def execute(self, csr, **kw):
ca_enabled_check()
ldap = self.api.Backend.ldap2
principal = kw.get('principal')
add = kw.get('add')
request_type = kw.get('request_type')
service = None
"""
Access control is partially handled by the ACI titled
'Hosts can modify service userCertificate'. This is for the case
where a machine binds using a host/ prinicpal. It can only do the
request if the target hostname is in the managedBy attribute which
is managed using the add/del member commands.
Binding with a user principal one needs to be in the request_certs
taskgroup (directly or indirectly via role membership).
"""
bind_principal = getattr(context, 'principal')
# Can this user request certs?
if not bind_principal.startswith('host/'):
self.check_access()
try:
subject = pkcs10.get_subject(csr)
extensions = pkcs10.get_extensions(csr)
subjectaltname = pkcs10.get_subjectaltname(csr) or ()
except (NSPRError, PyAsn1Error), e:
raise errors.CertificateOperationError(
error=_("Failure decoding Certificate Signing Request: %s") % e)
def execute(self, csr, **kw):
ca_enabled_check()
ldap = self.api.Backend.ldap2
principal = kw.get('principal')
add = kw.get('add')
request_type = kw.get('request_type')
service = None
"""
Access control is partially handled by the ACI titled
'Hosts can modify service userCertificate'. This is for the case
where a machine binds using a host/ prinicpal. It can only do the
request if the target hostname is in the managedBy attribute which
is managed using the add/del member commands.
Binding with a user principal one needs to be in the request_certs
taskgroup (directly or indirectly via role membership).
"""
bind_principal = getattr(context, 'principal')
# Can this user request certs?
if not bind_principal.startswith('host/'):
self.check_access()
try:
subject = pkcs10.get_subject(csr)
extensions = pkcs10.get_extensions(csr)
subjectaltname = pkcs10.get_subjectaltname(csr) or ()
except (NSPRError, PyAsn1Error), e:
raise errors.CertificateOperationError(
error=_("Failure decoding Certificate Signing Request: %s") %
e)
def execute(self, csr, **kw):
ca_enabled_check()
ldap = self.api.Backend.ldap2
add = kw.get('add')
request_type = kw.get('request_type')
profile_id = kw.get('profile_id', self.Backend.ra.DEFAULT_PROFILE)
ca = '.' # top-level CA hardcoded until subca plugin implemented
"""
Access control is partially handled by the ACI titled
'Hosts can modify service userCertificate'. This is for the case
where a machine binds using a host/ prinicpal. It can only do the
request if the target hostname is in the managedBy attribute which
is managed using the add/del member commands.
Binding with a user principal one needs to be in the request_certs
taskgroup (directly or indirectly via role membership).
"""
principal_string = kw.get('principal')
principal = split_any_principal(principal_string)
servicename, principal_name, realm = principal
if servicename is None:
principal_type = USER
elif servicename == 'host':
principal_type = HOST
else:
principal_type = SERVICE
caacl_check(principal_type, principal_string, ca, profile_id)
bind_principal = split_any_principal(getattr(context, 'principal'))
bind_service, bind_name, bind_realm = bind_principal
if bind_service is None:
bind_principal_type = USER
elif bind_service == 'host':
bind_principal_type = HOST
else:
bind_principal_type = SERVICE
if bind_principal != principal and bind_principal_type != HOST:
# Can the bound principal request certs for another principal?
self.check_access()
try:
subject = pkcs10.get_subject(csr)
extensions = pkcs10.get_extensions(csr)
subjectaltname = pkcs10.get_subjectaltname(csr) or ()
except (NSPRError, PyAsn1Error), e:
raise errors.CertificateOperationError(
error=_("Failure decoding Certificate Signing Request: %s") % e)
def execute(self, csr, all=False, raw=False, **kw):
ca_enabled_check()
ldap = self.api.Backend.ldap2
add = kw.get('add')
request_type = kw.get('request_type')
profile_id = kw.get('profile_id', self.Backend.ra.DEFAULT_PROFILE)
# Check that requested authority exists (done before CA ACL
# enforcement so that user gets better error message if
# referencing nonexistant CA) and look up authority ID.
#
ca = kw['cacn']
ca_obj = api.Command.ca_show(ca)['result']
ca_id = ca_obj['ipacaid'][0]
"""
Access control is partially handled by the ACI titled
'Hosts can modify service userCertificate'. This is for the case
where a machine binds using a host/ prinicpal. It can only do the
request if the target hostname is in the managedBy attribute which
is managed using the add/del member commands.
Binding with a user principal one needs to be in the request_certs
taskgroup (directly or indirectly via role membership).
"""
principal = kw.get('principal')
principal_string = unicode(principal)
if principal.is_user:
principal_type = USER
elif principal.is_host:
principal_type = HOST
else:
principal_type = SERVICE
bind_principal = kerberos.Principal(
getattr(context, 'principal'))
bind_principal_string = unicode(bind_principal)
if bind_principal.is_user:
bind_principal_type = USER
elif bind_principal.is_host:
bind_principal_type = HOST
else:
bind_principal_type = SERVICE
if (bind_principal_string != principal_string and
bind_principal_type != HOST):
# Can the bound principal request certs for another principal?
self.check_access()
try:
self.check_access("request certificate ignore caacl")
bypass_caacl = True
except errors.ACIError:
bypass_caacl = False
if not bypass_caacl:
caacl_check(principal_type, principal, ca, profile_id)
try:
subject = pkcs10.get_subject(csr)
extensions = pkcs10.get_extensions(csr)
subjectaltname = pkcs10.get_subjectaltname(csr) or ()
except (NSPRError, PyAsn1Error, ValueError) as e:
raise errors.CertificateOperationError(
error=_("Failure decoding Certificate Signing Request: %s") % e)
# self-service and host principals may bypass SAN permission check
if (bind_principal_string != principal_string
and bind_principal_type != HOST):
if '2.5.29.17' in extensions:
self.check_access('request certificate with subjectaltname')
dn = None
principal_obj = None
# See if the service exists and punt if it doesn't and we aren't
# going to add it
try:
if principal_type == SERVICE:
principal_obj = api.Command['service_show'](principal_string, all=True)
elif principal_type == HOST:
principal_obj = api.Command['host_show'](
principal.hostname, all=True)
elif principal_type == USER:
principal_obj = api.Command['user_show'](
principal.username, all=True)
except errors.NotFound as e:
if add:
if principal_type == SERVICE:
principal_obj = api.Command['service_add'](
principal_string, force=True)
else:
princtype_str = PRINCIPAL_TYPE_STRING_MAP[principal_type]
raise errors.OperationNotSupportedForPrincipalType(
operation=_("'add' option"),
principal_type=princtype_str)
else:
raise errors.NotFound(
reason=_("The principal for this request doesn't exist."))
principal_obj = principal_obj['result']
dn = principal_obj['dn']
# Ensure that the DN in the CSR matches the principal
cn = subject.common_name #pylint: disable=E1101
if not cn:
raise errors.ValidationError(name='csr',
error=_("No Common Name was found in subject of request."))
if principal_type in (SERVICE, HOST):
if cn.lower() != principal.hostname.lower():
raise errors.ACIError(
info=_("hostname in subject of request '%(cn)s' "
"does not match principal hostname '%(hostname)s'")
% dict(cn=cn, hostname=principal.hostname))
elif principal_type == USER:
# check user name
if cn != principal.username:
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_("DN commonName does not match user's login")
)
# check email address
mail = subject.email_address #pylint: disable=E1101
if mail is not None and mail not in principal_obj.get('mail', []):
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_(
"DN emailAddress does not match "
"any of user's email addresses")
)
# We got this far so the principal entry exists, can we write it?
if not ldap.can_write(dn, "usercertificate"):
raise errors.ACIError(info=_("Insufficient 'write' privilege "
"to the 'userCertificate' attribute of entry '%s'.") % dn)
# Validate the subject alt name, if any
for name_type, desc, name, der_name in subjectaltname:
if name_type == nss.certDNSName:
name = unicode(name)
alt_principal = None
alt_principal_obj = None
try:
if principal_type == HOST:
alt_principal = kerberos.Principal(
(u'host', name), principal.realm)
alt_principal_obj = api.Command['host_show'](name, all=True)
elif principal_type == SERVICE:
alt_principal = kerberos.Principal(
(principal.service_name, name), principal.realm)
alt_principal_obj = api.Command['service_show'](
alt_principal, all=True)
elif principal_type == USER:
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_("subject alt name type %s is forbidden "
"for user principals") % desc
)
except errors.NotFound:
# We don't want to issue any certificates referencing
# machines we don't know about. Nothing is stored in this
# host record related to this certificate.
raise errors.NotFound(reason=_('The service principal for '
'subject alt name %s in certificate request does not '
'exist') % name)
if alt_principal_obj is not None:
altdn = alt_principal_obj['result']['dn']
if not ldap.can_write(altdn, "usercertificate"):
raise errors.ACIError(info=_(
"Insufficient privilege to create a certificate "
"with subject alt name '%s'.") % name)
if alt_principal is not None and not bypass_caacl:
caacl_check(principal_type, alt_principal, ca, profile_id)
elif name_type in [
(nss.certOtherName, x509.SAN_UPN),
(nss.certOtherName, x509.SAN_KRB5PRINCIPALNAME),
]:
if name != principal_string:
raise errors.ACIError(
info=_("Principal '%s' in subject alt name does not "
"match requested principal") % name)
elif name_type == nss.certRFC822Name:
if principal_type == USER:
if name not in principal_obj.get('mail', []):
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_(
"RFC822Name does not match "
"any of user's email addresses")
)
else:
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_("subject alt name type %s is forbidden "
"for non-user principals") % desc
)
else:
raise errors.ACIError(
info=_("Subject alt name type %s is forbidden") % desc)
# Request the certificate
try:
result = self.Backend.ra.request_certificate(
csr, profile_id, ca_id, request_type=request_type)
except errors.HTTPRequestError as e:
if e.status == 409: # pylint: disable=no-member
raise errors.CertificateOperationError(
error=_("CA '%s' is disabled") % ca)
else:
raise e
if not raw:
self.obj._parse(result, all)
result['request_id'] = int(result['request_id'])
result['cacn'] = ca_obj['cn'][0]
# Success? Then add it to the principal's entry
# (unless the profile tells us not to)
profile = api.Command['certprofile_show'](profile_id)
store = profile['result']['ipacertprofilestoreissued'][0] == 'TRUE'
if store and 'certificate' in result:
cert = str(result.get('certificate'))
kwargs = dict(addattr=u'usercertificate={}'.format(cert))
if principal_type == SERVICE:
api.Command['service_mod'](principal_string, **kwargs)
elif principal_type == HOST:
api.Command['host_mod'](principal.hostname, **kwargs)
elif principal_type == USER:
api.Command['user_mod'](principal.username, **kwargs)
return dict(
result=result,
value=pkey_to_value(int(result['request_id']), kw),
)
def execute(self, csr, all=False, raw=False, **kw):
ca_enabled_check()
ldap = self.api.Backend.ldap2
add = kw.get('add')
request_type = kw.get('request_type')
profile_id = kw.get('profile_id', self.Backend.ra.DEFAULT_PROFILE)
# Check that requested authority exists (done before CA ACL
# enforcement so that user gets better error message if
# referencing nonexistant CA) and look up authority ID.
#
ca = kw['cacn']
ca_obj = api.Command.ca_show(ca)['result']
ca_id = ca_obj['ipacaid'][0]
"""
Access control is partially handled by the ACI titled
'Hosts can modify service userCertificate'. This is for the case
where a machine binds using a host/ prinicpal. It can only do the
request if the target hostname is in the managedBy attribute which
is managed using the add/del member commands.
Binding with a user principal one needs to be in the request_certs
taskgroup (directly or indirectly via role membership).
"""
principal = kw.get('principal')
principal_string = unicode(principal)
if principal.is_user:
principal_type = USER
elif principal.is_host:
principal_type = HOST
else:
principal_type = SERVICE
bind_principal = kerberos.Principal(getattr(context, 'principal'))
bind_principal_string = unicode(bind_principal)
if bind_principal.is_user:
bind_principal_type = USER
elif bind_principal.is_host:
bind_principal_type = HOST
else:
bind_principal_type = SERVICE
if (bind_principal_string != principal_string
and bind_principal_type != HOST):
# Can the bound principal request certs for another principal?
self.check_access()
try:
self.check_access("request certificate ignore caacl")
bypass_caacl = True
except errors.ACIError:
bypass_caacl = False
if not bypass_caacl:
caacl_check(principal_type, principal, ca, profile_id)
try:
subject = pkcs10.get_subject(csr)
extensions = pkcs10.get_extensions(csr)
subjectaltname = pkcs10.get_subjectaltname(csr) or ()
except (NSPRError, PyAsn1Error, ValueError) as e:
raise errors.CertificateOperationError(
error=_("Failure decoding Certificate Signing Request: %s") %
e)
# self-service and host principals may bypass SAN permission check
if (bind_principal_string != principal_string
and bind_principal_type != HOST):
if '2.5.29.17' in extensions:
self.check_access('request certificate with subjectaltname')
dn = None
principal_obj = None
# See if the service exists and punt if it doesn't and we aren't
# going to add it
try:
if principal_type == SERVICE:
principal_obj = api.Command['service_show'](principal_string,
all=True)
elif principal_type == HOST:
principal_obj = api.Command['host_show'](principal.hostname,
all=True)
elif principal_type == USER:
principal_obj = api.Command['user_show'](principal.username,
all=True)
except errors.NotFound as e:
if add:
if principal_type == SERVICE:
principal_obj = api.Command['service_add'](
principal_string, force=True)
else:
princtype_str = PRINCIPAL_TYPE_STRING_MAP[principal_type]
raise errors.OperationNotSupportedForPrincipalType(
operation=_("'add' option"),
principal_type=princtype_str)
else:
raise errors.NotFound(
reason=_("The principal for this request doesn't exist."))
principal_obj = principal_obj['result']
dn = principal_obj['dn']
# Ensure that the DN in the CSR matches the principal
cn = subject.common_name #pylint: disable=E1101
if not cn:
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_("No Common Name was found in subject of request."))
if principal_type in (SERVICE, HOST):
if cn.lower() != principal.hostname.lower():
raise errors.ACIError(info=_(
"hostname in subject of request '%(cn)s' "
"does not match principal hostname '%(hostname)s'") %
dict(cn=cn, hostname=principal.hostname))
elif principal_type == USER:
# check user name
if cn != principal.username:
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_("DN commonName does not match user's login"))
# check email address
mail = subject.email_address #pylint: disable=E1101
if mail is not None and mail not in principal_obj.get('mail', []):
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_("DN emailAddress does not match "
"any of user's email addresses"))
# We got this far so the principal entry exists, can we write it?
if not ldap.can_write(dn, "usercertificate"):
raise errors.ACIError(
info=_("Insufficient 'write' privilege "
"to the 'userCertificate' attribute of entry '%s'.") %
dn)
# Validate the subject alt name, if any
for name_type, desc, name, _der_name in subjectaltname:
if name_type == nss.certDNSName:
name = unicode(name)
alt_principal = None
alt_principal_obj = None
try:
if principal_type == HOST:
alt_principal = kerberos.Principal((u'host', name),
principal.realm)
alt_principal_obj = api.Command['host_show'](name,
all=True)
elif principal_type == SERVICE:
alt_principal = kerberos.Principal(
(principal.service_name, name), principal.realm)
alt_principal_obj = api.Command['service_show'](
alt_principal, all=True)
elif principal_type == USER:
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_("subject alt name type %s is forbidden "
"for user principals") % desc)
except errors.NotFound:
# We don't want to issue any certificates referencing
# machines we don't know about. Nothing is stored in this
# host record related to this certificate.
raise errors.NotFound(reason=_(
'The service principal for '
'subject alt name %s in certificate request does not '
'exist') % name)
if alt_principal_obj is not None:
altdn = alt_principal_obj['result']['dn']
if not ldap.can_write(altdn, "usercertificate"):
raise errors.ACIError(info=_(
"Insufficient privilege to create a certificate "
"with subject alt name '%s'.") % name)
if alt_principal is not None and not bypass_caacl:
caacl_check(principal_type, alt_principal, ca, profile_id)
elif name_type in [
(nss.certOtherName, x509.SAN_UPN),
(nss.certOtherName, x509.SAN_KRB5PRINCIPALNAME),
]:
if name != principal_string:
raise errors.ACIError(
info=_("Principal '%s' in subject alt name does not "
"match requested principal") % name)
elif name_type == nss.certRFC822Name:
if principal_type == USER:
if name not in principal_obj.get('mail', []):
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_("RFC822Name does not match "
"any of user's email addresses"))
else:
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_("subject alt name type %s is forbidden "
"for non-user principals") % desc)
else:
raise errors.ACIError(
info=_("Subject alt name type %s is forbidden") % desc)
# Request the certificate
try:
result = self.Backend.ra.request_certificate(
csr, profile_id, ca_id, request_type=request_type)
except errors.HTTPRequestError as e:
if e.status == 409: # pylint: disable=no-member
raise errors.CertificateOperationError(
error=_("CA '%s' is disabled") % ca)
else:
raise e
if not raw:
self.obj._parse(result, all)
result['request_id'] = int(result['request_id'])
result['cacn'] = ca_obj['cn'][0]
# Success? Then add it to the principal's entry
# (unless the profile tells us not to)
profile = api.Command['certprofile_show'](profile_id)
store = profile['result']['ipacertprofilestoreissued'][0] == 'TRUE'
if store and 'certificate' in result:
cert = str(result.get('certificate'))
kwargs = dict(addattr=u'usercertificate={}'.format(cert))
if principal_type == SERVICE:
api.Command['service_mod'](principal_string, **kwargs)
elif principal_type == HOST:
api.Command['host_mod'](principal.hostname, **kwargs)
elif principal_type == USER:
api.Command['user_mod'](principal.username, **kwargs)
return dict(
result=result,
value=pkey_to_value(int(result['request_id']), kw),
)
def execute(self, csr, **kw):
ca_enabled_check()
ldap = self.api.Backend.ldap2
add = kw.get('add')
request_type = kw.get('request_type')
profile_id = kw.get('profile_id', self.Backend.ra.DEFAULT_PROFILE)
ca = '.' # top-level CA hardcoded until subca plugin implemented
"""
Access control is partially handled by the ACI titled
'Hosts can modify service userCertificate'. This is for the case
where a machine binds using a host/ prinicpal. It can only do the
request if the target hostname is in the managedBy attribute which
is managed using the add/del member commands.
Binding with a user principal one needs to be in the request_certs
taskgroup (directly or indirectly via role membership).
"""
principal_string = kw.get('principal')
principal = split_any_principal(principal_string)
servicename, principal_name, realm = principal
if servicename is None:
principal_type = USER
elif servicename == 'host':
principal_type = HOST
else:
principal_type = SERVICE
bind_principal = split_any_principal(getattr(context, 'principal'))
bind_service, bind_name, bind_realm = bind_principal
if bind_service is None:
bind_principal_type = USER
elif bind_service == 'host':
bind_principal_type = HOST
else:
bind_principal_type = SERVICE
if bind_principal != principal and bind_principal_type != HOST:
# Can the bound principal request certs for another principal?
self.check_access()
try:
self.check_access("request certificate ignore caacl")
bypass_caacl = True
except errors.ACIError:
bypass_caacl = False
if not bypass_caacl:
caacl_check(principal_type, principal_string, ca, profile_id)
try:
subject = pkcs10.get_subject(csr)
extensions = pkcs10.get_extensions(csr)
subjectaltname = pkcs10.get_subjectaltname(csr) or ()
except (NSPRError, PyAsn1Error) as e:
raise errors.CertificateOperationError(
error=_("Failure decoding Certificate Signing Request: %s") % e)
# self-service and host principals may bypass SAN permission check
if bind_principal != principal and bind_principal_type != HOST:
if '2.5.29.17' in extensions:
self.check_access('request certificate with subjectaltname')
dn = None
principal_obj = None
# See if the service exists and punt if it doesn't and we aren't
# going to add it
try:
if principal_type == SERVICE:
principal_obj = api.Command['service_show'](principal_string, all=True)
elif principal_type == HOST:
principal_obj = api.Command['host_show'](principal_name, all=True)
elif principal_type == USER:
principal_obj = api.Command['user_show'](principal_name, all=True)
except errors.NotFound as e:
if principal_type == SERVICE and add:
principal_obj = api.Command['service_add'](principal_string, force=True)
else:
raise errors.NotFound(
reason=_("The principal for this request doesn't exist."))
principal_obj = principal_obj['result']
dn = principal_obj['dn']
# Ensure that the DN in the CSR matches the principal
cn = subject.common_name #pylint: disable=E1101
if not cn:
raise errors.ValidationError(name='csr',
error=_("No Common Name was found in subject of request."))
if principal_type in (SERVICE, HOST):
if cn.lower() != principal_name.lower():
raise errors.ACIError(
info=_("hostname in subject of request '%(cn)s' "
"does not match principal hostname '%(hostname)s'")
% dict(cn=cn, hostname=principal_name))
elif principal_type == USER:
# check user name
if cn != principal_name:
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_("DN commonName does not match user's login")
)
# check email address
mail = subject.email_address #pylint: disable=E1101
if mail is not None and mail not in principal_obj.get('mail', []):
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_(
"DN emailAddress does not match "
"any of user's email addresses")
)
# We got this far so the principal entry exists, can we write it?
if not ldap.can_write(dn, "usercertificate"):
raise errors.ACIError(info=_("Insufficient 'write' privilege "
"to the 'userCertificate' attribute of entry '%s'.") % dn)
# Validate the subject alt name, if any
for name_type, name in subjectaltname:
if name_type == pkcs10.SAN_DNSNAME:
name = unicode(name)
alt_principal_obj = None
alt_principal_string = None
try:
if principal_type == HOST:
alt_principal_string = 'host/%s@%s' % (name, realm)
alt_principal_obj = api.Command['host_show'](name, all=True)
elif principal_type == SERVICE:
alt_principal_string = '%s/%s@%s' % (servicename, name, realm)
alt_principal_obj = api.Command['service_show'](
alt_principal_string, all=True)
elif principal_type == USER:
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_("subject alt name type %s is forbidden "
"for user principals") % name_type
)
except errors.NotFound:
# We don't want to issue any certificates referencing
# machines we don't know about. Nothing is stored in this
# host record related to this certificate.
raise errors.NotFound(reason=_('The service principal for '
'subject alt name %s in certificate request does not '
'exist') % name)
if alt_principal_obj is not None:
altdn = alt_principal_obj['result']['dn']
if not ldap.can_write(altdn, "usercertificate"):
raise errors.ACIError(info=_(
"Insufficient privilege to create a certificate "
"with subject alt name '%s'.") % name)
if alt_principal_string is not None and not bypass_caacl:
caacl_check(
principal_type, alt_principal_string, ca, profile_id)
elif name_type in (pkcs10.SAN_OTHERNAME_KRB5PRINCIPALNAME,
pkcs10.SAN_OTHERNAME_UPN):
if split_any_principal(name) != principal:
raise errors.ACIError(
info=_("Principal '%s' in subject alt name does not "
"match requested principal") % name)
elif name_type == pkcs10.SAN_RFC822NAME:
if principal_type == USER:
if name not in principal_obj.get('mail', []):
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_(
"RFC822Name does not match "
"any of user's email addresses")
)
else:
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_("subject alt name type %s is forbidden "
"for non-user principals") % name_type
)
else:
raise errors.ACIError(
info=_("Subject alt name type %s is forbidden") %
name_type)
# Request the certificate
result = self.Backend.ra.request_certificate(
csr, profile_id, request_type=request_type)
cert = x509.load_certificate(result['certificate'])
result['issuer'] = unicode(cert.issuer)
result['valid_not_before'] = unicode(cert.valid_not_before_str)
result['valid_not_after'] = unicode(cert.valid_not_after_str)
result['md5_fingerprint'] = unicode(nss.data_to_hex(nss.md5_digest(cert.der_data), 64)[0])
result['sha1_fingerprint'] = unicode(nss.data_to_hex(nss.sha1_digest(cert.der_data), 64)[0])
# Success? Then add it to the principal's entry
# (unless the profile tells us not to)
profile = api.Command['certprofile_show'](profile_id)
store = profile['result']['ipacertprofilestoreissued'][0] == 'TRUE'
if store and 'certificate' in result:
cert = str(result.get('certificate'))
kwargs = dict(addattr=u'usercertificate={}'.format(cert))
if principal_type == SERVICE:
api.Command['service_mod'](principal_string, **kwargs)
elif principal_type == HOST:
api.Command['host_mod'](principal_name, **kwargs)
elif principal_type == USER:
api.Command['user_mod'](principal_name, **kwargs)
return dict(
result=result
)
def execute(self, csr, **kw):
ca_enabled_check()
ldap = self.api.Backend.ldap2
add = kw.get('add')
request_type = kw.get('request_type')
profile_id = kw.get('profile_id', self.Backend.ra.DEFAULT_PROFILE)
ca = '.' # top-level CA hardcoded until subca plugin implemented
"""
Access control is partially handled by the ACI titled
'Hosts can modify service userCertificate'. This is for the case
where a machine binds using a host/ prinicpal. It can only do the
request if the target hostname is in the managedBy attribute which
is managed using the add/del member commands.
Binding with a user principal one needs to be in the request_certs
taskgroup (directly or indirectly via role membership).
"""
principal_string = kw.get('principal')
principal = split_any_principal(principal_string)
servicename, principal_name, realm = principal
if servicename is None:
principal_type = USER
elif servicename == 'host':
principal_type = HOST
else:
principal_type = SERVICE
bind_principal = split_any_principal(getattr(context, 'principal'))
bind_service, bind_name, bind_realm = bind_principal
if bind_service is None:
bind_principal_type = USER
elif bind_service == 'host':
bind_principal_type = HOST
else:
bind_principal_type = SERVICE
if bind_principal != principal and bind_principal_type != HOST:
# Can the bound principal request certs for another principal?
self.check_access()
try:
self.check_access("request certificate ignore caacl")
bypass_caacl = True
except errors.ACIError:
bypass_caacl = False
if not bypass_caacl:
caacl_check(principal_type, principal_string, ca, profile_id)
try:
subject = pkcs10.get_subject(csr)
extensions = pkcs10.get_extensions(csr)
subjectaltname = pkcs10.get_subjectaltname(csr) or ()
except (NSPRError, PyAsn1Error, ValueError) as e:
raise errors.CertificateOperationError(
error=_("Failure decoding Certificate Signing Request: %s") %
e)
# self-service and host principals may bypass SAN permission check
if bind_principal != principal and bind_principal_type != HOST:
if '2.5.29.17' in extensions:
self.check_access('request certificate with subjectaltname')
dn = None
principal_obj = None
# See if the service exists and punt if it doesn't and we aren't
# going to add it
try:
if principal_type == SERVICE:
principal_obj = api.Command['service_show'](principal_string,
all=True)
elif principal_type == HOST:
principal_obj = api.Command['host_show'](principal_name,
all=True)
elif principal_type == USER:
principal_obj = api.Command['user_show'](principal_name,
all=True)
except errors.NotFound as e:
if principal_type == SERVICE and add:
principal_obj = api.Command['service_add'](principal_string,
force=True)
else:
raise errors.NotFound(
reason=_("The principal for this request doesn't exist."))
principal_obj = principal_obj['result']
dn = principal_obj['dn']
# Ensure that the DN in the CSR matches the principal
cn = subject.common_name #pylint: disable=E1101
if not cn:
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_("No Common Name was found in subject of request."))
if principal_type in (SERVICE, HOST):
if cn.lower() != principal_name.lower():
raise errors.ACIError(info=_(
"hostname in subject of request '%(cn)s' "
"does not match principal hostname '%(hostname)s'") %
dict(cn=cn, hostname=principal_name))
elif principal_type == USER:
# check user name
if cn != principal_name:
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_("DN commonName does not match user's login"))
# check email address
mail = subject.email_address #pylint: disable=E1101
if mail is not None and mail not in principal_obj.get('mail', []):
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_("DN emailAddress does not match "
"any of user's email addresses"))
# We got this far so the principal entry exists, can we write it?
if not ldap.can_write(dn, "usercertificate"):
raise errors.ACIError(
info=_("Insufficient 'write' privilege "
"to the 'userCertificate' attribute of entry '%s'.") %
dn)
# Validate the subject alt name, if any
for name_type, name in subjectaltname:
if name_type == pkcs10.SAN_DNSNAME:
name = unicode(name)
alt_principal_obj = None
alt_principal_string = None
try:
if principal_type == HOST:
alt_principal_string = 'host/%s@%s' % (name, realm)
alt_principal_obj = api.Command['host_show'](name,
all=True)
elif principal_type == SERVICE:
alt_principal_string = '%s/%s@%s' % (servicename, name,
realm)
alt_principal_obj = api.Command['service_show'](
alt_principal_string, all=True)
elif principal_type == USER:
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_("subject alt name type %s is forbidden "
"for user principals") % name_type)
except errors.NotFound:
# We don't want to issue any certificates referencing
# machines we don't know about. Nothing is stored in this
# host record related to this certificate.
raise errors.NotFound(reason=_(
'The service principal for '
'subject alt name %s in certificate request does not '
'exist') % name)
if alt_principal_obj is not None:
altdn = alt_principal_obj['result']['dn']
if not ldap.can_write(altdn, "usercertificate"):
raise errors.ACIError(info=_(
"Insufficient privilege to create a certificate "
"with subject alt name '%s'.") % name)
if alt_principal_string is not None and not bypass_caacl:
caacl_check(principal_type, alt_principal_string, ca,
profile_id)
elif name_type in (pkcs10.SAN_OTHERNAME_KRB5PRINCIPALNAME,
pkcs10.SAN_OTHERNAME_UPN):
if split_any_principal(name) != principal:
raise errors.ACIError(
info=_("Principal '%s' in subject alt name does not "
"match requested principal") % name)
elif name_type == pkcs10.SAN_RFC822NAME:
if principal_type == USER:
if name not in principal_obj.get('mail', []):
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_("RFC822Name does not match "
"any of user's email addresses"))
else:
raise errors.ValidationError(
name='csr',
error=_("subject alt name type %s is forbidden "
"for non-user principals") % name_type)
else:
raise errors.ACIError(
info=_("Subject alt name type %s is forbidden") %
name_type)
# Request the certificate
result = self.Backend.ra.request_certificate(csr,
profile_id,
request_type=request_type)
cert = x509.load_certificate(result['certificate'])
result['issuer'] = unicode(cert.issuer)
result['valid_not_before'] = unicode(cert.valid_not_before_str)
result['valid_not_after'] = unicode(cert.valid_not_after_str)
result['md5_fingerprint'] = unicode(
nss.data_to_hex(nss.md5_digest(cert.der_data), 64)[0])
result['sha1_fingerprint'] = unicode(
nss.data_to_hex(nss.sha1_digest(cert.der_data), 64)[0])
# Success? Then add it to the principal's entry
# (unless the profile tells us not to)
profile = api.Command['certprofile_show'](profile_id)
store = profile['result']['ipacertprofilestoreissued'][0] == 'TRUE'
if store and 'certificate' in result:
cert = str(result.get('certificate'))
kwargs = dict(addattr=u'usercertificate={}'.format(cert))
if principal_type == SERVICE:
api.Command['service_mod'](principal_string, **kwargs)
elif principal_type == HOST:
api.Command['host_mod'](principal_name, **kwargs)
elif principal_type == USER:
api.Command['user_mod'](principal_name, **kwargs)
return dict(result=result)
