def _build_key(
secret: bytes,
discriminator: bytes,
index: int | None = None,
out: bytes | None = None,
) -> bytes:
"""
Creates an unique-purpose key
"""
key_buff = _BUILD_KEY_BUFFER
utils.ensure(len(secret) == _SECRET_LENGTH, "Invalid key length")
utils.ensure(len(discriminator) <= _DISCRIMINATOR_LENGTH, "Disc too long")
offset = _SECRET_LENGTH
utils.memcpy(key_buff, 0, secret, 0, _SECRET_LENGTH)
for i in range(_SECRET_LENGTH, len(key_buff)):
key_buff[i] = 0
utils.memcpy(key_buff, offset, discriminator, 0, len(discriminator))
offset += _DISCRIMINATOR_LENGTH # fixed domain separator size
if index is not None:
# dump_uvarint_b_into, saving import
shifted = True
while shifted:
shifted = index >> 7
key_buff[offset] = (index & 0x7F) | (0x80 if shifted else 0x00)
offset += 1
index = shifted
return crypto_helpers.keccak_2hash(key_buff, out)
def _build_key(secret,
discriminator=None,
index: int = None,
out: bytes = None) -> bytes:
"""
Creates an unique-purpose key
"""
key_buff = BUILD_KEY_BUFFER # bytearray(32 + 12 + 4) # key + disc + index
utils.ensure(len(secret) == 32, "Invalid key length")
utils.ensure(len(discriminator) <= 12, "Disc too long")
offset = 32
utils.memcpy(key_buff, 0, secret, 0, 32)
for i in range(32, len(key_buff)):
key_buff[i] = 0
if discriminator is not None:
utils.memcpy(key_buff, offset, discriminator, 0, len(discriminator))
offset += len(discriminator)
if index is not None:
# dump_uvarint_b_into, saving import
shifted = True
while shifted:
shifted = index >> 7
key_buff[offset] = (index & 0x7F) | (0x80 if shifted else 0x00)
offset += 1
index = shifted
return crypto.keccak_2hash(key_buff, out)
async def send_cmd(cmd: Cmd, iface: io.HID) -> None:
init_desc = frame_init()
cont_desc = frame_cont()
offset = 0
seq = 0
datalen = len(cmd.data)
buf, frm = make_struct(init_desc)
frm.cid = cmd.cid
frm.cmd = cmd.cmd
frm.bcnt = datalen
offset += utils.memcpy(frm.data, 0, cmd.data, offset, datalen)
iface.write(buf)
if offset < datalen:
frm = overlay_struct(buf, cont_desc)
write = loop.wait(iface.iface_num() | io.POLL_WRITE)
while offset < datalen:
frm.seq = seq
offset += utils.memcpy(frm.data, 0, cmd.data, offset, datalen)
while True:
await write
if iface.write(buf) > 0:
break
seq += 1
def msg_authenticate_sign(challenge: bytes, app_id: bytes, privkey: bytes) -> bytes:
flags = bytes([_AUTH_FLAG_TUP])
# get next counter
ctr = storage.next_u2f_counter()
ctrbuf = ustruct.pack(">L", ctr)
# hash input data together with counter
dig = hashlib.sha256()
dig.update(app_id) # uint8_t appId[32];
dig.update(flags) # uint8_t flags;
dig.update(ctrbuf) # uint8_t ctr[4];
dig.update(challenge) # uint8_t chal[32];
dig = dig.digest()
# sign the digest and convert to der
sig = nist256p1.sign(privkey, dig, False)
sig = der.encode_seq((sig[1:33], sig[33:]))
# pack to a response
buf, resp = make_struct(resp_cmd_authenticate(len(sig)))
resp.flags = flags[0]
resp.ctr = ctr
utils.memcpy(resp.sig, 0, sig, 0, len(sig))
resp.status = _SW_NO_ERROR
return buf
def send_cmd(cmd: Cmd, iface: io.HID) -> None:
init_desc = frame_init()
cont_desc = frame_cont()
offset = 0
seq = 0
datalen = len(cmd.data)
buf, frm = make_struct(init_desc)
frm.cid = cmd.cid
frm.cmd = cmd.cmd
frm.bcnt = datalen
offset += utils.memcpy(frm.data, 0, cmd.data, offset, datalen)
iface.write(buf)
# log.debug(__name__, 'send init %s', buf)
if offset < datalen:
frm = overlay_struct(buf, cont_desc)
while offset < datalen:
frm.seq = seq
offset += utils.memcpy(frm.data, 0, cmd.data, offset, datalen)
utime.sleep_ms(1) # FIXME: async write
iface.write(buf)
# log.debug(__name__, 'send cont %s', buf)
seq += 1
async def read_cmd(iface: io.HID) -> Cmd:
desc_init = frame_init()
desc_cont = frame_cont()
read = loop.wait(iface.iface_num() | io.POLL_READ)
buf = await read
ifrm = overlay_struct(buf, desc_init)
bcnt = ifrm.bcnt
data = ifrm.data
datalen = len(data)
seq = 0
if ifrm.cmd & _TYPE_MASK == _TYPE_CONT:
# unexpected cont packet, abort current msg
if __debug__:
log.warning(__name__, "_TYPE_CONT")
return None
if datalen < bcnt:
databuf = bytearray(bcnt)
utils.memcpy(databuf, 0, data, 0, bcnt)
data = databuf
else:
data = data[:bcnt]
while datalen < bcnt:
buf = await read
cfrm = overlay_struct(buf, desc_cont)
if cfrm.seq == _CMD_INIT:
# _CMD_INIT frame, cancels current channel
ifrm = overlay_struct(buf, desc_init)
data = ifrm.data[: ifrm.bcnt]
break
if cfrm.cid != ifrm.cid:
# cont frame for a different channel, reply with BUSY and skip
if __debug__:
log.warning(__name__, "_ERR_CHANNEL_BUSY")
await send_cmd(cmd_error(cfrm.cid, _ERR_CHANNEL_BUSY), iface)
continue
if cfrm.seq != seq:
# cont frame for this channel, but incorrect seq number, abort
# current msg
if __debug__:
log.warning(__name__, "_ERR_INVALID_SEQ")
await send_cmd(cmd_error(cfrm.cid, _ERR_INVALID_SEQ), iface)
return None
datalen += utils.memcpy(data, datalen, cfrm.data, 0, bcnt - datalen)
seq += 1
return Cmd(ifrm.cid, ifrm.cmd, data)
def msg_register_sign(challenge: bytes, app_id: bytes) -> bytes:
from apps.common import seed
# derivation path is m/U2F'/r'/r'/r'/r'/r'/r'/r'/r'
keypath = [0x80000000 | random.uniform(0xf0000000) for _ in range(0, 8)]
nodepath = [_U2F_KEY_PATH] + keypath
# prepare signing key from random path, compute decompressed public key
node = seed.get_root_without_passphrase('nist256p1')
node.derive_path(nodepath)
pubkey = nist256p1.publickey(node.private_key(), False)
# first half of keyhandle is keypath
keybuf = ustruct.pack('>8L', *keypath)
# second half of keyhandle is a hmac of app_id and keypath
keybase = hmac.Hmac(node.private_key(), app_id, hashlib.sha256)
keybase.update(keybuf)
keybase = keybase.digest()
# hash the request data together with keyhandle and pubkey
dig = hashlib.sha256()
dig.update(b'\x00') # uint8_t reserved;
dig.update(app_id) # uint8_t appId[32];
dig.update(challenge) # uint8_t chal[32];
dig.update(keybuf) # uint8_t keyHandle[64];
dig.update(keybase)
dig.update(pubkey) # uint8_t pubKey[65];
dig = dig.digest()
# sign the digest and convert to der
sig = nist256p1.sign(_U2F_ATT_PRIV_KEY, dig, False)
sig = der.encode_seq((sig[1:33], sig[33:]))
# pack to a response
buf, resp = make_struct(
resp_cmd_register(
len(keybuf) + len(keybase), len(_U2F_ATT_CERT), len(sig)))
resp.registerId = _U2F_REGISTER_ID
utils.memcpy(resp.pubKey, 0, pubkey, 0, len(pubkey))
resp.keyHandleLen = len(keybuf) + len(keybase)
utils.memcpy(resp.keyHandle, 0, keybuf, 0, len(keybuf))
utils.memcpy(resp.keyHandle, len(keybuf), keybase, 0, len(keybase))
utils.memcpy(resp.cert, 0, _U2F_ATT_CERT, 0, len(_U2F_ATT_CERT))
utils.memcpy(resp.sig, 0, sig, 0, len(sig))
resp.status = _SW_NO_ERROR
return buf
async def write_message(iface: WireInterface, mtype: int,
mdata: bytes) -> None:
write = loop.wait(iface.iface_num() | io.POLL_WRITE)
# gather data from msg
msize = len(mdata)
# prepare the report buffer with header data
report = bytearray(_REP_LEN)
repofs = _REP_INIT_DATA
ustruct.pack_into(_REP_INIT, report, 0, _REP_MARKER, _REP_MAGIC,
_REP_MAGIC, mtype, msize)
nwritten = 0
while True:
# copy as much as possible to the report buffer
nwritten += utils.memcpy(report, repofs, mdata, nwritten)
# write the report
while True:
await write
n = iface.write(report)
if n == len(report):
break
# if we have more data to write, use continuation reports for it
if nwritten < msize:
repofs = _REP_CONT_DATA
else:
break
def _serialize_ecdh(ecdh_info, v2=False):
"""
Serializes ECDH according to the current format defined by the hard fork version
or the signature format respectively.
"""
if v2:
# In HF10 the amount is serialized to 8B and mask is deterministic
ecdh_info_bin = bytearray(8)
ecdh_info_bin[:] = ecdh_info.amount[0:8]
return ecdh_info_bin
else:
ecdh_info_bin = bytearray(64)
utils.memcpy(ecdh_info_bin, 0, ecdh_info.mask, 0, 32)
utils.memcpy(ecdh_info_bin, 32, ecdh_info.amount, 0, 32)
return ecdh_info_bin
async def areadinto(self, buf):
'''
Read exactly `len(buf)` bytes into `buf`, waiting for additional
reports, if needed. Raises `EOFError` if end-of-message is encountered
before the full read can be completed.
'''
if self.size < len(buf):
raise EOFError
read = loop.select(self.iface.iface_num() | io.POLL_READ)
nread = 0
while nread < len(buf):
if self.ofs == len(self.data):
# we are at the end of received data
# wait for continuation report
while True:
report = await read
marker = report[0]
if marker == _REP_MARKER:
break
self.data = report[_REP_CONT_DATA:_REP_CONT_DATA + self.size]
self.ofs = 0
# copy as much as possible to target buffer
nbytes = utils.memcpy(buf, nread, self.data, self.ofs, len(buf))
nread += nbytes
self.ofs += nbytes
self.size -= nbytes
return nread
def _dump_rsig_lr(buff: bytearray, offset: int,
rsig: Bulletproof | BulletproofPlus) -> int:
buff[offset] = len(rsig.L)
offset += 1
for x in rsig.L:
utils.memcpy(buff, offset, x, 0, 32)
offset += 32
buff[offset] = len(rsig.R)
offset += 1
for x in rsig.R:
utils.memcpy(buff, offset, x, 0, 32)
offset += 32
return offset
async def awrite(self, buf):
'''
Encode and write every byte from `buf`. Does not need to be called in
case message has zero length. Raises `EOFError` if the length of `buf`
exceeds the remaining message length.
'''
if self.size < len(buf):
raise EOFError
write = loop.select(self.iface.iface_num() | io.POLL_WRITE)
nwritten = 0
while nwritten < len(buf):
# copy as much as possible to report buffer
nbytes = utils.memcpy(self.data, self.ofs, buf, nwritten, len(buf))
nwritten += nbytes
self.ofs += nbytes
self.size -= nbytes
if self.ofs == _REP_LEN:
# we are at the end of the report, flush it
await write
self.iface.write(self.data)
self.ofs = _REP_CONT_DATA
return nwritten
async def read_into(self, dst):
'''
Read exactly `len(dst)` bytes into writable buffer-like `dst`.
Raises `EOFError` if the internal limit was reached or the
backing IO strategy signalled an EOF.
'''
n = len(dst)
if self._limit is not None:
if self._limit < n:
raise EOFError()
self._limit -= n
buf = self._buffer
ofs = self._ofs
i = 0
while i < n:
if ofs >= len(buf):
buf = yield
ofs = 0
# memcpy caps on the buffer lengths, no need for exact byte count
nb = memcpy(dst, i, buf, ofs, n)
ofs += nb
i += nb
self._buffer = buf
self._ofs = ofs
async def read_message(iface: WireInterface,
buffer: utils.BufferType) -> Message:
read = loop.wait(iface.iface_num() | io.POLL_READ)
# wait for initial report
report = await read
if report[0] != _REP_MARKER:
raise CodecError("Invalid magic")
_, magic1, magic2, mtype, msize = ustruct.unpack(_REP_INIT, report)
if magic1 != _REP_MAGIC or magic2 != _REP_MAGIC:
raise CodecError("Invalid magic")
read_and_throw_away = False
with buffer_lock:
if msize > len(buffer):
# allocate a new buffer to fit the message
try:
mdata: utils.BufferType = bytearray(msize)
except MemoryError:
mdata = bytearray(_REP_LEN)
read_and_throw_away = True
else:
# reuse a part of the supplied buffer
mdata = memoryview(buffer)[:msize]
# buffer the initial data
nread = utils.memcpy(mdata, 0, report, _REP_INIT_DATA)
while nread < msize:
# wait for continuation report
report = await read
if report[0] != _REP_MARKER:
raise CodecError("Invalid magic")
# buffer the continuation data
if read_and_throw_away:
nread += len(report) - 1
else:
nread += utils.memcpy(mdata, nread, report, _REP_CONT_DATA)
if read_and_throw_away:
raise CodecError("Message too large")
return Message(mtype, mdata)
def _set_tx_extra(state: State) -> bytes:
"""
Sets tx public keys into transaction's extra.
Extra field is supposed to be sorted (by sort_tx_extra() in the Monero)
Tag ordering: TX_EXTRA_TAG_PUBKEY, TX_EXTRA_TAG_ADDITIONAL_PUBKEYS, TX_EXTRA_NONCE
"""
from apps.monero.xmr.serialize import int_serialize
# Extra buffer length computation
# TX_EXTRA_TAG_PUBKEY (1B) | tx_pub_key (32B)
extra_size = 33
offset = 0
num_keys = 0
len_size = 0
if state.need_additional_txkeys:
num_keys = len(state.additional_tx_public_keys)
len_size = int_serialize.uvarint_size(num_keys)
# TX_EXTRA_TAG_ADDITIONAL_PUBKEYS (1B) | varint | keys
extra_size += 1 + len_size + 32 * num_keys
if state.extra_nonce:
extra_size += len(state.extra_nonce)
extra = bytearray(extra_size)
extra[0] = 1 # TX_EXTRA_TAG_PUBKEY
crypto.encodepoint_into(memoryview(extra)[1:], state.tx_pub)
offset += 33
if state.need_additional_txkeys:
extra[offset] = 0x4 # TX_EXTRA_TAG_ADDITIONAL_PUBKEYS
int_serialize.dump_uvarint_b_into(num_keys, extra, offset + 1)
offset += 1 + len_size
for idx in range(num_keys):
extra[offset:offset + 32] = state.additional_tx_public_keys[idx]
offset += 32
if state.extra_nonce:
utils.memcpy(extra, offset, state.extra_nonce, 0,
len(state.extra_nonce))
state.extra_nonce = None
return extra
def cmd_init(req: Cmd) -> Cmd:
if req.cid == 0:
return cmd_error(req.cid, _ERR_INVALID_CID)
elif req.cid == _CID_BROADCAST:
# uint32_t except 0 and 0xffffffff
resp_cid = random.uniform(0xFFFFFFFE) + 1
else:
resp_cid = req.cid
buf, resp = make_struct(resp_cmd_init())
utils.memcpy(resp.nonce, 0, req.data, 0, len(req.data))
resp.cid = resp_cid
resp.versionInterface = _U2FHID_IF_VERSION
resp.versionMajor = 2
resp.versionMinor = 0
resp.versionBuild = 0
resp.capFlags = _CAPFLAG_WINK
return Cmd(req.cid, req.cmd, buf)
async def all_inputs_set(state: State):
state.mem_trace(0)
await confirms.transaction_step(state.ctx, state.STEP_ALL_IN)
from trezor.messages.MoneroTransactionAllInputsSetAck import (
MoneroTransactionAllInputsSetAck, )
from trezor.messages.MoneroTransactionRsigData import MoneroTransactionRsigData
# Generate random commitment masks to be used in range proofs.
# If SimpleRCT is used the sum of the masks must match the input masks sum.
state.sumout = crypto.sc_init(0)
for i in range(state.output_count):
cur_mask = crypto.new_scalar() # new mask for each output
is_last = i + 1 == state.output_count
if is_last and state.rct_type == RctType.Simple:
# in SimpleRCT the last mask needs to be calculated as an offset of the sum
crypto.sc_sub_into(cur_mask, state.sumpouts_alphas, state.sumout)
else:
crypto.random_scalar(cur_mask)
crypto.sc_add_into(state.sumout, state.sumout, cur_mask)
state.output_masks.append(cur_mask)
if state.rct_type == RctType.Simple:
utils.ensure(crypto.sc_eq(state.sumout, state.sumpouts_alphas),
"Invalid masks sum") # sum check
state.sumout = crypto.sc_init(0)
rsig_data = MoneroTransactionRsigData()
resp = MoneroTransactionAllInputsSetAck(rsig_data=rsig_data)
# If range proofs are being offloaded, we send the masks to the host, which uses them
# to create the range proof. If not, we do not send any and we use them in the following step.
if state.rsig_offload:
tmp_buff = bytearray(32)
rsig_data.mask = bytearray(32 * state.output_count)
for i in range(state.output_count):
crypto.encodeint_into(tmp_buff, state.output_masks[i])
utils.memcpy(rsig_data.mask, 32 * i, tmp_buff, 0, 32)
return resp
def _build_key(secret, discriminator=None, index: int = None) -> bytes:
"""
Creates an unique-purpose key
"""
key_buff = bytearray(32 + 12 + 4) # key + disc + index
offset = 32
utils.memcpy(key_buff, 0, secret, 0, len(secret))
if discriminator is not None:
utils.memcpy(key_buff, offset, discriminator, 0, len(discriminator))
offset += len(discriminator)
if index is not None:
# dump_uvarint_b_into, saving import
shifted = True
while shifted:
shifted = index >> 7
key_buff[offset] = (index & 0x7F) | (0x80 if shifted else 0x00)
offset += 1
index = shifted
return crypto.keccak_2hash(key_buff)
def _get_ecdh_info_and_out_pk(state: State, tx_out_key, amount, mask,
amount_key):
"""
Calculates the Pedersen commitment C = aG + bH and returns it as CtKey.
Also encodes the two items - `mask` and `amount` - into ecdh info,
so the recipient is able to reconstruct the commitment.
"""
out_pk_dest = crypto.encodepoint(tx_out_key)
out_pk_commitment = crypto.encodepoint(crypto.gen_commitment(mask, amount))
state.sumout = crypto.sc_add(state.sumout, mask)
state.output_sk_masks.append(mask)
# masking of mask and amount
ecdh_info = _ecdh_encode(mask, amount, crypto.encodeint(amount_key))
# Manual ECDH info serialization
ecdh_info_bin = bytearray(64)
utils.memcpy(ecdh_info_bin, 0, ecdh_info.mask, 0, 32)
utils.memcpy(ecdh_info_bin, 32, ecdh_info.amount, 0, 32)
gc.collect()
return out_pk_dest, out_pk_commitment, ecdh_info_bin
def _dump_rsig_bp_plus(rsig: BulletproofPlus) -> bytes:
if len(rsig.L) > 127:
raise ValueError("Too large")
# Manual serialization as the generic purpose serialize.dump_msg_gc
# is more memory intensive which is not desired in the range proof section.
# BP: "V", "A", "A1", "B", "r1", "s1", "d1", "V", "L", "R"
# Commitment vector V is not serialized
# Vector size under 127 thus varint occupies 1 B
buff_size = 32 * (6 + 2 * (len(rsig.L))) + 2
buff = bytearray(buff_size)
utils.memcpy(buff, 0, rsig.A, 0, 32)
utils.memcpy(buff, 32, rsig.A1, 0, 32)
utils.memcpy(buff, 32 * 2, rsig.B, 0, 32)
utils.memcpy(buff, 32 * 3, rsig.r1, 0, 32)
utils.memcpy(buff, 32 * 4, rsig.s1, 0, 32)
utils.memcpy(buff, 32 * 5, rsig.d1, 0, 32)
_dump_rsig_lr(buff, 32 * 6, rsig)
return buff
def _dump_rsig_bp(rsig: Bulletproof) -> bytes:
if len(rsig.L) > 127:
raise ValueError("Too large")
# Manual serialization as the generic purpose serialize.dump_msg_gc
# is more memory intensive which is not desired in the range proof section.
# BP: V, A, S, T1, T2, taux, mu, L, R, a, b, t
# Commitment vector V is not serialized
# Vector size under 127 thus varint occupies 1 B
buff_size = 32 * (9 + 2 * (len(rsig.L))) + 2
buff = bytearray(buff_size)
utils.memcpy(buff, 0, rsig.A, 0, 32)
utils.memcpy(buff, 32, rsig.S, 0, 32)
utils.memcpy(buff, 32 * 2, rsig.T1, 0, 32)
utils.memcpy(buff, 32 * 3, rsig.T2, 0, 32)
utils.memcpy(buff, 32 * 4, rsig.taux, 0, 32)
utils.memcpy(buff, 32 * 5, rsig.mu, 0, 32)
offset = _dump_rsig_lr(buff, 32 * 6, rsig)
utils.memcpy(buff, offset, rsig.a, 0, 32)
offset += 32
utils.memcpy(buff, offset, rsig.b, 0, 32)
offset += 32
utils.memcpy(buff, offset, rsig.t, 0, 32)
return buff
async def set_output(
state: State,
dst_entr: MoneroTransactionDestinationEntry,
dst_entr_hmac: bytes,
rsig_data: MoneroTransactionRsigData,
is_offloaded_bp=False,
) -> MoneroTransactionSetOutputAck:
state.mem_trace(0, True)
mods = utils.unimport_begin()
# Progress update only for master message (skip for offloaded BP msg)
if not is_offloaded_bp:
await layout.transaction_step(state, state.STEP_OUT,
state.current_output_index + 1)
state.mem_trace(1, True)
dst_entr = _validate(state, dst_entr, dst_entr_hmac, is_offloaded_bp)
state.mem_trace(2, True)
if not state.is_processing_offloaded:
# First output - we include the size of the container into the tx prefix hasher
if state.current_output_index == 0:
state.tx_prefix_hasher.uvarint(state.output_count)
state.mem_trace(4, True)
state.output_amounts.append(dst_entr.amount)
state.summary_outs_money += dst_entr.amount
utils.unimport_end(mods)
state.mem_trace(5, True)
# Compute tx keys and masks if applicable
tx_out_key, amount_key, derivation = _compute_tx_keys(state, dst_entr)
utils.unimport_end(mods)
state.mem_trace(6, True)
# Range proof first, memory intensive (fragmentation)
rsig_data_new, mask = _range_proof(state, rsig_data)
utils.unimport_end(mods)
state.mem_trace(7, True)
# If det masks & offloading, return as we are handling offloaded BP.
if state.is_processing_offloaded:
from trezor.messages import MoneroTransactionSetOutputAck
return MoneroTransactionSetOutputAck()
# Tx header prefix hashing, hmac dst_entr
tx_out_bin, hmac_vouti = _set_out_tx_out(
state,
dst_entr,
tx_out_key,
derivation,
)
del (derivation, )
state.mem_trace(11, True)
out_pk_dest, out_pk_commitment, ecdh_info_bin = _get_ecdh_info_and_out_pk(
state=state,
tx_out_key=tx_out_key,
amount=dst_entr.amount,
mask=mask,
amount_key=amount_key,
)
del (dst_entr, mask, amount_key, tx_out_key)
state.mem_trace(12, True)
# Incremental hashing of the ECDH info.
# RctSigBase allows to hash only one of the (ecdh, out_pk) as they are serialized
# as whole vectors. We choose to hash ECDH first, because it saves state space.
state.full_message_hasher.set_ecdh(ecdh_info_bin)
state.mem_trace(13, True)
# output_pk_commitment is stored to the state as it is used during the signature and hashed to the
# RctSigBase later. No need to store amount, it was already stored.
state.output_pk_commitments.append(out_pk_commitment)
state.last_step = state.STEP_OUT
state.mem_trace(14, True)
from trezor.messages import MoneroTransactionSetOutputAck
out_pk_bin = bytearray(64)
utils.memcpy(out_pk_bin, 0, out_pk_dest, 0, 32)
utils.memcpy(out_pk_bin, 32, out_pk_commitment, 0, 32)
return MoneroTransactionSetOutputAck(
tx_out=tx_out_bin,
vouti_hmac=hmac_vouti,
rsig_data=rsig_data_new,
out_pk=out_pk_bin,
ecdh_info=ecdh_info_bin,
)
def generate_ring_signature(
prefix_hash: bytes,
image: Ge25519,
pubs: list[Ge25519],
sec: Sc25519,
sec_idx: int,
test: bool = False,
) -> Sig:
"""
Generates ring signature with key image.
void crypto_ops::generate_ring_signature()
"""
from trezor.utils import memcpy
if test:
t = crypto.scalarmult_base(sec)
if not crypto.point_eq(t, pubs[sec_idx]):
raise ValueError("Invalid sec key")
k_i = monero.generate_key_image(crypto.encodepoint(pubs[sec_idx]), sec)
if not crypto.point_eq(k_i, image):
raise ValueError("Key image invalid")
for k in pubs:
crypto.check_ed25519point(k)
buff_off = len(prefix_hash)
buff = bytearray(buff_off + 2 * 32 * len(pubs))
memcpy(buff, 0, prefix_hash, 0, buff_off)
mvbuff = memoryview(buff)
sum = crypto.sc_0()
k = crypto.sc_0()
sig = []
for _ in range(len(pubs)):
sig.append([crypto.sc_0(), crypto.sc_0()]) # c, r
for i in range(len(pubs)):
if i == sec_idx:
k = crypto.random_scalar()
tmp3 = crypto.scalarmult_base(k)
crypto.encodepoint_into(mvbuff[buff_off:buff_off + 32], tmp3)
buff_off += 32
tmp3 = crypto.hash_to_point(crypto.encodepoint(pubs[i]))
tmp2 = crypto.scalarmult(tmp3, k)
crypto.encodepoint_into(mvbuff[buff_off:buff_off + 32], tmp2)
buff_off += 32
else:
sig[i] = [crypto.random_scalar(), crypto.random_scalar()]
tmp3 = pubs[i]
tmp2 = crypto.ge25519_double_scalarmult_base_vartime(
sig[i][0], tmp3, sig[i][1])
crypto.encodepoint_into(mvbuff[buff_off:buff_off + 32], tmp2)
buff_off += 32
tmp3 = crypto.hash_to_point(crypto.encodepoint(tmp3))
tmp2 = crypto.ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime2(
sig[i][1], tmp3, sig[i][0], image)
crypto.encodepoint_into(mvbuff[buff_off:buff_off + 32], tmp2)
buff_off += 32
sum = crypto.sc_add(sum, sig[i][0])
h = crypto.hash_to_scalar(buff)
sig[sec_idx][0] = crypto.sc_sub(h, sum)
sig[sec_idx][1] = crypto.sc_mulsub(sig[sec_idx][0], sec, k)
return sig
async def set_output(state: State, dst_entr, dst_entr_hmac, rsig_data):
state.mem_trace(0, True)
mods = utils.unimport_begin()
await confirms.transaction_step(state.ctx, state.STEP_OUT,
state.current_output_index + 1,
state.output_count)
state.mem_trace(1)
state.current_output_index += 1
state.mem_trace(2, True)
await _validate(state, dst_entr, dst_entr_hmac)
# First output - we include the size of the container into the tx prefix hasher
if state.current_output_index == 0:
state.tx_prefix_hasher.uvarint(state.output_count)
state.mem_trace(4, True)
state.output_amounts.append(dst_entr.amount)
state.summary_outs_money += dst_entr.amount
utils.unimport_end(mods)
state.mem_trace(5, True)
# Range proof first, memory intensive
rsig, mask = _range_proof(state, dst_entr.amount, rsig_data)
utils.unimport_end(mods)
state.mem_trace(6, True)
# additional tx key if applicable
additional_txkey_priv = _set_out_additional_keys(state, dst_entr)
# derivation = a*R or r*A or s*C
derivation = _set_out_derivation(state, dst_entr, additional_txkey_priv)
# amount key = H_s(derivation || i)
amount_key = crypto.derivation_to_scalar(derivation,
state.current_output_index)
# one-time destination address P = H_s(derivation || i)*G + B
tx_out_key = crypto.derive_public_key(
derivation,
state.current_output_index,
crypto.decodepoint(dst_entr.addr.spend_public_key),
)
del (derivation, additional_txkey_priv)
state.mem_trace(7, True)
# Tx header prefix hashing, hmac dst_entr
tx_out_bin, hmac_vouti = await _set_out_tx_out(state, dst_entr, tx_out_key)
state.mem_trace(11, True)
out_pk_dest, out_pk_commitment, ecdh_info_bin = _get_ecdh_info_and_out_pk(
state=state,
tx_out_key=tx_out_key,
amount=dst_entr.amount,
mask=mask,
amount_key=amount_key,
)
del (dst_entr, mask, amount_key, tx_out_key)
state.mem_trace(12, True)
# Incremental hashing of the ECDH info.
# RctSigBase allows to hash only one of the (ecdh, out_pk) as they are serialized
# as whole vectors. We choose to hash ECDH first, because it saves state space.
state.full_message_hasher.set_ecdh(ecdh_info_bin)
state.mem_trace(13, True)
# output_pk_commitment is stored to the state as it is used during the signature and hashed to the
# RctSigBase later. No need to store amount, it was already stored.
state.output_pk_commitments.append(out_pk_commitment)
state.mem_trace(14, True)
from trezor.messages.MoneroTransactionSetOutputAck import (
MoneroTransactionSetOutputAck, )
out_pk_bin = bytearray(64)
utils.memcpy(out_pk_bin, 0, out_pk_dest, 0, 32)
utils.memcpy(out_pk_bin, 32, out_pk_commitment, 0, 32)
return MoneroTransactionSetOutputAck(
tx_out=tx_out_bin,
vouti_hmac=hmac_vouti,
rsig_data=_return_rsig_data(rsig),
out_pk=out_pk_bin,
ecdh_info=ecdh_info_bin,
)
