def charlie_double_withdraw( zeth_client: MixerClient, mk_tree: MerkleTree, input1: Tuple[int, ZethNote], charlie_eth_address: str, keystore: mock.KeyStore) -> contracts.MixResult: """ Charlie tries to carry out a double spending by modifying the value of the nullifier of the previous payment """ print( f" === Charlie attempts to withdraw {CHARLIE_WITHDRAW_ETH}ETH once " + "more (double spend) one of his note on the Mixer ===") charlie_apk = keystore["Charlie"].addr_pk.a_pk charlie_ask = keystore["Charlie"].addr_sk.a_sk tree_depth = mk_tree.depth mk_path1 = compute_merkle_path(input1[0], mk_tree) mk_root = mk_tree.get_root() # Create the an additional dummy input for the MixerClient input2 = get_dummy_input_and_address(charlie_apk) dummy_mk_path = mock.get_dummy_merkle_path(tree_depth) note1_value = to_zeth_units(EtherValue(CHARLIE_WITHDRAW_CHANGE_ETH)) v_out = EtherValue(CHARLIE_WITHDRAW_ETH) # ### ATTACK BLOCK # Add malicious nullifiers: we reuse old nullifiers to double spend by # adding $r$ to them so that they have the same value as before in Z_r, # and so the zksnark verification passes, but have different values in # {0;1}^256 so that they appear different to the contract. # See: https://github.com/clearmatics/zeth/issues/38 attack_primary_input3: int = 0 attack_primary_input4: int = 0 def compute_h_sig_attack_nf( nf0: bytes, nf1: bytes, sign_vk: JoinsplitSigVerificationKey) -> bytes: # We disassemble the nfs to get the formatting of the primary inputs input_nullifier0 = nf0.hex() input_nullifier1 = nf1.hex() nf0_rev = "{0:0256b}".format(int(input_nullifier0, 16)) primary_input3_bits = nf0_rev[:FIELD_CAPACITY] primary_input3_res_bits = nf0_rev[FIELD_CAPACITY:] nf1_rev = "{0:0256b}".format(int(input_nullifier1, 16)) primary_input4_bits = nf1_rev[:FIELD_CAPACITY] primary_input4_res_bits = nf1_rev[FIELD_CAPACITY:] # We perform the attack, recoding the modified public input values nonlocal attack_primary_input3 nonlocal attack_primary_input4 attack_primary_input3 = int(primary_input3_bits, 2) + ZETH_PRIME attack_primary_input4 = int(primary_input4_bits, 2) + ZETH_PRIME # We reassemble the nfs attack_primary_input3_bits = "{0:0256b}".format(attack_primary_input3) attack_nf0_bits = attack_primary_input3_bits[ len(attack_primary_input3_bits) - FIELD_CAPACITY:] +\ primary_input3_res_bits attack_nf0 = "{0:064x}".format(int(attack_nf0_bits, 2)) attack_primary_input4_bits = "{0:0256b}".format(attack_primary_input4) attack_nf1_bits = attack_primary_input4_bits[ len(attack_primary_input4_bits) - FIELD_CAPACITY:] +\ primary_input4_res_bits attack_nf1 = "{0:064x}".format(int(attack_nf1_bits, 2)) return compute_h_sig( bytes.fromhex(attack_nf0), bytes.fromhex(attack_nf1), sign_vk) (output_note1, output_note2, proof_json, signing_keypair) = \ zeth_client.get_proof_joinsplit_2_by_2( mk_root, input1, mk_path1, input2, dummy_mk_path, charlie_ask, # sender (charlie_apk, note1_value), # recipient1 (charlie_apk, 0), # recipient2 to_zeth_units(EtherValue(0)), # v_in to_zeth_units(v_out), # v_out compute_h_sig_attack_nf) # Update the primary inputs to the modified nullifiers, since libsnark # overwrites them with values in Z_p assert attack_primary_input3 != 0 assert attack_primary_input4 != 0 print("proof_json => ", proof_json) print("proof_json[inputs][3] => ", proof_json["inputs"][3]) print("proof_json[inputs][4] => ", proof_json["inputs"][4]) proof_json["inputs"][3] = hex(attack_primary_input3) proof_json["inputs"][4] = hex(attack_primary_input4) # ### ATTACK BLOCK # construct pk object from bytes pk_charlie = keystore["Charlie"].addr_pk.k_pk # encrypt the coins ciphertexts = encrypt_notes([ (output_note1, pk_charlie), (output_note2, pk_charlie)]) # Compute the joinSplit signature joinsplit_sig_charlie = joinsplit_sign( signing_keypair, charlie_eth_address, ciphertexts, proof_json) mix_params = contracts.MixParameters( proof_json, signing_keypair.vk, joinsplit_sig_charlie, ciphertexts) tx_hash = zeth_client.mix( mix_params, charlie_eth_address, # Pay an arbitrary amount (1 wei here) that will be refunded since the # `mix` function is payable None, EtherValue(1, 'wei')) return wait_for_tx_update_mk_tree(zeth_client, mk_tree, tx_hash)
def charlie_corrupt_bob_deposit( zeth_client: MixerClient, mk_tree: MerkleTree, bob_eth_address: str, charlie_eth_address: str, keystore: mock.KeyStore) -> contracts.MixResult: """ Charlie tries to break transaction malleability and corrupt the coins bob is sending in a transaction She does so by intercepting bob's transaction and either: - case 1: replacing the ciphertexts (or sender_eph_pk) by garbage/arbitrary data - case 2: replacing the ciphertexts by garbage/arbitrary data and using a new OT-signature - case 3: Charlie replays the mix call of Bob, to try to receive the vout Both attacks should fail, - case 1: the signature check should fail, else Charlie broke UF-CMA of the OT signature - case 2: the h_sig/vk verification should fail, as h_sig is not a function of vk any longer - case 3: the signature check should fail, because `msg.sender` will no match the value used in the mix parameters (Bob's Ethereum Address). NB. If the adversary were to corrupt the ciphertexts (or the encryption key), replace the OT-signature by a new one and modify the h_sig accordingly so that the check on the signature verification (key h_sig/vk) passes, the proof would not verify, which is why we do not test this case. """ print( f"=== Bob deposits {BOB_DEPOSIT_ETH} ETH for himself and split into " + f"note1: {BOB_SPLIT_1_ETH}ETH, note2: {BOB_SPLIT_2_ETH}ETH " + "but Charlie attempts to corrupt the transaction ===") bob_apk = keystore["Bob"].addr_pk.a_pk bob_ask = keystore["Bob"].addr_sk.a_sk tree_depth = mk_tree.depth mk_root = mk_tree.get_root() # mk_tree_depth = zeth_client.mk_tree_depth # mk_root = zeth_client.merkle_root # Create the JoinSplit dummy inputs for the deposit input1 = get_dummy_input_and_address(bob_apk) input2 = get_dummy_input_and_address(bob_apk) dummy_mk_path = mock.get_dummy_merkle_path(tree_depth) note1_value = to_zeth_units(EtherValue(BOB_SPLIT_1_ETH)) note2_value = to_zeth_units(EtherValue(BOB_SPLIT_2_ETH)) v_in = to_zeth_units(EtherValue(BOB_DEPOSIT_ETH)) (output_note1, output_note2, proof_json, joinsplit_keypair) = \ zeth_client.get_proof_joinsplit_2_by_2( mk_root, input1, dummy_mk_path, input2, dummy_mk_path, bob_ask, # sender (bob_apk, note1_value), # recipient1 (bob_apk, note2_value), # recipient2 v_in, # v_in to_zeth_units(EtherValue(0)) # v_out ) # Encrypt the coins to bob pk_bob = keystore["Bob"].addr_pk.k_pk ciphertexts = encrypt_notes([ (output_note1, pk_bob), (output_note2, pk_bob)]) # ### ATTACK BLOCK # Charlie intercepts Bob's deposit, corrupts it and # sends her transaction before Bob's transaction is accepted # Case 1: replacing the ciphertexts by garbage/arbitrary data # Corrupt the ciphertexts # (another way would have been to overwrite sender_eph_pk) fake_ciphertext0 = urandom(32) fake_ciphertext1 = urandom(32) result_corrupt1 = None try: joinsplit_sig_charlie = joinsplit_sign( joinsplit_keypair, charlie_eth_address, ciphertexts, proof_json) mix_params = contracts.MixParameters( proof_json, joinsplit_keypair.vk, joinsplit_sig_charlie, [fake_ciphertext0, fake_ciphertext1]) tx_hash = zeth_client.mix( mix_params, charlie_eth_address, None, EtherValue(BOB_DEPOSIT_ETH)) result_corrupt1 = \ wait_for_tx_update_mk_tree(zeth_client, mk_tree, tx_hash) except Exception as e: print( "Charlie's first corruption attempt" + f" successfully rejected! (msg: {e})" ) assert(result_corrupt1 is None), \ "Charlie managed to corrupt Bob's deposit the first time!" print("") # Case 2: replacing the ciphertexts by garbage/arbitrary data and # using a new OT-signature # Corrupt the ciphertexts fake_ciphertext0 = urandom(32) fake_ciphertext1 = urandom(32) new_joinsplit_keypair = signing.gen_signing_keypair() # Sign the primary inputs, sender_eph_pk and the ciphertexts result_corrupt2 = None try: joinsplit_sig_charlie = joinsplit_sign( new_joinsplit_keypair, charlie_eth_address, [fake_ciphertext0, fake_ciphertext1], proof_json) mix_params = contracts.MixParameters( proof_json, new_joinsplit_keypair.vk, joinsplit_sig_charlie, [fake_ciphertext0, fake_ciphertext1]) tx_hash = zeth_client.mix( mix_params, charlie_eth_address, None, EtherValue(BOB_DEPOSIT_ETH)) result_corrupt2 = \ wait_for_tx_update_mk_tree(zeth_client, mk_tree, tx_hash) except Exception as e: print( "Charlie's second corruption attempt" + f" successfully rejected! (msg: {e})" ) assert(result_corrupt2 is None), \ "Charlie managed to corrupt Bob's deposit the second time!" # Case3: Charlie uses the correct mix data, but attempts to send the mix # call from his own address (thereby receiving the output). result_corrupt3 = None try: joinsplit_sig_bob = joinsplit_sign( joinsplit_keypair, bob_eth_address, ciphertexts, proof_json) mix_params = contracts.MixParameters( proof_json, joinsplit_keypair.vk, joinsplit_sig_bob, ciphertexts) tx_hash = zeth_client.mix( mix_params, charlie_eth_address, None, EtherValue(BOB_DEPOSIT_ETH), 4000000) result_corrupt3 = \ wait_for_tx_update_mk_tree(zeth_client, mk_tree, tx_hash) except Exception as e: print( "Charlie's third corruption attempt" + f" successfully rejected! (msg: {e})" ) assert(result_corrupt3 is None), \ "Charlie managed to corrupt Bob's deposit the third time!" # ### ATTACK BLOCK # Bob transaction is finally mined joinsplit_sig_bob = joinsplit_sign( joinsplit_keypair, bob_eth_address, ciphertexts, proof_json) mix_params = contracts.MixParameters( proof_json, joinsplit_keypair.vk, joinsplit_sig_bob, ciphertexts) tx_hash = zeth_client.mix( mix_params, bob_eth_address, None, EtherValue(BOB_DEPOSIT_ETH)) return wait_for_tx_update_mk_tree(zeth_client, mk_tree, tx_hash)
def charlie_double_withdraw( zeth_client: MixerClient, prover_client: ProverClient, zksnark: IZKSnarkProvider, mk_tree: MerkleTree, input1: Tuple[int, ZethNote], charlie_eth_address: str, keystore: mock.KeyStore) -> MixResult: """ Charlie tries to carry out a double spending by modifying the value of the nullifier of the previous payment """ pp = zeth_client.prover_config.pairing_parameters scalar_field_mod = pp.scalar_field_mod() scalar_field_capacity = pp.scalar_field_capacity print( f" === Charlie attempts to withdraw {CHARLIE_WITHDRAW_ETH}ETH once " + "more (double spend) one of his note on the Mixer ===") charlie_addr = keystore["Charlie"] charlie_apk = charlie_addr.addr_pk.a_pk # Create the an additional dummy input for the MixerClient input2 = get_dummy_input_and_address(charlie_apk) note1_value = EtherValue(CHARLIE_WITHDRAW_CHANGE_ETH) v_out = EtherValue(CHARLIE_WITHDRAW_ETH) # ### ATTACK BLOCK # Add malicious nullifiers: we reuse old nullifiers to double spend by # adding $r$ to them so that they have the same value as before in Z_r, # and so the zksnark verification passes, but have different values in # {0;1}^256 so that they appear different to the contract. # See: https://github.com/clearmatics/zeth/issues/38 attack_primary_input3: int = 0 attack_primary_input4: int = 0 def compute_h_sig_attack_nf( nfs: List[bytes], sign_vk: JoinsplitSigVerificationKey) -> bytes: # We disassemble the nfs to get the formatting of the primary inputs assert len(nfs) == 2 nf0 = nfs[0] nf1 = nfs[1] input_nullifier0 = nf0.hex() input_nullifier1 = nf1.hex() nf0_rev = "{0:0256b}".format(int(input_nullifier0, 16)) primary_input3_bits = nf0_rev[:scalar_field_capacity] primary_input3_res_bits = nf0_rev[scalar_field_capacity:] nf1_rev = "{0:0256b}".format(int(input_nullifier1, 16)) primary_input4_bits = nf1_rev[:scalar_field_capacity] primary_input4_res_bits = nf1_rev[scalar_field_capacity:] # We perform the attack, recoding the modified public input values nonlocal attack_primary_input3 nonlocal attack_primary_input4 attack_primary_input3 = int(primary_input3_bits, 2) + scalar_field_mod attack_primary_input4 = int(primary_input4_bits, 2) + scalar_field_mod # We reassemble the nfs attack_primary_input3_bits = "{0:0256b}".format(attack_primary_input3) attack_nf0_bits = attack_primary_input3_bits[ len(attack_primary_input3_bits) - scalar_field_capacity:] +\ primary_input3_res_bits attack_nf0 = "{0:064x}".format(int(attack_nf0_bits, 2)) attack_primary_input4_bits = "{0:0256b}".format(attack_primary_input4) attack_nf1_bits = attack_primary_input4_bits[ len(attack_primary_input4_bits) - scalar_field_capacity:] +\ primary_input4_res_bits attack_nf1 = "{0:064x}".format(int(attack_nf1_bits, 2)) return compute_h_sig( [bytes.fromhex(attack_nf0), bytes.fromhex(attack_nf1)], sign_vk) output_note1, output_note2, proof, public_data, signing_keypair = \ get_mix_parameters_components( zeth_client, prover_client, mk_tree, keystore["Charlie"].ownership_keypair(), # sender [input1, input2], [(charlie_addr.addr_pk, note1_value), (charlie_addr.addr_pk, EtherValue(0))], EtherValue(0), v_out, compute_h_sig_attack_nf) # Update the primary inputs to the modified nullifiers, since libsnark # overwrites them with values in Z_p assert attack_primary_input3 != 0 assert attack_primary_input4 != 0 print("proof = ", proof) print("public_data[3] = ", public_data[3]) print("public_data[4] = ", public_data[4]) public_data[3] = attack_primary_input3 public_data[4] = attack_primary_input4 # ### ATTACK BLOCK # construct pk object from bytes pk_charlie = keystore["Charlie"].addr_pk.k_pk # encrypt the coins ciphertexts = encrypt_notes([ (output_note1, pk_charlie), (output_note2, pk_charlie)]) # Compute the joinSplit signature joinsplit_sig_charlie = joinsplit_sign( zksnark, pp, signing_keypair, charlie_eth_address, ciphertexts, proof, public_data) mix_params = MixParameters( proof, public_data, signing_keypair.vk, joinsplit_sig_charlie, ciphertexts) tx_hash = zeth_client.mix( mix_params, charlie_eth_address, # Pay an arbitrary amount (1 wei here) that will be refunded since the # `mix` function is payable None, EtherValue(1, 'wei')) return wait_for_tx_update_mk_tree(zeth_client, mk_tree, tx_hash)