def test_encrypt_ballot_with_stateful_composer_succeeds(self):
# Arrange
keypair = elgamal_keypair_from_secret(int_to_q(2))
manifest = election_factory.get_fake_manifest()
internal_manifest, context = election_factory.get_fake_ciphertext_election(
manifest, keypair.public_key)
data = election_factory.get_fake_ballot(internal_manifest)
self.assertTrue(
data.is_valid(internal_manifest.ballot_styles[0].object_id))
device = election_factory.get_encryption_device()
subject = EncryptionMediator(internal_manifest, context, device)
# Act
result = subject.encrypt(data)
# Assert
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
self.assertTrue(
result.is_valid_encryption(
internal_manifest.manifest_hash,
keypair.public_key,
context.crypto_extended_base_hash,
))
def test_encrypt_ballot_simple_succeeds(self):
# Arrange
keypair = elgamal_keypair_from_secret(int_to_q(2))
manifest = election_factory.get_fake_manifest()
internal_manifest, context = election_factory.get_fake_ciphertext_election(
manifest, keypair.public_key)
nonce_seed = TWO_MOD_Q
# TODO: Ballot Factory
subject = election_factory.get_fake_ballot(internal_manifest)
self.assertTrue(
subject.is_valid(internal_manifest.ballot_styles[0].object_id))
# Act
result = encrypt_ballot(subject, internal_manifest, context, SEED)
result_from_seed = encrypt_ballot(subject, internal_manifest, context,
SEED, nonce_seed)
# Assert
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
self.assertIsNotNone(result.code)
self.assertIsNotNone(result_from_seed)
self.assertTrue(
result.is_valid_encryption(
internal_manifest.manifest_hash,
keypair.public_key,
context.crypto_extended_base_hash,
))
self.assertTrue(
result_from_seed.is_valid_encryption(
internal_manifest.manifest_hash,
keypair.public_key,
context.crypto_extended_base_hash,
))
def test_gmpy2_parallelism_is_safe(self):
cpus = cpu_count()
problem_size = 1000
secret_keys = Nonces(int_to_q_unchecked(3))[
0:problem_size] # list of 1000 might-as-well-be-random Q's
log_info(
f"testing GMPY2 powmod parallelism safety (cpus = {cpus}, problem_size = {problem_size})"
)
# compute in parallel
start = timer()
p = Pool(cpus)
keypairs = p.map(elgamal_keypair_from_secret, secret_keys)
end1 = timer()
# verify scalar
for keypair in keypairs:
self.assertEqual(
keypair.public_key,
elgamal_keypair_from_secret(keypair.secret_key).public_key,
)
end2 = timer()
p.close(
) # apparently necessary to avoid warnings from the Pool system
log_info(f"Parallelism speedup: {(end2 - end1) / (end1 - start):.3f}")
def test_simple_elgamal_encryption_decryption(self):
nonce = ONE_MOD_Q
secret_key = TWO_MOD_Q
keypair = get_optional(elgamal_keypair_from_secret(secret_key))
public_key = keypair.public_key
self.assertLess(public_key.to_int(), P)
elem = g_pow_p(ZERO_MOD_Q)
self.assertEqual(elem, ONE_MOD_P) # g^0 == 1
ciphertext = get_optional(elgamal_encrypt(0, nonce,
keypair.public_key))
self.assertEqual(G, ciphertext.alpha.to_int())
self.assertEqual(
pow(ciphertext.alpha.to_int(), secret_key.to_int(), P),
pow(public_key.to_int(), nonce.to_int(), P),
)
self.assertEqual(
ciphertext.beta.to_int(),
pow(public_key.to_int(), nonce.to_int(), P),
)
plaintext = ciphertext.decrypt(keypair.secret_key)
self.assertEqual(0, plaintext)
def test_encrypt_simple_ballot_from_files_succeeds(self):
# Arrange
keypair = elgamal_keypair_from_secret(int_to_q(2))
election = election_factory.get_simple_election_from_file()
metadata, context = election_factory.get_fake_ciphertext_election(
election, keypair.public_key
)
data = ballot_factory.get_simple_ballot_from_file()
self.assertTrue(data.is_valid(metadata.ballot_styles[0].object_id))
device = EncryptionDevice("Location")
subject = EncryptionMediator(metadata, context, device)
# Act
result = subject.encrypt(data)
# Assert
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
self.assertEqual(data.object_id, result.object_id)
self.assertTrue(
result.is_valid_encryption(
metadata.description_hash,
keypair.public_key,
context.crypto_extended_base_hash,
)
)
def test_cast_ballot(self):
# Arrange
keypair = elgamal_keypair_from_secret(int_to_q(2))
election = election_factory.get_fake_election()
metadata, context = election_factory.get_fake_ciphertext_election(
election, keypair.public_key
)
store = BallotStore()
source = election_factory.get_fake_ballot(metadata)
self.assertTrue(source.is_valid(metadata.ballot_styles[0].object_id))
# Act
data = encrypt_ballot(source, metadata, context, SEED_HASH)
result = accept_ballot(data, BallotBoxState.CAST, metadata, context, store)
# Assert
expected = store.get(source.object_id)
self.assertEqual(expected.state, BallotBoxState.CAST)
self.assertEqual(result.state, BallotBoxState.CAST)
self.assertEqual(expected.object_id, result.object_id)
# Test failure modes
self.assertIsNone(
accept_ballot(data, BallotBoxState.CAST, metadata, context, store)
) # cannot cast again
self.assertIsNone(
accept_ballot(data, BallotBoxState.SPOILED, metadata, context, store)
) # cannot cspoil a ballot already cast
def test_encrypt_simple_selection_malformed_data_fails(self):
# Arrange
keypair = elgamal_keypair_from_secret(int_to_q(2))
nonce = randbelow(Q)
metadata = SelectionDescription("some-selection-object-id",
"some-candidate-id", 1)
hash_context = metadata.crypto_hash()
subject = selection_from(metadata)
self.assertTrue(subject.is_valid(metadata.object_id))
# Act
result = encrypt_selection(subject, metadata, keypair.public_key,
nonce)
# tamper with the description_hash
malformed_description_hash = deepcopy(result)
malformed_description_hash.description_hash = TWO_MOD_Q
# remove the proof
missing_proof = deepcopy(result)
missing_proof.proof = None
# Assert
self.assertFalse(
malformed_description_hash.is_valid_encryption(
hash_context, keypair.public_key))
self.assertFalse(
missing_proof.is_valid_encryption(hash_context,
keypair.public_key))
def test_djcp_proofs_simple(self):
# doesn't get any simpler than this
keypair = elgamal_keypair_from_secret(TWO_MOD_Q)
nonce = ONE_MOD_Q
seed = TWO_MOD_Q
message0 = get_optional(elgamal_encrypt(0, nonce, keypair.public_key))
proof0 = make_disjunctive_chaum_pedersen_zero(message0, nonce,
keypair.public_key,
ONE_MOD_Q, seed)
proof0bad = make_disjunctive_chaum_pedersen_one(
message0, nonce, keypair.public_key, ONE_MOD_Q, seed)
self.assertTrue(
proof0.is_valid(message0, keypair.public_key, ONE_MOD_Q))
self.assertFalse(
proof0bad.is_valid(message0, keypair.public_key, ONE_MOD_Q))
message1 = get_optional(elgamal_encrypt(1, nonce, keypair.public_key))
proof1 = make_disjunctive_chaum_pedersen_one(message1, nonce,
keypair.public_key,
ONE_MOD_Q, seed)
proof1bad = make_disjunctive_chaum_pedersen_zero(
message1, nonce, keypair.public_key, ONE_MOD_Q, seed)
self.assertTrue(
proof1.is_valid(message1, keypair.public_key, ONE_MOD_Q))
self.assertFalse(
proof1bad.is_valid(message1, keypair.public_key, ONE_MOD_Q))
def test_encrypt_ballot_simple_succeeds(self):
# Arrange
keypair = elgamal_keypair_from_secret(int_to_q(2))
election = election_factory.get_fake_election()
metadata, context = election_factory.get_fake_ciphertext_election(
election, keypair.public_key)
nonce_seed = TWO_MOD_Q
# TODO: Ballot Factory
subject = election_factory.get_fake_ballot(metadata)
self.assertTrue(subject.is_valid(metadata.ballot_styles[0].object_id))
# Act
result = encrypt_ballot(subject, metadata, context, SEED_HASH)
tracker_code = result.get_tracker_code()
result_from_seed = encrypt_ballot(subject, metadata, context,
SEED_HASH, nonce_seed)
# Assert
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
self.assertIsNotNone(result.tracking_id)
self.assertIsNotNone(tracker_code)
self.assertIsNotNone(result_from_seed)
self.assertTrue(
result.is_valid_encryption(context.crypto_extended_base_hash,
keypair.public_key))
self.assertTrue(
result_from_seed.is_valid_encryption(
context.crypto_extended_base_hash, keypair.public_key))
def test_gmpy2_parallelism_is_safe(self):
"""
Ensures running lots of parallel exponentiations still yields the correct answer.
This verifies that nothing incorrect is happening in the GMPY2 library
"""
# Arrange
scheduler = Scheduler()
problem_size = 1000
random_secret_keys = Nonces(int_to_q_unchecked(3))[0:problem_size]
log_info(
f"testing GMPY2 powmod parallelism safety (cpus = {scheduler.cpu_count}, problem_size = {problem_size})"
)
# Act
start = timer()
keypairs = scheduler.schedule(
elgamal_keypair_from_secret,
[list([secret_key]) for secret_key in random_secret_keys],
)
end1 = timer()
# Assert
for keypair in keypairs:
self.assertEqual(
keypair.public_key,
elgamal_keypair_from_secret(keypair.secret_key).public_key,
)
end2 = timer()
scheduler.close()
log_info(f"Parallelism speedup: {(end2 - end1) / (end1 - start):.3f}")
def test_ballot_box_spoil_ballot(self):
# Arrange
keypair = elgamal_keypair_from_secret(int_to_q(2))
manifest = election_factory.get_fake_manifest()
internal_manifest, context = election_factory.get_fake_ciphertext_election(
manifest, keypair.public_key)
store = DataStore()
source = election_factory.get_fake_ballot(internal_manifest)
self.assertTrue(
source.is_valid(internal_manifest.ballot_styles[0].object_id))
# Act
data = encrypt_ballot(source, internal_manifest, context, SEED)
subject = BallotBox(internal_manifest, context, store)
result = subject.spoil(data)
# Assert
expected = store.get(source.object_id)
self.assertEqual(expected.state, BallotBoxState.SPOILED)
self.assertEqual(result.state, BallotBoxState.SPOILED)
self.assertEqual(expected.object_id, result.object_id)
# Test failure modes
self.assertIsNone(subject.spoil(data)) # cannot spoil again
self.assertIsNone(
subject.cast(data)) # cannot cast a ballot alraedy spoiled
def elgamal_keypairs(draw: _DrawType):
"""
Generates an arbitrary ElGamal secret/public keypair.
:param draw: Hidden argument, used by Hypothesis.
"""
e = draw(elements_mod_q_no_zero())
return elgamal_keypair_from_secret(e if e != ONE_MOD_Q else TWO_MOD_Q)
def test_ccp_proofs_simple_encryption_of_one(self):
keypair = elgamal_keypair_from_secret(TWO_MOD_Q)
nonce = ONE_MOD_Q
seed = TWO_MOD_Q
message = get_optional(elgamal_encrypt(1, nonce, keypair.public_key))
proof = make_constant_chaum_pedersen(message, 1, nonce,
keypair.public_key, seed)
bad_proof = make_constant_chaum_pedersen(message, 0, nonce,
keypair.public_key, seed)
self.assertTrue(proof.is_valid(message, keypair.public_key))
self.assertFalse(bad_proof.is_valid(message, keypair.public_key))
def test_encrypt_simple_contest_referendum_succeeds(self):
# Arrange
keypair = elgamal_keypair_from_secret(int_to_q(2))
nonce = randbelow(Q)
ballot_selections = [
SelectionDescription(
"some-object-id-affirmative", "some-candidate-id-affirmative", 0
),
SelectionDescription(
"some-object-id-negative", "some-candidate-id-negative", 1
),
]
placeholder_selections = [
SelectionDescription(
"some-object-id-placeholder", "some-candidate-id-placeholder", 2
)
]
metadata = ContestDescriptionWithPlaceholders(
"some-contest-object-id",
"some-electoral-district-id",
0,
VoteVariationType.one_of_m,
1,
1,
"some-referendum-contest-name",
ballot_selections,
None,
None,
placeholder_selections,
)
hash_context = metadata.crypto_hash()
subject = contest_from(metadata)
self.assertTrue(
subject.is_valid(
metadata.object_id,
len(metadata.ballot_selections),
metadata.number_elected,
metadata.votes_allowed,
)
)
# Act
result = encrypt_contest(
subject, metadata, keypair.public_key, ONE_MOD_Q, nonce
)
# Assert
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
self.assertTrue(
result.is_valid_encryption(hash_context, keypair.public_key, ONE_MOD_Q)
)
def test_encrypt_contest_duplicate_selection_object_ids_fails(self):
"""
This is an example test of a failing test where the contest description
is malformed
"""
random_seed = 0
description = ContestDescription(
object_id="[email protected]",
electoral_district_id="[email protected]",
sequence_order=1,
vote_variation=VoteVariationType.n_of_m,
number_elected=1,
votes_allowed=1,
name="",
ballot_selections=[
SelectionDescription(
object_id="[email protected]",
candidate_id="*****@*****.**",
sequence_order=0,
),
# Note the selection description is the same as the first sequence element
SelectionDescription(
object_id="[email protected]",
candidate_id="*****@*****.**",
sequence_order=1,
),
],
)
keypair = elgamal_keypair_from_secret(TWO_MOD_Q)
seed = ONE_MOD_Q
# Bypass checking the validity of the description
data = ballot_factory.get_random_contest_from(
description, Random(0), suppress_validity_check=True
)
placeholders = generate_placeholder_selections_from(
description, description.number_elected
)
description_with_placeholders = contest_description_with_placeholders_from(
description, placeholders
)
# Act
subject = encrypt_contest(
data, description_with_placeholders, keypair.public_key, ONE_MOD_Q, seed
)
self.assertIsNone(subject)
def test_cp_proofs_simple(self):
keypair = elgamal_keypair_from_secret(TWO_MOD_Q)
nonce = ONE_MOD_Q
seed = TWO_MOD_Q
message = get_optional(elgamal_encrypt(0, nonce, keypair.public_key))
decryption = message.partial_decrypt(keypair.secret_key)
proof = make_chaum_pedersen(message, keypair.secret_key, decryption,
seed, ONE_MOD_Q)
bad_proof = make_chaum_pedersen(message, keypair.secret_key, TWO_MOD_Q,
seed, ONE_MOD_Q)
self.assertTrue(
proof.is_valid(message, keypair.public_key, decryption, ONE_MOD_Q))
self.assertFalse(
bad_proof.is_valid(message, keypair.public_key, decryption,
ONE_MOD_Q))
def test_djcp_proof_invalid_inputs(self):
# this is here to push up our coverage
keypair = elgamal_keypair_from_secret(TWO_MOD_Q)
nonce = ONE_MOD_Q
seed = TWO_MOD_Q
message0 = get_optional(elgamal_encrypt(0, nonce, keypair.public_key))
self.assertRaises(
Exception,
make_disjunctive_chaum_pedersen,
message0,
nonce,
keypair.public_key,
seed,
3,
)
def test_encrypt_contest_manually_formed_contest_description_valid_succeeds(self):
description = ContestDescription(
object_id="[email protected]",
electoral_district_id="[email protected]",
sequence_order=1,
vote_variation=VoteVariationType.n_of_m,
number_elected=1,
votes_allowed=1,
name="",
ballot_selections=[
SelectionDescription(
object_id="[email protected]",
candidate_id="*****@*****.**",
sequence_order=0,
),
SelectionDescription(
object_id="[email protected]",
candidate_id="*****@*****.**",
sequence_order=1,
),
],
ballot_title=None,
ballot_subtitle=None,
)
keypair = elgamal_keypair_from_secret(TWO_MOD_Q)
seed = ONE_MOD_Q
####################
data = ballot_factory.get_random_contest_from(description, Random(0))
placeholders = generate_placeholder_selections_from(
description, description.number_elected
)
description_with_placeholders = contest_description_with_placeholders_from(
description, placeholders
)
# Act
subject = encrypt_contest(
data,
description_with_placeholders,
keypair.public_key,
ONE_MOD_Q,
seed,
should_verify_proofs=True,
)
self.assertIsNotNone(subject)
def run_bench(filename: str, output_dir: Optional[str],
use_progressbar: bool) -> None:
start_time = timer()
print(f"Benchmarking: {filename}")
cvrs = read_dominion_csv(filename)
if cvrs is None:
print(f"Failed to read {filename}, terminating.")
exit(1)
rows, cols = cvrs.data.shape
parse_time = timer()
print(
f" Parse time: {parse_time - start_time: .3f} sec, {rows / (parse_time - start_time):.3f} ballots/sec"
)
assert rows > 0, "can't have zero ballots!"
# doesn't matter what the key is, so long as it's consistent for both runs
keypair = get_optional(
elgamal_keypair_from_secret(int_to_q_unchecked(31337)))
rtally_start = timer()
rtally = ray_tally_everything(
cvrs,
secret_key=keypair.secret_key,
verbose=True,
root_dir=output_dir,
use_progressbar=use_progressbar,
)
rtally_end = timer()
print(f"\nOVERALL PERFORMANCE")
print(f" Ray time: {rtally_end - rtally_start : .3f} sec")
print(
f" Ray rate: {rows / (rtally_end - rtally_start): .3f} ballots/sec"
)
if output_dir:
print(f"\nSANITY CHECK")
assert rtally.all_proofs_valid(
verbose=True,
recheck_ballots_and_tallies=False,
use_progressbar=use_progressbar,
), "proof failure!"
def setUp(self) -> None:
# Election setup
election_factory = ElectionFactory()
keypair = elgamal_keypair_from_secret(int_to_q(2))
manifest = election_factory.get_fake_manifest()
(
self.internal_manifest,
self.context,
) = election_factory.get_fake_ciphertext_election(
manifest, keypair.public_key)
device_hash = ElectionFactory.get_encryption_device().get_hash()
# Arrange ballots
self.plaintext_ballot = election_factory.get_fake_ballot(
self.internal_manifest)
ciphertext_ballot = encrypt_ballot(self.plaintext_ballot,
self.internal_manifest,
self.context, device_hash)
self.ballot_nonce = ciphertext_ballot.nonce
self.submitted_ballot = from_ciphertext_ballot(ciphertext_ballot,
BallotBoxState.CAST)
def test_encrypt_simple_selection_succeeds(self):
# Arrange
keypair = elgamal_keypair_from_secret(int_to_q(2))
nonce = randbelow(Q)
metadata = SelectionDescription("some-selection-object-id",
"some-candidate-id", 1)
hash_context = metadata.crypto_hash()
subject = selection_from(metadata)
self.assertTrue(subject.is_valid(metadata.object_id))
# Act
result = encrypt_selection(subject, metadata, keypair.public_key,
nonce)
# Assert
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
self.assertIsNotNone(result.message)
self.assertTrue(
result.is_valid_encryption(hash_context, keypair.public_key))
def test_schnorr_proofs_simple(self) -> None:
# doesn't get any simpler than this
keypair = get_optional(elgamal_keypair_from_secret(TWO_MOD_Q))
nonce = ONE_MOD_Q
proof = make_schnorr_proof(keypair, nonce)
self.assertTrue(proof.is_valid())
def ray_tally_everything(
cvrs: DominionCSV,
verbose: bool = True,
use_progressbar: bool = True,
date: Optional[datetime] = None,
seed_hash: Optional[ElementModQ] = None,
master_nonce: Optional[ElementModQ] = None,
secret_key: Optional[ElementModQ] = None,
root_dir: Optional[str] = None,
) -> "RayTallyEverythingResults":
"""
This top-level function takes a collection of Dominion CVRs and produces everything that
we might want for arlo-e2e: a list of encrypted ballots, their encrypted and decrypted tally,
and proofs of the correctness of the whole thing. The election `secret_key` is an optional
parameter. If absent, a random keypair is generated and used. Similarly, if a `seed_hash` or
`master_nonce` is not provided, random ones are generated and used.
For parallelism, Ray is used. Make sure you've called `ray.init()` or `ray_localhost_init()`
before calling this.
If `root_dir` is specified, then the tally is written out to the specified directory, and
the resulting `RayTallyEverythingResults` object will support the methods that allow those
ballots to be read back in again. Conversely, if `root_dir` is `None`, then nothing is
written to disk, and the result will not have access to individual ballots.
"""
rows, cols = cvrs.data.shape
ray_wait_for_workers(min_workers=2)
if date is None:
date = datetime.now()
if root_dir is not None:
mkdir_helper(root_dir, num_retries=NUM_WRITE_RETRIES)
r_manifest_aggregator = ManifestAggregatorActor.remote(
root_dir) # type: ignore
else:
r_manifest_aggregator = None
r_root_dir = ray.put(root_dir)
start_time = timer()
# Performance note: by using to_election_description_ray rather than to_election_description, we're
# only getting back a list of dictionaries rather than a list of PlaintextBallots. We're pushing that
# work out into the nodes, where it will run in parallel. The BallotPlaintextFactory wraps up all
# the (immutable) state necessary to convert from these dicts to PlaintextBallots and is meant to
# be sent to every node in the cluster.
ed, bpf, ballot_dicts, id_map = cvrs.to_election_description_ray(date=date)
setup_time = timer()
num_ballots = len(ballot_dicts)
assert num_ballots > 0, "can't have zero ballots!"
log_and_print(
f"ElectionGuard setup time: {setup_time - start_time: .3f} sec, {num_ballots / (setup_time - start_time):.3f} ballots/sec"
)
keypair = (elgamal_keypair_random() if secret_key is None else
elgamal_keypair_from_secret(secret_key))
assert keypair is not None, "unexpected failure with keypair computation"
secret_key, public_key = keypair
cec = make_ciphertext_election_context(
number_of_guardians=1,
quorum=1,
elgamal_public_key=public_key,
description_hash=ed.crypto_hash(),
)
r_cec = ray.put(cec)
ied = InternalElectionDescription(ed)
r_ied = ray.put(ied)
if seed_hash is None:
seed_hash = rand_q()
r_seed_hash = ray.put(seed_hash)
r_keypair = ray.put(keypair)
r_ballot_plaintext_factory = ray.put(bpf)
if master_nonce is None:
master_nonce = rand_q()
nonces = Nonces(master_nonce)
r_nonces = ray.put(nonces)
nonce_indices = range(num_ballots)
inputs = list(zip(ballot_dicts, nonce_indices))
batches = shard_list_uniform(inputs, BATCH_SIZE)
num_batches = len(batches)
log_and_print(
f"Launching Ray.io remote encryption! (number of batches: {num_batches})"
)
start_time = timer()
progressbar = (ProgressBar({
"Ballots": num_ballots,
"Tallies": num_ballots,
"Iterations": 0,
"Batch": 0,
}) if use_progressbar else None)
progressbar_actor = progressbar.actor if progressbar is not None else None
batch_tallies: List[ObjectRef] = []
for batch in batches:
if progressbar_actor:
progressbar_actor.update_completed.remote("Batch", 1)
num_ballots_in_batch = len(batch)
sharded_inputs = shard_list_uniform(batch, BALLOTS_PER_SHARD)
num_shards = len(sharded_inputs)
partial_tally_refs = [
r_encrypt_and_write.remote(
r_ied,
r_cec,
r_seed_hash,
r_root_dir,
r_manifest_aggregator,
progressbar_actor,
r_ballot_plaintext_factory,
r_nonces,
right_tuple_list(shard),
*(left_tuple_list(shard)),
) for shard in sharded_inputs
]
# log_and_print("Remote tallying.")
btally = ray_tally_ballots(partial_tally_refs, BALLOTS_PER_SHARD,
progressbar)
batch_tallies.append(btally)
# Each batch ultimately yields one partial tally; we add these up here at the
# very end. If we have a million ballots and have batches of 10k ballots, this
# would mean we'd have only 100 partial tallies. So, what's here works just fine.
# If we wanted, we could certainly burn some scalar time and keep a running,
# singular, partial tally. It's probably more important to push onward to the
# next batch, so we can do as much work in parallel as possible.
if len(batch_tallies) > 1:
tally = ray.get(ray_tally_ballots(batch_tallies, 10, progressbar))
else:
tally = ray.get(batch_tallies[0])
if progressbar:
progressbar.close()
assert tally is not None, "tally failed!"
log_and_print("Tally decryption.")
decrypted_tally: DECRYPT_TALLY_OUTPUT_TYPE = ray_decrypt_tally(
tally, r_cec, r_keypair, seed_hash)
log_and_print("Validating tally.")
# Sanity-checking logic: make sure we don't have any unexpected keys, and that the decrypted totals
# match up with the columns in the original plaintext data.
tally_keys = set(decrypted_tally.keys())
expected_keys = set(id_map.keys())
assert tally_keys.issubset(
expected_keys
), f"bad tally keys (actual keys: {sorted(tally_keys)}, expected keys: {sorted(expected_keys)})"
for obj_id in decrypted_tally.keys():
cvr_sum = int(cvrs.data[id_map[obj_id]].sum())
decryption, proof = decrypted_tally[obj_id]
assert cvr_sum == decryption, f"decryption failed for {obj_id}"
final_manifest: Optional[Manifest] = None
if root_dir is not None:
final_manifest = ray.get(r_manifest_aggregator.result.remote())
assert isinstance(
final_manifest,
Manifest), "type error: bad result from manifest aggregation"
# Assemble the data structure that we're returning. Having nonces in the ciphertext makes these
# structures sensitive for writing out to disk, but otherwise they're ready to go.
log_and_print("Constructing results.")
reported_tally: Dict[str, SelectionInfo] = {
k: SelectionInfo(
object_id=k,
encrypted_tally=tally[k],
# we need to forcibly convert mpz to int here to make serialization work properly
decrypted_tally=int(decrypted_tally[k][0]),
proof=decrypted_tally[k][1],
)
for k in tally.keys()
}
tabulate_time = timer()
log_and_print(
f"Encryption and tabulation: {rows} ballots, {rows / (tabulate_time - start_time): .3f} ballot/sec",
verbose,
)
return RayTallyEverythingResults(
metadata=cvrs.metadata,
cvr_metadata=cvrs.dataframe_without_selections(),
election_description=ed,
num_ballots=rows,
manifest=final_manifest,
tally=SelectionTally(reported_tally),
context=cec,
)
def test_elgamal_keypair_from_secret_requires_key_greater_than_one(self):
self.assertEqual(None, elgamal_keypair_from_secret(ZERO_MOD_Q))
self.assertEqual(None, elgamal_keypair_from_secret(ONE_MOD_Q))
def run_bench(filename: str, pool: Pool, file_dir: Optional[str]) -> None:
start_time = timer()
print(f"Benchmarking: {filename}")
log_info(f"Benchmarking: {filename}")
cvrs = read_dominion_csv(filename)
if cvrs is None:
print(f"Failed to read {filename}, terminating.")
exit(1)
rows, cols = cvrs.data.shape
parse_time = timer()
print(f" Parse time: {parse_time - start_time: .3f} sec")
assert rows > 0, "can't have zero ballots!"
# doesn't matter what the key is, so long as it's consistent for both runs
keypair = get_optional(elgamal_keypair_from_secret(int_to_q_unchecked(31337)))
tally_start = timer()
tally = fast_tally_everything(
cvrs, pool, verbose=True, secret_key=keypair.secret_key
)
if file_dir:
write_fast_tally(tally, file_dir + "_fast")
tally_end = timer()
assert tally.all_proofs_valid(verbose=True), "proof failure!"
print(f"\nstarting ray.io parallelism")
rtally_start = timer()
rtally = ray_tally_everything(
cvrs,
secret_key=keypair.secret_key,
root_dir=file_dir + "_ray" if file_dir else None,
)
rtally_end = timer()
if file_dir:
rtally_as_fast = rtally.to_fast_tally()
assert rtally_as_fast.all_proofs_valid(verbose=True), "proof failure!"
assert tally.equivalent(
rtally_as_fast, keypair, pool
), "tallies aren't equivalent!"
# Note: tally.equivalent() isn't quite as stringent as asserting that absolutely
# everything is identical, but it's a pretty good sanity check for our purposes.
# In tests/test_ray_tally.py, test_ray_and_multiprocessing_agree goes the extra
# distance to create identical tallies from each system and assert their equality.
print(f"\nOVERALL PERFORMANCE")
print(f" Pool time: {tally_end - tally_start: .3f} sec")
print(f" Pool rate: {rows / (tally_end - tally_start): .3f} ballots/sec")
print(f" Ray time: {rtally_end - rtally_start : .3f} sec")
print(f" Ray rate: {rows / (rtally_end - rtally_start): .3f} ballots/sec")
print(
f" Ray speedup: {(tally_end - tally_start) / (rtally_end - rtally_start) : .3f} (>1.0 = ray is faster, <1.0 = ray is slower)"
)
if file_dir is not None:
shutil.rmtree(file_dir + "_ray", ignore_errors=True)
shutil.rmtree(file_dir + "_fast", ignore_errors=True)
def fast_tally_everything(
cvrs: DominionCSV,
pool: Optional[Pool] = None,
verbose: bool = True,
date: Optional[datetime] = None,
seed_hash: Optional[ElementModQ] = None,
master_nonce: Optional[ElementModQ] = None,
secret_key: Optional[ElementModQ] = None,
use_progressbar: bool = True,
) -> FastTallyEverythingResults:
"""
This top-level function takes a collection of Dominion CVRs and produces everything that
we might want for arlo-e2e: a list of encrypted ballots, their encrypted and decrypted tally,
and proofs of the correctness of the whole thing. The election `secret_key` is an optional
parameter. If absent, a random keypair is generated and used. Similarly, if a `seed_hash` or
`master_nonce` is not provided, random ones are generated and used.
For parallelism, a `multiprocessing.pool.Pool` may be provided, and should result in significant
speedups on multicore computers. If absent, the computation will proceed sequentially.
"""
rows, cols = cvrs.data.shape
if date is None:
date = datetime.now()
parse_time = timer()
log_and_print(f"Rows: {rows}, cols: {cols}", verbose)
ed, ballots, id_map = cvrs.to_election_description(date=date)
assert len(ballots) > 0, "can't have zero ballots!"
keypair = (elgamal_keypair_random() if secret_key is None else
elgamal_keypair_from_secret(secret_key))
assert keypair is not None, "unexpected failure with keypair computation"
secret_key, public_key = keypair
# This computation exists only to cause side-effects in the DLog engine, so the lame nonce is not an issue.
assert len(ballots) == get_optional(
elgamal_encrypt(m=len(ballots),
nonce=int_to_q_unchecked(3),
public_key=public_key)).decrypt(
secret_key), "got wrong ElGamal decryption!"
dlog_prime_time = timer()
log_and_print(
f"DLog prime time (n={len(ballots)}): {dlog_prime_time - parse_time: .3f} sec",
verbose,
)
cec = make_ciphertext_election_context(
number_of_guardians=1,
quorum=1,
elgamal_public_key=public_key,
description_hash=ed.crypto_hash(),
)
ied = InternalElectionDescription(ed)
# REVIEW THIS: is this cryptographically sound? Is the seed_hash properly a secret? Should
# it go in the output? The nonces are clearly secret. If you know them, you can decrypt.
if seed_hash is None:
seed_hash = rand_q()
if master_nonce is None:
master_nonce = rand_q()
nonces: List[ElementModQ] = Nonces(master_nonce)[0:len(ballots)]
# even if verbose is false, we still want to see the progress bar for the encryption
cballots = fast_encrypt_ballots(ballots,
ied,
cec,
seed_hash,
nonces,
pool,
use_progressbar=use_progressbar)
eg_encrypt_time = timer()
log_and_print(
f"Encryption time: {eg_encrypt_time - dlog_prime_time: .3f} sec",
verbose)
log_and_print(
f"Encryption rate: {rows / (eg_encrypt_time - dlog_prime_time): .3f} ballot/sec",
verbose,
)
tally: TALLY_TYPE = fast_tally_ballots(cballots, pool)
eg_tabulate_time = timer()
log_and_print(
f"Tabulation time: {eg_tabulate_time - eg_encrypt_time: .3f} sec",
verbose)
log_and_print(
f"Tabulation rate: {rows / (eg_tabulate_time - eg_encrypt_time): .3f} ballot/sec",
verbose,
)
log_and_print(
f"Encryption and tabulation: {rows} ballots / {eg_tabulate_time - dlog_prime_time: .3f} sec = {rows / (eg_tabulate_time - dlog_prime_time): .3f} ballot/sec",
verbose,
)
assert tally is not None, "tally failed!"
if verbose: # pragma: no cover
print("Decryption & Proofs: ")
decrypted_tally: DECRYPT_TALLY_OUTPUT_TYPE = fast_decrypt_tally(
tally, cec, keypair, seed_hash, pool, verbose)
eg_decryption_time = timer()
log_and_print(
f"Decryption time: {eg_decryption_time - eg_tabulate_time: .3f} sec",
verbose)
log_and_print(
f"Decryption rate: {len(decrypted_tally.keys()) / (eg_decryption_time - eg_tabulate_time): .3f} selection/sec",
verbose,
)
# Sanity-checking logic: make sure we don't have any unexpected keys, and that the decrypted totals
# match up with the columns in the original plaintext data.
for obj_id in decrypted_tally.keys():
assert obj_id in id_map, "object_id in results that we don't know about!"
cvr_sum = int(cvrs.data[id_map[obj_id]].sum())
decryption, proof = decrypted_tally[obj_id]
assert cvr_sum == decryption, f"decryption failed for {obj_id}"
# Assemble the data structure that we're returning. Having nonces in the ciphertext makes these
# structures sensitive for writing out to disk, but otherwise they're ready to go.
reported_tally: Dict[str, SelectionInfo] = {
k: SelectionInfo(
object_id=k,
encrypted_tally=tally[k],
# we need to forcibly convert mpz to int here to make serialization work properly
decrypted_tally=int(decrypted_tally[k][0]),
proof=decrypted_tally[k][1],
)
for k in tally.keys()
}
# strips the ballots of their nonces, which is important because those could allow for decryption
accepted_ballots = [ciphertext_ballot_to_accepted(x) for x in cballots]
return FastTallyEverythingResults(
metadata=cvrs.metadata,
cvr_metadata=cvrs.dataframe_without_selections(),
election_description=ed,
encrypted_ballot_memos={
ballot.object_id: make_memo_value(ballot)
for ballot in accepted_ballots
},
tally=SelectionTally(reported_tally),
context=cec,
)
def test_ballot_store(self):
# Arrange
keypair = elgamal_keypair_from_secret(int_to_q(2))
election = election_factory.get_fake_election()
metadata, context = election_factory.get_fake_ciphertext_election(
election, keypair.public_key)
# get an encrypted fake ballot to work with
fake_ballot = election_factory.get_fake_ballot(metadata)
encrypted_ballot = encrypt_ballot(fake_ballot, metadata, context,
SEED_HASH)
# Set up the ballot store
subject = BallotStore()
data_cast = CiphertextAcceptedBallot(
encrypted_ballot.object_id,
encrypted_ballot.ballot_style,
encrypted_ballot.description_hash,
encrypted_ballot.previous_tracking_hash,
encrypted_ballot.contests,
encrypted_ballot.tracking_hash,
encrypted_ballot.timestamp,
)
data_cast.state = BallotBoxState.CAST
data_spoiled = CiphertextAcceptedBallot(
encrypted_ballot.object_id,
encrypted_ballot.ballot_style,
encrypted_ballot.description_hash,
encrypted_ballot.previous_tracking_hash,
encrypted_ballot.contests,
encrypted_ballot.tracking_hash,
encrypted_ballot.timestamp,
)
data_spoiled.state = BallotBoxState.SPOILED
self.assertIsNone(subject.get("cast"))
self.assertIsNone(subject.get("spoiled"))
# try to set a ballot with an unknown state
self.assertFalse(
subject.set(
"unknown",
CiphertextAcceptedBallot(
encrypted_ballot.object_id,
encrypted_ballot.ballot_style,
encrypted_ballot.description_hash,
encrypted_ballot.previous_tracking_hash,
encrypted_ballot.contests,
encrypted_ballot.tracking_hash,
encrypted_ballot.timestamp,
),
))
# Act
self.assertTrue(subject.set("cast", data_cast))
self.assertTrue(subject.set("spoiled", data_spoiled))
self.assertEqual(subject.get("cast"), data_cast)
self.assertEqual(subject.get("spoiled"), data_spoiled)
self.assertEqual(subject.exists("cast"), (True, data_cast))
self.assertEqual(subject.exists("spoiled"), (True, data_spoiled))
# test mutate state
data_cast.state = BallotBoxState.UNKNOWN
self.assertEqual(subject.exists("cast"), (False, data_cast))
# test remove
self.assertTrue(subject.set("cast", None))
self.assertEqual(subject.exists("cast"), (False, None))
speedup: Dict[int, float] = {}
print(f"CPUs detected: {cpu_count()}, launching thread pool")
pool = Pool(cpu_count())
# warm up the pool to help get consistent measurements
results = pool.map(identity, range(1, 30000))
assert results == list(range(1, 30000))
bench_start = timer()
for size in problem_sizes:
print("Benchmarking on problem size: ", size)
seeds = rands[0:size]
inputs = [
BenchInput(
get_optional(elgamal_keypair_from_secret(a)),
rands[size],
rands[size + 1],
) for a in seeds
]
start_all_scalar = timer()
timing_data = [chaum_pedersen_bench(i) for i in inputs]
end_all_scalar = timer()
print(f" Creating Chaum-Pedersen proofs ({size} iterations)")
avg_proof_scalar = average([t[0] for t in timing_data])
std_proof_scalar = std([t[0] for t in timing_data])
print(f" Avg = {avg_proof_scalar:.6f} sec")
print(f" Stddev = {std_proof_scalar:.6f} sec")
print(f" Validating Chaum-Pedersen proofs ({size} iterations)")
