def test_key_storage(self):
# Explicitly clear our cache.
KeyStorage._cached = (None, None)
# Call get method to retrieve our singleton KeyStorage.
ks = KeyStorage.get()
self.assertTrue(ks is not None)
# We should cache this object, so another call will return the
# same object.
self.assertTrue(ks is KeyStorage.get())
# Now advance mock time enough to expire our cache.
self.now += 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 # 1 year should be enough time
self.assertTrue(ks is not KeyStorage.get())
def test_key_storage(self):
# Explicitly clear our cache.
KeyStorage._cached = (None, None)
# Call get method to retrieve our singleton KeyStorage.
ks = KeyStorage.get()
self.assertTrue(ks is not None)
# We should cache this object, so another call will return the
# same object.
self.assertTrue(ks is KeyStorage.get())
# Now advance mock time enough to expire our cache.
self.now += 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 # 1 year should be enough time
self.assertTrue(ks is not KeyStorage.get())
def _create_security_token(user):
"""Create a CHIRP security token.
Args:
user: A User object.
Returns:
A string containing an encrypted security token that encodes
the user's email address as well as a timestamp.
"""
timestamp = int(time.time())
plaintext = "%x %s" % (timestamp, user.email)
nearest_mult_of_16 = 16 * ((len(plaintext) + 15) // 16)
# Pad plaintest with whitespace to make the length a multiple of 16,
# as this is a requirement of AES encryption.
plaintext = plaintext.rjust(nearest_mult_of_16, ' ')
if _DISABLE_CRYPTO:
body = plaintext
sig = "sig"
else:
key_storage = KeyStorage.get()
body = AES.new(key_storage.aes_key, AES.MODE_CBC).encrypt(plaintext)
hmac_key = key_storage.hmac_key
if type(hmac_key) == unicode:
# Crypto requires byte strings
hmac_key = hmac_key.encode('utf8')
sig = HMAC.HMAC(key=hmac_key, msg=body).hexdigest()
return '%s:%s' % (sig, body)
def _parse_security_token(token):
"""Parse a CHIRP security token.
Returns:
A Credentials object, or None if the token is not valid.
If a Credentials object is returned, its "user" field will not
be set.
"""
if not token:
return None
if ':' not in token:
logging.warn('Malformed token: no signature separator')
return None
sig, body = token.split(':', 1)
if _DISABLE_CRYPTO:
plaintext = body
else:
key_storage = KeyStorage.get()
hmac_key = key_storage.hmac_key
if type(hmac_key) == unicode:
# Crypto requires byte strings
hmac_key = hmac_key.encode('utf8')
computed_sig = HMAC.HMAC(key=hmac_key,
msg=body).hexdigest()
if sig != computed_sig:
logging.warn('Malformed token: invalid signature')
return None
try:
plaintext = AES.new(key_storage.aes_key,
AES.MODE_CBC).decrypt(body)
except ValueError:
logging.warn('Malformed token: wrong size')
return None
# Remove excess whitespace.
plaintext = plaintext.strip()
# The plaintext should contain at least one space.
if ' ' not in plaintext:
logging.warn('Malformed token: bad contents')
return None
parts = plaintext.split(' ')
if len(parts) != 2:
logging.warn('Malformed token: bad structure')
return None
timestamp, email = parts
try:
timestamp = int(timestamp, 16)
except ValueError:
logging.warn('Malformed token: bad timestamp')
return None
# Reject tokens that are too old or which have time-traveled. We
# allow for 1s of clock skew.
age_s = time.time() - timestamp
if age_s < -1 or age_s > _TOKEN_TIMEOUT_S:
logging.warn('Malformed token: expired (age=%ds)', age_s)
return None
cred = _Credentials()
cred.email = email
cred.security_token_is_stale = (age_s > 0.5 * _TOKEN_TIMEOUT_S)
return cred