def test_mixed_verfication(self):
""" Test verification using allowlist and keys """
lists_map = ima.process_allowlists(ALLOWLIST.splitlines(), '')
# every entry is covered by the allowlist and there's no keyring -> this should pass
self.assertTrue(
ima.process_measurement_list(COMBINED.splitlines(), str(lists_map))
is not None)
curdir = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
keydir = os.path.join(curdir, "data", "ima_keys")
keyring = ima_file_signatures.ImaKeyring()
rsakeyfile = os.path.join(keydir, "rsa2048pub.pem")
pubkey = ima_file_signatures.get_pubkey_from_file(rsakeyfile)
keyring.add_pubkey(pubkey)
eckeyfile = os.path.join(keydir, "secp256k1.pem")
pubkey = ima_file_signatures.get_pubkey_from_file(eckeyfile)
keyring.add_pubkey(pubkey)
# entries are not covered by a exclude list -> this should fail
self.assertTrue(
ima.process_measurement_list(COMBINED.splitlines(),
ima_keyring=keyring) is None)
# all entries are either covered by exclude list or by signature verification -> this should pass
self.assertTrue(
ima.process_measurement_list(COMBINED.splitlines(),
str(lists_map),
ima_keyring=keyring) is not None)
def test_signature_verification(self):
""" Test the signature verification """
curdir = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
keydir = os.path.join(curdir, "data", "ima_keys")
lines = SIGNATURES.split('\n')
# empty keyring
keyring = ima_file_signatures.ImaKeyring()
self.assertTrue(
ima.process_measurement_list(lines, ima_keyring=keyring) is None)
# add key for 1st entry; 1st entry must be verifiable
rsakeyfile = os.path.join(keydir, "rsa2048pub.pem")
pubkey = ima_file_signatures.get_pubkey_from_file(rsakeyfile)
keyring.add_pubkey(pubkey)
self.assertTrue(
ima.process_measurement_list(lines[0:1], ima_keyring=keyring)
is not None)
self.assertTrue(
ima.process_measurement_list(lines[1:2], ima_keyring=keyring) is
None)
# add key for 2nd entry; 1st & 2nd entries must be verifiable
eckeyfile = os.path.join(keydir, "secp256k1.pem")
pubkey = ima_file_signatures.get_pubkey_from_file(eckeyfile)
keyring.add_pubkey(pubkey)
self.assertTrue(
ima.process_measurement_list(lines[0:2], ima_keyring=keyring)
is not None)
def test_signature_verification(self):
""" Test the signature verification """
curdir = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
keydir = os.path.join(curdir, "data", "ima_keys")
lines = SIGNATURES.split('\n')
# empty keyring
keyrings = ima_file_signatures.ImaKeyrings()
_, failure = ima.process_measurement_list(AgentAttestState('1'),
lines,
ima_keyrings=keyrings)
self.assertTrue(failure)
tenant_keyring = ima_file_signatures.ImaKeyring()
keyrings.set_tenant_keyring(tenant_keyring)
# add key for 1st entry; 1st entry must be verifiable
rsakeyfile = os.path.join(keydir, "rsa2048pub.pem")
pubkey, keyidv2 = ima_file_signatures.get_pubkey_from_file(rsakeyfile)
tenant_keyring.add_pubkey(pubkey, keyidv2)
_, failure = ima.process_measurement_list(AgentAttestState('1'),
lines[0:1],
ima_keyrings=keyrings)
self.assertTrue(not failure)
_, failure = ima.process_measurement_list(AgentAttestState('1'),
lines[1:2],
ima_keyrings=keyrings)
self.assertTrue(failure)
# add key for 2nd entry; 1st & 2nd entries must be verifiable
eckeyfile = os.path.join(keydir, "secp256k1.pem")
pubkey, keyidv2 = ima_file_signatures.get_pubkey_from_file(eckeyfile)
tenant_keyring.add_pubkey(pubkey, keyidv2)
_, failure = ima.process_measurement_list(AgentAttestState('1'),
lines[0:2],
ima_keyrings=keyrings)
self.assertTrue(not failure)
def process_allowlist(self, args):
# Set up PCR values
tpm_policy = config.get('tenant', 'tpm_policy')
if "tpm_policy" in args and args["tpm_policy"] is not None:
tpm_policy = args["tpm_policy"]
self.tpm_policy = TPM_Utilities.readPolicy(tpm_policy)
logger.info("TPM PCR Mask from policy is %s", self.tpm_policy['mask'])
vtpm_policy = config.get('tenant', 'vtpm_policy')
if "vtpm_policy" in args and args["vtpm_policy"] is not None:
vtpm_policy = args["vtpm_policy"]
self.vtpm_policy = TPM_Utilities.readPolicy(vtpm_policy)
logger.info("TPM PCR Mask from policy is %s", self.vtpm_policy['mask'])
if args.get("ima_sign_verification_keys") is not None:
# Auto-enable IMA (or-bit mask)
self.tpm_policy['mask'] = "0x%X" % (
int(self.tpm_policy['mask'], 0) | (1 << config.IMA_PCR))
# Add all IMA file signing verification keys to a keyring
ima_keyring = ima_file_signatures.ImaKeyring()
for filename in args["ima_sign_verification_keys"]:
pubkey = ima_file_signatures.get_pubkey_from_file(filename)
if not pubkey:
raise UserError(
"File '%s' is not a file with a key" % filename)
ima_keyring.add_pubkey(pubkey)
self.ima_sign_verification_keys = ima_keyring.to_string()
# Read command-line path string allowlist
al_data = None
if "allowlist" in args and args["allowlist"] is not None:
self.enforce_pcrs(list(self.tpm_policy.keys()), [ config.IMA_PCR ], "IMA")
# Auto-enable IMA (or-bit mask)
self.tpm_policy['mask'] = "0x%X" % (
int(self.tpm_policy['mask'], 0) | (1 << config.IMA_PCR))
if isinstance(args["allowlist"], str):
if args["allowlist"] == "default":
args["allowlist"] = config.get('tenant', 'allowlist')
al_data = ima.read_allowlist(args["allowlist"], args["allowlist_checksum"], args["allowlist_sig"], args["allowlist_sig_key"])
elif isinstance(args["allowlist"], list):
al_data = args["allowlist"]
else:
raise UserError("Invalid allowlist provided")
# Read command-line path string IMA exclude list
excl_data = None
if "ima_exclude" in args and args["ima_exclude"] is not None:
if isinstance(args["ima_exclude"], str):
if args["ima_exclude"] == "default":
args["ima_exclude"] = config.get(
'tenant', 'ima_excludelist')
excl_data = ima.read_excllist(args["ima_exclude"])
elif isinstance(args["ima_exclude"], list):
excl_data = args["ima_exclude"]
else:
raise UserError("Invalid exclude list provided")
# Set up IMA
if TPM_Utilities.check_mask(self.tpm_policy['mask'], config.IMA_PCR) or \
TPM_Utilities.check_mask(self.vtpm_policy['mask'],
config.IMA_PCR):
# Process allowlists
self.allowlist = ima.process_allowlists(al_data, excl_data)
# Read command-line path string TPM event log (measured boot) reference state
mb_refstate_data = None
if "mb_refstate" in args and args["mb_refstate"] is not None:
self.enforce_pcrs(list(self.tpm_policy.keys()), config.MEASUREDBOOT_PCRS, "measured boot")
# Auto-enable TPM event log mesured boot (or-bit mask)
for _pcr in config.MEASUREDBOOT_PCRS :
self.tpm_policy['mask'] = "0x%X" % (
int(self.tpm_policy['mask'], 0) | (1 << _pcr))
logger.info("TPM PCR Mask automatically modified is %s to include IMA/Event log PCRs", self.tpm_policy['mask'])
if isinstance(args["mb_refstate"], str):
if args["mb_refstate"] == "default":
args["mb_refstate"] = config.get('tenant', 'mb_refstate')
mb_refstate_data = measured_boot.read_mb_refstate(args["mb_refstate"])
else:
raise UserError("Invalid measured boot reference state (intended state) provided")
# Set up measured boot (TPM event log) reference state
if TPM_Utilities.check_mask(self.tpm_policy['mask'], config.MEASUREDBOOT_PCRS[2]) :
# Process measured boot reference state
self.mb_refstate = measured_boot.process_refstate(mb_refstate_data)
def test_mixed_verfication(self):
""" Test verification using allowlist and keys """
lists_map = ima.process_allowlists(ALLOWLIST, '')
lists_map_wrong = ima.process_allowlists(ALLOWLIST_WRONG, '')
lists_map_empty = ima.process_allowlists(ALLOWLIST_EMPTY, '')
lists_map_exclude = ima.process_allowlists(ALLOWLIST, EXCLUDELIST)
lists_map_exclude_wrong = ima.process_allowlists(
ALLOWLIST_WRONG, EXCLUDELIST)
ima_keyrings = ima_file_signatures.ImaKeyrings()
empty_keyring = ima_file_signatures.ImaKeyring()
# every entry is covered by the allowlist and there's no keyring -> this should pass
_, failure = ima.process_measurement_list(AgentAttestState('1'),
COMBINED.splitlines(),
json.dumps(lists_map))
self.assertTrue(not failure)
curdir = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
keydir = os.path.join(curdir, "data", "ima_keys")
tenant_keyring = ima_file_signatures.ImaKeyring()
rsakeyfile = os.path.join(keydir, "rsa2048pub.pem")
pubkey, keyidv2 = ima_file_signatures.get_pubkey_from_file(rsakeyfile)
tenant_keyring.add_pubkey(pubkey, keyidv2)
eckeyfile = os.path.join(keydir, "secp256k1.pem")
pubkey, keyidv2 = ima_file_signatures.get_pubkey_from_file(eckeyfile)
tenant_keyring.add_pubkey(pubkey, keyidv2)
ima_keyrings.set_tenant_keyring(tenant_keyring)
# entries are not covered by a exclude list -> this should fail
_, failure = ima.process_measurement_list(AgentAttestState('1'),
COMBINED.splitlines(),
ima_keyrings=ima_keyrings)
self.assertTrue(failure)
# all entries are either covered by allow list or by signature verification -> this should pass
_, failure = ima.process_measurement_list(AgentAttestState('1'),
COMBINED.splitlines(),
json.dumps(lists_map),
ima_keyrings=ima_keyrings)
self.assertTrue(not failure)
# the signature is valid but the hash in the allowlist is wrong -> this should fail
_, failure = ima.process_measurement_list(AgentAttestState('1'),
SIGNATURES.splitlines(),
json.dumps(lists_map_wrong),
ima_keyrings=ima_keyrings)
self.assertTrue(failure)
# the signature is valid and the file is not in the allowlist -> this should pass
_, failure = ima.process_measurement_list(AgentAttestState('1'),
SIGNATURES.splitlines(),
json.dumps(lists_map_empty),
ima_keyrings=ima_keyrings)
self.assertTrue(not failure)
# the signature is invalid but the correct hash is in the allowlist -> this should fail
ima_keyrings.set_tenant_keyring(empty_keyring)
_, failure = ima.process_measurement_list(AgentAttestState('1'),
SIGNATURES.splitlines(),
json.dumps(lists_map),
ima_keyrings=ima_keyrings)
self.assertTrue(failure)
# the file has no signature but the hash is correct -> this should pass
_, failure = ima.process_measurement_list(AgentAttestState('1'),
MEASUREMENTS.splitlines(),
json.dumps(lists_map))
self.assertTrue(not failure)
# All files are in the exclude list but hashes are invalid -> this should pass
_, failure = ima.process_measurement_list(
AgentAttestState('1'), MEASUREMENTS.splitlines(),
json.dumps(lists_map_exclude_wrong))
self.assertTrue(not failure)
# All files are in the exclude list and their signatures are invalid -> this should pass
ima_keyrings.set_tenant_keyring(tenant_keyring)
_, failure = ima.process_measurement_list(
AgentAttestState('1'),
SIGNATURES.splitlines(),
json.dumps(lists_map_exclude),
ima_keyrings=ima_keyrings)
self.assertTrue(not failure)
# All files are in the exclude list but hashes or signatures are invalid -> this should pass
_, failure = ima.process_measurement_list(
AgentAttestState('1'),
MEASUREMENTS.splitlines(),
json.dumps(lists_map_exclude_wrong),
ima_keyrings=ima_keyrings)
self.assertTrue(not failure)
def init_add(self, args):
""" Set up required values. Command line options can overwrite these config values
Arguments:
args {[string]} -- agent_ip|agent_port|cv_agent_ip
"""
if "agent_ip" in args:
self.agent_ip = args["agent_ip"]
if 'agent_port' in args and args['agent_port'] is not None:
self.agent_port = args['agent_port']
if 'cv_agent_ip' in args and args['cv_agent_ip'] is not None:
self.cv_cloudagent_ip = args['cv_agent_ip']
else:
self.cv_cloudagent_ip = self.agent_ip
# Make sure all keys exist in dictionary
if "file" not in args:
args["file"] = None
if "keyfile" not in args:
args["keyfile"] = None
if "payload" not in args:
args["payload"] = None
if "ca_dir" not in args:
args["ca_dir"] = None
if "incl_dir" not in args:
args["incl_dir"] = None
if "ca_dir_pw" not in args:
args["ca_dir_pw"] = None
# Set up accepted algorithms
self.accept_tpm_hash_algs = config.get(
'tenant', 'accept_tpm_hash_algs').split(',')
self.accept_tpm_encryption_algs = config.get(
'tenant', 'accept_tpm_encryption_algs').split(',')
self.accept_tpm_signing_algs = config.get(
'tenant', 'accept_tpm_signing_algs').split(',')
# Set up PCR values
tpm_policy = config.get('tenant', 'tpm_policy')
if "tpm_policy" in args and args["tpm_policy"] is not None:
tpm_policy = args["tpm_policy"]
self.tpm_policy = TPM_Utilities.readPolicy(tpm_policy)
logger.info(f"TPM PCR Mask from policy is {self.tpm_policy['mask']}")
vtpm_policy = config.get('tenant', 'vtpm_policy')
if "vtpm_policy" in args and args["vtpm_policy"] is not None:
vtpm_policy = args["vtpm_policy"]
self.vtpm_policy = TPM_Utilities.readPolicy(vtpm_policy)
logger.info(f"TPM PCR Mask from policy is {self.vtpm_policy['mask']}")
if args.get("ima_sign_verification_keys") is not None:
# Auto-enable IMA (or-bit mask)
self.tpm_policy['mask'] = "0x%X" % (int(self.tpm_policy['mask'], 0)
| (1 << config.IMA_PCR))
# Add all IMA file signing verification keys to a keyring
ima_keyring = ima_file_signatures.ImaKeyring()
for filename in args["ima_sign_verification_keys"]:
pubkey = ima_file_signatures.get_pubkey_from_file(filename)
if not pubkey:
raise UserError("File '%s' is not a file with a key" %
filename)
ima_keyring.add_pubkey(pubkey)
self.ima_sign_verification_keys = ima_keyring.to_string()
# Read command-line path string allowlist
al_data = None
if "allowlist" in args and args["allowlist"] is not None:
self.enforce_pcrs(list(self.tpm_policy.keys()), [config.IMA_PCR],
"IMA")
# Auto-enable IMA (or-bit mask)
self.tpm_policy['mask'] = "0x%X" % (int(self.tpm_policy['mask'], 0)
| (1 << config.IMA_PCR))
if isinstance(args["allowlist"], str):
if args["allowlist"] == "default":
args["allowlist"] = config.get('tenant', 'allowlist')
al_data = ima.read_allowlist(args["allowlist"])
elif isinstance(args["allowlist"], list):
al_data = args["allowlist"]
else:
raise UserError("Invalid allowlist provided")
# Read command-line path string IMA exclude list
excl_data = None
if "ima_exclude" in args and args["ima_exclude"] is not None:
if isinstance(args["ima_exclude"], str):
if args["ima_exclude"] == "default":
args["ima_exclude"] = config.get('tenant',
'ima_excludelist')
excl_data = ima.read_excllist(args["ima_exclude"])
elif isinstance(args["ima_exclude"], list):
excl_data = args["ima_exclude"]
else:
raise UserError("Invalid exclude list provided")
# Set up IMA
if TPM_Utilities.check_mask(self.tpm_policy['mask'], config.IMA_PCR) or \
TPM_Utilities.check_mask(self.vtpm_policy['mask'], config.IMA_PCR):
# Process allowlists
self.allowlist = ima.process_allowlists(al_data, excl_data)
# Read command-line path string TPM2 event log template
if "mb_refstate" in args and args["mb_refstate"] is not None:
self.enforce_pcrs(list(self.tpm_policy.keys()),
config.MEASUREDBOOT_PCRS, "measured boot")
# Auto-enable TPM2 event log (or-bit mask)
for _pcr in config.MEASUREDBOOT_PCRS:
self.tpm_policy['mask'] = "0x%X" % (int(
self.tpm_policy['mask'], 0) | (1 << _pcr))
logger.info(
f"TPM PCR Mask automatically modified is {self.tpm_policy['mask']} to include IMA/Event log PCRs"
)
if isinstance(args["mb_refstate"], str):
if args["mb_refstate"] == "default":
args["mb_refstate"] = config.get('tenant', 'mb_refstate')
al_data = 'test'
elif isinstance(args["mb_refstate"], list):
al_data = args["mb_refstate"]
else:
raise UserError(
"Invalid measured boot reference state (intended state) provided"
)
# if none
if (args["file"] is None and args["keyfile"] is None
and args["ca_dir"] is None):
raise UserError(
"You must specify one of -k, -f, or --cert to specify the key/contents to be securely delivered to the agent"
)
if args["keyfile"] is not None:
if args["file"] is not None or args["ca_dir"] is not None:
raise UserError(
"You must specify one of -k, -f, or --cert to specify the key/contents to be securely delivered to the agent"
)
# read the keys in
if isinstance(args["keyfile"], dict) and "data" in args["keyfile"]:
if isinstance(args["keyfile"]["data"], list) and len(
args["keyfile"]["data"]) == 1:
keyfile = args["keyfile"]["data"][0]
if keyfile is None:
raise UserError("Invalid key file contents")
f = io.StringIO(keyfile)
else:
raise UserError("Invalid key file provided")
else:
f = open(args["keyfile"], 'r')
self.K = base64.b64decode(f.readline())
self.U = base64.b64decode(f.readline())
self.V = base64.b64decode(f.readline())
f.close()
# read the payload in (opt.)
if isinstance(args["payload"], dict) and "data" in args["payload"]:
if isinstance(args["payload"]["data"],
list) and len(args["payload"]["data"]) > 0:
self.payload = args["payload"]["data"][0]
else:
if args["payload"] is not None:
f = open(args["payload"], 'r')
self.payload = f.read()
f.close()
if args["file"] is not None:
if args["keyfile"] is not None or args["ca_dir"] is not None:
raise UserError(
"You must specify one of -k, -f, or --cert to specify the key/contents to be securely delivered to the agent"
)
if isinstance(args["file"], dict) and "data" in args["file"]:
if isinstance(args["file"]["data"],
list) and len(args["file"]["data"]) > 0:
contents = args["file"]["data"][0]
if contents is None:
raise UserError("Invalid file payload contents")
else:
raise UserError("Invalid file payload provided")
else:
with open(args["file"], 'r') as f:
contents = f.read()
ret = user_data_encrypt.encrypt(contents)
self.K = ret['k']
self.U = ret['u']
self.V = ret['v']
self.payload = ret['ciphertext']
if args["ca_dir"] is None and args["incl_dir"] is not None:
raise UserError(
"--include option is only valid when used with --cert")
if args["ca_dir"] is not None:
if args["file"] is not None or args["keyfile"] is not None:
raise UserError(
"You must specify one of -k, -f, or --cert to specify the key/contents to be securely delivered to the agent"
)
if args["ca_dir"] == 'default':
args["ca_dir"] = config.CA_WORK_DIR
if "ca_dir_pw" in args and args["ca_dir_pw"] is not None:
ca_util.setpassword(args["ca_dir_pw"])
if not os.path.exists(args["ca_dir"]) or not os.path.exists(
"%s/cacert.crt" % args["ca_dir"]):
logger.warning(" CA directory does not exist. Creating...")
ca_util.cmd_init(args["ca_dir"])
if not os.path.exists("%s/%s-private.pem" %
(args["ca_dir"], self.agent_uuid)):
ca_util.cmd_mkcert(args["ca_dir"], self.agent_uuid)
cert_pkg, serial, subject = ca_util.cmd_certpkg(
args["ca_dir"], self.agent_uuid)
# support revocation
if not os.path.exists(
"%s/RevocationNotifier-private.pem" % args["ca_dir"]):
ca_util.cmd_mkcert(args["ca_dir"], "RevocationNotifier")
rev_package, _, _ = ca_util.cmd_certpkg(args["ca_dir"],
"RevocationNotifier")
# extract public and private keys from package
sf = io.BytesIO(rev_package)
with zipfile.ZipFile(sf) as zf:
privkey = zf.read("RevocationNotifier-private.pem")
cert = zf.read("RevocationNotifier-cert.crt")
# put the cert of the revoker into the cert package
sf = io.BytesIO(cert_pkg)
with zipfile.ZipFile(sf, 'a',
compression=zipfile.ZIP_STORED) as zf:
zf.writestr('RevocationNotifier-cert.crt', cert)
# add additional files to zip
if args["incl_dir"] is not None:
if isinstance(args["incl_dir"], dict) and "data" in args[
"incl_dir"] and "name" in args["incl_dir"]:
if isinstance(args["incl_dir"]["data"],
list) and isinstance(
args["incl_dir"]["name"], list):
if len(args["incl_dir"]["data"]) != len(
args["incl_dir"]["name"]):
raise UserError("Invalid incl_dir provided")
for i in range(len(args["incl_dir"]["data"])):
zf.writestr(
os.path.basename(
args["incl_dir"]["name"][i]),
args["incl_dir"]["data"][i])
else:
if os.path.exists(args["incl_dir"]):
files = next(os.walk(args["incl_dir"]))[2]
for filename in files:
with open(
"%s/%s" % (args["incl_dir"], filename),
'rb') as f:
zf.writestr(os.path.basename(f.name),
f.read())
else:
logger.warning(
f'Specified include directory {args["incl_dir"]} does not exist. Skipping...'
)
cert_pkg = sf.getvalue()
# put the private key into the data to be send to the CV
self.revocation_key = privkey
# encrypt up the cert package
ret = user_data_encrypt.encrypt(cert_pkg)
self.K = ret['k']
self.U = ret['u']
self.V = ret['v']
self.metadata = {'cert_serial': serial, 'subject': subject}
self.payload = ret['ciphertext']
if self.payload is not None and len(self.payload) > config.getint(
'tenant', 'max_payload_size'):
raise UserError("Payload size %s exceeds max size %d" % (len(
self.payload), config.getint('tenant', 'max_payload_size')))