def ssh_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD(self, packet):
if self.ignoreNextPacket:
self.ignoreNextPacket = 0
return
if self.kexAlg == 'diffie-hellman-group1-sha1': # this is really KEXDH_INIT
clientDHPubKey, foo = getMP(packet)
y = Util.number.getRandomNumber(16, entropy.get_bytes)
f = pow(DH_GENERATOR, y, DH_PRIME)
sharedSecret = _MPpow(clientDHPubKey, y, DH_PRIME)
h = sha.new()
h.update(NS(self.otherVersionString))
h.update(NS(self.ourVersionString))
h.update(NS(self.clientKexInitPayload))
h.update(NS(self.ourKexInitPayload))
h.update(NS(self.factory.publicKeys[self.keyAlg]))
h.update(MP(clientDHPubKey))
h.update(MP(f))
h.update(sharedSecret)
exchangeHash = h.digest()
self.sendPacket(MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, NS(self.factory.publicKeys[self.keyAlg])+ \
MP(f)+NS(keys.signData(self.factory.privateKeys[self.keyAlg], exchangeHash)))
self._keySetup(sharedSecret, exchangeHash)
elif self.kexAlg == 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1':
self.kexAlg = 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1-old'
self.ideal = struct.unpack('>L', packet)[0]
self.g, self.p = self.factory.getDHPrime(self.ideal)
self.sendPacket(MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, MP(self.p)+MP(self.g))
else:
raise error.ConchError('bad kexalg: %s'%self.kexAlg)
def ssh_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD(self, packet):
if self.ignoreNextPacket:
self.ignoreNextPacket = 0
return
if self.kexAlg == 'diffie-hellman-group1-sha1': # this is really KEXDH_INIT
clientDHPubKey, foo = getMP(packet)
y = Util.number.getRandomNumber(16, entropy.get_bytes)
f = pow(DH_GENERATOR, y, DH_PRIME)
sharedSecret = _MPpow(clientDHPubKey, y, DH_PRIME)
h = sha.new()
h.update(NS(self.otherVersionString))
h.update(NS(self.ourVersionString))
h.update(NS(self.clientKexInitPayload))
h.update(NS(self.ourKexInitPayload))
h.update(NS(self.factory.publicKeys[self.keyAlg]))
h.update(MP(clientDHPubKey))
h.update(MP(f))
h.update(sharedSecret)
exchangeHash = h.digest()
self.sendPacket(MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, NS(self.factory.publicKeys[self.keyAlg])+ \
MP(f)+NS(keys.signData(self.factory.privateKeys[self.keyAlg], exchangeHash)))
self._keySetup(sharedSecret, exchangeHash)
elif self.kexAlg == 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1':
self.kexAlg = 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1-old'
self.ideal = struct.unpack('>L', packet)[0]
self.g, self.p = self.factory.getDHPrime(self.ideal)
self.sendPacket(MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, MP(self.p) + MP(self.g))
else:
raise error.ConchError('bad kexalg: %s' % self.kexAlg)
def ssh_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT(self, packet):
clientDHPubKey, foo = getMP(packet)
# if y < 1024, openssh will reject us: "bad server public DH value".
# y<1024 means f will be short, and of the form 2^y, so an observer
# could trivially derive our secret y from f. Openssh detects this
# and complains, so avoid creating such values by requiring y to be
# larger than ln2(self.p)
# TODO: we should also look at the value they send to us and reject
# insecure values of f (if g==2 and f has a single '1' bit while the
# rest are '0's, then they must have used a small y also).
# TODO: This could be computed when self.p is set up
# or do as openssh does and scan f for a single '1' bit instead
minimum = long(math.floor(math.log(self.p) / math.log(2)) + 1)
tries = 0
pSize = Util.number.size(self.p)
y = Util.number.getRandomNumber(pSize, entropy.get_bytes)
while tries < 10 and y < minimum:
tries += 1
y = Util.number.getRandomNumber(pSize, entropy.get_bytes)
assert(y >= minimum) # TODO: test_conch just hangs if this is hit
# the chance of it being hit are really really low
f = pow(self.g, y, self.p)
sharedSecret = _MPpow(clientDHPubKey, y, self.p)
h = sha.new()
h.update(NS(self.otherVersionString))
h.update(NS(self.ourVersionString))
h.update(NS(self.clientKexInitPayload))
h.update(NS(self.ourKexInitPayload))
h.update(NS(self.factory.publicKeys[self.keyAlg]))
if self.kexAlg == 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1':
h.update(struct.pack('>3L', self.min, self.ideal, self.max))
else:
h.update(struct.pack('>L', self.ideal))
h.update(MP(self.p))
h.update(MP(self.g))
h.update(MP(clientDHPubKey))
h.update(MP(f))
h.update(sharedSecret)
exchangeHash = h.digest()
self.sendPacket(MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, NS(self.factory.publicKeys[self.keyAlg])+ \
MP(f)+NS(keys.signData(self.factory.privateKeys[self.keyAlg], exchangeHash)))
self._keySetup(sharedSecret, exchangeHash)
def ssh_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT(self, packet):
clientDHPubKey, foo = getMP(packet)
# if y < 1024, openssh will reject us: "bad server public DH value".
# y<1024 means f will be short, and of the form 2^y, so an observer
# could trivially derive our secret y from f. Openssh detects this
# and complains, so avoid creating such values by requiring y to be
# larger than ln2(self.p)
# TODO: we should also look at the value they send to us and reject
# insecure values of f (if g==2 and f has a single '1' bit while the
# rest are '0's, then they must have used a small y also).
# TODO: This could be computed when self.p is set up
# or do as openssh does and scan f for a single '1' bit instead
minimum = long(math.floor(math.log(self.p) / math.log(2)) + 1)
tries = 0
pSize = Util.number.size(self.p)
y = Util.number.getRandomNumber(pSize, entropy.get_bytes)
while tries < 10 and y < minimum:
tries += 1
y = Util.number.getRandomNumber(pSize, entropy.get_bytes)
assert (y >= minimum) # TODO: test_conch just hangs if this is hit
# the chance of it being hit are really really low
f = pow(self.g, y, self.p)
sharedSecret = _MPpow(clientDHPubKey, y, self.p)
h = sha.new()
h.update(NS(self.otherVersionString))
h.update(NS(self.ourVersionString))
h.update(NS(self.clientKexInitPayload))
h.update(NS(self.ourKexInitPayload))
h.update(NS(self.factory.publicKeys[self.keyAlg]))
if self.kexAlg == 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1':
h.update(struct.pack('>3L', self.min, self.ideal, self.max))
else:
h.update(struct.pack('>L', self.ideal))
h.update(MP(self.p))
h.update(MP(self.g))
h.update(MP(clientDHPubKey))
h.update(MP(f))
h.update(sharedSecret)
exchangeHash = h.digest()
self.sendPacket(MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, NS(self.factory.publicKeys[self.keyAlg])+ \
MP(f)+NS(keys.signData(self.factory.privateKeys[self.keyAlg], exchangeHash)))
self._keySetup(sharedSecret, exchangeHash)
def _cbSignData(self, privateKey, signData):
return keys.signData(privateKey, signData)
def _cbSignData(self, privateKey, signData):
return keys.signData(privateKey, signData)
