m, n, policy_end) are different
# from previous policy
m, n = 2, 5
policy_end_datetime = maya.now() + datetime.timedelta(days=3)
roberto_policy = new_alice.grant(roberto, label, m=m, n=n, expiration=policy_end_datetime)
# Both policies must share the same public key (i.e., the policy public key)
assert policy_pubkey == roberto_policy.public_key
def doctor_decrypt(hash_key):
globalLogPublisher.addObserver(SimpleObserver())
SEEDNODE_URL = 'localhost:11501'
TEMP_DOCTOR_DIR = "{}/doctor-files".format(
os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
shutil.rmtree(TEMP_DOCTOR_DIR, ignore_errors=True)
ursula = Ursula.from_seed_and_stake_info(seed_uri=SEEDNODE_URL,
federated_only=True,
minimum_stake=0)
from doctor_keys import get_doctor_privkeys
doctor_keys = get_doctor_privkeys()
bob_enc_keypair = DecryptingKeypair(private_key=doctor_keys["enc"])
bob_sig_keypair = SigningKeypair(private_key=doctor_keys["sig"])
enc_power = DecryptingPower(keypair=bob_enc_keypair)
sig_power = SigningPower(keypair=bob_sig_keypair)
power_ups = [enc_power, sig_power]
print("Creating the Doctor ...")
doctor = Bob(
is_me=True,
federated_only=True,
crypto_power_ups=power_ups,
start_learning_now=True,
abort_on_learning_error=True,
known_nodes=[ursula],
save_metadata=False,
network_middleware=RestMiddleware(),
)
print("Doctor = ", doctor)
with open("policy-metadata.json", 'r') as f:
policy_data = json.load(f)
policy_pubkey = UmbralPublicKey.from_bytes(
bytes.fromhex(policy_data["policy_pubkey"]))
alices_sig_pubkey = UmbralPublicKey.from_bytes(
bytes.fromhex(policy_data["alice_sig_pubkey"]))
label = policy_data["label"].encode()
print("The Doctor joins policy for label '{}'".format(
label.decode("utf-8")))
doctor.join_policy(label, alices_sig_pubkey)
ipfs_api = ipfsapi.connect()
file = ipfs_api.get(hash_key)
print(file)
os.rename(hash_key, 'patient_details.msgpack')
data = msgpack.load(open("patient_details.msgpack", "rb"), raw=False)
message_kits = (UmbralMessageKit.from_bytes(k) for k in data['kits'])
data_source = DataSource.from_public_keys(
policy_public_key=policy_pubkey,
datasource_public_key=data['data_source'],
label=label)
complete_message = []
for message_kit in message_kits:
print(message_kit)
try:
start = timer()
retrieved_plaintexts = doctor.retrieve(
message_kit=message_kit,
data_source=data_source,
alice_verifying_key=alices_sig_pubkey)
end = timer()
plaintext = msgpack.loads(retrieved_plaintexts[0], raw=False)
complete_message.append(plaintext)
print(plaintext)
#with open("details.json", "w") as write_file:
# json.dump(plaintext, write_file)
except Exception as e:
traceback.print_exc()
with open("details.json", "w") as write_file:
json.dump(complete_message, write_file)
return complete_message
def test_bob_joins_policy_and_retrieves(federated_alice,
federated_ursulas,
certificates_tempdir,
):
# Let's partition Ursulas in two parts
a_couple_of_ursulas = list(federated_ursulas)[:2]
rest_of_ursulas = list(federated_ursulas)[2:]
# Bob becomes
bob = Bob(federated_only=True,
start_learning_now=True,
network_middleware=MockRestMiddleware(),
abort_on_learning_error=True,
known_nodes=a_couple_of_ursulas,
)
# Bob only knows a couple of Ursulas initially
assert len(bob.known_nodes) == 2
# Alice creates a policy granting access to Bob
# Just for fun, let's assume she distributes KFrags among Ursulas unknown to Bob
n = NUMBER_OF_URSULAS_IN_DEVELOPMENT_NETWORK - 2
label = b'label://' + os.urandom(32)
contract_end_datetime = maya.now() + datetime.timedelta(days=5)
policy = federated_alice.grant(bob=bob,
label=label,
m=3,
n=n,
expiration=contract_end_datetime,
handpicked_ursulas=set(rest_of_ursulas),
)
assert bob == policy.bob
assert label == policy.label
# Now, Bob joins the policy
bob.join_policy(label=label,
alice_pubkey_sig=federated_alice.stamp,
block=True)
# In the end, Bob should know all the Ursulas
assert len(bob.known_nodes) == len(federated_ursulas)
# Enrico becomes
enrico = Enrico(policy_encrypting_key=policy.public_key)
plaintext = b"What's your approach? Mississippis or what?"
message_kit, _signature = enrico.encrypt_message(plaintext)
alices_verifying_key = federated_alice.stamp.as_umbral_pubkey()
# Bob takes the message_kit and retrieves the message within
delivered_cleartexts = bob.retrieve(message_kit=message_kit,
data_source=enrico,
alice_verifying_key=alices_verifying_key,
label=policy.label)
assert plaintext == delivered_cleartexts[0]
# FIXME: Bob tries to retrieve again
# delivered_cleartexts = bob.retrieve(message_kit=message_kit,
# data_source=enrico,
# alice_verifying_key=alices_verifying_key,
# label=policy.label)
#
# assert plaintext == delivered_cleartexts[0]
# # Let's try retrieve again, but Alice revoked the policy.
failed_revocations = federated_alice.revoke(policy)
assert len(failed_revocations) == 0
with pytest.raises(Ursula.NotEnoughUrsulas):
_cleartexts = bob.retrieve(message_kit=message_kit,
data_source=enrico,
alice_verifying_key=alices_verifying_key,
label=policy.label)
def decryptDelegated():
json_data = json.loads(request.data.decode('utf-8'))
bob_private_keys = json.loads(json_data['bobKeys'])
policy_public_key = json_data['policy_public_key']
alice_signing_key = json_data['alice_sig_pubkey']
label = json_data['label']
# username = json_data['username']
message = json_data['message']
data_source = json_data['data_source']
data_source = bytes.fromhex(data_source)
print (bob_private_keys['enc'])
enc = UmbralPrivateKey.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(bob_private_keys["enc"]))
sig = UmbralPrivateKey.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(bob_private_keys["sig"]))
# signingPublic = sig.get_pubkey()
# bobFilePath = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), 'bob/' + username + '.json')
# doctor_pubkeys = _get_keys(bobFilePath, UmbralPublicKey)
# print (signingPublic == doctor_pubkeys['sig'])
# print (signingPublic)
# print (doctor_pubkeys['sig'])
print ('\n\n\n')
bob_enc_keypair = DecryptingKeypair(private_key=enc)
bob_sig_keypair = SigningKeypair(private_key=sig)
enc_power = DecryptingPower(keypair=bob_enc_keypair)
sig_power = SigningPower(keypair=bob_sig_keypair)
power_ups = [enc_power, sig_power]
doctor = Bob(
domains={'TEMPORARY_DOMAIN'},
is_me=True,
federated_only=True,
crypto_power_ups=power_ups,
start_learning_now=True,
abort_on_learning_error=True,
known_nodes={ursula},
save_metadata=False,
network_middleware=RestMiddleware()
)
policy_pubkey = UmbralPublicKey.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(policy_public_key))
alices_sig_pubkey = UmbralPublicKey.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(alice_signing_key))
label = label.encode()
doctor.join_policy(label, alices_sig_pubkey)
message_kit = UmbralMessageKit.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(message))
print (message_kit == MessageKit)
print (message_kit)
print (MessageKit)
print ('\n\n\n')
data_source = Enrico.from_public_keys(
{SigningPower: data_source},
policy_encrypting_key=policy_pubkey
)
retrieved_plaintexts = doctor.retrieve(
label=label,
message_kit=message_kit,
data_source=data_source,
alice_verifying_key=alices_sig_pubkey
)
# the object to be sent back to front end
# {
# "fileFieldCount": 2,
# "textFieldCount": 2,
# "files (stringified)": {
# "fileKey1": "fileUrl1",
# "fileKey2": "fileUrl2"
# },
# "textFields (stringified)": {
# "age": "18",
# "name": "arvind"
# }
# }
plaintext = msgpack.loads(retrieved_plaintexts[0], raw=False)
# the object from plaintext
# data_obj = createDataObject(plaintext, json_data['label'])
return jsonify(plaintext)
def test_alices_powers_are_persistent(federated_ursulas, tmpdir):
# Create a non-learning AliceConfiguration
alice_config = AliceConfiguration(config_root=os.path.join(
tmpdir, 'nucypher-custom-alice-config'),
network_middleware=MockRestMiddleware(),
known_nodes=federated_ursulas,
start_learning_now=False,
federated_only=True,
save_metadata=False,
reload_metadata=False)
# Generate keys and write them the disk
alice_config.initialize(password=INSECURE_DEVELOPMENT_PASSWORD)
# Unlock Alice's keyring
alice_config.keyring.unlock(password=INSECURE_DEVELOPMENT_PASSWORD)
# Produce an Alice
alice = alice_config() # or alice_config.produce()
# Save Alice's node configuration file to disk for later use
alice_config_file = alice_config.to_configuration_file()
# Let's save Alice's public keys too to check they are correctly restored later
alices_verifying_key = alice.public_keys(SigningPower)
alices_receiving_key = alice.public_keys(DecryptingPower)
# Next, let's fix a label for all the policies we will create later.
label = b"this_is_the_path_to_which_access_is_being_granted"
# Even before creating the policies, we can know what will be its public key.
# This can be used by Enrico (i.e., a Data Source) to encrypt messages
# before Alice grants access to Bobs.
policy_pubkey = alice.get_policy_encrypting_key_from_label(label)
# Now, let's create a policy for some Bob.
m, n = 3, 4
policy_end_datetime = maya.now() + datetime.timedelta(days=5)
bob = Bob(federated_only=True,
start_learning_now=False,
network_middleware=MockRestMiddleware())
bob_policy = alice.grant(bob,
label,
m=m,
n=n,
expiration=policy_end_datetime)
assert policy_pubkey == bob_policy.public_key
# ... and Alice and her configuration disappear.
del alice
del alice_config
###################################
# Some time passes. #
# ... #
# (jmyles plays the Song of Time) #
# ... #
# Alice appears again. #
###################################
# A new Alice is restored from the configuration file
new_alice_config = AliceConfiguration.from_configuration_file(
filepath=alice_config_file,
network_middleware=MockRestMiddleware(),
known_nodes=federated_ursulas,
start_learning_now=False,
)
# Alice unlocks her restored keyring from disk
new_alice_config.attach_keyring()
new_alice_config.keyring.unlock(password=INSECURE_DEVELOPMENT_PASSWORD)
new_alice = new_alice_config()
# First, we check that her public keys are correctly restored
assert alices_verifying_key == new_alice.public_keys(SigningPower)
assert alices_receiving_key == new_alice.public_keys(DecryptingPower)
# Bob's eldest brother, Roberto, appears too
roberto = Bob(federated_only=True,
start_learning_now=False,
network_middleware=MockRestMiddleware())
# Alice creates a new policy for Roberto. Note how all the parameters
# except for the label (i.e., recipient, m, n, policy_end) are different
# from previous policy
m, n = 2, 5
policy_end_datetime = maya.now() + datetime.timedelta(days=3)
roberto_policy = new_alice.grant(roberto,
label,
m=m,
n=n,
expiration=policy_end_datetime)
# Both policies must share the same public key (i.e., the policy public key)
assert policy_pubkey == roberto_policy.public_key
def createBobToResolveData(sub_uuid, sender, event_uuid, sub_private_key,
sub_signer_key, policy_pub_key, policy_sign_key,
label):
SEEDNODE_URI = "127.0.0.1:10151"
# TODO: path joins?
TEMP_DOCTOR_DIR = "{}/doctor-files".format(
os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
# Remove previous demo files and create new ones
shutil.rmtree(TEMP_DOCTOR_DIR, ignore_errors=True)
ursula = Ursula.from_seed_and_stake_info(seed_uri=SEEDNODE_URI,
federated_only=True,
minimum_stake=0)
# doctor private key
encdoctor = UmbralPrivateKey.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(sub_private_key))
signdoctor = UmbralPrivateKey.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(sub_signer_key))
bob_enc_keypair = DecryptingKeypair(private_key=encdoctor)
bob_sig_keypair = SigningKeypair(private_key=signdoctor)
enc_power = DecryptingPower(keypair=bob_enc_keypair)
sig_power = SigningPower(keypair=bob_sig_keypair)
power_ups = [enc_power, sig_power]
print("Creating the Doctor ...")
doctor = Bob(
domains={TEMPORARY_DOMAIN},
federated_only=True,
crypto_power_ups=power_ups,
start_learning_now=True,
abort_on_learning_error=True,
known_nodes=[ursula],
save_metadata=False,
network_middleware=RestMiddleware(),
)
print("Doctor = ", doctor)
policy_pub_keys = UmbralPublicKey.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(policy_pub_key))
policy_sign_keys = UmbralPublicKey.from_bytes(
bytes.fromhex(policy_sign_key))
label = label.encode()
print("The Doctor joins policy for label '{}'".format(
label.decode("utf-8")))
doctor.join_policy(label, policy_sign_keys)
data = msgpack.load(open(event_uuid + ".msgpack", "rb"), raw=False)
message_kits = UmbralMessageKit.from_bytes(data['data'])
data_source = Enrico.from_public_keys(
verifying_key=data['data_source'],
policy_encrypting_key=policy_pub_keys)
try:
retrieved_plaintexts = doctor.retrieve(
message_kits,
label=label,
enrico=data_source,
alice_verifying_key=policy_sign_keys)
plaintext = msgpack.loads(retrieved_plaintexts[0], raw=False)
# Now we can get the heart rate and the associated timestamp,
# generated by the heart rate monitor.
location_decrypted = plaintext['data_enc']
print(location_decrypted)
except Exception as e:
# We just want to know what went wrong and continue the demo
traceback.print_exc()
return location_decrypted
