async def test_handshake():
# TODO: this test should be re-written to not depend on functionality in the `ETHPeer` class.
cancel_token = CancelToken("test_handshake")
use_eip8 = False
initiator_remote = kademlia.Node(
keys.PrivateKey(test_values['receiver_private_key']).public_key,
kademlia.Address('0.0.0.0', 0, 0))
initiator = HandshakeInitiator(
initiator_remote,
keys.PrivateKey(test_values['initiator_private_key']), use_eip8,
cancel_token)
initiator.ephemeral_privkey = keys.PrivateKey(
test_values['initiator_ephemeral_private_key'])
responder_remote = kademlia.Node(
keys.PrivateKey(test_values['initiator_private_key']).public_key,
kademlia.Address('0.0.0.0', 0, 0))
responder = HandshakeResponder(
responder_remote, keys.PrivateKey(test_values['receiver_private_key']),
use_eip8, cancel_token)
responder.ephemeral_privkey = keys.PrivateKey(
test_values['receiver_ephemeral_private_key'])
# Check that the auth message generated by the initiator is what we expect. Notice that we
# can't use the auth_init generated here because the non-deterministic prefix would cause the
# derived secrets to not match the expected values.
_auth_init = initiator.create_auth_message(test_values['initiator_nonce'])
assert len(_auth_init) == len(test_values['auth_plaintext'])
assert _auth_init[65:] == test_values['auth_plaintext'][
65:] # starts with non deterministic k
# Check that encrypting and decrypting the auth_init gets us the orig msg.
_auth_init_ciphertext = initiator.encrypt_auth_message(_auth_init)
assert _auth_init == ecies.decrypt(_auth_init_ciphertext,
responder.privkey)
# Check that the responder correctly decodes the auth msg.
auth_msg_ciphertext = test_values['auth_ciphertext']
initiator_ephemeral_pubkey, initiator_nonce, _ = decode_authentication(
auth_msg_ciphertext, responder.privkey)
assert initiator_nonce == test_values['initiator_nonce']
assert initiator_ephemeral_pubkey == (keys.PrivateKey(
test_values['initiator_ephemeral_private_key']).public_key)
# Check that the auth_ack msg generated by the responder is what we expect.
auth_ack_msg = responder.create_auth_ack_message(
test_values['receiver_nonce'])
assert auth_ack_msg == test_values['authresp_plaintext']
# Check that the secrets derived from ephemeral key agreements match the expected values.
auth_ack_ciphertext = test_values['authresp_ciphertext']
aes_secret, mac_secret, egress_mac, ingress_mac = responder.derive_secrets(
initiator_nonce, test_values['receiver_nonce'],
initiator_ephemeral_pubkey, auth_msg_ciphertext, auth_ack_ciphertext)
assert aes_secret == test_values['aes_secret']
assert mac_secret == test_values['mac_secret']
# Test values are from initiator perspective, so they're reversed here.
assert ingress_mac.digest() == test_values['initial_egress_MAC']
assert egress_mac.digest() == test_values['initial_ingress_MAC']
# Check that the initiator secrets match as well.
responder_ephemeral_pubkey, responder_nonce = initiator.decode_auth_ack_message(
test_values['authresp_ciphertext'])
(initiator_aes_secret, initiator_mac_secret, initiator_egress_mac,
initiator_ingress_mac) = initiator.derive_secrets(
initiator_nonce, responder_nonce, responder_ephemeral_pubkey,
auth_msg_ciphertext, auth_ack_ciphertext)
assert initiator_aes_secret == aes_secret
assert initiator_mac_secret == mac_secret
assert initiator_ingress_mac.digest() == test_values['initial_ingress_MAC']
assert initiator_egress_mac.digest() == test_values['initial_egress_MAC']
# Finally, check that two Peers configured with the secrets generated above understand each
# other.
responder_reader = asyncio.StreamReader()
initiator_reader = asyncio.StreamReader()
# Link the initiator's writer to the responder's reader, and the responder's writer to the
# initiator's reader.
responder_writer = MockStreamWriter(initiator_reader.feed_data)
initiator_writer = MockStreamWriter(responder_reader.feed_data)
initiator_peer = DumbPeer(remote=initiator.remote,
privkey=initiator.privkey,
reader=initiator_reader,
writer=initiator_writer,
aes_secret=initiator_aes_secret,
mac_secret=initiator_mac_secret,
egress_mac=initiator_egress_mac,
ingress_mac=initiator_ingress_mac,
headerdb=None,
network_id=1)
initiator_peer.base_protocol.send_handshake()
responder_peer = DumbPeer(remote=responder.remote,
privkey=responder.privkey,
reader=responder_reader,
writer=responder_writer,
aes_secret=aes_secret,
mac_secret=mac_secret,
egress_mac=egress_mac,
ingress_mac=ingress_mac,
headerdb=None,
network_id=1)
responder_peer.base_protocol.send_handshake()
# The handshake msgs sent by each peer (above) are going to be fed directly into their remote's
# reader, and thus the read_msg() calls will return immediately.
responder_hello, _ = await responder_peer.read_msg()
initiator_hello, _ = await initiator_peer.read_msg()
assert isinstance(responder_hello, Hello)
assert isinstance(initiator_hello, Hello)
async def test_handshake():
# This data comes from https://gist.github.com/fjl/3a78780d17c755d22df2
test_values = {
"initiator_private_key": "5e173f6ac3c669587538e7727cf19b782a4f2fda07c1eaa662c593e5e85e3051",
"receiver_private_key": "c45f950382d542169ea207959ee0220ec1491755abe405cd7498d6b16adb6df8",
"initiator_ephemeral_private_key": "19c2185f4f40634926ebed3af09070ca9e029f2edd5fae6253074896205f5f6c", # noqa: E501
"receiver_ephemeral_private_key": "d25688cf0ab10afa1a0e2dba7853ed5f1e5bf1c631757ed4e103b593ff3f5620", # noqa: E501
"auth_plaintext": "884c36f7ae6b406637c1f61b2f57e1d2cab813d24c6559aaf843c3f48962f32f46662c066d39669b7b2e3ba14781477417600e7728399278b1b5d801a519aa570034fdb5419558137e0d44cd13d319afe5629eeccb47fd9dfe55cc6089426e46cc762dd8a0636e07a54b31169eba0c7a20a1ac1ef68596f1f283b5c676bae4064abfcce24799d09f67e392632d3ffdc12e3d6430dcb0ea19c318343ffa7aae74d4cd26fecb93657d1cd9e9eaf4f8be720b56dd1d39f190c4e1c6b7ec66f077bb1100", # noqa: E501
"authresp_plaintext": "802b052f8b066640bba94a4fc39d63815c377fced6fcb84d27f791c9921ddf3e9bf0108e298f490812847109cbd778fae393e80323fd643209841a3b7f110397f37ec61d84cea03dcc5e8385db93248584e8af4b4d1c832d8c7453c0089687a700", # noqa: E501
"auth_ciphertext": "04a0274c5951e32132e7f088c9bdfdc76c9d91f0dc6078e848f8e3361193dbdc43b94351ea3d89e4ff33ddcefbc80070498824857f499656c4f79bbd97b6c51a514251d69fd1785ef8764bd1d262a883f780964cce6a14ff206daf1206aa073a2d35ce2697ebf3514225bef186631b2fd2316a4b7bcdefec8d75a1025ba2c5404a34e7795e1dd4bc01c6113ece07b0df13b69d3ba654a36e35e69ff9d482d88d2f0228e7d96fe11dccbb465a1831c7d4ad3a026924b182fc2bdfe016a6944312021da5cc459713b13b86a686cf34d6fe6615020e4acf26bf0d5b7579ba813e7723eb95b3cef9942f01a58bd61baee7c9bdd438956b426a4ffe238e61746a8c93d5e10680617c82e48d706ac4953f5e1c4c4f7d013c87d34a06626f498f34576dc017fdd3d581e83cfd26cf125b6d2bda1f1d56", # noqa: E501
"authresp_ciphertext": "049934a7b2d7f9af8fd9db941d9da281ac9381b5740e1f64f7092f3588d4f87f5ce55191a6653e5e80c1c5dd538169aa123e70dc6ffc5af1827e546c0e958e42dad355bcc1fcb9cdf2cf47ff524d2ad98cbf275e661bf4cf00960e74b5956b799771334f426df007350b46049adb21a6e78ab1408d5e6ccde6fb5e69f0f4c92bb9c725c02f99fa72b9cdc8dd53cff089e0e73317f61cc5abf6152513cb7d833f09d2851603919bf0fbe44d79a09245c6e8338eb502083dc84b846f2fee1cc310d2cc8b1b9334728f97220bb799376233e113", # noqa: E501
"ecdhe_shared_secret": "e3f407f83fc012470c26a93fdff534100f2c6f736439ce0ca90e9914f7d1c381",
"initiator_nonce": "cd26fecb93657d1cd9e9eaf4f8be720b56dd1d39f190c4e1c6b7ec66f077bb11",
"receiver_nonce": "f37ec61d84cea03dcc5e8385db93248584e8af4b4d1c832d8c7453c0089687a7",
"aes_secret": "c0458fa97a5230830e05f4f20b7c755c1d4e54b1ce5cf43260bb191eef4e418d",
"mac_secret": "48c938884d5067a1598272fcddaa4b833cd5e7d92e8228c0ecdfabbe68aef7f1",
"token": "3f9ec2592d1554852b1f54d228f042ed0a9310ea86d038dc2b401ba8cd7fdac4",
"initial_egress_MAC": "09771e93b1a6109e97074cbe2d2b0cf3d3878efafe68f53c41bb60c0ec49097e",
"initial_ingress_MAC": "75823d96e23136c89666ee025fb21a432be906512b3dd4a3049e898adb433847",
"initiator_hello_packet": "6ef23fcf1cec7312df623f9ae701e63b550cdb8517fefd8dd398fc2acd1d935e6e0434a2b96769078477637347b7b01924fff9ff1c06df2f804df3b0402bbb9f87365b3c6856b45e1e2b6470986813c3816a71bff9d69dd297a5dbd935ab578f6e5d7e93e4506a44f307c332d95e8a4b102585fd8ef9fc9e3e055537a5cec2e9", # noqa: E501
"receiver_hello_packet": "6ef23fcf1cec7312df623f9ae701e63be36a1cdd1b19179146019984f3625d4a6e0434a2b96769050577657247b7b02bc6c314470eca7e3ef650b98c83e9d7dd4830b3f718ff562349aead2530a8d28a8484604f92e5fced2c6183f304344ab0e7c301a0c05559f4c25db65e36820b4b909a226171a60ac6cb7beea09376d6d8" # noqa: E501
}
for k, v in test_values.items():
test_values[k] = decode_hex(v)
initiator_remote = kademlia.Node(
keys.PrivateKey(test_values['receiver_private_key']).public_key,
kademlia.Address('0.0.0.0', 0, 0))
initiator = HandshakeInitiator(
initiator_remote,
keys.PrivateKey(test_values['initiator_private_key']))
initiator.ephemeral_privkey = keys.PrivateKey(test_values['initiator_ephemeral_private_key'])
responder_remote = kademlia.Node(
keys.PrivateKey(test_values['initiator_private_key']).public_key,
kademlia.Address('0.0.0.0', 0, 0))
responder = HandshakeResponder(
responder_remote,
keys.PrivateKey(test_values['receiver_private_key']))
responder.ephemeral_privkey = keys.PrivateKey(test_values['receiver_ephemeral_private_key'])
# Check that the auth message generated by the initiator is what we expect. Notice that we
# can't use the auth_init generated here because the non-deterministic prefix would cause the
# derived secrets to not match the expected values.
_auth_init = initiator.create_auth_message(test_values['initiator_nonce'])
assert len(_auth_init) == len(test_values['auth_plaintext'])
assert _auth_init[65:] == test_values['auth_plaintext'][65:] # starts with non deterministic k
# Check that encrypting and decrypting the auth_init gets us the orig msg.
_auth_init_ciphertext = initiator.encrypt_auth_message(_auth_init)
assert _auth_init == ecies.decrypt(_auth_init_ciphertext, responder.privkey)
# Check that the responder correctly decodes the auth msg.
auth_msg_ciphertext = test_values['auth_ciphertext']
initiator_ephemeral_pubkey, initiator_nonce = responder.decode_authentication(
auth_msg_ciphertext)
assert initiator_nonce == test_values['initiator_nonce']
assert initiator_ephemeral_pubkey == (
keys.PrivateKey(test_values['initiator_ephemeral_private_key']).public_key)
# Check that the auth_ack msg generated by the responder is what we expect.
auth_ack_msg = responder.create_auth_ack_message(test_values['receiver_nonce'])
assert auth_ack_msg == test_values['authresp_plaintext']
# Check that the secrets derived from ephemeral key agreements match the expected values.
auth_ack_ciphertext = test_values['authresp_ciphertext']
aes_secret, mac_secret, egress_mac, ingress_mac = responder.derive_secrets(
initiator_nonce, test_values['receiver_nonce'],
initiator_ephemeral_pubkey, auth_msg_ciphertext, auth_ack_ciphertext)
assert aes_secret == test_values['aes_secret']
assert mac_secret == test_values['mac_secret']
# Test values are from initiator perspective, so they're reversed here.
assert ingress_mac.digest() == test_values['initial_egress_MAC']
assert egress_mac.digest() == test_values['initial_ingress_MAC']
# Check that the initiator secrets match as well.
responder_ephemeral_pubkey, responder_nonce = initiator.decode_auth_ack_message(
test_values['authresp_ciphertext'])
(initiator_aes_secret,
initiator_mac_secret,
initiator_egress_mac,
initiator_ingress_mac) = initiator.derive_secrets(
initiator_nonce, responder_nonce,
responder_ephemeral_pubkey, auth_msg_ciphertext, auth_ack_ciphertext)
assert initiator_aes_secret == aes_secret
assert initiator_mac_secret == mac_secret
assert initiator_ingress_mac.digest() == test_values['initial_ingress_MAC']
assert initiator_egress_mac.digest() == test_values['initial_egress_MAC']
# Finally, check that two Peers configured with the secrets generated above understand each
# other.
responder_reader = asyncio.StreamReader()
initiator_reader = asyncio.StreamReader()
# Link the initiator's writer to the responder's reader, and the responder's writer to the
# initiator's reader.
responder_writer = type(
"mock-streamwriter",
(object,),
{"write": initiator_reader.feed_data}
)
initiator_writer = type(
"mock-streamwriter",
(object,),
{"write": responder_reader.feed_data}
)
initiator_peer = BasePeer(
remote=initiator.remote, privkey=initiator.privkey, reader=initiator_reader,
writer=initiator_writer, aes_secret=initiator_aes_secret, mac_secret=initiator_mac_secret,
egress_mac=initiator_egress_mac, ingress_mac=initiator_ingress_mac, chaindb=None,
network_id=1)
initiator_peer.base_protocol.send_handshake()
responder_peer = BasePeer(
remote=responder.remote, privkey=responder.privkey, reader=responder_reader,
writer=responder_writer, aes_secret=aes_secret, mac_secret=mac_secret,
egress_mac=egress_mac, ingress_mac=ingress_mac, chaindb=None, network_id=1)
responder_peer.base_protocol.send_handshake()
# The handshake msgs sent by each peer (above) are going to be fed directly into their remote's
# reader, and thus the read_msg() calls will return immediately.
responder_hello, _ = await responder_peer.read_msg()
initiator_hello, _ = await initiator_peer.read_msg()
assert isinstance(responder_hello, Hello)
assert isinstance(initiator_hello, Hello)
async def test_handshake():
# TODO: this test should be re-written to not depend on functionality in the `ETHPeer` class.
cancel_token = CancelToken("test_handshake")
use_eip8 = False
initiator_remote = kademlia.Node(
keys.PrivateKey(test_values['receiver_private_key']).public_key,
kademlia.Address('0.0.0.0', 0, 0))
initiator = HandshakeInitiator(
initiator_remote,
keys.PrivateKey(test_values['initiator_private_key']), use_eip8,
cancel_token)
initiator.ephemeral_privkey = keys.PrivateKey(
test_values['initiator_ephemeral_private_key'])
responder_remote = kademlia.Node(
keys.PrivateKey(test_values['initiator_private_key']).public_key,
kademlia.Address('0.0.0.0', 0, 0))
responder = HandshakeResponder(
responder_remote, keys.PrivateKey(test_values['receiver_private_key']),
use_eip8, cancel_token)
responder.ephemeral_privkey = keys.PrivateKey(
test_values['receiver_ephemeral_private_key'])
# Check that the auth message generated by the initiator is what we expect. Notice that we
# can't use the auth_init generated here because the non-deterministic prefix would cause the
# derived secrets to not match the expected values.
_auth_init = initiator.create_auth_message(test_values['initiator_nonce'])
assert len(_auth_init) == len(test_values['auth_plaintext'])
assert _auth_init[65:] == test_values['auth_plaintext'][
65:] # starts with non deterministic k
# Check that encrypting and decrypting the auth_init gets us the orig msg.
_auth_init_ciphertext = initiator.encrypt_auth_message(_auth_init)
assert _auth_init == ecies.decrypt(_auth_init_ciphertext,
responder.privkey)
# Check that the responder correctly decodes the auth msg.
auth_msg_ciphertext = test_values['auth_ciphertext']
initiator_ephemeral_pubkey, initiator_nonce, _ = decode_authentication(
auth_msg_ciphertext, responder.privkey)
assert initiator_nonce == test_values['initiator_nonce']
assert initiator_ephemeral_pubkey == (keys.PrivateKey(
test_values['initiator_ephemeral_private_key']).public_key)
# Check that the auth_ack msg generated by the responder is what we expect.
auth_ack_msg = responder.create_auth_ack_message(
test_values['receiver_nonce'])
assert auth_ack_msg == test_values['authresp_plaintext']
# Check that the secrets derived from ephemeral key agreements match the expected values.
auth_ack_ciphertext = test_values['authresp_ciphertext']
aes_secret, mac_secret, egress_mac, ingress_mac = responder.derive_secrets(
initiator_nonce, test_values['receiver_nonce'],
initiator_ephemeral_pubkey, auth_msg_ciphertext, auth_ack_ciphertext)
assert aes_secret == test_values['aes_secret']
assert mac_secret == test_values['mac_secret']
# Test values are from initiator perspective, so they're reversed here.
assert ingress_mac.digest() == test_values['initial_egress_MAC']
assert egress_mac.digest() == test_values['initial_ingress_MAC']
# Check that the initiator secrets match as well.
responder_ephemeral_pubkey, responder_nonce = initiator.decode_auth_ack_message(
test_values['authresp_ciphertext'])
(initiator_aes_secret, initiator_mac_secret, initiator_egress_mac,
initiator_ingress_mac) = initiator.derive_secrets(
initiator_nonce, responder_nonce, responder_ephemeral_pubkey,
auth_msg_ciphertext, auth_ack_ciphertext)
assert initiator_aes_secret == aes_secret
assert initiator_mac_secret == mac_secret
assert initiator_ingress_mac.digest() == test_values['initial_ingress_MAC']
assert initiator_egress_mac.digest() == test_values['initial_egress_MAC']
# Finally, check that two Peers configured with the secrets generated above understand each
# other.
(
(responder_reader, responder_writer),
(initiator_reader, initiator_writer),
) = get_directly_connected_streams()
capabilities = (('paragon', 1), )
initiator_transport = Transport(remote=initiator_remote,
private_key=initiator.privkey,
reader=initiator_reader,
writer=initiator_writer,
aes_secret=initiator_aes_secret,
mac_secret=initiator_mac_secret,
egress_mac=initiator_egress_mac,
ingress_mac=initiator_ingress_mac)
initiator_p2p_protocol = P2PProtocolV5(initiator_transport, 0, False)
initiator_multiplexer = Multiplexer(
transport=initiator_transport,
base_protocol=initiator_p2p_protocol,
protocols=(),
)
initiator_multiplexer.get_base_protocol().send(
Hello(
HelloPayload(
client_version_string='initiator',
capabilities=capabilities,
listen_port=30303,
version=DEVP2P_V5,
remote_public_key=initiator.privkey.public_key.to_bytes(),
)))
responder_transport = Transport(
remote=responder_remote,
private_key=responder.privkey,
reader=responder_reader,
writer=responder_writer,
aes_secret=aes_secret,
mac_secret=mac_secret,
egress_mac=egress_mac,
ingress_mac=ingress_mac,
)
responder_p2p_protocol = P2PProtocolV5(responder_transport, 0, False)
responder_multiplexer = Multiplexer(
transport=responder_transport,
base_protocol=responder_p2p_protocol,
protocols=(),
)
responder_multiplexer.get_base_protocol().send(
Hello(
HelloPayload(
client_version_string='responder',
capabilities=capabilities,
listen_port=30303,
version=DEVP2P_V5,
remote_public_key=responder.privkey.public_key.to_bytes(),
)))
async with initiator_multiplexer.multiplex():
async with responder_multiplexer.multiplex():
initiator_stream = initiator_multiplexer.stream_protocol_messages(
initiator_p2p_protocol, )
responder_stream = responder_multiplexer.stream_protocol_messages(
responder_p2p_protocol, )
initiator_hello = await asyncio.wait_for(
initiator_stream.asend(None), timeout=0.1)
responder_hello = await asyncio.wait_for(
responder_stream.asend(None), timeout=0.1)
await initiator_stream.aclose()
await responder_stream.aclose()
assert isinstance(responder_hello, Hello)
assert isinstance(initiator_hello, Hello)
async def test_handshake():
# This data comes from https://gist.github.com/fjl/3a78780d17c755d22df2
test_values = {
"initiator_private_key":
"5e173f6ac3c669587538e7727cf19b782a4f2fda07c1eaa662c593e5e85e3051",
"receiver_private_key":
"c45f950382d542169ea207959ee0220ec1491755abe405cd7498d6b16adb6df8",
"initiator_ephemeral_private_key":
"19c2185f4f40634926ebed3af09070ca9e029f2edd5fae6253074896205f5f6c", # noqa: E501
"receiver_ephemeral_private_key":
"d25688cf0ab10afa1a0e2dba7853ed5f1e5bf1c631757ed4e103b593ff3f5620", # noqa: E501
"auth_plaintext":
"884c36f7ae6b406637c1f61b2f57e1d2cab813d24c6559aaf843c3f48962f32f46662c066d39669b7b2e3ba14781477417600e7728399278b1b5d801a519aa570034fdb5419558137e0d44cd13d319afe5629eeccb47fd9dfe55cc6089426e46cc762dd8a0636e07a54b31169eba0c7a20a1ac1ef68596f1f283b5c676bae4064abfcce24799d09f67e392632d3ffdc12e3d6430dcb0ea19c318343ffa7aae74d4cd26fecb93657d1cd9e9eaf4f8be720b56dd1d39f190c4e1c6b7ec66f077bb1100", # noqa: E501
"authresp_plaintext":
"802b052f8b066640bba94a4fc39d63815c377fced6fcb84d27f791c9921ddf3e9bf0108e298f490812847109cbd778fae393e80323fd643209841a3b7f110397f37ec61d84cea03dcc5e8385db93248584e8af4b4d1c832d8c7453c0089687a700", # noqa: E501
"auth_ciphertext":
"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", # noqa: E501
"authresp_ciphertext":
"049934a7b2d7f9af8fd9db941d9da281ac9381b5740e1f64f7092f3588d4f87f5ce55191a6653e5e80c1c5dd538169aa123e70dc6ffc5af1827e546c0e958e42dad355bcc1fcb9cdf2cf47ff524d2ad98cbf275e661bf4cf00960e74b5956b799771334f426df007350b46049adb21a6e78ab1408d5e6ccde6fb5e69f0f4c92bb9c725c02f99fa72b9cdc8dd53cff089e0e73317f61cc5abf6152513cb7d833f09d2851603919bf0fbe44d79a09245c6e8338eb502083dc84b846f2fee1cc310d2cc8b1b9334728f97220bb799376233e113", # noqa: E501
"ecdhe_shared_secret":
"e3f407f83fc012470c26a93fdff534100f2c6f736439ce0ca90e9914f7d1c381",
"initiator_nonce":
"cd26fecb93657d1cd9e9eaf4f8be720b56dd1d39f190c4e1c6b7ec66f077bb11",
"receiver_nonce":
"f37ec61d84cea03dcc5e8385db93248584e8af4b4d1c832d8c7453c0089687a7",
"aes_secret":
"c0458fa97a5230830e05f4f20b7c755c1d4e54b1ce5cf43260bb191eef4e418d",
"mac_secret":
"48c938884d5067a1598272fcddaa4b833cd5e7d92e8228c0ecdfabbe68aef7f1",
"token":
"3f9ec2592d1554852b1f54d228f042ed0a9310ea86d038dc2b401ba8cd7fdac4",
"initial_egress_MAC":
"09771e93b1a6109e97074cbe2d2b0cf3d3878efafe68f53c41bb60c0ec49097e",
"initial_ingress_MAC":
"75823d96e23136c89666ee025fb21a432be906512b3dd4a3049e898adb433847",
"initiator_hello_packet":
"6ef23fcf1cec7312df623f9ae701e63b550cdb8517fefd8dd398fc2acd1d935e6e0434a2b96769078477637347b7b01924fff9ff1c06df2f804df3b0402bbb9f87365b3c6856b45e1e2b6470986813c3816a71bff9d69dd297a5dbd935ab578f6e5d7e93e4506a44f307c332d95e8a4b102585fd8ef9fc9e3e055537a5cec2e9", # noqa: E501
"receiver_hello_packet":
"6ef23fcf1cec7312df623f9ae701e63be36a1cdd1b19179146019984f3625d4a6e0434a2b96769050577657247b7b02bc6c314470eca7e3ef650b98c83e9d7dd4830b3f718ff562349aead2530a8d28a8484604f92e5fced2c6183f304344ab0e7c301a0c05559f4c25db65e36820b4b909a226171a60ac6cb7beea09376d6d8" # noqa: E501
}
for k, v in test_values.items():
test_values[k] = decode_hex(v)
initiator_remote = kademlia.Node(
keys.PrivateKey(test_values['receiver_private_key']).public_key,
kademlia.Address('0.0.0.0', 0, 0))
initiator = HandshakeInitiator(
initiator_remote,
keys.PrivateKey(test_values['initiator_private_key']))
initiator.ephemeral_privkey = keys.PrivateKey(
test_values['initiator_ephemeral_private_key'])
responder_remote = kademlia.Node(
keys.PrivateKey(test_values['initiator_private_key']).public_key,
kademlia.Address('0.0.0.0', 0, 0))
responder = HandshakeResponder(
responder_remote, keys.PrivateKey(test_values['receiver_private_key']))
responder.ephemeral_privkey = keys.PrivateKey(
test_values['receiver_ephemeral_private_key'])
# Check that the auth message generated by the initiator is what we expect. Notice that we
# can't use the auth_init generated here because the non-deterministic prefix would cause the
# derived secrets to not match the expected values.
_auth_init = initiator.create_auth_message(test_values['initiator_nonce'])
assert len(_auth_init) == len(test_values['auth_plaintext'])
assert _auth_init[65:] == test_values['auth_plaintext'][
65:] # starts with non deterministic k
# Check that encrypting and decrypting the auth_init gets us the orig msg.
_auth_init_ciphertext = initiator.encrypt_auth_message(_auth_init)
assert _auth_init == ecies.decrypt(_auth_init_ciphertext,
responder.privkey)
# Check that the responder correctly decodes the auth msg.
auth_msg_ciphertext = test_values['auth_ciphertext']
initiator_ephemeral_pubkey, initiator_nonce = responder.decode_authentication(
auth_msg_ciphertext)
assert initiator_nonce == test_values['initiator_nonce']
assert initiator_ephemeral_pubkey == (keys.PrivateKey(
test_values['initiator_ephemeral_private_key']).public_key)
# Check that the auth_ack msg generated by the responder is what we expect.
auth_ack_msg = responder.create_auth_ack_message(
test_values['receiver_nonce'])
assert auth_ack_msg == test_values['authresp_plaintext']
# Check that the secrets derived from ephemeral key agreements match the expected values.
auth_ack_ciphertext = test_values['authresp_ciphertext']
aes_secret, mac_secret, egress_mac, ingress_mac = responder.derive_secrets(
initiator_nonce, test_values['receiver_nonce'],
initiator_ephemeral_pubkey, auth_msg_ciphertext, auth_ack_ciphertext)
assert aes_secret == test_values['aes_secret']
assert mac_secret == test_values['mac_secret']
# Test values are from initiator perspective, so they're reversed here.
assert ingress_mac.digest() == test_values['initial_egress_MAC']
assert egress_mac.digest() == test_values['initial_ingress_MAC']
# Check that the initiator secrets match as well.
responder_ephemeral_pubkey, responder_nonce = initiator.decode_auth_ack_message(
test_values['authresp_ciphertext'])
(initiator_aes_secret, initiator_mac_secret, initiator_egress_mac,
initiator_ingress_mac) = initiator.derive_secrets(
initiator_nonce, responder_nonce, responder_ephemeral_pubkey,
auth_msg_ciphertext, auth_ack_ciphertext)
assert initiator_aes_secret == aes_secret
assert initiator_mac_secret == mac_secret
assert initiator_ingress_mac.digest() == test_values['initial_ingress_MAC']
assert initiator_egress_mac.digest() == test_values['initial_egress_MAC']
# Finally, check that two Peers configured with the secrets generated above understand each
# other.
responder_reader = asyncio.StreamReader()
initiator_reader = asyncio.StreamReader()
# Link the initiator's writer to the responder's reader, and the responder's writer to the
# initiator's reader.
responder_writer = type("mock-streamwriter", (object, ),
{"write": initiator_reader.feed_data})
initiator_writer = type("mock-streamwriter", (object, ),
{"write": responder_reader.feed_data})
initiator_peer = DummyPeer(remote=initiator.remote,
privkey=initiator.privkey,
reader=initiator_reader,
writer=initiator_writer,
aes_secret=initiator_aes_secret,
mac_secret=initiator_mac_secret,
egress_mac=initiator_egress_mac,
ingress_mac=initiator_ingress_mac,
chaindb=None,
network_id=1)
initiator_peer.base_protocol.send_handshake()
responder_peer = DummyPeer(remote=responder.remote,
privkey=responder.privkey,
reader=responder_reader,
writer=responder_writer,
aes_secret=aes_secret,
mac_secret=mac_secret,
egress_mac=egress_mac,
ingress_mac=ingress_mac,
chaindb=None,
network_id=1)
responder_peer.base_protocol.send_handshake()
# The handshake msgs sent by each peer (above) are going to be fed directly into their remote's
# reader, and thus the read_msg() calls will return immediately.
responder_hello, _ = await responder_peer.read_msg()
initiator_hello, _ = await initiator_peer.read_msg()
assert isinstance(responder_hello, Hello)
assert isinstance(initiator_hello, Hello)