def decode(self):
"""Helper method: Determines this message's type and contents."""
if self.payload is None:
return
message = self.payload
self.contents = None
try:
self.dPayload = mixminion.BuildMessage.decodePayload(message, "")
if self.dPayload is None:
# encrypted message
self.type = 'enc'
self.contents = message
self.headers = {}
elif self.dPayload.isSingleton():
# forward message, singleton.
self.type = 'plain'
body = self.dPayload.getUncompressedContents()
self.contents, self.headers = \
Packet.parseMessageAndHeaders(body)
else:
# forward message, fragment.
self.isfrag = 1
self.type = 'plain'
self.contents = message
self.headers = {}
except Packet.CompressedDataTooLong, _:
self.contents = Packet.parsePayload(message).getContents()
self.type = 'long'
self.headers = {}
def decode(self):
"""Helper method: Determines this message's type and contents."""
if self.payload is None:
return
message = self.payload
self.contents = None
try:
self.dPayload = mixminion.BuildMessage.decodePayload(message, "")
if self.dPayload is None:
# encrypted message
self.type = 'enc'
self.contents = message
self.headers = {}
elif self.dPayload.isSingleton():
# forward message, singleton.
self.type = 'plain'
body = self.dPayload.getUncompressedContents()
self.contents, self.headers = \
Packet.parseMessageAndHeaders(body)
else:
# forward message, fragment.
self.isfrag = 1
self.type = 'plain'
self.contents = message
self.headers = {}
except Packet.CompressedDataTooLong, _:
self.contents = Packet.parsePayload(message).getContents()
self.type = 'long'
self.headers = {}
def setTagged(self,tagged=1):
"""Re-frame the routingInfo in this packet. If 'tagged' is true,
then the routingInfo starts with TAG_LEN bytes of decoding
handle, and the rest is address. If 'tagged' is false, then
it's all address.
"""
x = self.tag+self.address
if tagged:
if len(x)<Packet.TAG_LEN:
raise Packet.ParseError("Missing decoding handle for exit type")
self.tag = x[:Packet.TAG_LEN]
self.address = x[Packet.TAG_LEN:]
else:
self.tag = ""
self.address = x
def _constructMessage(secrets1, secrets2, header1, header2, payload):
"""Helper method: Builds a message, given both headers, all known
secrets, and the padded payload.
If using a reply block for header2, secrets2 should be null.
"""
assert len(payload) == PAYLOAD_LEN
assert len(header1) == len(header2) == HEADER_LEN
if secrets2:
# (Copy secrets2 so we don't reverse the original)
secrets2 = secrets2[:]
# If we're not using a reply block, encrypt the payload for
# each key in the second path, in reverse order.
secrets2.reverse()
for secret in secrets2:
ks = Crypto.Keyset(secret)
key = ks.getLionessKeys(Crypto.PAYLOAD_ENCRYPT_MODE)
payload = Crypto.lioness_encrypt(payload, key)
# Encrypt header2 with a hash of the payload.
key = Crypto.lioness_keys_from_payload(payload)
header2 = Crypto.lioness_encrypt(header2, key)
# Encrypt payload with a hash of header2. Now tagging either will make
# both unrecoverable.
key = Crypto.lioness_keys_from_header(header2)
payload = Crypto.lioness_encrypt(payload, key)
# Copy secrets1 so we don't reverse the original.
secrets1 = secrets1[:]
# Now, encrypt header2 and the payload for each node in path1, reversed.
secrets1.reverse()
for secret in secrets1:
ks = Crypto.Keyset(secret)
hkey = ks.getLionessKeys(Crypto.HEADER_ENCRYPT_MODE)
pkey = ks.getLionessKeys(Crypto.PAYLOAD_ENCRYPT_MODE)
header2 = Crypto.lioness_encrypt(header2,hkey)
payload = Crypto.lioness_encrypt(payload,pkey)
return Packet(header1, header2, payload).pack()
def getTextEncodedMessage(self):
"""Return a Packet.TextEncodedMessage object for this packet."""
tag = None
if self.isOvercompressed():
tp = 'LONG'
elif self.isEncrypted():
tp = 'ENC'
tag = self.tag
elif self.isPrintingAscii():
assert self.isPlaintext()
tp = 'TXT'
elif self.isFragment():
assert self.isPlaintext()
tp = 'FRAG'
else:
assert self.isPlaintext()
tp = 'BIN'
return Packet.TextEncodedMessage(self.contents, tp, tag)
def processPacket(self, msg):
"""Given a 32K mixminion packet, processes it completely.
Return one of:
None [if the packet should be dropped.]
a DeliveryPacket object
a RelayedPacket object
May raise CryptoError, ParseError, or ContentError if the packet
is malformatted, misencrypted, unparseable, repeated, or otherwise
unhandleable.
WARNING: This implementation does nothing to prevent timing
attacks: dropped packets, packets with bad digests, replayed
packets, and exit packets are all processed faster than
forwarded packets. You must prevent timing attacks elsewhere."""
# Break into headers and payload
pkt = Packet.parsePacket(msg)
header1 = Packet.parseHeader(pkt.header1)
encSubh = header1[:Packet.ENC_SUBHEADER_LEN]
header1 = header1[Packet.ENC_SUBHEADER_LEN:]
assert len(header1) == Packet.HEADER_LEN - Packet.ENC_SUBHEADER_LEN
assert len(header1) == (128*16) - 256 == 1792
# Try to decrypt the first subheader. Try each private key in
# order. Only fail if all private keys fail.
subh = None
e = None
self.lock.acquire()
try:
for pk, hashlog in self.privatekeys:
try:
subh = Crypto.pk_decrypt(encSubh, pk)
break
except Crypto.CryptoError, err:
e = err
finally:
self.lock.release()
if not subh:
# Nobody managed to get us the first subheader. Raise the
# most-recently-received error.
raise e
if len(subh) != Packet.MAX_SUBHEADER_LEN:
raise ContentError("Bad length in RSA-encrypted part of subheader")
subh = Packet.parseSubheader(subh) #may raise ParseError
# Check the version: can we read it?
if subh.major != Packet.MAJOR_NO or subh.minor != Packet.MINOR_NO:
raise ContentError("Invalid protocol version")
# Check the digest of all of header1 but the first subheader.
if subh.digest != Crypto.sha1(header1):
raise ContentError("Invalid digest")
# Get ready to generate packet keys.
keys = Crypto.Keyset(subh.secret)
# Replay prevention
replayhash = keys.get(Crypto.REPLAY_PREVENTION_MODE, Crypto.DIGEST_LEN)
if hashlog.seenHash(replayhash):
raise ContentError("Duplicate packet detected.")
else:
hashlog.logHash(replayhash)
# If we're meant to drop, drop now.
rt = subh.routingtype
if rt == Packet.DROP_TYPE:
return None
# Prepare the key to decrypt the header in counter mode. We'll be
# using this more than once.
header_sec_key = Crypto.aes_key(keys.get(Crypto.HEADER_SECRET_MODE))
# Prepare key to generate padding
junk_key = Crypto.aes_key(keys.get(Crypto.RANDOM_JUNK_MODE))
# Pad the rest of header 1
header1 += Crypto.prng(junk_key,
Packet.OAEP_OVERHEAD + Packet.MIN_SUBHEADER_LEN
+ subh.routinglen)
assert len(header1) == (Packet.HEADER_LEN - Packet.ENC_SUBHEADER_LEN
+ Packet.OAEP_OVERHEAD+Packet.MIN_SUBHEADER_LEN
+ subh.routinglen)
assert len(header1) == 1792 + 42 + 42 + subh.routinglen == \
1876 + subh.routinglen
# Decrypt the rest of header 1, encrypting the padding.
header1 = Crypto.ctr_crypt(header1, header_sec_key)
# If the subheader says that we have extra routing info that didn't
# fit in the RSA-encrypted part, get it now.
overflowLength = subh.getOverflowLength()
if overflowLength:
subh.appendOverflow(header1[:overflowLength])
header1 = header1[overflowLength:]
assert len(header1) == (
1876 + subh.routinglen
- max(0,subh.routinglen-Packet.MAX_ROUTING_INFO_LEN))
header1 = subh.underflow + header1
assert len(header1) == Packet.HEADER_LEN
# Decrypt the payload.
payload = Crypto.lioness_decrypt(pkt.payload,
keys.getLionessKeys(Crypto.PAYLOAD_ENCRYPT_MODE))
# If we're an exit node, there's no need to process the headers
# further.
if rt >= Packet.MIN_EXIT_TYPE:
return DeliveryPacket(rt, subh.getExitAddress(0),
keys.get(Crypto.APPLICATION_KEY_MODE),
payload)
# If we're not an exit node, make sure that what we recognize our
# routing type.
if rt not in (Packet.SWAP_FWD_IPV4_TYPE, Packet.FWD_IPV4_TYPE,
Packet.SWAP_FWD_HOST_TYPE, Packet.FWD_HOST_TYPE):
raise ContentError("Unrecognized Mixminion routing type")
# Decrypt header 2.
header2 = Crypto.lioness_decrypt(pkt.header2,
keys.getLionessKeys(Crypto.HEADER_ENCRYPT_MODE))
# If we're the swap node, (1) decrypt the payload with a hash of
# header2... (2) decrypt header2 with a hash of the payload...
# (3) and swap the headers.
if Packet.typeIsSwap(rt):
hkey = Crypto.lioness_keys_from_header(header2)
payload = Crypto.lioness_decrypt(payload, hkey)
hkey = Crypto.lioness_keys_from_payload(payload)
header2 = Crypto.lioness_decrypt(header2, hkey)
header1, header2 = header2, header1
# Build the address object for the next hop
address = Packet.parseRelayInfoByType(rt, subh.routinginfo)
# Construct the packet for the next hop.
pkt = Packet.Packet(header1, header2, payload).pack()
return RelayedPacket(address, pkt)
def processPacket(self, msg):
"""Given a 32K mixminion packet, processes it completely.
Return one of:
None [if the packet should be dropped.]
a DeliveryPacket object
a RelayedPacket object
May raise CryptoError, ParseError, or ContentError if the packet
is malformatted, misencrypted, unparseable, repeated, or otherwise
unhandleable.
WARNING: This implementation does nothing to prevent timing
attacks: dropped packets, packets with bad digests, replayed
packets, and exit packets are all processed faster than
forwarded packets. You must prevent timing attacks elsewhere."""
# Break into headers and payload
pkt = Packet.parsePacket(msg)
header1 = Packet.parseHeader(pkt.header1)
encSubh = header1[:Packet.ENC_SUBHEADER_LEN]
header1 = header1[Packet.ENC_SUBHEADER_LEN:]
assert len(header1) == Packet.HEADER_LEN - Packet.ENC_SUBHEADER_LEN
assert len(header1) == (128*16) - 256 == 1792
# Try to decrypt the first subheader. Try each private key in
# order. Only fail if all private keys fail.
subh = None
e = None
self.lock.acquire()
try:
for pk, hashlog in self.privatekeys:
try:
subh = Crypto.pk_decrypt(encSubh, pk)
break
except Crypto.CryptoError, err:
e = err
finally:
self.lock.release()
if not subh:
# Nobody managed to get us the first subheader. Raise the
# most-recently-received error.
raise e
if len(subh) != Packet.MAX_SUBHEADER_LEN:
raise ContentError("Bad length in RSA-encrypted part of subheader")
subh = Packet.parseSubheader(subh) #may raise ParseError
# Check the version: can we read it?
if subh.major != Packet.MAJOR_NO or subh.minor != Packet.MINOR_NO:
raise ContentError("Invalid protocol version")
# Check the digest of all of header1 but the first subheader.
if subh.digest != Crypto.sha1(header1):
raise ContentError("Invalid digest")
# Get ready to generate packet keys.
keys = Crypto.Keyset(subh.secret)
# Replay prevention
replayhash = keys.get(Crypto.REPLAY_PREVENTION_MODE, Crypto.DIGEST_LEN)
if hashlog.seenHash(replayhash):
raise ContentError("Duplicate packet detected.")
else:
hashlog.logHash(replayhash)
# If we're meant to drop, drop now.
rt = subh.routingtype
if rt == Packet.DROP_TYPE:
return None
# Prepare the key to decrypt the header in counter mode. We'll be
# using this more than once.
header_sec_key = Crypto.aes_key(keys.get(Crypto.HEADER_SECRET_MODE))
# Prepare key to generate padding
junk_key = Crypto.aes_key(keys.get(Crypto.RANDOM_JUNK_MODE))
# Pad the rest of header 1
header1 += Crypto.prng(junk_key,
Packet.OAEP_OVERHEAD + Packet.MIN_SUBHEADER_LEN
+ subh.routinglen)
assert len(header1) == (Packet.HEADER_LEN - Packet.ENC_SUBHEADER_LEN
+ Packet.OAEP_OVERHEAD+Packet.MIN_SUBHEADER_LEN
+ subh.routinglen)
assert len(header1) == 1792 + 42 + 42 + subh.routinglen == \
1876 + subh.routinglen
# Decrypt the rest of header 1, encrypting the padding.
header1 = Crypto.ctr_crypt(header1, header_sec_key)
# If the subheader says that we have extra routing info that didn't
# fit in the RSA-encrypted part, get it now.
overflowLength = subh.getOverflowLength()
if overflowLength:
subh.appendOverflow(header1[:overflowLength])
header1 = header1[overflowLength:]
assert len(header1) == (
1876 + subh.routinglen
- max(0,subh.routinglen-Packet.MAX_ROUTING_INFO_LEN))
header1 = subh.underflow + header1
assert len(header1) == Packet.HEADER_LEN
# Decrypt the payload.
payload = Crypto.lioness_decrypt(pkt.payload,
keys.getLionessKeys(Crypto.PAYLOAD_ENCRYPT_MODE))
# If we're an exit node, there's no need to process the headers
# further.
if rt >= Packet.MIN_EXIT_TYPE:
return DeliveryPacket(rt, subh.getExitAddress(0),
keys.get(Crypto.APPLICATION_KEY_MODE),
payload)
# If we're not an exit node, make sure that what we recognize our
# routing type.
if rt not in (Packet.SWAP_FWD_IPV4_TYPE, Packet.FWD_IPV4_TYPE,
Packet.SWAP_FWD_HOST_TYPE, Packet.FWD_HOST_TYPE):
raise ContentError("Unrecognized Mixminion routing type")
# Decrypt header 2.
header2 = Crypto.lioness_decrypt(pkt.header2,
keys.getLionessKeys(Crypto.HEADER_ENCRYPT_MODE))
# If we're the swap node, (1) decrypt the payload with a hash of
# header2... (2) decrypt header2 with a hash of the payload...
# (3) and swap the headers.
if Packet.typeIsSwap(rt):
hkey = Crypto.lioness_keys_from_header(header2)
payload = Crypto.lioness_decrypt(payload, hkey)
hkey = Crypto.lioness_keys_from_payload(payload)
header2 = Crypto.lioness_decrypt(header2, hkey)
header1, header2 = header2, header1
# Build the address object for the next hop
address = Packet.parseRelayInfoByType(rt, subh.routinginfo)
# Construct the packet for the next hop.
pkt = Packet.Packet(header1, header2, payload).pack()
return RelayedPacket(address, pkt)