def test_append_crypto_meta(self):
actual = crypto_utils.append_crypto_meta('abc', self.meta)
expected = 'abc; swift_meta=%s' % self.serialized_meta
self.assertEqual(actual, expected)
actual = crypto_utils.append_crypto_meta('abc', self.meta_with_key)
expected = 'abc; swift_meta=%s' % self.serialized_meta_with_key
self.assertEqual(actual, expected)
def test_append_crypto_meta(self):
actual = crypto_utils.append_crypto_meta('abc', self.meta)
expected = 'abc; swift_meta=%s' % self.serialized_meta
self.assertEqual(actual, expected)
actual = crypto_utils.append_crypto_meta('abc', self.meta_with_key)
expected = 'abc; swift_meta=%s' % self.serialized_meta_with_key
self.assertEqual(actual, expected)
def encrypt_user_metadata(self, req, keys):
"""
Encrypt user-metadata header values. Replace each x-object-meta-<key>
user metadata header with a corresponding
x-object-transient-sysmeta-crypto-meta-<key> header which has the
crypto metadata required to decrypt appended to the encrypted value.
:param req: a swob Request
:param keys: a dict of encryption keys
"""
prefix = get_object_transient_sysmeta('crypto-meta-')
user_meta_headers = [h for h in req.headers.items() if
is_user_meta(self.server_type, h[0]) and h[1]]
crypto_meta = None
for name, val in user_meta_headers:
short_name = strip_user_meta_prefix(self.server_type, name)
new_name = prefix + short_name
enc_val, crypto_meta = encrypt_header_val(
self.crypto, val, keys[self.server_type])
req.headers[new_name] = append_crypto_meta(enc_val, crypto_meta)
req.headers.pop(name)
# store a single copy of the crypto meta items that are common to all
# encrypted user metadata independently of any such meta that is stored
# with the object body because it might change on a POST. This is done
# for future-proofing - the meta stored here is not currently used
# during decryption.
if crypto_meta:
meta = dump_crypto_meta({'cipher': crypto_meta['cipher'],
'key_id': keys['id']})
req.headers[get_object_transient_sysmeta('crypto-meta')] = meta
def encrypt_user_metadata(self, req, keys):
"""
Encrypt user-metadata header values. Replace each x-object-meta-<key>
user metadata header with a corresponding
x-object-transient-sysmeta-crypto-meta-<key> header which has the
crypto metadata required to decrypt appended to the encrypted value.
:param req: a swob Request
:param keys: a dict of encryption keys
"""
prefix = get_object_transient_sysmeta('crypto-meta-')
user_meta_headers = [
h for h in req.headers.items()
if is_user_meta(self.server_type, h[0]) and h[1]
]
crypto_meta = None
for name, val in user_meta_headers:
short_name = strip_user_meta_prefix(self.server_type, name)
new_name = prefix + short_name
enc_val, crypto_meta = encrypt_header_val(self.crypto, val,
keys[self.server_type])
req.headers[new_name] = append_crypto_meta(enc_val, crypto_meta)
req.headers.pop(name)
# store a single copy of the crypto meta items that are common to all
# encrypted user metadata independently of any such meta that is stored
# with the object body because it might change on a POST. This is done
# for future-proofing - the meta stored here is not currently used
# during decryption.
if crypto_meta:
meta = dump_crypto_meta({
'cipher': crypto_meta['cipher'],
'key_id': keys['id']
})
req.headers[get_object_transient_sysmeta('crypto-meta')] = meta
def test_append_crypto_meta(self):
actual = crypto_utils.append_crypto_meta('abc', self.meta)
expected = 'abc; swift_meta=%s' % self.serialized_meta
self.assertEqual(actual, expected)
actual = crypto_utils.append_crypto_meta('abc', self.meta_with_key)
expected = 'abc; swift_meta=%s' % self.serialized_meta_with_key
self.assertEqual(actual, expected)
def check_bad_value(value):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
crypto_utils.append_crypto_meta(value, self.meta)
check_bad_value(None)
check_bad_value({})
check_bad_value(1)
def footers_callback(footers):
if inner_callback:
# pass on footers dict to any other callback that was
# registered before this one. It may override any footers that
# were set.
inner_callback(footers)
plaintext_etag = None
if self.body_crypto_ctxt:
plaintext_etag = self.plaintext_md5.hexdigest()
# If client (or other middleware) supplied etag, then validate
# against plaintext etag
etag_to_check = footers.get('Etag') or client_etag
if (etag_to_check is not None and
plaintext_etag != etag_to_check):
raise HTTPUnprocessableEntity(request=Request(self.env))
# override any previous notion of etag with the ciphertext etag
footers['Etag'] = self.ciphertext_md5.hexdigest()
# Encrypt the plaintext etag using the object key and persist
# as sysmeta along with the crypto parameters that were used.
encrypted_etag, etag_crypto_meta = encrypt_header_val(
self.crypto, plaintext_etag, self.keys['object'])
footers['X-Object-Sysmeta-Crypto-Etag'] = \
append_crypto_meta(encrypted_etag, etag_crypto_meta)
footers['X-Object-Sysmeta-Crypto-Body-Meta'] = \
dump_crypto_meta(self.body_crypto_meta)
# Also add an HMAC of the etag for use when evaluating
# conditional requests
footers['X-Object-Sysmeta-Crypto-Etag-Mac'] = _hmac_etag(
self.keys['object'], plaintext_etag)
else:
# No data was read from body, nothing was encrypted, so don't
# set any crypto sysmeta for the body, but do re-instate any
# etag provided in inbound request if other middleware has not
# already set a value.
if client_etag is not None:
footers.setdefault('Etag', client_etag)
# When deciding on the etag that should appear in container
# listings, look for:
# * override in the footer, otherwise
# * override in the header, and finally
# * MD5 of the plaintext received
# This may be None if no override was set and no data was read. An
# override value of '' will be passed on.
container_listing_etag = footers.get(
'X-Object-Sysmeta-Container-Update-Override-Etag',
container_listing_etag_header)
if container_listing_etag is None:
container_listing_etag = plaintext_etag
if (container_listing_etag and
(container_listing_etag != MD5_OF_EMPTY_STRING or
plaintext_etag)):
# Encrypt the container-listing etag using the container key
# and a random IV, and use it to override the container update
# value, with the crypto parameters appended. We use the
# container key here so that only that key is required to
# decrypt all etag values in a container listing when handling
# a container GET request. Don't encrypt an EMPTY_ETAG
# unless there actually was some body content, in which case
# the container-listing etag is possibly conveying some
# non-obvious information.
val, crypto_meta = encrypt_header_val(
self.crypto, container_listing_etag,
self.keys['container'])
crypto_meta['key_id'] = self.keys['id']
footers['X-Object-Sysmeta-Container-Update-Override-Etag'] = \
append_crypto_meta(val, crypto_meta)
def footers_callback(footers):
if inner_callback:
# pass on footers dict to any other callback that was
# registered before this one. It may override any footers that
# were set.
inner_callback(footers)
plaintext_etag = None
if self.body_crypto_ctxt:
plaintext_etag = self.plaintext_md5.hexdigest()
# If client (or other middleware) supplied etag, then validate
# against plaintext etag
etag_to_check = footers.get('Etag') or client_etag
if (etag_to_check is not None
and plaintext_etag != etag_to_check):
raise HTTPUnprocessableEntity(request=Request(self.env))
# override any previous notion of etag with the ciphertext etag
footers['Etag'] = self.ciphertext_md5.hexdigest()
# Encrypt the plaintext etag using the object key and persist
# as sysmeta along with the crypto parameters that were used.
encrypted_etag, etag_crypto_meta = encrypt_header_val(
self.crypto, plaintext_etag, self.keys['object'])
footers['X-Object-Sysmeta-Crypto-Etag'] = \
append_crypto_meta(encrypted_etag, etag_crypto_meta)
footers['X-Object-Sysmeta-Crypto-Body-Meta'] = \
dump_crypto_meta(self.body_crypto_meta)
# Also add an HMAC of the etag for use when evaluating
# conditional requests
footers['X-Object-Sysmeta-Crypto-Etag-Mac'] = _hmac_etag(
self.keys['object'], plaintext_etag)
else:
# No data was read from body, nothing was encrypted, so don't
# set any crypto sysmeta for the body, but do re-instate any
# etag provided in inbound request if other middleware has not
# already set a value.
if client_etag is not None:
footers.setdefault('Etag', client_etag)
# When deciding on the etag that should appear in container
# listings, look for:
# * override in the footer, otherwise
# * override in the header, and finally
# * MD5 of the plaintext received
# This may be None if no override was set and no data was read
container_listing_etag = footers.get(
'X-Object-Sysmeta-Container-Update-Override-Etag',
container_listing_etag_header) or plaintext_etag
if (container_listing_etag is not None
and (container_listing_etag != MD5_OF_EMPTY_STRING
or plaintext_etag)):
# Encrypt the container-listing etag using the container key
# and a random IV, and use it to override the container update
# value, with the crypto parameters appended. We use the
# container key here so that only that key is required to
# decrypt all etag values in a container listing when handling
# a container GET request. Don't encrypt an EMPTY_ETAG
# unless there actually was some body content, in which case
# the container-listing etag is possibly conveying some
# non-obvious information.
val, crypto_meta = encrypt_header_val(self.crypto,
container_listing_etag,
self.keys['container'])
crypto_meta['key_id'] = self.keys['id']
footers['X-Object-Sysmeta-Container-Update-Override-Etag'] = \
append_crypto_meta(val, crypto_meta)
def test_append_then_extract_crypto_meta(self):
val = 'abc'
actual = crypto_utils.extract_crypto_meta(
crypto_utils.append_crypto_meta(val, self.meta))
self.assertEqual((val, self.meta), actual)
def test_append_then_extract_crypto_meta(self):
val = 'abc'
actual = crypto_utils.extract_crypto_meta(
crypto_utils.append_crypto_meta(val, self.meta))
self.assertEqual((val, self.meta), actual)
def check_bad_value(value):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
crypto_utils.append_crypto_meta(value, self.meta)