def _add_unspent_txo(self, utxo, height):
"""
Add a UTXO as returned by rpc's listunspent call to the wallet.
Note that these are returned as little endian outpoint txids, so
are converted.
params:
utxo: single utxo dict as returned by listunspent
current_blockheight: blockheight as integer, used to
set the block in which a confirmed utxo is included.
"""
txid = hextobin(utxo['txid'])
script = hextobin(utxo['scriptPubKey'])
value = int(Decimal(str(utxo['amount'])) * Decimal('1e8'))
self.add_utxo(txid, int(utxo['vout']), script, value, height)
def get_all_transactions(self):
""" Get all transactions (spending or receiving) that
are currently recorded by our blockchain interface as relating
to this wallet, as a list.
"""
res = []
processed_txids = []
for r in self.bci._yield_transactions(
self.get_wallet_name()):
txid = r["txid"]
if txid not in processed_txids:
tx = self.bci.get_transaction(hextobin(txid))
res.append(self.bci.get_deser_from_gettransaction(tx))
processed_txids.append(txid)
return res
def test_fidelity_bond_seen(valid, fidelity_bond_proof, maker_nick,
taker_nick):
proof = FidelityBondProof(
maker_nick, taker_nick,
hextobin(fidelity_bond_proof['certificate-pubkey']),
fidelity_bond_proof['certificate-expiry'],
hextobin(fidelity_bond_proof['certificate-signature']),
(hextobin(fidelity_bond_proof['txid']), fidelity_bond_proof['vout']),
hextobin(fidelity_bond_proof['utxo-pubkey']),
fidelity_bond_proof['locktime'])
serialized = proof._serialize_proof_msg(
fidelity_bond_proof['nick-signature'])
ob = get_ob()
ob.msgchan.nick = taker_nick
ob.on_fidelity_bond_seen(maker_nick, fidelity_bond_cmd_list[0], serialized)
rows = ob.db.execute("SELECT * FROM fidelitybonds;").fetchall()
assert len(rows) == 1
assert rows[0]["counterparty"] == maker_nick
assert rows[0]["takernick"] == taker_nick
try:
parsed_proof = FidelityBondProof.parse_and_verify_proof_msg(
rows[0]["counterparty"], rows[0]["takernick"], rows[0]["proof"])
except ValueError:
parsed_proof = None
if valid:
assert parsed_proof is not None
assert parsed_proof.utxo[0] == hextobin(fidelity_bond_proof["txid"])
assert parsed_proof.utxo[1] == fidelity_bond_proof["vout"]
assert parsed_proof.locktime == fidelity_bond_proof["locktime"]
assert parsed_proof.cert_expiry == fidelity_bond_proof[
"certificate-expiry"]
assert parsed_proof.utxo_pub == hextobin(
fidelity_bond_proof["utxo-pubkey"])
else:
assert parsed_proof is None
def test_duplicate_fidelity_bond_rejected():
fidelity_bond_info = (({
"nick-signature":
(b'0E\x02!\x00\xdbb\x15\x96\xa0\x87\xb8\x1d\xe05\xddV\xa1\x1bn\x8f' +
b'q\x90&\x8cG@\x89"2\xb2\x81\x9b\xc00\xa5\xb6\x02 \x03\x14l\xd7BR\xba\x8c:\x88('
+
b'\x8e3l\xac\xf5`T\x87\xfa\xf5\xa9\x1f\x19\xc0\xb6\xe9\xbb\xdc\xc7y\x99'
),
"certificate-signature":
("3045022100eb512af938113badb4d7b29e0c22061c51dadb113a9395e" +
"9ed81a46103391213022029170de414964f07228c4f0d404b1386272bae337f0133f1329d948a"
+ "252fa2a0"),
"certificate-pubkey":
"0258efb077960d6848f001904857f062fa453de26c1ad8736f55497254f56e8a74",
"certificate-expiry":
1,
"utxo-pubkey":
"02f54f027377e84171296453828aa863c23fc4489453025f49bd3addfb3a359b3d",
"txid":
"84c88fafe0bb75f507fe3bfb29a93d10b2e80c15a63b2943c1a5fecb5a55cba2",
"vout":
0,
"locktime":
1640995200
}, "J5A4k9ecQzRRDfBx", "J55VZ6U6ZyFDNeuv"), ({
"nick-signature":
(b'0E\x02!\x00\x80\xc6$\x0c\xa1\x15YS\xacHB\xb33\xfa~\x9f\xb9`\xb3' +
b'\xfe\xed0\xadHq\xc1~\x03.B\xbb#\x02 #y~]\xd9\xbbX2\xc0\x1b\xe57\xf4\x0f\x1f'
+ b'\xd6$\x01\xf9\x15Z\xc9X\xa5\x18\xbe\x83\x1a&4Y\xd4'),
"certificate-signature":
("304402205669ea394f7381e9abf0b3c013fac2b79d24c02feb86ff153" +
"cff83c658d7cf7402200b295ace655687f80738f3733c1dc5f1e2b8f351c017a05b8bd31983dd"
+ "4d723f"),
"certificate-pubkey":
"031d1c006a6310dbdf57341efc19c3a43c402379d7ccd2480416cadc7579f973f7",
"certificate-expiry":
1,
"utxo-pubkey":
"02616c56412eb738a9eacfb0550b43a5a2e77e5d5205ea9e2ca8dfac34e50c9754",
"txid":
"84c88fafe0bb75f507fe3bfb29a93d10b2e80c15a63b2943c1a5fecb5a55cba2",
"vout":
1,
"locktime":
1893456000
}, "J54LS6YyJPoseqFS", "J55VZ6U6ZyFDNeuv"))
ob = get_ob()
fidelity_bond_proof1, maker_nick1, taker_nick1 = fidelity_bond_info[0]
proof = FidelityBondProof(
maker_nick1, taker_nick1,
hextobin(fidelity_bond_proof1['certificate-pubkey']),
fidelity_bond_proof1['certificate-expiry'],
hextobin(fidelity_bond_proof1['certificate-signature']),
(hextobin(fidelity_bond_proof1['txid']), fidelity_bond_proof1['vout']),
hextobin(fidelity_bond_proof1['utxo-pubkey']),
fidelity_bond_proof1['locktime'])
serialized1 = proof._serialize_proof_msg(
fidelity_bond_proof1['nick-signature'])
ob.msgchan.nick = taker_nick1
ob.on_fidelity_bond_seen(maker_nick1, fidelity_bond_cmd_list[0],
serialized1)
rows = ob.db.execute("SELECT * FROM fidelitybonds;").fetchall()
assert len(rows) == 1
#show the same fidelity bond message again, check it gets rejected as duplicate
ob.on_fidelity_bond_seen(maker_nick1, fidelity_bond_cmd_list[0],
serialized1)
rows = ob.db.execute("SELECT * FROM fidelitybonds;").fetchall()
assert len(rows) == 1
#show a different fidelity bond and check it does get accepted
fidelity_bond_proof2, maker_nick2, taker_nick2 = fidelity_bond_info[1]
proof2 = FidelityBondProof(
maker_nick1, taker_nick1,
hextobin(fidelity_bond_proof2['certificate-pubkey']),
fidelity_bond_proof2['certificate-expiry'],
hextobin(fidelity_bond_proof2['certificate-signature']),
(hextobin(fidelity_bond_proof2['txid']), fidelity_bond_proof2['vout']),
hextobin(fidelity_bond_proof2['utxo-pubkey']),
fidelity_bond_proof2['locktime'])
serialized2 = proof2._serialize_proof_msg(
fidelity_bond_proof2['nick-signature'])
ob.msgchan.nick = taker_nick2
ob.on_fidelity_bond_seen(maker_nick2, fidelity_bond_cmd_list[0],
serialized2)
rows = ob.db.execute("SELECT * FROM fidelitybonds;").fetchall()
assert len(rows) == 2
def transaction_monitor(self):
"""Keeps track of any changes in the wallet (new transactions).
Intended to be run as a twisted task.LoopingCall so that this
Service is constantly in near-realtime sync with the blockchain.
"""
if not self.update_blockheight():
return
txlist = self.bci.list_transactions(100)
if not txlist:
return
new_txs = []
for x in txlist:
# process either (a) a completely new tx or
# (b) a tx that reached unconf status but we are still
# waiting for conf (active_txids)
if "txid" not in x:
continue
if x['txid'] in self.active_txids or x['txid'] not in self.old_txs:
new_txs.append(x)
# reset for next polling event:
self.old_txs = [x['txid'] for x in txlist if "txid" in x]
for tx in new_txs:
txid = tx["txid"]
res = self.bci.get_transaction(hextobin(txid))
if not res:
continue
confs = res["confirmations"]
if not isinstance(confs, Integral):
jlog.warning("Malformed gettx result: " + str(res))
continue
if confs < 0:
jlog.info("Transaction: " + txid +
" has a conflict, abandoning.")
continue
if confs == 0:
height = None
else:
height = self.current_blockheight - confs + 1
txd = self.bci.get_deser_from_gettransaction(res)
if txd is None:
continue
removed_utxos, added_utxos = self.wallet.process_new_tx(
txd, height)
if txid not in self.processed_txids:
# apply checks to disable/freeze utxos to reused addrs if needed:
self.check_for_reuse(added_utxos)
# TODO note that this log message will be missed if confirmation
# is absurdly fast, this is considered acceptable compared with
# additional complexity.
self.log_new_tx(removed_utxos, added_utxos, txid)
self.processed_txids.append(txid)
# first fire 'all' type callbacks, irrespective of if the
# transaction pertains to anything known (but must
# have correct label per above); filter on this Joinmarket wallet label,
# or the external monitoring label:
if (self.bci.is_address_labeled(tx, self.get_wallet_name())
or self.bci.is_address_labeled(
tx, self.EXTERNAL_WALLET_LABEL)):
for f in self.callbacks["all"]:
# note we need no return value as we will never
# remove these from the list
f(txd, txid)
# The tuple given as the second possible key for the dict
# is such because txid is not always available
# at the time of callback registration).
possible_keys = [
txid,
tuple((x.scriptPubKey, x.nValue) for x in txd.vout)
]
# note that len(added_utxos) > 0 is not a sufficient condition for
# the tx being new, since wallet.add_new_utxos will happily re-add
# a utxo that already exists; but this does not cause re-firing
# of callbacks since we in these cases delete the callback after being
# called once.
# Note also that it's entirely possible that there are only removals,
# not additions, to the utxo set, specifically in sweeps to external
# addresses. In this case, since removal can by definition only
# happen once, we must allow entries in self.active_txids through the
# filter.
if len(added_utxos) > 0 or len(removed_utxos) > 0 \
or txid in self.active_txids:
if confs == 0:
for k in possible_keys:
if k in self.callbacks["unconfirmed"]:
for f in self.callbacks["unconfirmed"][k]:
# True implies success, implies removal:
if f(txd, txid):
self.callbacks["unconfirmed"][k].remove(f)
# keep monitoring for conf > 0:
self.active_txids.append(txid)
elif confs > 0:
for k in possible_keys:
if k in self.callbacks["confirmed"]:
for f in self.callbacks["confirmed"][k]:
if f(txd, txid, confs):
self.callbacks["confirmed"][k].remove(f)
if txid in self.active_txids:
self.active_txids.remove(txid)
