def MsgTestAESCBCSeperate(self,msg):
groupObj = PairingGroup('SS512')
ran = groupObj.random(GT)
a = AuthenticatedCryptoAbstraction(sha2(ran))
ct = a.encrypt(msg)
b = AuthenticatedCryptoAbstraction(sha2(ran))
dmsg = b.decrypt(ct);
assert msg == dmsg , 'o: =>%s\nm: =>%s' % (msg, dmsg)
def decrypt(self, pk, sk, ct):
c1, c2 = ct['c1'], ct['c2']
key = abenc.decrypt(pk, sk, c1)
if key is False:
raise Exception("failed to decrypt!")
cipher = AuthenticatedCryptoAbstraction(sha2(key))
return cipher.decrypt(c2)
def encrypt(self, pk, M, object):
key = self.group.random(GT)
c1 = abenc.encrypt(pk, key, object)
# instantiate a symmetric enc scheme from this key
cipher = AuthenticatedCryptoAbstraction(sha2(key))
c2 = cipher.encrypt(M)
return {'c1': c1, 'c2': c2}
def testTamperMac(self):
key = sha2(PairingGroup('SS512').random(GT))
m = MessageAuthenticator(key)
a = m.mac('hello world')
m1 = MessageAuthenticator(key)
a["digest"]= "tampered"
assert not m1.verify(a), "expected message to verify";
def encrypt(self, pk, ID, M):
if type(M) != bytes: raise "message not right type!"
key = group.random(GT)
c1 = ibenc.encrypt(pk, ID, key)
# instantiate a symmetric enc scheme from this key
cipher = AuthenticatedCryptoAbstraction(sha2(key))
c2 = cipher.encrypt(M)
return {'c1': c1, 'c2': c2}
def keyenc(self, params, ID, msg):
s = group.random()
A = sha2(params['v']**s) # session key
B = params['Y']**s
C = (params['X']**s) * (params['g']**(s * ID))
# use prf here?
ciph = {'B': B, 'C': C}
return (A, ciph) # user must destroy A since it protects the msg
def decrypt(self, pk, sk, ct):
c1, c2 = ct['c1'], ct['c2']
key = abenc.decrypt(pk, sk, c1)
if key is False:
print ("[WARNING] key failed to decrypt, message not intented for this device.")
return None
cipher = AuthenticatedCryptoAbstraction(sha2(key))
return cipher.decrypt(c2)
def testTamperAlg(self):
key = sha2(PairingGroup('SS512').random(GT))
m = MessageAuthenticator(key)
a = m.mac('hello world')
m1 = MessageAuthenticator(key)
m1._algorithm = "alg" # bypassing the algorithm check to verify the mac is over the alg + data
a["alg"]= "alg"
assert not m1.verify(a), "expected message to verify";
def encrypt(self, gp, pk, M, policy_str):
if type(M) != bytes and type(policy_str) != str:
raise Exception("message and policy not right type!")
key = group.random(GT)
c1 = abencma.encrypt(gp, pk, key, policy_str)
# instantiate a symmetric enc scheme from this key
cipher = AuthenticatedCryptoAbstraction(sha2(key))
c2 = cipher.encrypt(M)
return {'c1': c1, 'c2': c2}
def decrypt(self, pk, ID, ct):
c1, c2 = ct['c1'], ct['c2']
key = ibenc.decrypt(pk, ID, c1)
cipher = AuthenticatedCryptoAbstraction(sha2(key))
return cipher.decrypt(c2)
def keydec(self, pk, dID, CT):
A, B, C = CT['A'], CT['B'], CT['C']
v_s = pair(((B**dID['r']) * C), dID['K'])
return sha2(v_s)
def testSeperateVerify(self):
key = sha2(PairingGroup('SS512').random(GT))
m = MessageAuthenticator(key)
a = m.mac('hello world')
m1 = MessageAuthenticator(key)
assert m1.verify(a), "expected message to verify";
def MsgtestAESCBC(self,msg):
groupObj = PairingGroup('SS512')
a = AuthenticatedCryptoAbstraction(sha2(groupObj.random(GT)))
ct = a.encrypt(msg)
dmsg = a.decrypt(ct);
assert msg == dmsg , 'o: =>%s\nm: =>%s' % (msg, dmsg)
