async def is_authenticated(reader: StreamReader, writer: StreamWriter) -> bool:
challenge = create_random_challenge()
request_id = RequestIDGenerator.generate_request_id(
) % CONNECTION_COUNTER_LIMIT
frame = AuthenticationChallengeFrame(challenge, request_id)
await send_over_stream_async(frame, writer, settings.CONCENT_PRIVATE_KEY)
logger.info(f"Challenge has been sent for request ID: {request_id}.")
received_frame = await handle_frame_receive_async(
reader, settings.SIGNING_SERVICE_PUBLIC_KEY)
logger.info(f"Response has been received for request ID: {request_id}.")
is_successful = True
message_to_log = f'Authentication unsuccessful. Request ID: {request_id}. '
if not isinstance(received_frame, AuthenticationResponseFrame):
is_successful = False
message_to_log += f'Received_frame is not AuthenticationResponseFrame instance. It is {type(received_frame)} instance.'
elif received_frame.request_id != request_id:
is_successful = False
message_to_log += f'Received_frame ID should be {request_id}, but it is {received_frame.request_id}. '
else:
try:
ecdsa_verify(settings.SIGNING_SERVICE_PUBLIC_KEY,
received_frame.payload, challenge)
except InvalidSignature:
is_successful = False
message_to_log += 'Invalid ECDSA signature'
if not is_successful:
logger.debug(message_to_log)
return is_successful
def test_message_sig(self):
"""Signed message inside a signed message"""
concent_keys = cryptography.ECCx(None)
provider_keys = cryptography.ECCx(None)
requestor_keys = cryptography.ECCx(None)
report_computed_task = factories.tasks.ReportComputedTaskFactory()
# Dump TaskToCompute to make it signed
s_rct = shortcuts.dump(
report_computed_task,
requestor_keys.raw_privkey,
provider_keys.raw_pubkey,
)
# Load TaskToCompute back to its original format
# Task TaskToCompute is verified correctly
report_computed_task = shortcuts.load(
s_rct,
provider_keys.raw_privkey,
requestor_keys.raw_pubkey,
)
first_sig = report_computed_task.sig
first_hash = report_computed_task.get_short_hash()
force_report = message.ForceReportComputedTask()
force_report.report_computed_task = report_computed_task
s_force_report = shortcuts.dump(
force_report,
provider_keys.raw_privkey,
concent_keys.raw_pubkey,
)
force_report = shortcuts.load(
s_force_report,
concent_keys.raw_privkey,
provider_keys.raw_pubkey,
)
second_sig = force_report.report_computed_task.sig
second_hash = force_report.report_computed_task.get_short_hash()
self.assertEqual(first_sig, second_sig)
self.assertEqual(first_hash, second_hash)
# Now, attached TaskToCompute should still be verified using
# original key. ecdsa_verify will raise InvalidSignature on
# failure.
cryptography.ecdsa_verify(
requestor_keys.raw_pubkey,
force_report.report_computed_task.sig,
force_report.report_computed_task.get_short_hash(),
)
def _validate_signature(cls, raw_signed_part_of_the_frame: bytes, signature: bytes, public_key: bytes) -> None:
try:
ecdsa_verify(
pubkey=public_key,
signature=signature,
message=raw_signed_part_of_the_frame,
)
except InvalidSignature:
raise SignatureInvalidMiddlemanProtocolError(
'Frame signature does not match its content.'
)
def test_signature(self):
bob = get_ecc('secret2')
# sign
message = sha3("Hello Alice")
signature = bob.sign(message)
# verify signature
assert ecdsa_verify(bob.raw_pubkey, signature, message) is True
# wrong signature
message = sha3("Hello Alicf")
with self.assertRaises(exceptions.InvalidSignature):
ecdsa_verify(bob.raw_pubkey, signature, message)
def test_that_authenticate_should_send_authentication_response_if_authentication_challenge_is_correct(
self):
middleman_message = AuthenticationChallengeFrame(
payload=self.authentication_challenge,
request_id=99,
)
raw_message = middleman_message.serialize(
private_key=CONCENT_PRIVATE_KEY)
raw_message_received = self._prepare_and_execute_handle_connection(
raw_message, )
deserialized_message = AbstractFrame.deserialize(
raw_message=raw_message_received,
public_key=SIGNING_SERVICE_PUBLIC_KEY,
)
assertpy.assert_that(deserialized_message).is_instance_of(
AuthenticationResponseFrame)
assertpy.assert_that(
deserialized_message.payload).is_instance_of(bytes)
assertpy.assert_that(
ecdsa_verify(
SIGNING_SERVICE_PUBLIC_KEY,
deserialized_message.payload,
self.authentication_challenge,
)).is_true()
def test_that_get_authentication_challenge_signature_should_return_signature_of_passed_bytes(self):
authentication_challenge = bytes(os.urandom(1000))
signature = self.signing_service._get_authentication_challenge_signature(authentication_challenge)
self.assertIsInstance(signature, bytes)
self.assertTrue(
ecdsa_verify(
self.signing_service.signing_service_public_key,
signature,
authentication_challenge,
)
)
def verify_signature(self,
public_key: bytes,
msg_hash: bytes = None) -> bool:
"""
Verify the message's signature using the provided public key.
Ensures that the message's content is intact and that it has been
indeed signed by the expected party.
:param public_key: the public key of the expected sender
:param msg_hash: if provided, a call to `get_short_hash()`
will be skipped and the provided hash used instead
:return: `True` if the signature is correct.
:raises: `exceptions.InvalidSignature` if the signature is corrupted
"""
return cryptography.ecdsa_verify(pubkey=public_key,
signature=self.sig,
message=msg_hash
or self.get_short_hash())
def test_message_sig(self):
"""Signed message inside a signed message"""
concent_keys = cryptography.ECCx(None)
provider_keys = cryptography.ECCx(None)
requestor_keys = cryptography.ECCx(None)
task_to_compute = message.TaskToCompute()
ctd = message.ComputeTaskDef({
'task_id': 20,
})
task_to_compute.compute_task_def = ctd
# Dump TaskToCompute to make it signed
s_task_to_compute = shortcuts.dump(
task_to_compute,
requestor_keys.raw_privkey,
provider_keys.raw_pubkey,
)
# Load TaskToCompute back to its original format
task_to_compute = shortcuts.load(
s_task_to_compute,
provider_keys.raw_privkey,
requestor_keys.raw_pubkey,
)
first_sig = task_to_compute.sig
first_hash = task_to_compute.get_short_hash()
# Task TaskToCompute is verified correctly
cryptography.ecdsa_verify(
requestor_keys.raw_pubkey,
task_to_compute.sig,
task_to_compute.get_short_hash(),
)
force_report = message.ForceReportComputedTask()
force_report.task_to_compute = task_to_compute
s_force_report = shortcuts.dump(
force_report,
provider_keys.raw_privkey,
concent_keys.raw_pubkey,
)
force_report = shortcuts.load(
s_force_report,
concent_keys.raw_privkey,
provider_keys.raw_pubkey,
)
second_sig = force_report.task_to_compute.sig
second_hash = force_report.task_to_compute.get_short_hash()
self.assertEqual(first_sig, second_sig)
self.assertEqual(first_hash, second_hash)
# Now, attached TaskToCompute should still be verified using
# original key. ecdsa_verify will raise InvalidSignature on
# failure.
cryptography.ecdsa_verify(
requestor_keys.raw_pubkey,
force_report.task_to_compute.sig,
force_report.task_to_compute.get_short_hash(),
)