def test_ipset_clear():
ipset = IPSet(['10.0.0.0/16'])
ipset.update(IPRange('10.1.0.0', '10.1.255.255'))
assert ipset == IPSet(['10.0.0.0/15'])
ipset.clear()
assert ipset == IPSet([])
class FederationConfig(Config):
section = "federation"
def read_config(self, config, **kwargs):
# FIXME: federation_domain_whitelist needs sytests
self.federation_domain_whitelist = None # type: Optional[dict]
federation_domain_whitelist = config.get("federation_domain_whitelist",
None)
if federation_domain_whitelist is not None:
# turn the whitelist into a hash for speed of lookup
self.federation_domain_whitelist = {}
for domain in federation_domain_whitelist:
self.federation_domain_whitelist[domain] = True
self.federation_ip_range_blacklist = config.get(
"federation_ip_range_blacklist", [])
# Attempt to create an IPSet from the given ranges
try:
self.federation_ip_range_blacklist = IPSet(
self.federation_ip_range_blacklist)
# Always blacklist 0.0.0.0, ::
self.federation_ip_range_blacklist.update(["0.0.0.0", "::"])
except Exception as e:
raise ConfigError(
"Invalid range(s) provided in federation_ip_range_blacklist: %s"
% e)
def generate_config_section(self, config_dir_path, server_name, **kwargs):
return """\
def test_ipset_clear():
ipset = IPSet(['10.0.0.0/16'])
ipset.update(IPRange('10.1.0.0', '10.1.255.255'))
assert ipset == IPSet(['10.0.0.0/15'])
ipset.clear()
assert ipset == IPSet([])
def test_ipset_updates():
s1 = IPSet(['192.0.2.0/25'])
s2 = IPSet(['192.0.2.128/25'])
s1.update(s2)
assert s1 == IPSet(['192.0.2.0/24'])
s1.update(['192.0.0.0/24', '192.0.1.0/24', '192.0.3.0/24'])
assert s1 == IPSet(['192.0.0.0/22'])
def test_ipset_updates():
s1 = IPSet(['192.0.2.0/25'])
s2 = IPSet(['192.0.2.128/25'])
s1.update(s2)
assert s1 == IPSet(['192.0.2.0/24'])
s1.update(['192.0.0.0/24', '192.0.1.0/24', '192.0.3.0/24'])
assert s1 == IPSet(['192.0.0.0/22'])
def test_ipset_exceptions():
s1 = IPSet(['10.0.0.1'])
# IPSet objects are not hashable.
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
hash(s1)
# Bad update argument type.
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
s1.update(42)
def test_ipset_exceptions():
s1 = IPSet(['10.0.0.1'])
# IPSet objects are not hashable.
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
hash(s1)
# Bad update argument type.
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
s1.update(42)
def parse_and_group_target_specs(target_specs, nocidr):
str_targets = set()
ipset_targets = IPSet()
for target_spec in target_specs:
if (target_spec.startswith(".") or
(target_spec[0].isalpha() or target_spec[-1].isalpha())
or (nocidr and "/" in target_spec)):
str_targets.add(target_spec)
else:
if "-" in target_spec:
start_ip, post_dash_segment = target_spec.split("-")
end_ip = start_ip.rsplit(".", maxsplit=1)[0] + "." + \
post_dash_segment
target_spec = IPRange(start_ip, end_ip)
elif "*" in target_spec:
target_spec = glob_to_iprange(target_spec)
else: # str IP addresses and str CIDR notations
target_spec = (target_spec, )
ipset_targets.update(IPSet(target_spec))
return (str_targets, ipset_targets)
def test_ipset_adding_and_removing_members_ip_addresses_as_ints():
s1 = IPSet(['10.0.0.0/25'])
s1.add('10.0.0.0/24')
assert s1 == IPSet(['10.0.0.0/24'])
integer1 = int(IPAddress('10.0.0.1'))
integer2 = int(IPAddress('fe80::'))
integer3 = int(IPAddress('10.0.0.2'))
s2 = IPSet([integer1, integer2])
assert s2 == IPSet(['10.0.0.1/32', 'fe80::/128'])
s2.add(integer3)
assert s2 == IPSet(['10.0.0.1/32', '10.0.0.2/32', 'fe80::/128'])
s2.remove(integer2)
assert s2 == IPSet(['10.0.0.1/32', '10.0.0.2/32'])
s2.update([integer2])
assert s2 == IPSet(['10.0.0.1/32', '10.0.0.2/32', 'fe80::/128'])
def test_ipset_adding_and_removing_members_ip_addresses_as_ints():
s1 = IPSet(['10.0.0.0/25'])
s1.add('10.0.0.0/24')
assert s1 == IPSet(['10.0.0.0/24'])
integer1 = int(IPAddress('10.0.0.1'))
integer2 = int(IPAddress('fe80::'))
integer3 = int(IPAddress('10.0.0.2'))
s2 = IPSet([integer1, integer2])
assert s2 == IPSet(['10.0.0.1/32', 'fe80::/128'])
s2.add(integer3)
assert s2 == IPSet(['10.0.0.1/32', '10.0.0.2/32', 'fe80::/128'])
s2.remove(integer2)
assert s2 == IPSet(['10.0.0.1/32', '10.0.0.2/32'])
s2.update([integer2])
assert s2 == IPSet(['10.0.0.1/32', '10.0.0.2/32', 'fe80::/128'])
def parse_ip_ranges(data, key):
'''
Parses IP range or CIDR mask.
:param data: Dictionary where to look for the value.
:param key: Key for the value to be parsed.
:return: Set of IP ranges and networks.
'''
if key not in data:
return None
ranges = [[s.strip() for s in r.split('-')] for r in data[key]]
result = IPSet()
for r in ranges:
resolved_set = resolve_service_tag_alias(r[0])
if resolved_set is not None:
result.update(resolved_set)
else:
if len(r) > 2:
raise Exception('Invalid range. Use x.x.x.x-y.y.y.y or x.x.x.x or x.x.x.x/y.')
result.add(IPRange(*r) if len(r) == 2 else IPNetwork(r[0]))
return result
def test_ipset_updates():
s1 = IPSet(['192.0.2.0/25'])
s2 = IPSet(['192.0.2.128/25'])
s1.update(s2)
assert s1 == IPSet(['192.0.2.0/24'])
s1.update(['192.0.0.0/24', '192.0.1.0/24', '192.0.3.0/24'])
assert s1 == IPSet(['192.0.0.0/22'])
expected = IPSet(['192.0.1.0/24', '192.0.2.0/24'])
s3 = IPSet(['192.0.1.0/24'])
s3.update(IPRange('192.0.2.0', '192.0.2.255'))
assert s3 == expected
s4 = IPSet(['192.0.1.0/24'])
s4.update([
IPRange('192.0.2.0', '192.0.2.100'),
IPRange('192.0.2.50', '192.0.2.255')
])
assert s4 == expected
class ContentRepositoryConfig(Config):
def read_config(self, config, **kwargs):
self.max_upload_size = self.parse_size(
config.get("max_upload_size", "10M"))
self.max_image_pixels = self.parse_size(
config.get("max_image_pixels", "32M"))
self.max_spider_size = self.parse_size(
config.get("max_spider_size", "10M"))
self.media_store_path = self.ensure_directory(
config.get("media_store_path", "media_store"))
backup_media_store_path = config.get("backup_media_store_path")
synchronous_backup_media_store = config.get(
"synchronous_backup_media_store", False)
storage_providers = config.get("media_storage_providers", [])
if backup_media_store_path:
if storage_providers:
raise ConfigError(
"Cannot use both 'backup_media_store_path' and 'storage_providers'"
)
storage_providers = [{
"module": "file_system",
"store_local": True,
"store_synchronous": synchronous_backup_media_store,
"store_remote": True,
"config": {
"directory": backup_media_store_path
},
}]
# This is a list of config that can be used to create the storage
# providers. The entries are tuples of (Class, class_config,
# MediaStorageProviderConfig), where Class is the class of the provider,
# the class_config the config to pass to it, and
# MediaStorageProviderConfig are options for StorageProviderWrapper.
#
# We don't create the storage providers here as not all workers need
# them to be started.
self.media_storage_providers = []
for provider_config in storage_providers:
# We special case the module "file_system" so as not to need to
# expose FileStorageProviderBackend
if provider_config["module"] == "file_system":
provider_config["module"] = (
"synapse.rest.media.v1.storage_provider"
".FileStorageProviderBackend")
provider_class, parsed_config = load_module(provider_config)
wrapper_config = MediaStorageProviderConfig(
provider_config.get("store_local", False),
provider_config.get("store_remote", False),
provider_config.get("store_synchronous", False),
)
self.media_storage_providers.append(
(provider_class, parsed_config, wrapper_config))
self.uploads_path = self.ensure_directory(
config.get("uploads_path", "uploads"))
self.dynamic_thumbnails = config.get("dynamic_thumbnails", False)
self.thumbnail_requirements = parse_thumbnail_requirements(
config.get("thumbnail_sizes", DEFAULT_THUMBNAIL_SIZES))
self.url_preview_enabled = config.get("url_preview_enabled", False)
if self.url_preview_enabled:
try:
import lxml
lxml # To stop unused lint.
except ImportError:
raise ConfigError(MISSING_LXML)
try:
from netaddr import IPSet
except ImportError:
raise ConfigError(MISSING_NETADDR)
if "url_preview_ip_range_blacklist" not in config:
raise ConfigError(
"For security, you must specify an explicit target IP address "
"blacklist in url_preview_ip_range_blacklist for url previewing "
"to work")
self.url_preview_ip_range_blacklist = IPSet(
config["url_preview_ip_range_blacklist"])
# we always blacklist '0.0.0.0' and '::', which are supposed to be
# unroutable addresses.
self.url_preview_ip_range_blacklist.update(["0.0.0.0", "::"])
self.url_preview_ip_range_whitelist = IPSet(
config.get("url_preview_ip_range_whitelist", ()))
self.url_preview_url_blacklist = config.get(
"url_preview_url_blacklist", ())
def generate_config_section(self, data_dir_path, **kwargs):
media_store = os.path.join(data_dir_path, "media_store")
uploads_path = os.path.join(data_dir_path, "uploads")
formatted_thumbnail_sizes = "".join(THUMBNAIL_SIZE_YAML % s
for s in DEFAULT_THUMBNAIL_SIZES)
# strip final NL
formatted_thumbnail_sizes = formatted_thumbnail_sizes[:-1]
return (r"""
# Directory where uploaded images and attachments are stored.
#
media_store_path: "%(media_store)s"
# Media storage providers allow media to be stored in different
# locations.
#
#media_storage_providers:
# - module: file_system
# # Whether to write new local files.
# store_local: false
# # Whether to write new remote media
# store_remote: false
# # Whether to block upload requests waiting for write to this
# # provider to complete
# store_synchronous: false
# config:
# directory: /mnt/some/other/directory
# Directory where in-progress uploads are stored.
#
uploads_path: "%(uploads_path)s"
# The largest allowed upload size in bytes
#
#max_upload_size: 10M
# Maximum number of pixels that will be thumbnailed
#
#max_image_pixels: 32M
# Whether to generate new thumbnails on the fly to precisely match
# the resolution requested by the client. If true then whenever
# a new resolution is requested by the client the server will
# generate a new thumbnail. If false the server will pick a thumbnail
# from a precalculated list.
#
#dynamic_thumbnails: false
# List of thumbnails to precalculate when an image is uploaded.
#
#thumbnail_sizes:
%(formatted_thumbnail_sizes)s
# Is the preview URL API enabled?
#
# 'false' by default: uncomment the following to enable it (and specify a
# url_preview_ip_range_blacklist blacklist).
#
#url_preview_enabled: true
# List of IP address CIDR ranges that the URL preview spider is denied
# from accessing. There are no defaults: you must explicitly
# specify a list for URL previewing to work. You should specify any
# internal services in your network that you do not want synapse to try
# to connect to, otherwise anyone in any Matrix room could cause your
# synapse to issue arbitrary GET requests to your internal services,
# causing serious security issues.
#
# (0.0.0.0 and :: are always blacklisted, whether or not they are explicitly
# listed here, since they correspond to unroutable addresses.)
#
# This must be specified if url_preview_enabled is set. It is recommended that
# you uncomment the following list as a starting point.
#
#url_preview_ip_range_blacklist:
# - '127.0.0.0/8'
# - '10.0.0.0/8'
# - '172.16.0.0/12'
# - '192.168.0.0/16'
# - '100.64.0.0/10'
# - '169.254.0.0/16'
# - '::1/128'
# - 'fe80::/64'
# - 'fc00::/7'
# List of IP address CIDR ranges that the URL preview spider is allowed
# to access even if they are specified in url_preview_ip_range_blacklist.
# This is useful for specifying exceptions to wide-ranging blacklisted
# target IP ranges - e.g. for enabling URL previews for a specific private
# website only visible in your network.
#
#url_preview_ip_range_whitelist:
# - '192.168.1.1'
# Optional list of URL matches that the URL preview spider is
# denied from accessing. You should use url_preview_ip_range_blacklist
# in preference to this, otherwise someone could define a public DNS
# entry that points to a private IP address and circumvent the blacklist.
# This is more useful if you know there is an entire shape of URL that
# you know that will never want synapse to try to spider.
#
# Each list entry is a dictionary of url component attributes as returned
# by urlparse.urlsplit as applied to the absolute form of the URL. See
# https://docs.python.org/2/library/urlparse.html#urlparse.urlsplit
# The values of the dictionary are treated as an filename match pattern
# applied to that component of URLs, unless they start with a ^ in which
# case they are treated as a regular expression match. If all the
# specified component matches for a given list item succeed, the URL is
# blacklisted.
#
#url_preview_url_blacklist:
# # blacklist any URL with a username in its URI
# - username: '******'
#
# # blacklist all *.google.com URLs
# - netloc: 'google.com'
# - netloc: '*.google.com'
#
# # blacklist all plain HTTP URLs
# - scheme: 'http'
#
# # blacklist http(s)://www.acme.com/foo
# - netloc: 'www.acme.com'
# path: '/foo'
#
# # blacklist any URL with a literal IPv4 address
# - netloc: '^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$'
# The largest allowed URL preview spidering size in bytes
#
#max_spider_size: 10M
""" % locals())
def run():
#Check old processes are not running
check_old_processes_running()
#Load config
config_data = ConfigParser.RawConfigParser()
config_data.read('chain_config.cfg')
EXT_TX_PER_LOOP = config_data.getint(
'Transaction generation and processing', 'ext_tx_per_loop')
USER_TX_PER_LOOP = config_data.getint(
'Transaction generation and processing', 'user_tx_per_loop')
LOOPS_PER_TX = config_data.getint('Transaction generation and processing',
'loops_per_tx')
START_TIME = config_data.getint('Transaction generation and processing',
'start_time')
DKG_RENEWAL_INTERVAL = config_data.getint('Consensus',
'dkg_renewal_interval')
BLOCK_TIME = config_data.getint('General', 'block_time')
TIMEOUT = config_data.getint('General', 'timeout')
DKG_TIMEOUT = config_data.getint('Consensus', 'dkg_timeout')
#Telemetry initialization
start_time = time.time()
init_logger()
delays_blocks = open_log_block_process_delay()
delays_txs = open_log_delay_create_txs()
#Modules initialization
mainLog.info("Initializing Chain")
chain = init_chain()
last_block = chain.get_head_block().header.number
mainLog.debug("Last block: %s", last_block)
mainLog.info("Initializing Keystore")
keys, addresses = init_keystore()
mainLog.info("Loaded %s keys", len(keys))
mainLog.info("----------------LOADED ADDRESSES---------------------")
mainLog.info([add.encode("HEX") for add in addresses])
mainLog.info("----------------END ADDRESS LIST---------------------")
mainLog.info("Initializing P2P")
p2p = init_p2p(chain.get_head_block().header.number)
mainLog.info("Initializing Parser")
user = init_user()
try:
user.read_transactions("./transactions.txt")
except Exception as e:
mainLog.critical("Exception while reading user transactions")
mainLog.exception(e)
p2p.stop()
sys.exit(0)
mainLog.info("Initializing OOR")
oor = init_oor()
#Variables initialization
end = 0
count = 0
dkg_on = False
exit_from_dkg = False
processed_user = 0
user_tx_count = 0
block_num = chain.get_head_block().header.number
timestamp = chain.get_head_block().header.timestamp
last_random_no = chain.get_head_block().header.random_number.encode('hex')
current_group_sig = chain.get_head_block().header.group_sig
current_group_key = chain.get_current_group_key()
my_dkgIDs = []
myIPs = IPSet()
for i in range(len(keys)):
myIPs.update(chain.get_own_ips(keys[i].address))
mainLog.info("Own IPs at startup are: %s", myIPs)
dkg_group = chain.get_current_dkg_group()
in_dkg_group, my_dkgIDs = find_me_in_dkg_group(dkg_group, addresses)
mainLog.info("Initializing Consensus")
consensus = cons.Consensus(dkg_group, my_dkgIDs, last_random_no,
current_group_key, block_num, current_group_sig,
current_group_key)
isMaster = load_master_private_keys(consensus, my_dkgIDs)
if not in_dkg_group:
consensus.store_ids(dkg_group)
else:
mainLog.warning(
"TODO: nodes that belong to the DKG group and connect after the DKG do not have private keys, so they shouldn't create shares. Needs to be disabled!"
)
if not isMaster:
create_shares = False
if isMaster:
consensus.create_shares(last_random_no, block_num, count)
create_shares = True
cache = Share_Cache()
before = time.time()
last_random_no, block_num, count = perform_bootstrap(
chain, p2p, consensus, delays_blocks, delays_txs, DKG_RENEWAL_INTERVAL,
last_random_no, block_num, count)
after = time.time()
elapsed = after - before
mainLog.info("Bootstrap finished. Elapsed time: %s", elapsed)
timestamp = chain.get_head_block().header.timestamp
current_group_sig = chain.get_head_block().header.group_sig
current_group_key = chain.get_current_group_key()
last_random_no = chain.get_head_block().header.random_number.encode('hex')
from_bootstrap = True
while (not end):
#Process new blocks. DOES NOT support bootstrap
try:
block = p2p.get_block()
while block is not None:
#FALSE: Only nodes that do NOT belong to the DKG get stuck here until they receive the block with the new group key
mainLog.info("Received new block no. %s", block.number)
mainLog.info("Block Data: Group Signature: %s --Random number: %s --Group Key: %s", block.header.group_sig, \
block.header.random_number.encode('hex'), block.header.group_pubkey)
res = False
try:
signer = consensus.get_next_signer(block.count)
expected_message = str(last_random_no) + str(
block_num) + str(count)
#Use in case the OR in the next line does not work
# if exit_from_dkg or dkg_on:
# usePrevGroupKey = True
# else:
# usePrevGroupKey = False
if consensus.verify_group_sig(expected_message,
block.header.group_sig,
exit_from_dkg or dkg_on):
mainLog.debug("Verify Group Signature OK")
else:
raise BlsInvalidGroupSignature()
if in_dkg_group and exit_from_dkg:
# We ONLY enter here if the node belongs to the DKG group and just finished a new DKG
exit_from_dkg = False
if block.header.group_pubkey != consensus.get_current_group_key(
):
mainLog.error(
"FATAL ERROR. A node in the DKG group received a block with a Group Public Key not matching the generated from the DKG."
)
raise Exception(
"Unexpected group key in block header. Stopping"
)
signer = chain.extract_first_ip_from_address(
signing_addr)
elif dkg_on:
# We ONLY enter here if the nodes DOES NOT belong to the DKG group and is waiting for a current DKG to finish
signer = chain.extract_first_ip_from_address(
signing_addr)
consensus.set_current_group_key(
block.header.group_pubkey)
dkg_on = False
mainLog.debug(
"Verifying new block signature, signer should be %s",
signer)
mainLog.debug("Owner of the previous IP is address %s",
chain.get_addr_from_ip(signer).encode("HEX"))
mainLog.debug("Coinbase in the block is: %s",
block.header.coinbase.encode("HEX"))
res = chain.verify_block_signature(block, signer)
except UnsignedBlock as e:
mainLog.exception(e)
mainLog.error("Unsigned block. Skipping")
res = False
except InvalidBlockSigner as e:
mainLog.exception(e)
mainLog.error(
"Block no. %s signautre is invalid! Ignoring.",
block.number)
res = False
except BlsInvalidGroupSignature as e:
mainLog.exception(e)
mainLog.error(
"Block no. %s: invalid unexpected or invalid BLS group signature! Ignoring.",
block.number)
res = False
except Exception as e:
mainLog.error(
"Unrecoverable error when checking block signature. Exiting.",
block.number)
mainLog.exception(e)
raise e
if res:
# correct block
before = time.time()
chain.add_block(block)
after = time.time()
delay = after - before
delays_blocks.write(
str(block.number) + ',' + str(delay) + '\n')
delays_txs.write("Added new block no." +
str(block.number) + '\n')
timestamp = chain.get_head_block().header.timestamp
block_num = chain.get_head_block().header.number
last_random_no = block.header.random_number.encode('hex')
if from_bootstrap:
from_bootstrap = False
consensus.bootstrap_only_set_random_no_manual(
last_random_no)
consensus.bootstrap_only_set_group_sig_manual(
block.header.group_sig)
#after a correct block: reset BLS and create and broadcast new shares (like receiving a new block)
consensus.calculate_next_signer(block_num)
consensus.reset_bls()
if in_dkg_group and create_shares:
count = 0
new_shares = consensus.create_shares(
last_random_no, block_num, count)
for share in new_shares:
p2p.broadcast_share(share)
cache.store_bls(share)
mainLog.info("Sent a new share to the network")
else:
mainLog.error(
"Received an erroneous block. Ignoring block...")
block = p2p.get_block()
except Exception as e:
mainLog.critical("Exception while processing a received block")
mainLog.exception(e)
p2p.stop()
sys.exit(0)
#Process transactions from the network
processed = 0
try:
tx_ext = p2p.get_tx()
while tx_ext is not None:
#Check that the transaction has not been sent from this node or already processed
processed = processed + 1
if not (chain.in_chain(tx_ext) or chain.in_pool(tx_ext)):
mainLog.info("Received external transaction: to: %s hash %s", \
tx_ext.to.encode('HEX'), tx_ext.hash.encode('HEX'))
try:
chain.add_pending_transaction(tx_ext)
# Correct tx
p2p.broadcast_tx(tx_ext)
except Exception as e:
mainLog.info("Discarded invalid external transaction: to: %s", \
tx_ext.to.encode("HEX"))
mainLog.exception(e)
if processed < EXT_TX_PER_LOOP:
tx_ext = p2p.get_tx()
else:
tx_ext = None
except Exception as e:
mainLog.critical(
"Exception while processing a received transaction")
mainLog.exception(e)
p2p.stop()
sys.exit(0)
#Check if the node has to sign the next block. Control also timeouts
#Before we wait for the block time
try:
timestamp = chain.get_head_block().header.timestamp
block_num = chain.get_head_block().header.number
if ((time.time() - timestamp) >= BLOCK_TIME):
#Time to create a new block
if (time.time() - timestamp) >= TIMEOUT:
#The expected signer didn't create a block. Trigger a recalculation of the random number to select a new signer
#TODO: does NOT work because it will enter all the time when the timeout expires
# count = count + 1
# timeout_expired = True
# if count == 0:
# consensus.reset_bls()
# consensus.create_share(count)
# p2p.broadcast_share(new_share)
# mainLog.info("Timeout expired. Recalculated random no and sent a new share to the network")
mainLog.info("Contextual information: Current time: %s --Last block timestamp: %s --Last random number: %s --Last block number: %s", \
time.time(), timestamp, consensus.get_current_random_no(), block_num)
raise Exception(
"FATAL ERROR, Block tiemout expired. The feature to re-calculte the random number after a block timeout exprity is not implemented. Stopping..."
)
if (consensus.shares_ready() or exit_from_dkg) and not dkg_on:
if not exit_from_dkg:
#Normal operation
signer = consensus.get_next_signer(count)
signing_addr = chain.get_addr_from_ip(signer)
#When we exit a new DKG round, the variable signing_addr stores the next signer (we are temporarily overriding the BLS RN generation)
if signing_addr in addresses:
exit_from_dkg = False
mainLog.info(
"This node has to sign a block, selected IP: %s",
signer)
mainLog.info("Associated address: %s",
signing_addr.encode("HEX"))
new_block = chain.create_block(signing_addr, consensus.get_current_random_no(), \
consensus.get_current_group_key(), consensus.get_current_group_sig(), count)
try:
key_pos = addresses.index(signing_addr)
except:
raise Exception(
"FATAL ERROR: This node does not own the indicated key to sign the block (not present in the keystore)"
)
sig_key = keys[key_pos]
new_block.sign(sig_key.privkey)
mainLog.info("Created new block no. %s, timestamp %s, coinbase %s", \
new_block.header.number, new_block.header.timestamp, new_block.header.coinbase.encode("HEX"))
mainLog.info(
"New block signature data: v %s -- r %s -- s %s",
new_block.v, new_block.r, new_block.s)
mainLog.info("Block Group Signature: %s --Random number: %s --Group Key: %s", new_block.header.group_sig, \
new_block.header.random_number.encode('hex'), new_block.header.group_pubkey)
mainLog.info("This block contains %s transactions",
new_block.transaction_count)
# mainLog.info("Sleeping 2s to give way to clock drift...")
# time.sleep(2)
#Like receiving a new block
before = time.time()
chain.add_block(new_block)
after = time.time()
delay = after - before
delays_blocks.write(
str(new_block.number) + ',' + str(delay) + '\n')
delays_txs.write("Added new block no." +
str(new_block.number) + '\n')
p2p.broadcast_block(new_block)
#after a correct block, create and broadcast new share
count = 0
#timeout_expired = False
block_num = new_block.number
consensus.calculate_next_signer(block_num)
last_random_no = consensus.get_current_random_no()
consensus.reset_bls()
time.sleep(10)
if in_dkg_group and create_shares:
count = 0
new_shares = consensus.create_shares(
last_random_no, block_num, count)
for share in new_shares:
p2p.broadcast_share(share)
cache.store_bls(share)
mainLog.info("Sent a new share to the network")
except Exception as e:
mainLog.critical(
"Exception while checking if the node has to sign the next block"
)
mainLog.exception(e)
p2p.stop()
sys.exit(0)
# Process transactions from the user
if ((time.time() - start_time) > START_TIME
or isMaster) and not dkg_on:
if user_tx_count == LOOPS_PER_TX - 1:
try:
tx_int = user.get_tx()
while tx_int is not None:
before = time.time()
processed_user = processed_user + 1
user_tx_count = 0
try:
try:
key_pos = addresses.index(tx_int["from"])
#mainLog.debug("Found key in %s", key_pos)
except:
raise Exception(
"Key indicated in from field is not in present in the keystore"
)
key = keys[key_pos]
tx = chain.parse_transaction(tx_int)
tx.sign(key.privkey)
mainLog.info("Processing user transaction, from: %s -- to: %s -- hash %s -- value %s", \
tx_int["from"].encode("HEX"), tx_int["to"].encode("HEX"), tx.hash.encode("HEX"), tx_int["value"])
#mainLog.debug("TX signed. Info: v %s -- r %s -- s %s -- NONCE %s", tx.v, \
#tx.r, str(tx.s), tx.nonce)
# correct tx
try:
chain.add_pending_transaction(tx)
except Exception as e:
raise e
p2p.broadcast_tx(tx)
after = time.time()
delay = after - before
delays_txs.write(
str(tx.hash.encode("HEX")) + ',' + str(delay) +
'\n')
#mainLog.info("Sent transaction to the network, from: %s -- to: %s -- value: %s", \
#tx_int["from"].encode("HEX"), tx.to.encode("HEX"), tx.ip_network)
# seen_tx.append(tx.hash)
except Exception as e:
mainLog.error(
"Error when creating user transaction, ignoring transaction."
)
mainLog.exception(e.message)
# Temporarily diabled because we want 1 tx per 2 loops
# if processed < USER_TX_PER_LOOP:
# tx_int = user.get_tx()
# else:
# tx_int = None
tx_int = None
except Exception as e:
mainLog.exception(e)
p2p.stop()
sys.exit(0)
else:
user_tx_count = user_tx_count + 1
#answer queries from OOR
try:
nonce, afi, address = oor.get_query()
if nonce is not None and afi is not None and address is not None:
info = chain.query_eid(ipaddr=address, nonce=nonce)
oor.send(info)
except Exception as e:
mainLog.critical("Exception while answering queries from OOR")
mainLog.exception(e)
p2p.stop()
sys.exit(0)
#########Answer queries from the network
#blocks
try:
block_numbers = p2p.get_block_queries()
if block_numbers is not None:
mainLog.info("Answering query for block nos. %s",
block_numbers)
response = []
for number in block_numbers:
response.append(chain.get_block_by_number(number))
p2p.answer_block_queries(response)
except Exception as e:
mainLog.critical(
"Exception while answering queries from the network")
mainLog.exception(e)
p2p.stop()
sys.exit(0)
#transaction pool
try:
if p2p.tx_pool_query():
mainLog.info("Answering tx pool query")
pool = chain.get_pending_transactions()
p2p.answer_tx_pool_query(pool)
except Exception as e:
mainLog.critical("Exception while answering the transaction pool")
mainLog.exception(e)
# Stop P2P
p2p.stop()
sys.exit(0)
########Consensus
#Get shares from the network
try:
share = p2p.get_share()
while share is not None and not dkg_on:
mainLog.info("Received new BLS share from P2P.")
if not cache.in_bls_cache(share):
mainLog.info("Share not in cache, processing")
if share.block_number == block_num:
msg = str(last_random_no) + str(block_num) + str(count)
res = consensus.store_share(share, msg, block_num)
elif share.block_number > block_num:
mainLog.debug(
"Receive a share for a future block number. Saving for later..."
)
mainLog.debug(
"Current block no. %s, block no. in share: %s",
block_num, share.block_number)
cache.store_future_bls(share)
else:
mainLog.debug(
"Receive a share for a past block number. VERY STRANGE!!! Discarding..."
)
cache.store_bls(share)
p2p.broadcast_share(share)
share = p2p.get_share()
while cache.pending_future_bls(block_num):
share = cache.get_future_bls(block_num)
msg = str(last_random_no) + str(block_num) + str(count)
res = consensus.store_share(share, msg, block_num)
except Exception as e:
mainLog.critical("Exception while processing received shares")
mainLog.exception(e)
# Stop P2P
p2p.stop()
sys.exit(0)
if (time.time() - timestamp) > (BLOCK_TIME *
0.75) and not consensus.shares_ready():
mainLog.warning(
"This node has not computed yet Group Signature...")
if (time.time() - timestamp) > (BLOCK_TIME *
0.99) and not isMaster:
mainLog.warning(
"It is nearly block time and we don't have Group Signature. Activating boostrap mode."
)
from_bootstrap = True
#DKG management
#Trigger new DKG
try:
if (
(block_num + 1) % DKG_RENEWAL_INTERVAL == 0
) and not dkg_on and not exit_from_dkg and consensus.shares_ready(
):
mainLog.info(
"Next block needs new Group Key. Triggering DKG renewal.")
dkg_on = True
create_shares = True
dkg_group = chain.get_current_dkg_group()
in_dkg_group, my_dkgIDs = find_me_in_dkg_group(
dkg_group, addresses)
if in_dkg_group:
to_send = consensus.new_dkg(dkg_group, my_dkgIDs)
for dkg_share in to_send:
cache.store_dkg(dkg_share)
p2p.send_dkg_share(dkg_share)
#For cases when one node does ALL the DKG
if consensus.all_node_dkgs_finished():
dkg_on = False
exit_from_dkg = True
mainLog.info(
"DKG Finished sucessfully for all node IDs. Exiting loop and resuming normal operation."
)
else:
# Configure nodes that do not participate in the DKG so they can verfiy BLS shares later
consensus.store_ids(dkg_group)
#Define new signer that has to be in the dkg_group. Selected randomly from the people in the group (temporal override of the BLS RN generation)
random_no = chain.get_block_by_number(
block_num).header.random_number.encode('hex')
random_pos = compress_random_no_to_int(random_no,
16) % len(dkg_group)
# signing_addr will be used in block RX and block creation code in the beginning of the loop
signing_addr = dkg_group[random_pos]
except Exception as e:
mainLog.critical("Exception while creating DKG shares")
mainLog.exception(e)
# Stop P2P
p2p.stop()
sys.exit(0)
#Collect DKG shares for the new DKG
try:
#During DKG, the prototype only works on DKG
if in_dkg_group:
#WE STAY HERE FOR THE WHOLE DKG
dkg_share = p2p.get_dkg_share()
while dkg_on and dkg_share is not None:
mainLog.info("Received new DKG share from P2P")
if not cache.in_dkg_cache(dkg_share):
if dkg_share.to in my_dkgIDs:
#Next fix if current fix does not work
#if dkg_share.to in my_dkgIDs and consensus.allSharesReceived(dkg_sahre.to):
consensus.verify_dkg_contribution(dkg_share)
if consensus.all_node_dkgs_finished():
dkg_on = False
exit_from_dkg = True
mainLog.info(
"DKG Finished sucessfully for all node IDs. Exiting loop and resuming normal operation."
)
# if not isMaster:
# mainLog.info("Sleeping for 1hmin to give time to master for its keys")
# time.sleep(30*88)
time.sleep(120)
elif (time.time() - timestamp) >= DKG_TIMEOUT:
mainLog.critical(
"Fatal Error. DKG renewal timeout expired. Stopping..."
)
raise Exception
# Send shares that are NOT for me
else:
p2p.send_dkg_share(dkg_share)
cache.store_dkg(dkg_share)
dkg_share = p2p.get_dkg_share()
elif dkg_on:
mainLog.info(
"This node is not participating in the DKG. Will sleep for one block time and wait for a block with the new public key"
)
time.sleep(BLOCK_TIME)
if (time.time() - timestamp) >= DKG_TIMEOUT:
mainLog.critical(
"Fatal Error. DKG renewal timeout expired. Stopping..."
)
raise Exception
except Exception as e:
mainLog.critical("Exception while processing received DKG shares")
mainLog.exception(e)
# Stop P2P
p2p.stop()
sys.exit(0)
class ServerConfig(Config):
def read_config(self, config):
self.server_name = config["server_name"]
self.server_context = config.get("server_context", None)
try:
parse_and_validate_server_name(self.server_name)
except ValueError as e:
raise ConfigError(str(e))
self.pid_file = self.abspath(config.get("pid_file"))
self.web_client_location = config.get("web_client_location", None)
self.soft_file_limit = config.get("soft_file_limit", 0)
self.daemonize = config.get("daemonize")
self.print_pidfile = config.get("print_pidfile")
self.user_agent_suffix = config.get("user_agent_suffix")
self.use_frozen_dicts = config.get("use_frozen_dicts", False)
self.public_baseurl = config.get("public_baseurl")
self.cpu_affinity = config.get("cpu_affinity")
# Whether to send federation traffic out in this process. This only
# applies to some federation traffic, and so shouldn't be used to
# "disable" federation
self.send_federation = config.get("send_federation", True)
# Whether to enable user presence.
self.use_presence = config.get("use_presence", True)
# Whether to update the user directory or not. This should be set to
# false only if we are updating the user directory in a worker
self.update_user_directory = config.get("update_user_directory", True)
# whether to enable the media repository endpoints. This should be set
# to false if the media repository is running as a separate endpoint;
# doing so ensures that we will not run cache cleanup jobs on the
# master, potentially causing inconsistency.
self.enable_media_repo = config.get("enable_media_repo", True)
# Whether to require authentication to retrieve profile data (avatars,
# display names) of other users through the client API.
self.require_auth_for_profile_requests = config.get(
"require_auth_for_profile_requests", False,
)
# If set to 'True', requires authentication to access the server's
# public rooms directory through the client API, and forbids any other
# homeserver to fetch it via federation.
self.restrict_public_rooms_to_local_users = config.get(
"restrict_public_rooms_to_local_users", False,
)
# whether to enable search. If disabled, new entries will not be inserted
# into the search tables and they will not be indexed. Users will receive
# errors when attempting to search for messages.
self.enable_search = config.get("enable_search", True)
self.filter_timeline_limit = config.get("filter_timeline_limit", -1)
# Whether we should block invites sent to users on this server
# (other than those sent by local server admins)
self.block_non_admin_invites = config.get(
"block_non_admin_invites", False,
)
# Whether to enable experimental MSC1849 (aka relations) support
self.experimental_msc1849_support_enabled = config.get(
"experimental_msc1849_support_enabled", False,
)
# Options to control access by tracking MAU
self.limit_usage_by_mau = config.get("limit_usage_by_mau", False)
self.max_mau_value = 0
if self.limit_usage_by_mau:
self.max_mau_value = config.get(
"max_mau_value", 0,
)
self.mau_stats_only = config.get("mau_stats_only", False)
self.mau_limits_reserved_threepids = config.get(
"mau_limit_reserved_threepids", []
)
self.mau_trial_days = config.get(
"mau_trial_days", 0,
)
# Options to disable HS
self.hs_disabled = config.get("hs_disabled", False)
self.hs_disabled_message = config.get("hs_disabled_message", "")
self.hs_disabled_limit_type = config.get("hs_disabled_limit_type", "")
# Admin uri to direct users at should their instance become blocked
# due to resource constraints
self.admin_contact = config.get("admin_contact", None)
# FIXME: federation_domain_whitelist needs sytests
self.federation_domain_whitelist = None
federation_domain_whitelist = config.get(
"federation_domain_whitelist", None,
)
if federation_domain_whitelist is not None:
# turn the whitelist into a hash for speed of lookup
self.federation_domain_whitelist = {}
for domain in federation_domain_whitelist:
self.federation_domain_whitelist[domain] = True
self.federation_ip_range_blacklist = config.get(
"federation_ip_range_blacklist", [],
)
# Attempt to create an IPSet from the given ranges
try:
self.federation_ip_range_blacklist = IPSet(
self.federation_ip_range_blacklist
)
# Always blacklist 0.0.0.0, ::
self.federation_ip_range_blacklist.update(["0.0.0.0", "::"])
except Exception as e:
raise ConfigError(
"Invalid range(s) provided in "
"federation_ip_range_blacklist: %s" % e
)
if self.public_baseurl is not None:
if self.public_baseurl[-1] != '/':
self.public_baseurl += '/'
self.start_pushers = config.get("start_pushers", True)
# (undocumented) option for torturing the worker-mode replication a bit,
# for testing. The value defines the number of milliseconds to pause before
# sending out any replication updates.
self.replication_torture_level = config.get("replication_torture_level")
# Whether to require a user to be in the room to add an alias to it.
# Defaults to True.
self.require_membership_for_aliases = config.get(
"require_membership_for_aliases", True,
)
# Whether to allow per-room membership profiles through the send of membership
# events with profile information that differ from the target's global profile.
self.allow_per_room_profiles = config.get("allow_per_room_profiles", True)
self.listeners = []
for listener in config.get("listeners", []):
if not isinstance(listener.get("port", None), int):
raise ConfigError(
"Listener configuration is lacking a valid 'port' option"
)
if listener.setdefault("tls", False):
# no_tls is not really supported any more, but let's grandfather it in
# here.
if config.get("no_tls", False):
logger.info(
"Ignoring TLS-enabled listener on port %i due to no_tls"
)
continue
bind_address = listener.pop("bind_address", None)
bind_addresses = listener.setdefault("bind_addresses", [])
# if bind_address was specified, add it to the list of addresses
if bind_address:
bind_addresses.append(bind_address)
# if we still have an empty list of addresses, use the default list
if not bind_addresses:
if listener['type'] == 'metrics':
# the metrics listener doesn't support IPv6
bind_addresses.append('0.0.0.0')
else:
bind_addresses.extend(DEFAULT_BIND_ADDRESSES)
self.listeners.append(listener)
if not self.web_client_location:
_warn_if_webclient_configured(self.listeners)
self.gc_thresholds = read_gc_thresholds(config.get("gc_thresholds", None))
bind_port = config.get("bind_port")
if bind_port:
if config.get("no_tls", False):
raise ConfigError("no_tls is incompatible with bind_port")
self.listeners = []
bind_host = config.get("bind_host", "")
gzip_responses = config.get("gzip_responses", True)
self.listeners.append({
"port": bind_port,
"bind_addresses": [bind_host],
"tls": True,
"type": "http",
"resources": [
{
"names": ["client"],
"compress": gzip_responses,
},
{
"names": ["federation"],
"compress": False,
}
]
})
unsecure_port = config.get("unsecure_port", bind_port - 400)
if unsecure_port:
self.listeners.append({
"port": unsecure_port,
"bind_addresses": [bind_host],
"tls": False,
"type": "http",
"resources": [
{
"names": ["client"],
"compress": gzip_responses,
},
{
"names": ["federation"],
"compress": False,
}
]
})
manhole = config.get("manhole")
if manhole:
self.listeners.append({
"port": manhole,
"bind_addresses": ["127.0.0.1"],
"type": "manhole",
"tls": False,
})
metrics_port = config.get("metrics_port")
if metrics_port:
logger.warn(
("The metrics_port configuration option is deprecated in Synapse 0.31 "
"in favour of a listener. Please see "
"http://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/blob/master/docs/metrics-howto.rst"
" on how to configure the new listener."))
self.listeners.append({
"port": metrics_port,
"bind_addresses": [config.get("metrics_bind_host", "127.0.0.1")],
"tls": False,
"type": "http",
"resources": [
{
"names": ["metrics"],
"compress": False,
},
]
})
_check_resource_config(self.listeners)
def has_tls_listener(self):
return any(l["tls"] for l in self.listeners)
def default_config(self, server_name, data_dir_path, **kwargs):
_, bind_port = parse_and_validate_server_name(server_name)
if bind_port is not None:
unsecure_port = bind_port - 400
else:
bind_port = 8448
unsecure_port = 8008
pid_file = os.path.join(data_dir_path, "homeserver.pid")
return """\
## Server ##
# The domain name of the server, with optional explicit port.
# This is used by remote servers to connect to this server,
# e.g. matrix.org, localhost:8080, etc.
# This is also the last part of your UserID.
#
server_name: "%(server_name)s"
# When running as a daemon, the file to store the pid in
#
pid_file: %(pid_file)s
# CPU affinity mask. Setting this restricts the CPUs on which the
# process will be scheduled. It is represented as a bitmask, with the
# lowest order bit corresponding to the first logical CPU and the
# highest order bit corresponding to the last logical CPU. Not all CPUs
# may exist on a given system but a mask may specify more CPUs than are
# present.
#
# For example:
# 0x00000001 is processor #0,
# 0x00000003 is processors #0 and #1,
# 0xFFFFFFFF is all processors (#0 through #31).
#
# Pinning a Python process to a single CPU is desirable, because Python
# is inherently single-threaded due to the GIL, and can suffer a
# 30-40%% slowdown due to cache blow-out and thread context switching
# if the scheduler happens to schedule the underlying threads across
# different cores. See
# https://www.mirantis.com/blog/improve-performance-python-programs-restricting-single-cpu/.
#
# This setting requires the affinity package to be installed!
#
#cpu_affinity: 0xFFFFFFFF
# The path to the web client which will be served at /_matrix/client/
# if 'webclient' is configured under the 'listeners' configuration.
#
#web_client_location: "/path/to/web/root"
# The public-facing base URL that clients use to access this HS
# (not including _matrix/...). This is the same URL a user would
# enter into the 'custom HS URL' field on their client. If you
# use synapse with a reverse proxy, this should be the URL to reach
# synapse via the proxy.
#
#public_baseurl: https://example.com/
# Set the soft limit on the number of file descriptors synapse can use
# Zero is used to indicate synapse should set the soft limit to the
# hard limit.
#
#soft_file_limit: 0
# Set to false to disable presence tracking on this homeserver.
#
#use_presence: false
# Whether to require authentication to retrieve profile data (avatars,
# display names) of other users through the client API. Defaults to
# 'false'. Note that profile data is also available via the federation
# API, so this setting is of limited value if federation is enabled on
# the server.
#
#require_auth_for_profile_requests: true
# If set to 'true', requires authentication to access the server's
# public rooms directory through the client API, and forbids any other
# homeserver to fetch it via federation. Defaults to 'false'.
#
#restrict_public_rooms_to_local_users: true
# The GC threshold parameters to pass to `gc.set_threshold`, if defined
#
#gc_thresholds: [700, 10, 10]
# Set the limit on the returned events in the timeline in the get
# and sync operations. The default value is -1, means no upper limit.
#
#filter_timeline_limit: 5000
# Whether room invites to users on this server should be blocked
# (except those sent by local server admins). The default is False.
#
#block_non_admin_invites: True
# Room searching
#
# If disabled, new messages will not be indexed for searching and users
# will receive errors when searching for messages. Defaults to enabled.
#
#enable_search: false
# Restrict federation to the following whitelist of domains.
# N.B. we recommend also firewalling your federation listener to limit
# inbound federation traffic as early as possible, rather than relying
# purely on this application-layer restriction. If not specified, the
# default is to whitelist everything.
#
#federation_domain_whitelist:
# - lon.example.com
# - nyc.example.com
# - syd.example.com
# Prevent federation requests from being sent to the following
# blacklist IP address CIDR ranges. If this option is not specified, or
# specified with an empty list, no ip range blacklist will be enforced.
#
# (0.0.0.0 and :: are always blacklisted, whether or not they are explicitly
# listed here, since they correspond to unroutable addresses.)
#
federation_ip_range_blacklist:
- '127.0.0.0/8'
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
- '100.64.0.0/10'
- '169.254.0.0/16'
- '::1/128'
- 'fe80::/64'
- 'fc00::/7'
# List of ports that Synapse should listen on, their purpose and their
# configuration.
#
# Options for each listener include:
#
# port: the TCP port to bind to
#
# bind_addresses: a list of local addresses to listen on. The default is
# 'all local interfaces'.
#
# type: the type of listener. Normally 'http', but other valid options are:
# 'manhole' (see docs/manhole.md),
# 'metrics' (see docs/metrics-howto.rst),
# 'replication' (see docs/workers.rst).
#
# tls: set to true to enable TLS for this listener. Will use the TLS
# key/cert specified in tls_private_key_path / tls_certificate_path.
#
# x_forwarded: Only valid for an 'http' listener. Set to true to use the
# X-Forwarded-For header as the client IP. Useful when Synapse is
# behind a reverse-proxy.
#
# resources: Only valid for an 'http' listener. A list of resources to host
# on this port. Options for each resource are:
#
# names: a list of names of HTTP resources. See below for a list of
# valid resource names.
#
# compress: set to true to enable HTTP comression for this resource.
#
# additional_resources: Only valid for an 'http' listener. A map of
# additional endpoints which should be loaded via dynamic modules.
#
# Valid resource names are:
#
# client: the client-server API (/_matrix/client), and the synapse admin
# API (/_synapse/admin). Also implies 'media' and 'static'.
#
# consent: user consent forms (/_matrix/consent). See
# docs/consent_tracking.md.
#
# federation: the server-server API (/_matrix/federation). Also implies
# 'media', 'keys', 'openid'
#
# keys: the key discovery API (/_matrix/keys).
#
# media: the media API (/_matrix/media).
#
# metrics: the metrics interface. See docs/metrics-howto.rst.
#
# openid: OpenID authentication.
#
# replication: the HTTP replication API (/_synapse/replication). See
# docs/workers.rst.
#
# static: static resources under synapse/static (/_matrix/static). (Mostly
# useful for 'fallback authentication'.)
#
# webclient: A web client. Requires web_client_location to be set.
#
listeners:
# TLS-enabled listener: for when matrix traffic is sent directly to synapse.
#
# Disabled by default. To enable it, uncomment the following. (Note that you
# will also need to give Synapse a TLS key and certificate: see the TLS section
# below.)
#
#- port: %(bind_port)s
# type: http
# tls: true
# resources:
# - names: [client, federation]
# Unsecure HTTP listener: for when matrix traffic passes through a reverse proxy
# that unwraps TLS.
#
# If you plan to use a reverse proxy, please see
# https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/blob/master/docs/reverse_proxy.rst.
#
- port: %(unsecure_port)s
tls: false
bind_addresses: ['::1', '127.0.0.1']
type: http
x_forwarded: true
resources:
- names: [client, federation]
compress: false
# example additonal_resources:
#
#additional_resources:
# "/_matrix/my/custom/endpoint":
# module: my_module.CustomRequestHandler
# config: {}
# Turn on the twisted ssh manhole service on localhost on the given
# port.
#
#- port: 9000
# bind_addresses: ['::1', '127.0.0.1']
# type: manhole
## Homeserver blocking ##
# How to reach the server admin, used in ResourceLimitError
#
#admin_contact: 'mailto:[email protected]'
# Global blocking
#
#hs_disabled: False
#hs_disabled_message: 'Human readable reason for why the HS is blocked'
#hs_disabled_limit_type: 'error code(str), to help clients decode reason'
# Monthly Active User Blocking
#
#limit_usage_by_mau: False
#max_mau_value: 50
#mau_trial_days: 2
# If enabled, the metrics for the number of monthly active users will
# be populated, however no one will be limited. If limit_usage_by_mau
# is true, this is implied to be true.
#
#mau_stats_only: False
# Sometimes the server admin will want to ensure certain accounts are
# never blocked by mau checking. These accounts are specified here.
#
#mau_limit_reserved_threepids:
# - medium: 'email'
# address: '*****@*****.**'
# Used by phonehome stats to group together related servers.
#server_context: context
# Whether to require a user to be in the room to add an alias to it.
# Defaults to 'true'.
#
#require_membership_for_aliases: false
# Whether to allow per-room membership profiles through the send of membership
# events with profile information that differ from the target's global profile.
# Defaults to 'true'.
#
#allow_per_room_profiles: false
""" % locals()
def read_arguments(self, args):
if args.manhole is not None:
self.manhole = args.manhole
if args.daemonize is not None:
self.daemonize = args.daemonize
if args.print_pidfile is not None:
self.print_pidfile = args.print_pidfile
def add_arguments(self, parser):
server_group = parser.add_argument_group("server")
server_group.add_argument("-D", "--daemonize", action='store_true',
default=None,
help="Daemonize the home server")
server_group.add_argument("--print-pidfile", action='store_true',
default=None,
help="Print the path to the pidfile just"
" before daemonizing")
server_group.add_argument("--manhole", metavar="PORT", dest="manhole",
type=int,
help="Turn on the twisted telnet manhole"
" service on the given port.")
class ContentRepositoryConfig(Config):
section = "media"
def read_config(self, config, **kwargs):
# Only enable the media repo if either the media repo is enabled or the
# current worker app is the media repo.
if (self.enable_media_repo is False and
config.get("worker_app") != "synapse.app.media_repository"):
self.can_load_media_repo = False
return
else:
self.can_load_media_repo = True
# Whether this instance should be the one to run the background jobs to
# e.g clean up old URL previews.
self.media_instance_running_background_jobs = config.get(
"media_instance_running_background_jobs", )
self.max_upload_size = self.parse_size(
config.get("max_upload_size", "50M"))
self.max_image_pixels = self.parse_size(
config.get("max_image_pixels", "32M"))
self.max_spider_size = self.parse_size(
config.get("max_spider_size", "10M"))
self.media_store_path = self.ensure_directory(
config.get("media_store_path", "media_store"))
backup_media_store_path = config.get("backup_media_store_path")
synchronous_backup_media_store = config.get(
"synchronous_backup_media_store", False)
storage_providers = config.get("media_storage_providers", [])
if backup_media_store_path:
if storage_providers:
raise ConfigError(
"Cannot use both 'backup_media_store_path' and 'storage_providers'"
)
storage_providers = [{
"module": "file_system",
"store_local": True,
"store_synchronous": synchronous_backup_media_store,
"store_remote": True,
"config": {
"directory": backup_media_store_path
},
}]
# This is a list of config that can be used to create the storage
# providers. The entries are tuples of (Class, class_config,
# MediaStorageProviderConfig), where Class is the class of the provider,
# the class_config the config to pass to it, and
# MediaStorageProviderConfig are options for StorageProviderWrapper.
#
# We don't create the storage providers here as not all workers need
# them to be started.
self.media_storage_providers = [] # type: List[tuple]
for i, provider_config in enumerate(storage_providers):
# We special case the module "file_system" so as not to need to
# expose FileStorageProviderBackend
if provider_config["module"] == "file_system":
provider_config["module"] = (
"synapse.rest.media.v1.storage_provider"
".FileStorageProviderBackend")
provider_class, parsed_config = load_module(
provider_config, ("media_storage_providers", "<item %i>" % i))
wrapper_config = MediaStorageProviderConfig(
provider_config.get("store_local", False),
provider_config.get("store_remote", False),
provider_config.get("store_synchronous", False),
)
self.media_storage_providers.append(
(provider_class, parsed_config, wrapper_config))
self.dynamic_thumbnails = config.get("dynamic_thumbnails", False)
self.thumbnail_requirements = parse_thumbnail_requirements(
config.get("thumbnail_sizes", DEFAULT_THUMBNAIL_SIZES))
self.url_preview_enabled = config.get("url_preview_enabled", False)
if self.url_preview_enabled:
try:
check_requirements("url_preview")
except DependencyException as e:
raise ConfigError(e.message)
if "url_preview_ip_range_blacklist" not in config:
raise ConfigError(
"For security, you must specify an explicit target IP address "
"blacklist in url_preview_ip_range_blacklist for url previewing "
"to work")
self.url_preview_ip_range_blacklist = IPSet(
config["url_preview_ip_range_blacklist"])
# we always blacklist '0.0.0.0' and '::', which are supposed to be
# unroutable addresses.
self.url_preview_ip_range_blacklist.update(["0.0.0.0", "::"])
self.url_preview_ip_range_whitelist = IPSet(
config.get("url_preview_ip_range_whitelist", ()))
self.url_preview_url_blacklist = config.get(
"url_preview_url_blacklist", ())
self.url_preview_accept_language = config.get(
"url_preview_accept_language") or ["en"]
def generate_config_section(self, data_dir_path, **kwargs):
media_store = os.path.join(data_dir_path, "media_store")
uploads_path = os.path.join(data_dir_path, "uploads")
formatted_thumbnail_sizes = "".join(THUMBNAIL_SIZE_YAML % s
for s in DEFAULT_THUMBNAIL_SIZES)
# strip final NL
formatted_thumbnail_sizes = formatted_thumbnail_sizes[:-1]
ip_range_blacklist = "\n".join(" # - '%s'" % ip
for ip in DEFAULT_IP_RANGE_BLACKLIST)
return (r"""
## Media Store ##
# Enable the media store service in the Synapse master. Uncomment the
# following if you are using a separate media store worker.
#
#enable_media_repo: false
# Directory where uploaded images and attachments are stored.
#
media_store_path: "%(media_store)s"
# Media storage providers allow media to be stored in different
# locations.
#
#media_storage_providers:
# - module: file_system
# # Whether to store newly uploaded local files
# store_local: false
# # Whether to store newly downloaded remote files
# store_remote: false
# # Whether to wait for successful storage for local uploads
# store_synchronous: false
# config:
# directory: /mnt/some/other/directory
# The largest allowed upload size in bytes
#
#max_upload_size: 50M
# Maximum number of pixels that will be thumbnailed
#
#max_image_pixels: 32M
# Whether to generate new thumbnails on the fly to precisely match
# the resolution requested by the client. If true then whenever
# a new resolution is requested by the client the server will
# generate a new thumbnail. If false the server will pick a thumbnail
# from a precalculated list.
#
#dynamic_thumbnails: false
# List of thumbnails to precalculate when an image is uploaded.
#
#thumbnail_sizes:
%(formatted_thumbnail_sizes)s
# Is the preview URL API enabled?
#
# 'false' by default: uncomment the following to enable it (and specify a
# url_preview_ip_range_blacklist blacklist).
#
#url_preview_enabled: true
# List of IP address CIDR ranges that the URL preview spider is denied
# from accessing. There are no defaults: you must explicitly
# specify a list for URL previewing to work. You should specify any
# internal services in your network that you do not want synapse to try
# to connect to, otherwise anyone in any Matrix room could cause your
# synapse to issue arbitrary GET requests to your internal services,
# causing serious security issues.
#
# (0.0.0.0 and :: are always blacklisted, whether or not they are explicitly
# listed here, since they correspond to unroutable addresses.)
#
# This must be specified if url_preview_enabled is set. It is recommended that
# you uncomment the following list as a starting point.
#
#url_preview_ip_range_blacklist:
%(ip_range_blacklist)s
# List of IP address CIDR ranges that the URL preview spider is allowed
# to access even if they are specified in url_preview_ip_range_blacklist.
# This is useful for specifying exceptions to wide-ranging blacklisted
# target IP ranges - e.g. for enabling URL previews for a specific private
# website only visible in your network.
#
#url_preview_ip_range_whitelist:
# - '192.168.1.1'
# Optional list of URL matches that the URL preview spider is
# denied from accessing. You should use url_preview_ip_range_blacklist
# in preference to this, otherwise someone could define a public DNS
# entry that points to a private IP address and circumvent the blacklist.
# This is more useful if you know there is an entire shape of URL that
# you know that will never want synapse to try to spider.
#
# Each list entry is a dictionary of url component attributes as returned
# by urlparse.urlsplit as applied to the absolute form of the URL. See
# https://docs.python.org/2/library/urlparse.html#urlparse.urlsplit
# The values of the dictionary are treated as an filename match pattern
# applied to that component of URLs, unless they start with a ^ in which
# case they are treated as a regular expression match. If all the
# specified component matches for a given list item succeed, the URL is
# blacklisted.
#
#url_preview_url_blacklist:
# # blacklist any URL with a username in its URI
# - username: '******'
#
# # blacklist all *.google.com URLs
# - netloc: 'google.com'
# - netloc: '*.google.com'
#
# # blacklist all plain HTTP URLs
# - scheme: 'http'
#
# # blacklist http(s)://www.acme.com/foo
# - netloc: 'www.acme.com'
# path: '/foo'
#
# # blacklist any URL with a literal IPv4 address
# - netloc: '^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$'
# The largest allowed URL preview spidering size in bytes
#
#max_spider_size: 10M
# A list of values for the Accept-Language HTTP header used when
# downloading webpages during URL preview generation. This allows
# Synapse to specify the preferred languages that URL previews should
# be in when communicating with remote servers.
#
# Each value is a IETF language tag; a 2-3 letter identifier for a
# language, optionally followed by subtags separated by '-', specifying
# a country or region variant.
#
# Multiple values can be provided, and a weight can be added to each by
# using quality value syntax (;q=). '*' translates to any language.
#
# Defaults to "en".
#
# Example:
#
# url_preview_accept_language:
# - en-UK
# - en-US;q=0.9
# - fr;q=0.8
# - *;q=0.7
#
url_preview_accept_language:
# - en
""" % locals())
class ServerConfig(Config):
section = "server"
def read_config(self, config, **kwargs):
self.server_name = config["server_name"]
self.server_context = config.get("server_context", None)
try:
parse_and_validate_server_name(self.server_name)
except ValueError as e:
raise ConfigError(str(e))
self.pid_file = self.abspath(config.get("pid_file"))
self.web_client_location = config.get("web_client_location", None)
self.soft_file_limit = config.get("soft_file_limit", 0)
self.daemonize = config.get("daemonize")
self.print_pidfile = config.get("print_pidfile")
self.user_agent_suffix = config.get("user_agent_suffix")
self.use_frozen_dicts = config.get("use_frozen_dicts", False)
self.public_baseurl = config.get("public_baseurl")
# Whether to send federation traffic out in this process. This only
# applies to some federation traffic, and so shouldn't be used to
# "disable" federation
self.send_federation = config.get("send_federation", True)
# Whether to enable user presence.
self.use_presence = config.get("use_presence", True)
# Whether to update the user directory or not. This should be set to
# false only if we are updating the user directory in a worker
self.update_user_directory = config.get("update_user_directory", True)
# whether to enable the media repository endpoints. This should be set
# to false if the media repository is running as a separate endpoint;
# doing so ensures that we will not run cache cleanup jobs on the
# master, potentially causing inconsistency.
self.enable_media_repo = config.get("enable_media_repo", True)
# Whether to require authentication to retrieve profile data (avatars,
# display names) of other users through the client API.
self.require_auth_for_profile_requests = config.get(
"require_auth_for_profile_requests", False
)
# Whether to require sharing a room with a user to retrieve their
# profile data
self.limit_profile_requests_to_users_who_share_rooms = config.get(
"limit_profile_requests_to_users_who_share_rooms", False,
)
if "restrict_public_rooms_to_local_users" in config and (
"allow_public_rooms_without_auth" in config
or "allow_public_rooms_over_federation" in config
):
raise ConfigError(
"Can't use 'restrict_public_rooms_to_local_users' if"
" 'allow_public_rooms_without_auth' and/or"
" 'allow_public_rooms_over_federation' is set."
)
# Check if the legacy "restrict_public_rooms_to_local_users" flag is set. This
# flag is now obsolete but we need to check it for backward-compatibility.
if config.get("restrict_public_rooms_to_local_users", False):
self.allow_public_rooms_without_auth = False
self.allow_public_rooms_over_federation = False
else:
# If set to 'true', removes the need for authentication to access the server's
# public rooms directory through the client API, meaning that anyone can
# query the room directory. Defaults to 'false'.
self.allow_public_rooms_without_auth = config.get(
"allow_public_rooms_without_auth", False
)
# If set to 'true', allows any other homeserver to fetch the server's public
# rooms directory via federation. Defaults to 'false'.
self.allow_public_rooms_over_federation = config.get(
"allow_public_rooms_over_federation", False
)
default_room_version = config.get("default_room_version", DEFAULT_ROOM_VERSION)
# Ensure room version is a str
default_room_version = str(default_room_version)
if default_room_version not in KNOWN_ROOM_VERSIONS:
raise ConfigError(
"Unknown default_room_version: %s, known room versions: %s"
% (default_room_version, list(KNOWN_ROOM_VERSIONS.keys()))
)
# Get the actual room version object rather than just the identifier
self.default_room_version = KNOWN_ROOM_VERSIONS[default_room_version]
# whether to enable search. If disabled, new entries will not be inserted
# into the search tables and they will not be indexed. Users will receive
# errors when attempting to search for messages.
self.enable_search = config.get("enable_search", True)
self.filter_timeline_limit = config.get("filter_timeline_limit", -1)
# Whether we should block invites sent to users on this server
# (other than those sent by local server admins)
self.block_non_admin_invites = config.get("block_non_admin_invites", False)
# Whether to enable experimental MSC1849 (aka relations) support
self.experimental_msc1849_support_enabled = config.get(
"experimental_msc1849_support_enabled", True
)
# Options to control access by tracking MAU
self.limit_usage_by_mau = config.get("limit_usage_by_mau", False)
self.max_mau_value = 0
if self.limit_usage_by_mau:
self.max_mau_value = config.get("max_mau_value", 0)
self.mau_stats_only = config.get("mau_stats_only", False)
self.mau_limits_reserved_threepids = config.get(
"mau_limit_reserved_threepids", []
)
self.mau_trial_days = config.get("mau_trial_days", 0)
self.mau_limit_alerting = config.get("mau_limit_alerting", True)
# How long to keep redacted events in the database in unredacted form
# before redacting them.
redaction_retention_period = config.get("redaction_retention_period", "7d")
if redaction_retention_period is not None:
self.redaction_retention_period = self.parse_duration(
redaction_retention_period
)
else:
self.redaction_retention_period = None
# How long to keep entries in the `users_ips` table.
user_ips_max_age = config.get("user_ips_max_age", "28d")
if user_ips_max_age is not None:
self.user_ips_max_age = self.parse_duration(user_ips_max_age)
else:
self.user_ips_max_age = None
# Options to disable HS
self.hs_disabled = config.get("hs_disabled", False)
self.hs_disabled_message = config.get("hs_disabled_message", "")
# Admin uri to direct users at should their instance become blocked
# due to resource constraints
self.admin_contact = config.get("admin_contact", None)
# FIXME: federation_domain_whitelist needs sytests
self.federation_domain_whitelist = None # type: Optional[dict]
federation_domain_whitelist = config.get("federation_domain_whitelist", None)
if federation_domain_whitelist is not None:
# turn the whitelist into a hash for speed of lookup
self.federation_domain_whitelist = {}
for domain in federation_domain_whitelist:
self.federation_domain_whitelist[domain] = True
self.federation_ip_range_blacklist = config.get(
"federation_ip_range_blacklist", []
)
# Attempt to create an IPSet from the given ranges
try:
self.federation_ip_range_blacklist = IPSet(
self.federation_ip_range_blacklist
)
# Always blacklist 0.0.0.0, ::
self.federation_ip_range_blacklist.update(["0.0.0.0", "::"])
except Exception as e:
raise ConfigError(
"Invalid range(s) provided in federation_ip_range_blacklist: %s" % e
)
if self.public_baseurl is not None:
if self.public_baseurl[-1] != "/":
self.public_baseurl += "/"
self.start_pushers = config.get("start_pushers", True)
# (undocumented) option for torturing the worker-mode replication a bit,
# for testing. The value defines the number of milliseconds to pause before
# sending out any replication updates.
self.replication_torture_level = config.get("replication_torture_level")
# Whether to require a user to be in the room to add an alias to it.
# Defaults to True.
self.require_membership_for_aliases = config.get(
"require_membership_for_aliases", True
)
# Whether to allow per-room membership profiles through the send of membership
# events with profile information that differ from the target's global profile.
self.allow_per_room_profiles = config.get("allow_per_room_profiles", True)
retention_config = config.get("retention")
if retention_config is None:
retention_config = {}
self.retention_enabled = retention_config.get("enabled", False)
retention_default_policy = retention_config.get("default_policy")
if retention_default_policy is not None:
self.retention_default_min_lifetime = retention_default_policy.get(
"min_lifetime"
)
if self.retention_default_min_lifetime is not None:
self.retention_default_min_lifetime = self.parse_duration(
self.retention_default_min_lifetime
)
self.retention_default_max_lifetime = retention_default_policy.get(
"max_lifetime"
)
if self.retention_default_max_lifetime is not None:
self.retention_default_max_lifetime = self.parse_duration(
self.retention_default_max_lifetime
)
if (
self.retention_default_min_lifetime is not None
and self.retention_default_max_lifetime is not None
and (
self.retention_default_min_lifetime
> self.retention_default_max_lifetime
)
):
raise ConfigError(
"The default retention policy's 'min_lifetime' can not be greater"
" than its 'max_lifetime'"
)
else:
self.retention_default_min_lifetime = None
self.retention_default_max_lifetime = None
if self.retention_enabled:
logger.info(
"Message retention policies support enabled with the following default"
" policy: min_lifetime = %s ; max_lifetime = %s",
self.retention_default_min_lifetime,
self.retention_default_max_lifetime,
)
self.retention_allowed_lifetime_min = retention_config.get(
"allowed_lifetime_min"
)
if self.retention_allowed_lifetime_min is not None:
self.retention_allowed_lifetime_min = self.parse_duration(
self.retention_allowed_lifetime_min
)
self.retention_allowed_lifetime_max = retention_config.get(
"allowed_lifetime_max"
)
if self.retention_allowed_lifetime_max is not None:
self.retention_allowed_lifetime_max = self.parse_duration(
self.retention_allowed_lifetime_max
)
if (
self.retention_allowed_lifetime_min is not None
and self.retention_allowed_lifetime_max is not None
and self.retention_allowed_lifetime_min
> self.retention_allowed_lifetime_max
):
raise ConfigError(
"Invalid retention policy limits: 'allowed_lifetime_min' can not be"
" greater than 'allowed_lifetime_max'"
)
self.retention_purge_jobs = [] # type: List[Dict[str, Optional[int]]]
for purge_job_config in retention_config.get("purge_jobs", []):
interval_config = purge_job_config.get("interval")
if interval_config is None:
raise ConfigError(
"A retention policy's purge jobs configuration must have the"
" 'interval' key set."
)
interval = self.parse_duration(interval_config)
shortest_max_lifetime = purge_job_config.get("shortest_max_lifetime")
if shortest_max_lifetime is not None:
shortest_max_lifetime = self.parse_duration(shortest_max_lifetime)
longest_max_lifetime = purge_job_config.get("longest_max_lifetime")
if longest_max_lifetime is not None:
longest_max_lifetime = self.parse_duration(longest_max_lifetime)
if (
shortest_max_lifetime is not None
and longest_max_lifetime is not None
and shortest_max_lifetime > longest_max_lifetime
):
raise ConfigError(
"A retention policy's purge jobs configuration's"
" 'shortest_max_lifetime' value can not be greater than its"
" 'longest_max_lifetime' value."
)
self.retention_purge_jobs.append(
{
"interval": interval,
"shortest_max_lifetime": shortest_max_lifetime,
"longest_max_lifetime": longest_max_lifetime,
}
)
if not self.retention_purge_jobs:
self.retention_purge_jobs = [
{
"interval": self.parse_duration("1d"),
"shortest_max_lifetime": None,
"longest_max_lifetime": None,
}
]
self.listeners = [] # type: List[dict]
for listener in config.get("listeners", []):
if not isinstance(listener.get("port", None), int):
raise ConfigError(
"Listener configuration is lacking a valid 'port' option"
)
if listener.setdefault("tls", False):
# no_tls is not really supported any more, but let's grandfather it in
# here.
if config.get("no_tls", False):
logger.info(
"Ignoring TLS-enabled listener on port %i due to no_tls"
)
continue
bind_address = listener.pop("bind_address", None)
bind_addresses = listener.setdefault("bind_addresses", [])
# if bind_address was specified, add it to the list of addresses
if bind_address:
bind_addresses.append(bind_address)
# if we still have an empty list of addresses, use the default list
if not bind_addresses:
if listener["type"] == "metrics":
# the metrics listener doesn't support IPv6
bind_addresses.append("0.0.0.0")
else:
bind_addresses.extend(DEFAULT_BIND_ADDRESSES)
self.listeners.append(listener)
if not self.web_client_location:
_warn_if_webclient_configured(self.listeners)
self.gc_thresholds = read_gc_thresholds(config.get("gc_thresholds", None))
@attr.s
class LimitRemoteRoomsConfig(object):
enabled = attr.ib(
validator=attr.validators.instance_of(bool), default=False
)
complexity = attr.ib(
validator=attr.validators.instance_of(
(float, int) # type: ignore[arg-type] # noqa
),
default=1.0,
)
complexity_error = attr.ib(
validator=attr.validators.instance_of(str),
default=ROOM_COMPLEXITY_TOO_GREAT,
)
self.limit_remote_rooms = LimitRemoteRoomsConfig(
**config.get("limit_remote_rooms", {})
)
bind_port = config.get("bind_port")
if bind_port:
if config.get("no_tls", False):
raise ConfigError("no_tls is incompatible with bind_port")
self.listeners = []
bind_host = config.get("bind_host", "")
gzip_responses = config.get("gzip_responses", True)
self.listeners.append(
{
"port": bind_port,
"bind_addresses": [bind_host],
"tls": True,
"type": "http",
"resources": [
{"names": ["client"], "compress": gzip_responses},
{"names": ["federation"], "compress": False},
],
}
)
unsecure_port = config.get("unsecure_port", bind_port - 400)
if unsecure_port:
self.listeners.append(
{
"port": unsecure_port,
"bind_addresses": [bind_host],
"tls": False,
"type": "http",
"resources": [
{"names": ["client"], "compress": gzip_responses},
{"names": ["federation"], "compress": False},
],
}
)
manhole = config.get("manhole")
if manhole:
self.listeners.append(
{
"port": manhole,
"bind_addresses": ["127.0.0.1"],
"type": "manhole",
"tls": False,
}
)
metrics_port = config.get("metrics_port")
if metrics_port:
logger.warning(METRICS_PORT_WARNING)
self.listeners.append(
{
"port": metrics_port,
"bind_addresses": [config.get("metrics_bind_host", "127.0.0.1")],
"tls": False,
"type": "http",
"resources": [{"names": ["metrics"], "compress": False}],
}
)
_check_resource_config(self.listeners)
self.cleanup_extremities_with_dummy_events = config.get(
"cleanup_extremities_with_dummy_events", True
)
# The number of forward extremities in a room needed to send a dummy event.
self.dummy_events_threshold = config.get("dummy_events_threshold", 10)
self.enable_ephemeral_messages = config.get("enable_ephemeral_messages", False)
# Inhibits the /requestToken endpoints from returning an error that might leak
# information about whether an e-mail address is in use or not on this
# homeserver, and instead return a 200 with a fake sid if this kind of error is
# met, without sending anything.
# This is a compromise between sending an email, which could be a spam vector,
# and letting the client know which email address is bound to an account and
# which one isn't.
self.request_token_inhibit_3pid_errors = config.get(
"request_token_inhibit_3pid_errors", False,
)
def has_tls_listener(self) -> bool:
return any(l["tls"] for l in self.listeners)
def generate_config_section(
self, server_name, data_dir_path, open_private_ports, listeners, **kwargs
):
_, bind_port = parse_and_validate_server_name(server_name)
if bind_port is not None:
unsecure_port = bind_port - 400
else:
bind_port = 8448
unsecure_port = 8008
pid_file = os.path.join(data_dir_path, "homeserver.pid")
# Bring DEFAULT_ROOM_VERSION into the local-scope for use in the
# default config string
default_room_version = DEFAULT_ROOM_VERSION
secure_listeners = []
unsecure_listeners = []
private_addresses = ["::1", "127.0.0.1"]
if listeners:
for listener in listeners:
if listener["tls"]:
secure_listeners.append(listener)
else:
# If we don't want open ports we need to bind the listeners
# to some address other than 0.0.0.0. Here we chose to use
# localhost.
# If the addresses are already bound we won't overwrite them
# however.
if not open_private_ports:
listener.setdefault("bind_addresses", private_addresses)
unsecure_listeners.append(listener)
secure_http_bindings = indent(
yaml.dump(secure_listeners), " " * 10
).lstrip()
unsecure_http_bindings = indent(
yaml.dump(unsecure_listeners), " " * 10
).lstrip()
if not unsecure_listeners:
unsecure_http_bindings = (
"""- port: %(unsecure_port)s
tls: false
type: http
x_forwarded: true"""
% locals()
)
if not open_private_ports:
unsecure_http_bindings += (
"\n bind_addresses: ['::1', '127.0.0.1']"
)
unsecure_http_bindings += """
resources:
- names: [client, federation]
compress: false"""
if listeners:
# comment out this block
unsecure_http_bindings = "#" + re.sub(
"\n {10}",
lambda match: match.group(0) + "#",
unsecure_http_bindings,
)
if not secure_listeners:
secure_http_bindings = (
"""#- port: %(bind_port)s
# type: http
# tls: true
# resources:
# - names: [client, federation]"""
% locals()
)
return (
"""\
## Server ##
# The domain name of the server, with optional explicit port.
# This is used by remote servers to connect to this server,
# e.g. matrix.org, localhost:8080, etc.
# This is also the last part of your UserID.
#
server_name: "%(server_name)s"
# When running as a daemon, the file to store the pid in
#
pid_file: %(pid_file)s
# The absolute URL to the web client which /_matrix/client will redirect
# to if 'webclient' is configured under the 'listeners' configuration.
#
# This option can be also set to the filesystem path to the web client
# which will be served at /_matrix/client/ if 'webclient' is configured
# under the 'listeners' configuration, however this is a security risk:
# https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse#security-note
#
#web_client_location: https://riot.example.com/
# The public-facing base URL that clients use to access this HS
# (not including _matrix/...). This is the same URL a user would
# enter into the 'custom HS URL' field on their client. If you
# use synapse with a reverse proxy, this should be the URL to reach
# synapse via the proxy.
#
#public_baseurl: https://example.com/
# Set the soft limit on the number of file descriptors synapse can use
# Zero is used to indicate synapse should set the soft limit to the
# hard limit.
#
#soft_file_limit: 0
# Set to false to disable presence tracking on this homeserver.
#
#use_presence: false
# Whether to require authentication to retrieve profile data (avatars,
# display names) of other users through the client API. Defaults to
# 'false'. Note that profile data is also available via the federation
# API, so this setting is of limited value if federation is enabled on
# the server.
#
#require_auth_for_profile_requests: true
# Uncomment to require a user to share a room with another user in order
# to retrieve their profile information. Only checked on Client-Server
# requests. Profile requests from other servers should be checked by the
# requesting server. Defaults to 'false'.
#
#limit_profile_requests_to_users_who_share_rooms: true
# If set to 'true', removes the need for authentication to access the server's
# public rooms directory through the client API, meaning that anyone can
# query the room directory. Defaults to 'false'.
#
#allow_public_rooms_without_auth: true
# If set to 'true', allows any other homeserver to fetch the server's public
# rooms directory via federation. Defaults to 'false'.
#
#allow_public_rooms_over_federation: true
# The default room version for newly created rooms.
#
# Known room versions are listed here:
# https://matrix.org/docs/spec/#complete-list-of-room-versions
#
# For example, for room version 1, default_room_version should be set
# to "1".
#
#default_room_version: "%(default_room_version)s"
# The GC threshold parameters to pass to `gc.set_threshold`, if defined
#
#gc_thresholds: [700, 10, 10]
# Set the limit on the returned events in the timeline in the get
# and sync operations. The default value is -1, means no upper limit.
#
#filter_timeline_limit: 5000
# Whether room invites to users on this server should be blocked
# (except those sent by local server admins). The default is False.
#
#block_non_admin_invites: true
# Room searching
#
# If disabled, new messages will not be indexed for searching and users
# will receive errors when searching for messages. Defaults to enabled.
#
#enable_search: false
# Restrict federation to the following whitelist of domains.
# N.B. we recommend also firewalling your federation listener to limit
# inbound federation traffic as early as possible, rather than relying
# purely on this application-layer restriction. If not specified, the
# default is to whitelist everything.
#
#federation_domain_whitelist:
# - lon.example.com
# - nyc.example.com
# - syd.example.com
# Prevent federation requests from being sent to the following
# blacklist IP address CIDR ranges. If this option is not specified, or
# specified with an empty list, no ip range blacklist will be enforced.
#
# As of Synapse v1.4.0 this option also affects any outbound requests to identity
# servers provided by user input.
#
# (0.0.0.0 and :: are always blacklisted, whether or not they are explicitly
# listed here, since they correspond to unroutable addresses.)
#
federation_ip_range_blacklist:
- '127.0.0.0/8'
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
- '100.64.0.0/10'
- '169.254.0.0/16'
- '::1/128'
- 'fe80::/64'
- 'fc00::/7'
# List of ports that Synapse should listen on, their purpose and their
# configuration.
#
# Options for each listener include:
#
# port: the TCP port to bind to
#
# bind_addresses: a list of local addresses to listen on. The default is
# 'all local interfaces'.
#
# type: the type of listener. Normally 'http', but other valid options are:
# 'manhole' (see docs/manhole.md),
# 'metrics' (see docs/metrics-howto.md),
# 'replication' (see docs/workers.md).
#
# tls: set to true to enable TLS for this listener. Will use the TLS
# key/cert specified in tls_private_key_path / tls_certificate_path.
#
# x_forwarded: Only valid for an 'http' listener. Set to true to use the
# X-Forwarded-For header as the client IP. Useful when Synapse is
# behind a reverse-proxy.
#
# resources: Only valid for an 'http' listener. A list of resources to host
# on this port. Options for each resource are:
#
# names: a list of names of HTTP resources. See below for a list of
# valid resource names.
#
# compress: set to true to enable HTTP comression for this resource.
#
# additional_resources: Only valid for an 'http' listener. A map of
# additional endpoints which should be loaded via dynamic modules.
#
# Valid resource names are:
#
# client: the client-server API (/_matrix/client), and the synapse admin
# API (/_synapse/admin). Also implies 'media' and 'static'.
#
# consent: user consent forms (/_matrix/consent). See
# docs/consent_tracking.md.
#
# federation: the server-server API (/_matrix/federation). Also implies
# 'media', 'keys', 'openid'
#
# keys: the key discovery API (/_matrix/keys).
#
# media: the media API (/_matrix/media).
#
# metrics: the metrics interface. See docs/metrics-howto.md.
#
# openid: OpenID authentication.
#
# replication: the HTTP replication API (/_synapse/replication). See
# docs/workers.md.
#
# static: static resources under synapse/static (/_matrix/static). (Mostly
# useful for 'fallback authentication'.)
#
# webclient: A web client. Requires web_client_location to be set.
#
listeners:
# TLS-enabled listener: for when matrix traffic is sent directly to synapse.
#
# Disabled by default. To enable it, uncomment the following. (Note that you
# will also need to give Synapse a TLS key and certificate: see the TLS section
# below.)
#
%(secure_http_bindings)s
# Unsecure HTTP listener: for when matrix traffic passes through a reverse proxy
# that unwraps TLS.
#
# If you plan to use a reverse proxy, please see
# https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/blob/master/docs/reverse_proxy.md.
#
%(unsecure_http_bindings)s
# example additional_resources:
#
#additional_resources:
# "/_matrix/my/custom/endpoint":
# module: my_module.CustomRequestHandler
# config: {}
# Turn on the twisted ssh manhole service on localhost on the given
# port.
#
#- port: 9000
# bind_addresses: ['::1', '127.0.0.1']
# type: manhole
# Forward extremities can build up in a room due to networking delays between
# homeservers. Once this happens in a large room, calculation of the state of
# that room can become quite expensive. To mitigate this, once the number of
# forward extremities reaches a given threshold, Synapse will send an
# org.matrix.dummy_event event, which will reduce the forward extremities
# in the room.
#
# This setting defines the threshold (i.e. number of forward extremities in the
# room) at which dummy events are sent. The default value is 10.
#
#dummy_events_threshold: 5
## Homeserver blocking ##
# How to reach the server admin, used in ResourceLimitError
#
#admin_contact: 'mailto:[email protected]'
# Global blocking
#
#hs_disabled: false
#hs_disabled_message: 'Human readable reason for why the HS is blocked'
# Monthly Active User Blocking
#
# Used in cases where the admin or server owner wants to limit to the
# number of monthly active users.
#
# 'limit_usage_by_mau' disables/enables monthly active user blocking. When
# anabled and a limit is reached the server returns a 'ResourceLimitError'
# with error type Codes.RESOURCE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED
#
# 'max_mau_value' is the hard limit of monthly active users above which
# the server will start blocking user actions.
#
# 'mau_trial_days' is a means to add a grace period for active users. It
# means that users must be active for this number of days before they
# can be considered active and guards against the case where lots of users
# sign up in a short space of time never to return after their initial
# session.
#
# 'mau_limit_alerting' is a means of limiting client side alerting
# should the mau limit be reached. This is useful for small instances
# where the admin has 5 mau seats (say) for 5 specific people and no
# interest increasing the mau limit further. Defaults to True, which
# means that alerting is enabled
#
#limit_usage_by_mau: false
#max_mau_value: 50
#mau_trial_days: 2
#mau_limit_alerting: false
# If enabled, the metrics for the number of monthly active users will
# be populated, however no one will be limited. If limit_usage_by_mau
# is true, this is implied to be true.
#
#mau_stats_only: false
# Sometimes the server admin will want to ensure certain accounts are
# never blocked by mau checking. These accounts are specified here.
#
#mau_limit_reserved_threepids:
# - medium: 'email'
# address: '*****@*****.**'
# Used by phonehome stats to group together related servers.
#server_context: context
# Resource-constrained homeserver Settings
#
# If limit_remote_rooms.enabled is True, the room complexity will be
# checked before a user joins a new remote room. If it is above
# limit_remote_rooms.complexity, it will disallow joining or
# instantly leave.
#
# limit_remote_rooms.complexity_error can be set to customise the text
# displayed to the user when a room above the complexity threshold has
# its join cancelled.
#
# Uncomment the below lines to enable:
#limit_remote_rooms:
# enabled: true
# complexity: 1.0
# complexity_error: "This room is too complex."
# Whether to require a user to be in the room to add an alias to it.
# Defaults to 'true'.
#
#require_membership_for_aliases: false
# Whether to allow per-room membership profiles through the send of membership
# events with profile information that differ from the target's global profile.
# Defaults to 'true'.
#
#allow_per_room_profiles: false
# How long to keep redacted events in unredacted form in the database. After
# this period redacted events get replaced with their redacted form in the DB.
#
# Defaults to `7d`. Set to `null` to disable.
#
#redaction_retention_period: 28d
# How long to track users' last seen time and IPs in the database.
#
# Defaults to `28d`. Set to `null` to disable clearing out of old rows.
#
#user_ips_max_age: 14d
# Message retention policy at the server level.
#
# Room admins and mods can define a retention period for their rooms using the
# 'm.room.retention' state event, and server admins can cap this period by setting
# the 'allowed_lifetime_min' and 'allowed_lifetime_max' config options.
#
# If this feature is enabled, Synapse will regularly look for and purge events
# which are older than the room's maximum retention period. Synapse will also
# filter events received over federation so that events that should have been
# purged are ignored and not stored again.
#
retention:
# The message retention policies feature is disabled by default. Uncomment the
# following line to enable it.
#
#enabled: true
# Default retention policy. If set, Synapse will apply it to rooms that lack the
# 'm.room.retention' state event. Currently, the value of 'min_lifetime' doesn't
# matter much because Synapse doesn't take it into account yet.
#
#default_policy:
# min_lifetime: 1d
# max_lifetime: 1y
# Retention policy limits. If set, a user won't be able to send a
# 'm.room.retention' event which features a 'min_lifetime' or a 'max_lifetime'
# that's not within this range. This is especially useful in closed federations,
# in which server admins can make sure every federating server applies the same
# rules.
#
#allowed_lifetime_min: 1d
#allowed_lifetime_max: 1y
# Server admins can define the settings of the background jobs purging the
# events which lifetime has expired under the 'purge_jobs' section.
#
# If no configuration is provided, a single job will be set up to delete expired
# events in every room daily.
#
# Each job's configuration defines which range of message lifetimes the job
# takes care of. For example, if 'shortest_max_lifetime' is '2d' and
# 'longest_max_lifetime' is '3d', the job will handle purging expired events in
# rooms whose state defines a 'max_lifetime' that's both higher than 2 days, and
# lower than or equal to 3 days. Both the minimum and the maximum value of a
# range are optional, e.g. a job with no 'shortest_max_lifetime' and a
# 'longest_max_lifetime' of '3d' will handle every room with a retention policy
# which 'max_lifetime' is lower than or equal to three days.
#
# The rationale for this per-job configuration is that some rooms might have a
# retention policy with a low 'max_lifetime', where history needs to be purged
# of outdated messages on a more frequent basis than for the rest of the rooms
# (e.g. every 12h), but not want that purge to be performed by a job that's
# iterating over every room it knows, which could be heavy on the server.
#
#purge_jobs:
# - shortest_max_lifetime: 1d
# longest_max_lifetime: 3d
# interval: 12h
# - shortest_max_lifetime: 3d
# longest_max_lifetime: 1y
# interval: 1d
# Inhibits the /requestToken endpoints from returning an error that might leak
# information about whether an e-mail address is in use or not on this
# homeserver.
# Note that for some endpoints the error situation is the e-mail already being
# used, and for others the error is entering the e-mail being unused.
# If this option is enabled, instead of returning an error, these endpoints will
# act as if no error happened and return a fake session ID ('sid') to clients.
#
#request_token_inhibit_3pid_errors: true
"""
% locals()
)
def read_arguments(self, args):
if args.manhole is not None:
self.manhole = args.manhole
if args.daemonize is not None:
self.daemonize = args.daemonize
if args.print_pidfile is not None:
self.print_pidfile = args.print_pidfile
@staticmethod
def add_arguments(parser):
server_group = parser.add_argument_group("server")
server_group.add_argument(
"-D",
"--daemonize",
action="store_true",
default=None,
help="Daemonize the homeserver",
)
server_group.add_argument(
"--print-pidfile",
action="store_true",
default=None,
help="Print the path to the pidfile just before daemonizing",
)
server_group.add_argument(
"--manhole",
metavar="PORT",
dest="manhole",
type=int,
help="Turn on the twisted telnet manhole service on the given port.",
)
class ServerConfig(Config):
def read_config(self, config, **kwargs):
self.server_name = config["server_name"]
self.server_context = config.get("server_context", None)
try:
parse_and_validate_server_name(self.server_name)
except ValueError as e:
raise ConfigError(str(e))
self.pid_file = self.abspath(config.get("pid_file"))
self.web_client_location = config.get("web_client_location", None)
self.soft_file_limit = config.get("soft_file_limit", 0)
self.daemonize = config.get("daemonize")
self.print_pidfile = config.get("print_pidfile")
self.user_agent_suffix = config.get("user_agent_suffix")
self.use_frozen_dicts = config.get("use_frozen_dicts", False)
self.public_baseurl = config.get("public_baseurl")
# Whether to send federation traffic out in this process. This only
# applies to some federation traffic, and so shouldn't be used to
# "disable" federation
self.send_federation = config.get("send_federation", True)
# Whether to enable user presence.
self.use_presence = config.get("use_presence", True)
# Whether to update the user directory or not. This should be set to
# false only if we are updating the user directory in a worker
self.update_user_directory = config.get("update_user_directory", True)
# whether to enable the media repository endpoints. This should be set
# to false if the media repository is running as a separate endpoint;
# doing so ensures that we will not run cache cleanup jobs on the
# master, potentially causing inconsistency.
self.enable_media_repo = config.get("enable_media_repo", True)
# Whether to require authentication to retrieve profile data (avatars,
# display names) of other users through the client API.
self.require_auth_for_profile_requests = config.get(
"require_auth_for_profile_requests", False)
if "restrict_public_rooms_to_local_users" in config and (
"allow_public_rooms_without_auth" in config
or "allow_public_rooms_over_federation" in config):
raise ConfigError(
"Can't use 'restrict_public_rooms_to_local_users' if"
" 'allow_public_rooms_without_auth' and/or"
" 'allow_public_rooms_over_federation' is set.")
# Check if the legacy "restrict_public_rooms_to_local_users" flag is set. This
# flag is now obsolete but we need to check it for backward-compatibility.
if config.get("restrict_public_rooms_to_local_users", False):
self.allow_public_rooms_without_auth = False
self.allow_public_rooms_over_federation = False
else:
# If set to 'False', requires authentication to access the server's public
# rooms directory through the client API. Defaults to 'True'.
self.allow_public_rooms_without_auth = config.get(
"allow_public_rooms_without_auth", True)
# If set to 'False', forbids any other homeserver to fetch the server's public
# rooms directory via federation. Defaults to 'True'.
self.allow_public_rooms_over_federation = config.get(
"allow_public_rooms_over_federation", True)
default_room_version = config.get("default_room_version",
DEFAULT_ROOM_VERSION)
# Ensure room version is a str
default_room_version = str(default_room_version)
if default_room_version not in KNOWN_ROOM_VERSIONS:
raise ConfigError(
"Unknown default_room_version: %s, known room versions: %s" %
(default_room_version, list(KNOWN_ROOM_VERSIONS.keys())))
# Get the actual room version object rather than just the identifier
self.default_room_version = KNOWN_ROOM_VERSIONS[default_room_version]
# whether to enable search. If disabled, new entries will not be inserted
# into the search tables and they will not be indexed. Users will receive
# errors when attempting to search for messages.
self.enable_search = config.get("enable_search", True)
self.filter_timeline_limit = config.get("filter_timeline_limit", -1)
# Whether we should block invites sent to users on this server
# (other than those sent by local server admins)
self.block_non_admin_invites = config.get("block_non_admin_invites",
False)
# Whether to enable experimental MSC1849 (aka relations) support
self.experimental_msc1849_support_enabled = config.get(
"experimental_msc1849_support_enabled", True)
# Options to control access by tracking MAU
self.limit_usage_by_mau = config.get("limit_usage_by_mau", False)
self.max_mau_value = 0
if self.limit_usage_by_mau:
self.max_mau_value = config.get("max_mau_value", 0)
self.mau_stats_only = config.get("mau_stats_only", False)
self.mau_limits_reserved_threepids = config.get(
"mau_limit_reserved_threepids", [])
self.mau_trial_days = config.get("mau_trial_days", 0)
# Options to disable HS
self.hs_disabled = config.get("hs_disabled", False)
self.hs_disabled_message = config.get("hs_disabled_message", "")
self.hs_disabled_limit_type = config.get("hs_disabled_limit_type", "")
# Admin uri to direct users at should their instance become blocked
# due to resource constraints
self.admin_contact = config.get("admin_contact", None)
# FIXME: federation_domain_whitelist needs sytests
self.federation_domain_whitelist = None
federation_domain_whitelist = config.get("federation_domain_whitelist",
None)
if federation_domain_whitelist is not None:
# turn the whitelist into a hash for speed of lookup
self.federation_domain_whitelist = {}
for domain in federation_domain_whitelist:
self.federation_domain_whitelist[domain] = True
self.federation_ip_range_blacklist = config.get(
"federation_ip_range_blacklist", [])
# Attempt to create an IPSet from the given ranges
try:
self.federation_ip_range_blacklist = IPSet(
self.federation_ip_range_blacklist)
# Always blacklist 0.0.0.0, ::
self.federation_ip_range_blacklist.update(["0.0.0.0", "::"])
except Exception as e:
raise ConfigError("Invalid range(s) provided in "
"federation_ip_range_blacklist: %s" % e)
if self.public_baseurl is not None:
if self.public_baseurl[-1] != "/":
self.public_baseurl += "/"
self.start_pushers = config.get("start_pushers", True)
# (undocumented) option for torturing the worker-mode replication a bit,
# for testing. The value defines the number of milliseconds to pause before
# sending out any replication updates.
self.replication_torture_level = config.get(
"replication_torture_level")
# Whether to require a user to be in the room to add an alias to it.
# Defaults to True.
self.require_membership_for_aliases = config.get(
"require_membership_for_aliases", True)
# Whether to allow per-room membership profiles through the send of membership
# events with profile information that differ from the target's global profile.
self.allow_per_room_profiles = config.get("allow_per_room_profiles",
True)
self.listeners = []
for listener in config.get("listeners", []):
if not isinstance(listener.get("port", None), int):
raise ConfigError(
"Listener configuration is lacking a valid 'port' option")
if listener.setdefault("tls", False):
# no_tls is not really supported any more, but let's grandfather it in
# here.
if config.get("no_tls", False):
logger.info(
"Ignoring TLS-enabled listener on port %i due to no_tls"
)
continue
bind_address = listener.pop("bind_address", None)
bind_addresses = listener.setdefault("bind_addresses", [])
# if bind_address was specified, add it to the list of addresses
if bind_address:
bind_addresses.append(bind_address)
# if we still have an empty list of addresses, use the default list
if not bind_addresses:
if listener["type"] == "metrics":
# the metrics listener doesn't support IPv6
bind_addresses.append("0.0.0.0")
else:
bind_addresses.extend(DEFAULT_BIND_ADDRESSES)
self.listeners.append(listener)
if not self.web_client_location:
_warn_if_webclient_configured(self.listeners)
self.gc_thresholds = read_gc_thresholds(
config.get("gc_thresholds", None))
bind_port = config.get("bind_port")
if bind_port:
if config.get("no_tls", False):
raise ConfigError("no_tls is incompatible with bind_port")
self.listeners = []
bind_host = config.get("bind_host", "")
gzip_responses = config.get("gzip_responses", True)
self.listeners.append({
"port":
bind_port,
"bind_addresses": [bind_host],
"tls":
True,
"type":
"http",
"resources": [
{
"names": ["client"],
"compress": gzip_responses
},
{
"names": ["federation"],
"compress": False
},
],
})
unsecure_port = config.get("unsecure_port", bind_port - 400)
if unsecure_port:
self.listeners.append({
"port":
unsecure_port,
"bind_addresses": [bind_host],
"tls":
False,
"type":
"http",
"resources": [
{
"names": ["client"],
"compress": gzip_responses
},
{
"names": ["federation"],
"compress": False
},
],
})
manhole = config.get("manhole")
if manhole:
self.listeners.append({
"port": manhole,
"bind_addresses": ["127.0.0.1"],
"type": "manhole",
"tls": False,
})
metrics_port = config.get("metrics_port")
if metrics_port:
logger.warn((
"The metrics_port configuration option is deprecated in Synapse 0.31 "
"in favour of a listener. Please see "
"http://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/blob/master/docs/metrics-howto.rst"
" on how to configure the new listener."))
self.listeners.append({
"port":
metrics_port,
"bind_addresses":
[config.get("metrics_bind_host", "127.0.0.1")],
"tls":
False,
"type":
"http",
"resources": [{
"names": ["metrics"],
"compress": False
}],
})
_check_resource_config(self.listeners)
# An experimental option to try and periodically clean up extremities
# by sending dummy events.
self.cleanup_extremities_with_dummy_events = config.get(
"cleanup_extremities_with_dummy_events", False)
def has_tls_listener(self):
return any(l["tls"] for l in self.listeners)
def generate_config_section(self, server_name, data_dir_path,
open_private_ports, **kwargs):
_, bind_port = parse_and_validate_server_name(server_name)
if bind_port is not None:
unsecure_port = bind_port - 400
else:
bind_port = 8448
unsecure_port = 8008
pid_file = os.path.join(data_dir_path, "homeserver.pid")
# Bring DEFAULT_ROOM_VERSION into the local-scope for use in the
# default config string
default_room_version = DEFAULT_ROOM_VERSION
unsecure_http_binding = "port: %i\n tls: false" % (
unsecure_port, )
if not open_private_ports:
unsecure_http_binding += (
"\n bind_addresses: ['::1', '127.0.0.1']")
return ("""\
## Server ##
# The domain name of the server, with optional explicit port.
# This is used by remote servers to connect to this server,
# e.g. matrix.org, localhost:8080, etc.
# This is also the last part of your UserID.
#
server_name: "%(server_name)s"
# When running as a daemon, the file to store the pid in
#
pid_file: %(pid_file)s
# The path to the web client which will be served at /_matrix/client/
# if 'webclient' is configured under the 'listeners' configuration.
#
#web_client_location: "/path/to/web/root"
# The public-facing base URL that clients use to access this HS
# (not including _matrix/...). This is the same URL a user would
# enter into the 'custom HS URL' field on their client. If you
# use synapse with a reverse proxy, this should be the URL to reach
# synapse via the proxy.
#
#public_baseurl: https://example.com/
# Set the soft limit on the number of file descriptors synapse can use
# Zero is used to indicate synapse should set the soft limit to the
# hard limit.
#
#soft_file_limit: 0
# Set to false to disable presence tracking on this homeserver.
#
#use_presence: false
# Whether to require authentication to retrieve profile data (avatars,
# display names) of other users through the client API. Defaults to
# 'false'. Note that profile data is also available via the federation
# API, so this setting is of limited value if federation is enabled on
# the server.
#
#require_auth_for_profile_requests: true
# If set to 'false', requires authentication to access the server's public rooms
# directory through the client API. Defaults to 'true'.
#
#allow_public_rooms_without_auth: false
# If set to 'false', forbids any other homeserver to fetch the server's public
# rooms directory via federation. Defaults to 'true'.
#
#allow_public_rooms_over_federation: false
# The default room version for newly created rooms.
#
# Known room versions are listed here:
# https://matrix.org/docs/spec/#complete-list-of-room-versions
#
# For example, for room version 1, default_room_version should be set
# to "1".
#
#default_room_version: "%(default_room_version)s"
# The GC threshold parameters to pass to `gc.set_threshold`, if defined
#
#gc_thresholds: [700, 10, 10]
# Set the limit on the returned events in the timeline in the get
# and sync operations. The default value is -1, means no upper limit.
#
#filter_timeline_limit: 5000
# Whether room invites to users on this server should be blocked
# (except those sent by local server admins). The default is False.
#
#block_non_admin_invites: True
# Room searching
#
# If disabled, new messages will not be indexed for searching and users
# will receive errors when searching for messages. Defaults to enabled.
#
#enable_search: false
# Restrict federation to the following whitelist of domains.
# N.B. we recommend also firewalling your federation listener to limit
# inbound federation traffic as early as possible, rather than relying
# purely on this application-layer restriction. If not specified, the
# default is to whitelist everything.
#
#federation_domain_whitelist:
# - lon.example.com
# - nyc.example.com
# - syd.example.com
# Prevent federation requests from being sent to the following
# blacklist IP address CIDR ranges. If this option is not specified, or
# specified with an empty list, no ip range blacklist will be enforced.
#
# (0.0.0.0 and :: are always blacklisted, whether or not they are explicitly
# listed here, since they correspond to unroutable addresses.)
#
federation_ip_range_blacklist:
- '127.0.0.0/8'
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
- '100.64.0.0/10'
- '169.254.0.0/16'
- '::1/128'
- 'fe80::/64'
- 'fc00::/7'
# List of ports that Synapse should listen on, their purpose and their
# configuration.
#
# Options for each listener include:
#
# port: the TCP port to bind to
#
# bind_addresses: a list of local addresses to listen on. The default is
# 'all local interfaces'.
#
# type: the type of listener. Normally 'http', but other valid options are:
# 'manhole' (see docs/manhole.md),
# 'metrics' (see docs/metrics-howto.rst),
# 'replication' (see docs/workers.rst).
#
# tls: set to true to enable TLS for this listener. Will use the TLS
# key/cert specified in tls_private_key_path / tls_certificate_path.
#
# x_forwarded: Only valid for an 'http' listener. Set to true to use the
# X-Forwarded-For header as the client IP. Useful when Synapse is
# behind a reverse-proxy.
#
# resources: Only valid for an 'http' listener. A list of resources to host
# on this port. Options for each resource are:
#
# names: a list of names of HTTP resources. See below for a list of
# valid resource names.
#
# compress: set to true to enable HTTP comression for this resource.
#
# additional_resources: Only valid for an 'http' listener. A map of
# additional endpoints which should be loaded via dynamic modules.
#
# Valid resource names are:
#
# client: the client-server API (/_matrix/client), and the synapse admin
# API (/_synapse/admin). Also implies 'media' and 'static'.
#
# consent: user consent forms (/_matrix/consent). See
# docs/consent_tracking.md.
#
# federation: the server-server API (/_matrix/federation). Also implies
# 'media', 'keys', 'openid'
#
# keys: the key discovery API (/_matrix/keys).
#
# media: the media API (/_matrix/media).
#
# metrics: the metrics interface. See docs/metrics-howto.rst.
#
# openid: OpenID authentication.
#
# replication: the HTTP replication API (/_synapse/replication). See
# docs/workers.rst.
#
# static: static resources under synapse/static (/_matrix/static). (Mostly
# useful for 'fallback authentication'.)
#
# webclient: A web client. Requires web_client_location to be set.
#
listeners:
# TLS-enabled listener: for when matrix traffic is sent directly to synapse.
#
# Disabled by default. To enable it, uncomment the following. (Note that you
# will also need to give Synapse a TLS key and certificate: see the TLS section
# below.)
#
#- port: %(bind_port)s
# type: http
# tls: true
# resources:
# - names: [client, federation]
# Unsecure HTTP listener: for when matrix traffic passes through a reverse proxy
# that unwraps TLS.
#
# If you plan to use a reverse proxy, please see
# https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/blob/master/docs/reverse_proxy.rst.
#
- %(unsecure_http_binding)s
type: http
x_forwarded: true
resources:
- names: [client, federation]
compress: false
# example additional_resources:
#
#additional_resources:
# "/_matrix/my/custom/endpoint":
# module: my_module.CustomRequestHandler
# config: {}
# Turn on the twisted ssh manhole service on localhost on the given
# port.
#
#- port: 9000
# bind_addresses: ['::1', '127.0.0.1']
# type: manhole
## Homeserver blocking ##
# How to reach the server admin, used in ResourceLimitError
#
#admin_contact: 'mailto:[email protected]'
# Global blocking
#
#hs_disabled: False
#hs_disabled_message: 'Human readable reason for why the HS is blocked'
#hs_disabled_limit_type: 'error code(str), to help clients decode reason'
# Monthly Active User Blocking
#
# Used in cases where the admin or server owner wants to limit to the
# number of monthly active users.
#
# 'limit_usage_by_mau' disables/enables monthly active user blocking. When
# anabled and a limit is reached the server returns a 'ResourceLimitError'
# with error type Codes.RESOURCE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED
#
# 'max_mau_value' is the hard limit of monthly active users above which
# the server will start blocking user actions.
#
# 'mau_trial_days' is a means to add a grace period for active users. It
# means that users must be active for this number of days before they
# can be considered active and guards against the case where lots of users
# sign up in a short space of time never to return after their initial
# session.
#
#limit_usage_by_mau: False
#max_mau_value: 50
#mau_trial_days: 2
# If enabled, the metrics for the number of monthly active users will
# be populated, however no one will be limited. If limit_usage_by_mau
# is true, this is implied to be true.
#
#mau_stats_only: False
# Sometimes the server admin will want to ensure certain accounts are
# never blocked by mau checking. These accounts are specified here.
#
#mau_limit_reserved_threepids:
# - medium: 'email'
# address: '*****@*****.**'
# Used by phonehome stats to group together related servers.
#server_context: context
# Whether to require a user to be in the room to add an alias to it.
# Defaults to 'true'.
#
#require_membership_for_aliases: false
# Whether to allow per-room membership profiles through the send of membership
# events with profile information that differ from the target's global profile.
# Defaults to 'true'.
#
#allow_per_room_profiles: false
""" % locals())
def read_arguments(self, args):
if args.manhole is not None:
self.manhole = args.manhole
if args.daemonize is not None:
self.daemonize = args.daemonize
if args.print_pidfile is not None:
self.print_pidfile = args.print_pidfile
@staticmethod
def add_arguments(parser):
server_group = parser.add_argument_group("server")
server_group.add_argument(
"-D",
"--daemonize",
action="store_true",
default=None,
help="Daemonize the home server",
)
server_group.add_argument(
"--print-pidfile",
action="store_true",
default=None,
help="Print the path to the pidfile just"
" before daemonizing",
)
server_group.add_argument(
"--manhole",
metavar="PORT",
dest="manhole",
type=int,
help="Turn on the twisted telnet manhole"
" service on the given port.",
)
class ContentRepositoryConfig(Config):
def read_config(self, config):
self.max_upload_size = self.parse_size(config.get("max_upload_size", "10M"))
self.max_image_pixels = self.parse_size(config.get("max_image_pixels", "32M"))
self.max_spider_size = self.parse_size(config.get("max_spider_size", "10M"))
self.media_store_path = self.ensure_directory(config["media_store_path"])
backup_media_store_path = config.get("backup_media_store_path")
synchronous_backup_media_store = config.get(
"synchronous_backup_media_store", False
)
storage_providers = config.get("media_storage_providers", [])
if backup_media_store_path:
if storage_providers:
raise ConfigError(
"Cannot use both 'backup_media_store_path' and 'storage_providers'"
)
storage_providers = [{
"module": "file_system",
"store_local": True,
"store_synchronous": synchronous_backup_media_store,
"store_remote": True,
"config": {
"directory": backup_media_store_path,
}
}]
# This is a list of config that can be used to create the storage
# providers. The entries are tuples of (Class, class_config,
# MediaStorageProviderConfig), where Class is the class of the provider,
# the class_config the config to pass to it, and
# MediaStorageProviderConfig are options for StorageProviderWrapper.
#
# We don't create the storage providers here as not all workers need
# them to be started.
self.media_storage_providers = []
for provider_config in storage_providers:
# We special case the module "file_system" so as not to need to
# expose FileStorageProviderBackend
if provider_config["module"] == "file_system":
provider_config["module"] = (
"synapse.rest.media.v1.storage_provider"
".FileStorageProviderBackend"
)
provider_class, parsed_config = load_module(provider_config)
wrapper_config = MediaStorageProviderConfig(
provider_config.get("store_local", False),
provider_config.get("store_remote", False),
provider_config.get("store_synchronous", False),
)
self.media_storage_providers.append(
(provider_class, parsed_config, wrapper_config,)
)
self.uploads_path = self.ensure_directory(config["uploads_path"])
self.dynamic_thumbnails = config.get("dynamic_thumbnails", False)
self.thumbnail_requirements = parse_thumbnail_requirements(
config.get("thumbnail_sizes", DEFAULT_THUMBNAIL_SIZES),
)
self.url_preview_enabled = config.get("url_preview_enabled", False)
if self.url_preview_enabled:
try:
import lxml
lxml # To stop unused lint.
except ImportError:
raise ConfigError(MISSING_LXML)
try:
from netaddr import IPSet
except ImportError:
raise ConfigError(MISSING_NETADDR)
if "url_preview_ip_range_blacklist" not in config:
raise ConfigError(
"For security, you must specify an explicit target IP address "
"blacklist in url_preview_ip_range_blacklist for url previewing "
"to work"
)
self.url_preview_ip_range_blacklist = IPSet(
config["url_preview_ip_range_blacklist"]
)
# we always blacklist '0.0.0.0' and '::', which are supposed to be
# unroutable addresses.
self.url_preview_ip_range_blacklist.update(['0.0.0.0', '::'])
self.url_preview_ip_range_whitelist = IPSet(
config.get("url_preview_ip_range_whitelist", ())
)
self.url_preview_url_blacklist = config.get(
"url_preview_url_blacklist", ()
)
def default_config(self, data_dir_path, **kwargs):
media_store = os.path.join(data_dir_path, "media_store")
uploads_path = os.path.join(data_dir_path, "uploads")
formatted_thumbnail_sizes = "".join(
THUMBNAIL_SIZE_YAML % s for s in DEFAULT_THUMBNAIL_SIZES
)
# strip final NL
formatted_thumbnail_sizes = formatted_thumbnail_sizes[:-1]
return r"""
# Directory where uploaded images and attachments are stored.
#
media_store_path: "%(media_store)s"
# Media storage providers allow media to be stored in different
# locations.
#
#media_storage_providers:
# - module: file_system
# # Whether to write new local files.
# store_local: false
# # Whether to write new remote media
# store_remote: false
# # Whether to block upload requests waiting for write to this
# # provider to complete
# store_synchronous: false
# config:
# directory: /mnt/some/other/directory
# Directory where in-progress uploads are stored.
#
uploads_path: "%(uploads_path)s"
# The largest allowed upload size in bytes
#
#max_upload_size: 10M
# Maximum number of pixels that will be thumbnailed
#
#max_image_pixels: 32M
# Whether to generate new thumbnails on the fly to precisely match
# the resolution requested by the client. If true then whenever
# a new resolution is requested by the client the server will
# generate a new thumbnail. If false the server will pick a thumbnail
# from a precalculated list.
#
#dynamic_thumbnails: false
# List of thumbnails to precalculate when an image is uploaded.
#
#thumbnail_sizes:
%(formatted_thumbnail_sizes)s
# Is the preview URL API enabled?
#
# 'false' by default: uncomment the following to enable it (and specify a
# url_preview_ip_range_blacklist blacklist).
#
#url_preview_enabled: true
# List of IP address CIDR ranges that the URL preview spider is denied
# from accessing. There are no defaults: you must explicitly
# specify a list for URL previewing to work. You should specify any
# internal services in your network that you do not want synapse to try
# to connect to, otherwise anyone in any Matrix room could cause your
# synapse to issue arbitrary GET requests to your internal services,
# causing serious security issues.
#
# (0.0.0.0 and :: are always blacklisted, whether or not they are explicitly
# listed here, since they correspond to unroutable addresses.)
#
# This must be specified if url_preview_enabled is set. It is recommended that
# you uncomment the following list as a starting point.
#
#url_preview_ip_range_blacklist:
# - '127.0.0.0/8'
# - '10.0.0.0/8'
# - '172.16.0.0/12'
# - '192.168.0.0/16'
# - '100.64.0.0/10'
# - '169.254.0.0/16'
# - '::1/128'
# - 'fe80::/64'
# - 'fc00::/7'
# List of IP address CIDR ranges that the URL preview spider is allowed
# to access even if they are specified in url_preview_ip_range_blacklist.
# This is useful for specifying exceptions to wide-ranging blacklisted
# target IP ranges - e.g. for enabling URL previews for a specific private
# website only visible in your network.
#
#url_preview_ip_range_whitelist:
# - '192.168.1.1'
# Optional list of URL matches that the URL preview spider is
# denied from accessing. You should use url_preview_ip_range_blacklist
# in preference to this, otherwise someone could define a public DNS
# entry that points to a private IP address and circumvent the blacklist.
# This is more useful if you know there is an entire shape of URL that
# you know that will never want synapse to try to spider.
#
# Each list entry is a dictionary of url component attributes as returned
# by urlparse.urlsplit as applied to the absolute form of the URL. See
# https://docs.python.org/2/library/urlparse.html#urlparse.urlsplit
# The values of the dictionary are treated as an filename match pattern
# applied to that component of URLs, unless they start with a ^ in which
# case they are treated as a regular expression match. If all the
# specified component matches for a given list item succeed, the URL is
# blacklisted.
#
#url_preview_url_blacklist:
# # blacklist any URL with a username in its URI
# - username: '******'
#
# # blacklist all *.google.com URLs
# - netloc: 'google.com'
# - netloc: '*.google.com'
#
# # blacklist all plain HTTP URLs
# - scheme: 'http'
#
# # blacklist http(s)://www.acme.com/foo
# - netloc: 'www.acme.com'
# path: '/foo'
#
# # blacklist any URL with a literal IPv4 address
# - netloc: '^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$'
# The largest allowed URL preview spidering size in bytes
#
#max_spider_size: 10M
""" % locals()
