def recover_key_from_nonce(msg, sig, k, q, hash=sha1):
"""Recovers a DSA private key (`x`) from a message-signature-pair given a known nonce
Example:
```python
>>> from bop.crypto_constructor import dsa
>>> my_dsa = dsa()
>>> msg = b"Hello kind stranger!"
>>> sig = my_dsa.sign(msg)
>>> leaked_nonce = sig._k
>>> my_dsa.x == recover_key_from_nonce(msg, sig, leaked_nonce, my_dsa.q, hash=my_dsa.hash)
True
```
Arguments:
msg {bytes or int} -- The message which was signed
sig {tuple or Signature} -- The signature of the given message in form `(r, s)`
k {int} -- The leaked nonce
q {int} -- The public parameter q
"""
if type(msg) != bytes:
msg = i2b(msg)
h = b2i(hash(msg))
r, s = sig
return ((s * k - h) * invmod(r, q)) % q
def _dsa_sign(msg, p, q, g, x, k, hash=hash):
if type(msg) != bytes:
msg = i2b(msg)
h = b2i(hash(msg))
r = pow(g, k, p) % q
s = (invmod(k, q) * (h + r * x)) % q
return r, s
def decrypt(self, cipher):
was_bytes = False
if type(cipher) != int:
cipher = b2i(cipher)
was_bytes = True
m = pow(cipher, self.d, self.n)
if was_bytes:
m = i2b(m)
return m
def encrypt(self, plaintext):
was_bytes = False
if type(plaintext) != int:
plaintext = b2i(plaintext)
was_bytes = True
c = pow(plaintext, self.e, self.n)
if was_bytes:
c = i2b(c)
return c
def verify(self, msg, sig):
r, s = sig
if r <= 0 or r >= self.q or s <= 0 or s >= self.q:
return False
if type(msg) != bytes:
msg = i2b(msg)
h = b2i(self.hash(msg))
w = invmod(s, self.q)
u1 = (w * h) % self.q
u2 = (w * r) % self.q
v = (pow(self.g, u1, self.p) * pow(self.y, u2, self.p)) % self.q
return v == r
def sign(self, msg):
if type(msg) != bytes:
msg = i2b(msg)
h = b2i(self.hash(msg))
s = 0
while s == 0:
r = 0
while r == 0:
if self.generate_nonce is not None:
k = self.generate_nonce()
else:
k = secrets.randbelow(self.q - 2) + 2
r = pow(self.g, k, self.p) % self.q
s = (invmod(k, self.q) * (h + r * self.x)) % self.q
return self.Signature(r, s, k)
def bleichenbacher_forge_signature(message,
key_size,
hash=sha1,
protocol=b"DUMMY"):
r"""Forge a signature RSA (e=3) signature for the given message.
This method can be used to forge signatures if the checking is incorrectly implemented.
For this example a dummy PKCS1.5 padding is applied (see argument `protocol`).
This padding right-aligns the content (i.e. the hash of the message and some
protocol information). However an incorrect implementation may not check if
the signature is actually right-aligned.
You may need a minimum key size for this to work. 1024 bits should be sufficient.
Example:
```python3
>>> import re
>>> from bop.hashing import sha1
>>> from bop.crypto_constructor import rsa
>>> def check(message, sig, rsa):
... c = rsa.encrypt(sig)
... # note that we are ignoring trailing bytes
... # also note that the leading zero byte gets trimmed
... h = re.match(br"^\x01(\xff)*?\x00DUMMY(.{20})", c, re.DOTALL).group(2)
... return h == sha1(message)
...
>>> some_rsa = rsa(e=3)
>>> my_msg = b"My very valid message"
>>> my_sig = bleichenbacher_forge_signature(my_msg, some_rsa.key_size)
>>> check(my_msg, my_sig, some_rsa)
True
```
Arguments:
message {bytes} -- The message to sign
key_size {int} -- The size of the public key parameter N in bits
Keyword Arguments:
hash {callable} -- The hash algorithm to use (default: {sha1})
protocol {bytes} -- The bytes to use which specify meta data. In reality this would be some kind of ASN.1 scheme but for this toy example it does not really matter. (default: {b"DUMMY"})
Returns:
bytes -- The signature of the message
"""
# we fake this. In reality a little bit of effort has to be made in order to specify the
# hash algorithm used, size of the hash etc.
h = hash(message)
payload = b"\x00" + protocol + h
payload_len = len(payload) * 8
# this is more or less a heuristic, place digest at about 2/3
position = key_size // 8 // 3 * 16
n = (1 << payload_len) - b2i(payload)
c = (1 << (key_size - 15)) - n * (1 << position)
root = cubic_root2(c)
if len(root) == 1:
# we are lucky
root = root[0]
else:
root = root[-1]
return i2b(root)
def decrypt_pkcs_padding_leak(oracle, msg, e, n):
"""Perform an adaptive chosen ciphertext against a weak RSA implementation leaking PKCS1v5 padding information.
This attack was discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher and is well described in the original [paper](http://archiv.infsec.ethz.ch/education/fs08/secsem/bleichenbacher98.pdf).
Side note:\
This attack is generally faster if `msg` is already properly padded.
Depending on the keysize the expected running time may be somewhere between a few seconds (key size <= 512 bits) or somewhere around
one minute for a 1024 public modulus.
I once tested using a 2048 bit key which ran about an hour..\
I am pretty sure this implementation is far from optimal, though I am not qualified to judge where I went wrong.
Example:
```python3
>>> from bop.oracles.padding import PaddingRSAOracle as Oracle
>>> import bop.utils as utils
>>> # We will choose smaller params to keep the running time down a little bit
>>> p, q = utils.gen_rsa_key_params(256)
>>> o = Oracle(p, q)
>>> e, n = o.public_key()
>>> plain = b"Hey! This message is save!"
>>> # Optional: Pad the message:
>>> # plain = utils.pad_pkcs1v5(plain, n)
>>> msg = o.encrypt(plain)
>>> decrypt_pkcs_padding_leak(o, msg, e, n)
b'Hey! This message is save!'
```
Args:
oracle (callable): An oracle which leaks whether the decrypted message has a valid PKCS1v5 padding or not
(i. e. the first byte is equal to 0 and the second byte is equal to 2)
msg (bytes or int): The message to decrypt
e (int): The public exponent
n (int): The public modulus
Returns:
bytes or int: The decrypted message. Depending on the input type the output type is matched.
"""
was_bytes = False
if type(msg) != int:
msg = b2i(msg)
was_bytes = True
k = bit_length_exp2(n)
assert k > 16
B = 1 << (k - 16)
s0 = 1
c0 = msg
first = True
M = {(2 * B, 3 * B - 1)}
if not oracle(msg):
# Blinding
# ensure we have a valid padding to work with
while True:
s0 = secrets.randbelow(n - 1) + 1
c0 = (msg * pow(s0, e, n)) % n
if oracle(c0):
break
while True:
if first:
# Step 2a
s = n // (3 * B)
while oracle((c0 * pow(s, e, n)) % n) is False:
s += 1
first = False
elif len(M) > 1:
# Step 2b
s_ = s + 1
while not oracle((c0 * pow(s_, e, n)) % n):
s_ += 1
s = s_
else:
# Step 2c
a, b = next(iter(M))
found = False
r = 2 * (b * s - 2 * B) // n
while not found:
s_ = (2 * B + r * n) // b
s_max = (3 * B + r * n) // a
while s_ <= s_max:
if oracle((c0 * pow(s_, e, n)) % n):
found = True
break
s_ += 1
r += 1
s = s_
# Step 3
M_ = set()
for a, b in M:
r_low = (a * s - 3 * B + 1) // n
r_high = (b * s - 2 * B) // n
for r in range(r_low, r_high + 1):
# note the + s - 1 in order to ensure rounding to the next integer
low = max(a, (2 * B + r * n + s - 1) // s)
high = min(b, (3 * B - 1 + r * n) // s)
if low <= high and (low, high) not in M_:
M_.add((low, high))
M = M_
# Step 4
if len(M) == 1:
a, b = next(iter(M))
if a == b:
plain = (a * invmod(s0, n)) % n
if was_bytes:
return i2b(plain)
return plain
def decrypt_parity_leak(oracle, msg, e, n):
"""Performs a RSA-parity attack given an oracle which reports whether a decrypted plaintext is even or odd
Example:
```python
>>> from bop.oracles.parity import RsaParityOracle as Oracle
>>> o = Oracle()
>>> msg = o.encrypt(b"Hello Bob!")
>>> e, n = o.public_key()
>>> decrypt_parity_leak(o, msg, e, n)
b'Hello Bob!'
```
Args:
oracle (callable): A function which decrypts ciphers which were encrypted using the given public key and reports whether the resulting plain text is even (`True`) or odd (`False`)
msg (bytes or int): The encrypted message to decrypt
e (int): The public key exponent e
n (int): The public key modul n
Raises:
RuntimeError: If the plain text cannot be recovered. This is propably caused by rounding errors
Returns:
bytes or int: The decrypted message. Depending on the type given (`msg`) the resulting type matches.
"""
was_bytes = False
if type(msg) != int:
was_bytes = True
msg = b2i(msg)
i = 2
upper = n
lower = 0
# we will use this to carry the rounding error, though this is VERY vague
# the desired plain text is usually off by only 1 anyways
rest = 1
while i <= n:
# encrypt i
f = pow(i, e, n)
if oracle(f * msg):
# even
upper = (upper + lower) // 2
rest += (upper + lower) & 1
else:
# odd
lower = (upper + lower) // 2
i <<= 1
for plain in range(lower, upper + rest):
if pow(plain, e, n) == msg:
if was_bytes:
return i2b(plain)
else:
return plain
raise RuntimeError("Could not find plain text. Something went wrong :(")
def recover_key_from_duplicate_nonce(gen, public_parameters, hash=sha1):
"""Attempt to recover a DSA private key (`x`) from a stream of messages by searching for a duplicate usage of a nonce.
Note that this is a pretty naive implementation running in O(n^2) where n is the number of messages (signatures) checked.
Example:
```python
>>> from bop.crypto_constructor import dsa
>>> import secrets
>>>
>>> # Setup a weak implementation
>>> my_dsa = dsa()
>>> def weak_nonce_generator():
... return secrets.choice(range(2, 11))
...
>>> my_dsa.generate_nonce = weak_nonce_generator
>>> def message_src():
... while True:
... msg = secrets.token_bytes(16)
... yield msg, my_dsa.sign(msg)
...
>>> x, leaked_nonce = recover_key_from_duplicate_nonce(message_src(), my_dsa.public_parameters, hash=my_dsa.hash)
>>> my_dsa.x == x
True
```
Arguments:
gen {generator} -- A generator yielding message-signature-pairs `(msg, signature)`.
It will be consumed until a duplicate nonce is found or it is empty.
public_parameters {tuple} -- The public parameters of the DSA algorithm used
Keyword Arguments:
hash {callable} -- The hash function to use (default: {sha1})
Returns:
(int, int) -- (x, leaked_nonce), i.e. the private key and the leaked nonce. Or (None, None) if no duplicate was found.
"""
p, q, g, y = public_parameters
first_msg, first_sig = next(gen)
if type(first_msg) != bytes:
first_msg = i2b(first_msg)
bases = [(first_msg, first_sig)]
# we do a simple exhaustive search for a duplicated nonce
for msg1, sig1 in gen:
if type(msg1) != bytes:
msg1 = i2b(msg1)
h1 = b2i(hash(msg1))
r1, s1 = sig1
for msg2, sig2 in bases:
h2 = b2i(hash(msg2))
r2, s2 = sig2
# Assume k was equal
k = ((h2 - h1) * invmod(s2 - s1, q)) % q
# Check if our assumption holds
x = recover_key_from_nonce(msg1, sig1, k, q, hash=hash)
if _dsa_sign(msg1, p, q, g, x, k, hash=hash) == (r1, s1):
return x, k
bases.append((msg1, sig1))
return None, None