def wrapWorkflowMethod(self, ob, method_id, func, args, kw):
'''
Allows the user to request a workflow action. This method
must perform its own security checks.
'''
sdef = self._getWorkflowStateOf(ob)
if sdef is None:
raise WorkflowException, 'Object is in an undefined state'
if method_id not in sdef.transitions:
raise Unauthorized(method_id)
tdef = self.transitions.get(method_id, None)
if tdef is None or tdef.trigger_type != TRIGGER_WORKFLOW_METHOD:
raise WorkflowException, (
'Transition %s is not triggered by a workflow method'
% method_id)
if not self._checkTransitionGuard(tdef, ob):
raise Unauthorized(method_id)
res = func(*args, **kw)
try:
self._changeStateOf(ob, tdef)
except ObjectDeleted:
# Re-raise with a different result.
raise ObjectDeleted(res)
except ObjectMoved, ex:
# Re-raise with a different result.
raise ObjectMoved(ex.getNewObject(), res)
def guarded_getattr(inst, name, default=_marker):
"""Retrieves an attribute, checking security in the process.
Raises Unauthorized if the attribute is found but the user is
not allowed to access the attribute.
"""
if name[:1] == '_':
raise Unauthorized(name)
# Try to get the attribute normally so that unusual
# exceptions are caught early.
try:
v = getattr(inst, name)
except AttributeError:
if default is not _marker:
return default
raise
try:
container = v.__self__
except AttributeError:
container = aq_parent(aq_inner(v)) or inst
assertion = Containers(type(container))
if isinstance(assertion, dict):
# We got a table that lets us reason about individual
# attrs
assertion = assertion.get(name)
if assertion:
# There's an entry, but it may be a function.
if callable(assertion):
return assertion(inst, name)
# Nope, it's boolean
return v
raise Unauthorized(name)
if assertion:
if callable(assertion):
factory = assertion(name, v)
if callable(factory):
return factory(inst, name)
assert factory == 1
else:
assert assertion == 1
return v
# See if we can get the value doing a filtered acquire.
# aq_acquire will either return the same value as held by
# v or it will return an Unauthorized raised by validate.
validate = getSecurityManager().validate
aq_acquire(inst, name, aq_validate, validate)
return v
def doActionFor(self, ob, action, comment='', **kw):
'''
Allows the user to request a workflow action. This method
must perform its own security checks.
'''
kw['comment'] = comment
sdef = self._getWorkflowStateOf(ob)
if sdef is None:
raise WorkflowException(_(u'Object is in an undefined state.'))
if action not in sdef.transitions:
raise Unauthorized(action)
tdef = self.transitions.get(action, None)
if tdef is None or tdef.trigger_type != TRIGGER_USER_ACTION:
msg = _(u"Transition '${action_id}' is not triggered by a user "
u"action.", mapping={'action_id': action})
raise WorkflowException(msg)
if not self._checkTransitionGuard(tdef, ob, **kw):
raise Unauthorized(action)
self._changeStateOf(ob, tdef, kw)
def __getitem__(self, index):
data = self._data
try:
s = self._seq
except AttributeError:
return data[index]
i = index
if i < 0:
i = len(self) + i
if i < 0:
raise IndexError(index)
ind = len(data)
if i < ind:
return data[i]
ind = ind - 1
test = self._test
e = self._eindex
skip = self._skip
while i > ind:
e = e + 1
try:
try:
v = guarded_getitem(s, e)
except Unauthorized as vv:
if skip is None:
self._eindex = e
msg = '(item %s): %s' % (index, vv)
raise Unauthorized(msg)
skip_this = 1
else:
skip_this = 0
except IndexError:
del self._test
del self._seq
del self._eindex
raise IndexError(index)
if skip_this:
continue
if skip and not getSecurityManager().checkPermission(skip, v):
continue
if test is None or test(v):
data.append(v)
ind = ind + 1
self._eindex = e
return data[i]
def manage_takeOwnership(self, REQUEST, RESPONSE, recursive=0):
"""Take ownership (responsibility) for an object.
If 'recursive' is true, then also take ownership of all sub-objects.
"""
security = getSecurityManager()
want_referer = REQUEST['URL1'] + '/manage_owner'
got_referer = ("%s://%s%s" %
parse.urlparse(REQUEST['HTTP_REFERER'])[:3])
__traceback_info__ = want_referer, got_referer
if (want_referer != got_referer or security.calledByExecutable()):
raise Unauthorized(
'manage_takeOwnership was called from an invalid context')
self.changeOwnership(security.getUser(), recursive)
raise Redirect(REQUEST['HTTP_REFERER'])
def __call__(self):
request = self.context.REQUEST
token, path = self.split_cookie()
tr_annotate = ITokenRolesAnnotate(self.context, None)
if tr_annotate and (not tr_annotate.token_dict.has_key(token)):
if path:
path = base64.b64decode(path)
portal_state = getMultiAdapter((self.context, request),
name=u'plone_portal_state')
navigation_root = portal_state.navigation_root()
parent = navigation_root.unrestrictedTraverse(
path.replace('/'.join(navigation_root.getPhysicalPath()),
'')[1:])
tr_annotate = ITokenRolesAnnotate(parent, None)
if self.canView or (tr_annotate
and tr_annotate.token_dict.has_key(token)):
return self.index()
raise Unauthorized(self.__name__)
def __call__(self):
if not self.request.method == 'POST':
return
if not self.context.can_reset_token():
raise Unauthorized("You are not allowed to send token email")
email = self.context.official_email
if email:
# send_newtoken_email(self.context)
notify(ResetTokenEvent(self.context))
show_message("Email Sent to {0}".format(email),
request=self.request,
type="info")
else:
show_message("Official email is not set",
request=self.request,
type="error")
return self.request.response.redirect(self.context.absolute_url())
def open_url(url, asFile=False, data=None):
"""Retrieve content from url"""
safe_domains = []
for safedomains_utils in component.getUtilitiesFor(IPlominoSafeDomains):
safe_domains += safedomains_utils[1].domains
is_safe = False
for domain in safe_domains:
if (url.startswith(domain)
or url.split("//")[1].split("/")[0].split('@')[-1] == domain):
is_safe = True
break
if is_safe:
if data and not isinstance(data, basestring):
data = urllib.urlencode(data)
f = urllib.urlopen(url, data)
if asFile:
return f.fp
else:
return f.read()
else:
raise Unauthorized(url)
def unrestrictedTraverse(self, path, default=_marker, restricted=False):
"""Lookup an object by path.
path -- The path to the object. May be a sequence of strings or a slash
separated string. If the path begins with an empty path element
(i.e., an empty string or a slash) then the lookup is performed
from the application root. Otherwise, the lookup is relative to
self. Two dots (..) as a path element indicates an upward traversal
to the acquisition parent.
default -- If provided, this is the value returned if the path cannot
be traversed for any reason (i.e., no object exists at that path or
the object is inaccessible).
restricted -- If false (default) then no security checking is performed.
If true, then all of the objects along the path are validated with
the security machinery. Usually invoked using restrictedTraverse().
"""
if not path:
return self
if isinstance(path, str):
# Unicode paths are not allowed
path = path.split('/')
else:
path = list(path)
REQUEST = {'TraversalRequestNameStack': path}
path.reverse()
path_pop = path.pop
if len(path) > 1 and not path[0]:
# Remove trailing slash
path_pop(0)
if restricted:
validate = getSecurityManager().validate
if not path[-1]:
# If the path starts with an empty string, go to the root first.
path_pop()
obj = self.getPhysicalRoot()
if restricted:
validate(None, None, None, obj) # may raise Unauthorized
else:
obj = self
# import time ordering problem
from webdav.NullResource import NullResource
resource = _marker
try:
while path:
name = path_pop()
__traceback_info__ = path, name
if name[0] == '_':
# Never allowed in a URL.
raise NotFound, name
if name == '..':
next = aq_parent(obj)
if next is not None:
if restricted and not validate(obj, obj, name, next):
raise Unauthorized(name)
obj = next
continue
bobo_traverse = getattr(obj, '__bobo_traverse__', None)
try:
if name and name[:1] in '@+' and name != '+' and nsParse(
name)[1]:
# Process URI segment parameters.
ns, nm = nsParse(name)
try:
next = namespaceLookup(ns, nm, obj,
aq_acquire(self, 'REQUEST'))
if IAcquirer.providedBy(next):
next = next.__of__(obj)
if restricted and not validate(
obj, obj, name, next):
raise Unauthorized(name)
except LocationError:
raise AttributeError(name)
else:
next = UseTraversalDefault # indicator
try:
if bobo_traverse is not None:
next = bobo_traverse(REQUEST, name)
if restricted:
if aq_base(next) is not next:
# The object is wrapped, so the acquisition
# context is the container.
container = aq_parent(aq_inner(next))
elif getattr(next, 'im_self',
None) is not None:
# Bound method, the bound instance
# is the container
container = next.im_self
elif getattr(aq_base(obj), name,
_marker) is next:
# Unwrapped direct attribute of the object so
# object is the container
container = obj
else:
# Can't determine container
container = None
# If next is a simple unwrapped property, its
# parentage is indeterminate, but it may have
# been acquired safely. In this case validate
# will raise an error, and we can explicitly
# check that our value was acquired safely.
try:
ok = validate(obj, container, name,
next)
except Unauthorized:
ok = False
if not ok:
if (container is not None
or guarded_getattr(
obj, name,
_marker) is not next):
raise Unauthorized(name)
except UseTraversalDefault:
# behave as if there had been no '__bobo_traverse__'
bobo_traverse = None
if next is UseTraversalDefault:
if getattr(aq_base(obj), name,
_marker) is not _marker:
if restricted:
next = guarded_getattr(obj, name)
else:
next = getattr(obj, name)
else:
try:
next = obj[name]
# The item lookup may return a NullResource,
# if this is the case we save it and return it
# if all other lookups fail.
if isinstance(next, NullResource):
resource = next
raise KeyError(name)
except (AttributeError, TypeError):
# Raise NotFound for easier debugging
# instead of AttributeError: __getitem__
# or TypeError: not subscriptable
raise NotFound(name)
if restricted and not validate(
obj, obj, None, next):
raise Unauthorized(name)
except (AttributeError, NotFound, KeyError), e:
# Try to look for a view
next = queryMultiAdapter(
(obj, aq_acquire(self, 'REQUEST')), Interface, name)
if next is not None:
if IAcquirer.providedBy(next):
next = next.__of__(obj)
if restricted and not validate(obj, obj, name, next):
raise Unauthorized(name)
elif bobo_traverse is not None:
# Attribute lookup should not be done after
# __bobo_traverse__:
raise e
else:
# No view, try acquired attributes
try:
if restricted:
next = guarded_getattr(obj, name, _marker)
else:
next = getattr(obj, name, _marker)
except AttributeError:
raise e
if next is _marker:
# If we have a NullResource from earlier use it.
next = resource
if next is _marker:
# Nothing found re-raise error
raise e
obj = next
return obj
def __you_lose(self):
name = self.__dict__['_name']
raise Unauthorized('Not authorized to access binding: %s' % name)
def raiseVerbose(
msg,
accessed,
container,
name,
value,
context,
required_roles=None,
user_roles=None,
user=None,
eo=None,
eo_owner=None,
eo_owner_roles=None,
eo_proxy_roles=None,
):
"""Raises an Unauthorized error with a verbose explanation."""
s = '%s. Access to %s of %s' % (msg, repr(name), item_repr(container))
if aq_base(container) is not aq_base(accessed):
s += ', acquired through %s,' % item_repr(accessed)
info = [s + ' denied.']
if user is not None:
try:
ufolder = '/'.join(aq_parent(aq_inner(user)).getPhysicalPath())
except:
ufolder = '(unknown)'
info.append('Your user account, %s, exists at %s.' %
(str(user), ufolder))
if required_roles is not None:
p = None
required_roles = list(required_roles)
for r in required_roles:
if r.startswith('_') and r.endswith('_Permission'):
p = r[1:]
required_roles.remove(r)
break
sr = simplifyRoles(required_roles)
if p:
# got a permission name
info.append('Access requires %s, '
'granted to the following roles: %s.' % (p, sr))
else:
# permission name unknown
info.append('Access requires one of the following roles: %s.' % sr)
if user_roles is not None:
info.append('Your roles in this context are %s.' %
simplifyRoles(user_roles))
if eo is not None:
s = 'The executing script is %s' % item_repr(eo)
if eo_proxy_roles is not None:
s += ', with proxy roles: %s' % simplifyRoles(eo_proxy_roles)
if eo_owner is not None:
s += ', owned by %s' % repr(eo_owner)
if eo_owner_roles is not None:
s += ', who has the roles %s' % simplifyRoles(eo_owner_roles)
info.append(s + '.')
text = ' '.join(info)
LOG.debug('Unauthorized: %s' % text)
raise Unauthorized(text)
def validate(self,
accessed,
container,
name,
value,
context,
roles=_noroles,
getattr=getattr,
_noroles=_noroles,
valid_aq_=('aq_parent', 'aq_inner', 'aq_explicit')):
############################################################
# Provide special rules for the acquisition attributes
if isinstance(name, str):
if name.startswith('aq_') and name not in valid_aq_:
if self._verbose:
raiseVerbose(
'aq_* names (other than %s) are not allowed' %
', '.join(valid_aq_), accessed, container, name, value,
context)
raise Unauthorized(name, value)
containerbase = aq_base(container)
accessedbase = aq_base(accessed)
if accessedbase is accessed:
# accessed is not a wrapper, so assume that the
# value could not have been acquired.
accessedbase = container
############################################################
# If roles weren't passed in, we'll try to get them from the object
if roles is _noroles:
roles = getRoles(container, name, value, _noroles)
############################################################
# We still might not have any roles
if roles is _noroles:
############################################################
# We have an object without roles and we didn't get a list
# of roles passed in. Presumably, the value is some simple
# object like a string or a list. We'll try to get roles
# from its container.
if container is None:
# Either container or a list of roles is required
# for ZopeSecurityPolicy to know whether access is
# allowable.
if self._verbose:
raiseVerbose('No container provided', accessed, container,
name, value, context)
raise Unauthorized(name, value)
roles = getattr(container, '__roles__', roles)
if roles is _noroles:
if containerbase is container:
# Container is not wrapped.
if containerbase is not accessedbase:
if self._verbose:
raiseVerbose(
'Unable to find __roles__ in the container '
'and the container is not wrapped', accessed,
container, name, value, context)
raise Unauthorized(name, value)
else:
# Try to acquire roles
try:
roles = aq_acquire(container, '__roles__')
except AttributeError:
if containerbase is not accessedbase:
if self._verbose:
raiseVerbose(
'Unable to find or acquire __roles__ '
'from the container', accessed, container,
name, value, context)
raise Unauthorized(name, value)
# We need to make sure that we are allowed to
# get unprotected attributes from the container. We are
# allowed for certain simple containers and if the
# container says we can. Simple containers
# may also impose name restrictions.
p = Containers(type(container), None)
if p is None:
p = getattr(container,
'__allow_access_to_unprotected_subobjects__', None)
if p is not None:
if not isinstance(p, int): # catches bool too
if isinstance(p, dict):
if isinstance(name, basestring):
p = p.get(name)
else:
p = 1
else:
p = p(name, value)
if not p:
if self._verbose:
raiseVerbose('The container has no security assertions',
accessed, container, name, value, context)
raise Unauthorized(name, value)
if roles is _noroles:
return 1
# We are going to need a security-aware object to pass
# to allowed(). We'll use the container.
value = container
# Short-circuit tests if we can:
try:
if roles is None or 'Anonymous' in roles:
return 1
except TypeError:
# 'roles' isn't a sequence
LOG.error("'%s' passed as roles"
" during validation of '%s' is not a sequence." %
( ` roles `, name))
raise
# Check executable security
stack = context.stack
if stack:
eo = stack[-1]
# If the executable had an owner, can it execute?
if self._ownerous:
owner = eo.getOwner()
if (owner is not None) and not owner.allowed(value, roles):
# We don't want someone to acquire if they can't
# get an unacquired!
if self._verbose:
if len(roles) < 1:
raiseVerbose("The object is marked as private",
accessed, container, name, value,
context)
elif userHasRolesButNotInContext(owner, value, roles):
raiseVerbose(
"The owner of the executing script is defined "
"outside the context of the object being "
"accessed",
accessed,
container,
name,
value,
context,
required_roles=roles,
eo_owner=owner,
eo=eo)
else:
raiseVerbose(
"The owner of the executing script does not "
"have the required permission",
accessed,
container,
name,
value,
context,
required_roles=roles,
eo_owner=owner,
eo=eo,
eo_owner_roles=getUserRolesInContext(
owner, value))
raise Unauthorized(name, value)
# Proxy roles, which are a lot safer now.
proxy_roles = getattr(eo, '_proxy_roles', None)
if proxy_roles:
# Verify that the owner actually can state the proxy role
# in the context of the accessed item; users in subfolders
# should not be able to use proxy roles to access items
# above their subfolder!
owner = eo.getWrappedOwner()
if owner is not None:
if container is not containerbase:
# Unwrapped objects don't need checking
if not owner._check_context(container):
# container is higher up than the owner,
# deny access
if self._verbose:
raiseVerbose(
"The owner of the executing script is "
"defined outside the context of the "
"object being accessed. The script has "
"proxy roles, but they do not apply in "
"this context.",
accessed,
container,
name,
value,
context,
required_roles=roles,
eo_owner=owner,
eo=eo)
raise Unauthorized(name, value)
for r in proxy_roles:
if r in roles:
return 1
# Proxy roles actually limit access!
if self._verbose:
if len(roles) < 1:
raiseVerbose("The object is marked as private",
accessed, container, name, value, context)
else:
raiseVerbose(
"The proxy roles set on the executing script "
"do not allow access",
accessed,
container,
name,
value,
context,
eo=eo,
eo_proxy_roles=proxy_roles,
required_roles=roles)
raise Unauthorized(name, value)
try:
if self._authenticated and context.user.allowed(value, roles):
return 1
except AttributeError:
pass
if self._verbose:
if len(roles) < 1:
raiseVerbose("The object is marked as private", accessed,
container, name, value, context)
elif not self._authenticated:
raiseVerbose(
"Authenticated access is not allowed by this "
"security policy", accessed, container, name, value,
context)
elif userHasRolesButNotInContext(context.user, value, roles):
raiseVerbose(
"Your user account is defined outside "
"the context of the object being accessed",
accessed,
container,
name,
value,
context,
required_roles=roles,
user=context.user)
else:
raiseVerbose(
"Your user account does not "
"have the required permission",
accessed,
container,
name,
value,
context,
required_roles=roles,
user=context.user,
user_roles=getUserRolesInContext(context.user, value))
raise Unauthorized(name, value)
def __call__(self):
self.update()
if self.isAnon:
raise Unauthorized(msg_unauthorized)
return self.index()