def test_95_context_algs(self): """test handling of 'algs' in context object""" handler = self.handler from passlib.context import CryptContext c1 = CryptContext(["scram"], scram__algs="sha1,md5") h = c1.hash("dummy") self.assertEqual(handler.extract_digest_algs(h), ["md5", "sha-1"]) self.assertFalse(c1.needs_update(h)) c2 = c1.copy(scram__algs="sha1") self.assertFalse(c2.needs_update(h)) c2 = c1.copy(scram__algs="sha1,sha256") self.assertTrue(c2.needs_update(h))
class Praetorian: """ Comprises the implementation for the flask-praetorian flask extension. Provides a tool that allows password authentication and token provision for applications and designated endpoints """ def __init__( self, app=None, user_class=None, token_store_class=None, is_blacklisted=None, encode_jwt_token_hook=None, refresh_jwt_token_hook=None, ): self.pwd_ctx = None self.hash_scheme = None self.salt = None # TODO allow there to be only tokens if we want - not that important for now if app is not None and user_class is not None: self.init_app( app, user_class, token_store_class, is_blacklisted, encode_jwt_token_hook, refresh_jwt_token_hook, ) def init_app( self, app=None, user_class=None, token_store_class=None, is_blacklisted=None, encode_jwt_token_hook=None, refresh_jwt_token_hook=None, ): """ Initializes the Praetorian extension :param: app: The flask app to bind this extension to :param: user_class: The class used to interact with user data :param: token_store_class: The class used to interact with token store data :param: is_blacklisted: A method that may optionally be used to check the token against a blacklist when access or refresh is requested should take the jti for the token to check as a single argument. Returns True if the jti is blacklisted, False otherwise. By default, always returns False. :param encode_jwt_token_hook: A method that may optionally be called right before an encoded jwt is generated. Should take payload_parts which contains the ingredients for the jwt. :param refresh_jwt_token_hook: A method that may optionally be called right before an encoded jwt is refreshed. Should take payload_parts which contains the ingredients for the jwt. """ PraetorianError.require_condition( app.config.get('SECRET_KEY') is not None, "There must be a SECRET_KEY app config setting set", ) self.roles_disabled = app.config.get( 'PRAETORIAN_ROLES_DISABLED', DEFAULT_ROLES_DISABLED, ) self.hash_autoupdate = app.config.get( 'PRAETORIAN_HASH_AUTOUPDATE', DEFAULT_HASH_AUTOUPDATE, ) self.hash_autotest = app.config.get( 'PRAETORIAN_HASH_AUTOTEST', DEFAULT_HASH_AUTOTEST, ) self.pwd_ctx = CryptContext( schemes=app.config.get( 'PRAETORIAN_HASH_ALLOWED_SCHEMES', DEFAULT_HASH_ALLOWED_SCHEMES, ), default=app.config.get( 'PRAETORIAN_HASH_SCHEME', DEFAULT_HASH_SCHEME, ), deprecated=app.config.get( 'PRAETORIAN_HASH_DEPRECATED_SCHEMES', DEFAULT_HASH_DEPRECATED_SCHEMES, ), ) valid_schemes = self.pwd_ctx.schemes() PraetorianError.require_condition( self.hash_scheme in valid_schemes or self.hash_scheme is None, "If {} is set, it must be one of the following schemes: {}".format( 'PRAETORIAN_HASH_SCHEME', valid_schemes, ), ) self.user_class = self._validate_user_class(user_class) #self.token_class = self._validate_token_class(token_class) self.token_store_class = token_store_class self.is_blacklisted = is_blacklisted or (lambda t: False) self.encode_jwt_token_hook = encode_jwt_token_hook self.refresh_jwt_token_hook = refresh_jwt_token_hook self.encode_key = app.config['SECRET_KEY'] self.allowed_algorithms = app.config.get( 'JWT_ALLOWED_ALGORITHMS', DEFAULT_JWT_ALLOWED_ALGORITHMS, ) self.encode_algorithm = app.config.get( 'JWT_ALGORITHM', DEFAULT_JWT_ALGORITHM, ) self.access_lifespan = app.config.get( 'JWT_ACCESS_LIFESPAN', DEFAULT_JWT_ACCESS_LIFESPAN, ) self.refresh_lifespan = app.config.get( 'JWT_REFRESH_LIFESPAN', DEFAULT_JWT_REFRESH_LIFESPAN, ) self.reset_lifespan = app.config.get( 'JWT_RESET_LIFESPAN', DEFAULT_JWT_RESET_LIFESPAN, ) self.jwt_places = app.config.get( 'JWT_PLACES', DEFAULT_JWT_PLACES, ) self.cookie_name = app.config.get( 'JWT_COOKIE_NAME', DEFAULT_JWT_COOKIE_NAME, ) self.header_name = app.config.get( 'JWT_HEADER_NAME', DEFAULT_JWT_HEADER_NAME, ) self.header_type = app.config.get( 'JWT_HEADER_TYPE', DEFAULT_JWT_HEADER_TYPE, ) self.user_class_validation_method = app.config.get( 'USER_CLASS_VALIDATION_METHOD', DEFAULT_USER_CLASS_VALIDATION_METHOD, ) self.confirmation_template = app.config.get( 'PRAETORIAN_CONFIRMATION_TEMPLATE', DEFAULT_CONFIRMATION_TEMPLATE, ) self.confirmation_uri = app.config.get('PRAETORIAN_CONFIRMATION_URI', ) self.confirmation_sender = app.config.get( 'PRAETORIAN_CONFIRMATION_SENDER', ) self.confirmation_subject = app.config.get( 'PRAETORIAN_CONFIRMATION_SUBJECT', DEFAULT_CONFIRMATION_SUBJECT, ) self.reset_template = app.config.get( 'PRAETORIAN_RESET_TEMPLATE', DEFAULT_RESET_TEMPLATE, ) self.reset_uri = app.config.get('PRAETORIAN_RESET_URI', ) self.reset_sender = app.config.get('PRAETORIAN_RESET_SENDER', ) self.reset_subject = app.config.get( 'PRAETORIAN_RESET_SUBJECT', DEFAULT_RESET_SUBJECT, ) if isinstance(self.access_lifespan, dict): self.access_lifespan = pendulum.duration(**self.access_lifespan) elif isinstance(self.access_lifespan, str): self.access_lifespan = duration_from_string(self.access_lifespan) ConfigurationError.require_condition( isinstance(self.access_lifespan, datetime.timedelta), "access lifespan was not configured", ) if isinstance(self.refresh_lifespan, dict): self.refresh_lifespan = pendulum.duration(**self.refresh_lifespan) if isinstance(self.refresh_lifespan, str): self.refresh_lifespan = duration_from_string(self.refresh_lifespan) ConfigurationError.require_condition( isinstance(self.refresh_lifespan, datetime.timedelta), "refresh lifespan was not configured", ) if not app.config.get('DISABLE_PRAETORIAN_ERROR_HANDLER'): app.register_error_handler( PraetorianError, PraetorianError.build_error_handler(), ) self.is_testing = app.config.get('TESTING', False) if not hasattr(app, 'extensions'): app.extensions = {} app.extensions['praetorian'] = self return app def _validate_user_class(self, user_class): """ Validates the supplied user_class to make sure that it has the class methods and attributes necessary to function correctly. After validating class methods, will attempt to instantiate a dummy instance of the user class to test for the requisite attributes Requirements: - ``lookup`` method. Accepts a string parameter, returns instance - ``identify`` method. Accepts an identity parameter, returns instance - ``identity`` attribute. Provides unique id for the instance - ``rolenames`` attribute. Provides list of roles attached to instance - ``password`` attribute. Provides hashed password for instance """ PraetorianError.require_condition( getattr(user_class, 'lookup', None) is not None, textwrap.dedent(""" The user_class must have a lookup class method: user_class.lookup(<str>) -> <user instance> """), ) PraetorianError.require_condition( getattr(user_class, 'identify', None) is not None, textwrap.dedent(""" The user_class must have an identify class method: user_class.identify(<identity>) -> <user instance> """), ) dummy_user = None try: dummy_user = user_class() except Exception: flask.current_app.logger.debug( "Skipping instance validation because " "user cannot be instantiated without arguments") if dummy_user: PraetorianError.require_condition( hasattr(dummy_user, "identity"), textwrap.dedent(""" Instances of user_class must have an identity attribute: user_instance.identity -> <unique id for instance> """), ) PraetorianError.require_condition( self.roles_disabled or hasattr(dummy_user, "rolenames"), textwrap.dedent(""" Instances of user_class must have a rolenames attribute: user_instance.rolenames -> [<role1>, <role2>, ...] """), ) PraetorianError.require_condition( hasattr(dummy_user, "password"), textwrap.dedent(""" Instances of user_class must have a password attribute: user_instance.rolenames -> <hashed password> """), ) return user_class def _validate_token_class(self, token_store_class): """ Validates the supplied user_class to make sure that it has the class methods and attributes necessary to function correctly. After validating class methods, will attempt to instantiate a dummy instance of the user class to test for the requisite attributes Requirements: - ``lookup`` method. Accepts a string parameter, returns instance - ``identify`` method. Accepts an identity parameter, returns instance - ``identity`` attribute. Provides unique id for the instance - ``rolenames`` attribute. Provides list of roles attached to instance - ``password`` attribute. Provides hashed password for instance # TODO remove password """ PraetorianError.require_condition( getattr(token_store_class, 'lookup', None) is not None, textwrap.dedent(""" The user_class must have a lookup class method: user_class.lookup(<str>) -> <user instance> """), ) PraetorianError.require_condition( getattr(token_store_class, 'identify', None) is not None, textwrap.dedent(""" The user_class must have an identify class method: user_class.identify(<identity>) -> <user instance> """), ) dummy_token_store = None try: dummy_token_store = token_store_class() except Exception: flask.current_app.logger.debug( "Skipping instance validation because " "token cannot be instantiated without arguments") if dummy_token_store: PraetorianError.require_condition( hasattr(dummy_token_store, "identity"), textwrap.dedent(""" Instances of token_class must have an identity attribute: token_instance.identity -> <unique id for instance> """), ) PraetorianError.require_condition( self.roles_disabled or hasattr(dummy_token_store, "rolenames"), textwrap.dedent(""" Instances of token_class must have a rolenames attribute: token_instance.rolenames -> [<role1>, <role2>, ...] """), ) # PraetorianError.require_condition( # hasattr(dummy_token, "password"), # textwrap.dedent(""" # Instances of user_class must have a password attribute: # user_instance.rolenames -> <hashed password> # """), # ) return dummy_token_store def authenticate(self, username, password): """ Verifies that a password matches the stored password for that username. If verification passes, the matching user instance is returned """ PraetorianError.require_condition( self.user_class is not None, "Praetorian must be initialized before this method is available", ) user = self.user_class.lookup(username) AuthenticationError.require_condition( user is not None and self._verify_password( password, user.password, ), 'The username and/or password are incorrect', ) """ If we are set to PRAETORIAN_HASH_AUTOUPDATE then check our hash and if needed, update the user. The developer is responsible for using the returned user object and updating the data storage endpoint. Else, if we are set to PRAETORIAN_HASH_AUTOTEST then check out hash and return exception if our hash is using the wrong scheme, but don't modify the user. """ if self.hash_autoupdate: self.verify_and_update(user=user, password=password) elif self.hash_autotest: self.verify_and_update(user=user) return user def _verify_password(self, raw_password, hashed_password): """ Verifies that a plaintext password matches the hashed version of that password using the stored passlib password context """ PraetorianError.require_condition( self.pwd_ctx is not None, "Praetorian must be initialized before this method is available", ) return self.pwd_ctx.verify(raw_password, hashed_password) @deprecated('Use `hash_password` instead.') def encrypt_password(self, raw_password): """ *NOTE* This should be deprecated as its an incorrect definition for what is actually being done -- we are hashing, not encrypting """ return self.hash_password(raw_password) def error_handler(self, error): """ Provides a flask error handler that is used for PraetorianErrors (and derived exceptions). """ warnings.warn( """ error_handler is deprecated. Use FlaskBuzz.build_error_handler instead """, warnings.DeprecationWarning, ) return error.jsonify(), error.status_code, error.headers def _check_user(self, user): """ Checks to make sure that a user is valid. First, checks that the user is not None. If this check fails, a MissingUserError is raised. Next, checks if the user has a validation method. If the method does not exist, the check passes. If the method exists, it is called. If the result of the call is not truthy, an InvalidUserError is raised """ MissingUserError.require_condition( user is not None, 'Could not find the requested user', ) user_validate_method = getattr(user, self.user_class_validation_method, None) if user_validate_method is None: return InvalidUserError.require_condition( user_validate_method(), "The user is not valid or has had access revoked", ) def encode_jwt_token(self, user, override_access_lifespan=None, override_refresh_lifespan=None, bypass_user_check=False, is_registration_token=False, is_reset_token=False, **custom_claims): """ Encodes user data into a jwt token that can be used for authorization at protected endpoints :param: override_access_lifespan: Override's the instance's access lifespan to set a custom duration after which the new token's accessability will expire. May not exceed the refresh_lifespan :param: override_refresh_lifespan: Override's the instance's refresh lifespan to set a custom duration after which the new token's refreshability will expire. :param: bypass_user_check: Override checking the user for being real/active. Used for registration token generation. :param: is_registration_token: Indicates that the token will be used only for email-based registration :param: custom_claims: Additional claims that should be packed in the payload. Note that any claims supplied here must be JSON compatible types """ ClaimCollisionError.require_condition( set(custom_claims.keys()).isdisjoint(RESERVED_CLAIMS), "The custom claims collide with required claims", ) if not bypass_user_check: self._check_user(user) moment = pendulum.now('UTC') if override_refresh_lifespan is None: refresh_lifespan = self.refresh_lifespan else: refresh_lifespan = override_refresh_lifespan refresh_expiration = (moment + refresh_lifespan).int_timestamp if override_access_lifespan is None: access_lifespan = self.access_lifespan else: access_lifespan = override_access_lifespan access_expiration = min( (moment + access_lifespan).int_timestamp, refresh_expiration, ) payload_parts = { 'iat': moment.int_timestamp, 'exp': access_expiration, 'jti': str(uuid.uuid4()), 'id': user.identity, 'rls': ','.join(user.rolenames), REFRESH_EXPIRATION_CLAIM: refresh_expiration, } if is_registration_token: payload_parts[IS_REGISTRATION_TOKEN_CLAIM] = True if is_reset_token: payload_parts[IS_RESET_TOKEN_CLAIM] = True flask.current_app.logger.debug( "Attaching custom claims: {}".format(custom_claims), ) payload_parts.update(custom_claims) if self.encode_jwt_token_hook: self.encode_jwt_token_hook(**payload_parts) return jwt.encode( payload_parts, self.encode_key, self.encode_algorithm, ).decode('utf-8') def encode_eternal_jwt_token(self, user, **custom_claims): """ This utility function encodes a jwt token that never expires .. note:: This should be used sparingly since the token could become a security concern if it is ever lost. If you use this method, you should be sure that your application also implements a blacklist so that a given token can be blocked should it be lost or become a security concern """ return self.encode_jwt_token(user, override_access_lifespan=VITAM_AETERNUM, override_refresh_lifespan=VITAM_AETERNUM, **custom_claims) def refresh_jwt_token(self, token, override_access_lifespan=None): """ Creates a new token for a user if and only if the old token's access permission is expired but its refresh permission is not yet expired. The new token's refresh expiration moment is the same as the old token's, but the new token's access expiration is refreshed :param: token: The existing jwt token that needs to be replaced with a new, refreshed token :param: override_access_lifespan: Override's the instance's access lifespan to set a custom duration after which the new token's accessability will expire. May not exceed the refresh lifespan """ moment = pendulum.now('UTC') data = self.extract_jwt_token(token, access_type=AccessType.refresh) user = self.user_class.identify(data['id']) self._check_user(user) if override_access_lifespan is None: access_lifespan = self.access_lifespan else: access_lifespan = override_access_lifespan refresh_expiration = data[REFRESH_EXPIRATION_CLAIM] access_expiration = min( (moment + access_lifespan).int_timestamp, refresh_expiration, ) custom_claims = { k: v for (k, v) in data.items() if k not in RESERVED_CLAIMS } payload_parts = { 'iat': moment.int_timestamp, 'exp': access_expiration, 'jti': data['jti'], 'id': data['id'], 'rls': ','.join(user.rolenames), REFRESH_EXPIRATION_CLAIM: refresh_expiration, } payload_parts.update(custom_claims) if self.refresh_jwt_token_hook: self.refresh_jwt_token_hook(**payload_parts) return jwt.encode( payload_parts, self.encode_key, self.encode_algorithm, ).decode('utf-8') def extract_jwt_token(self, token, access_type=AccessType.access): """ Extracts a data dictionary from a jwt token """ # Note: we disable exp verification because we will do it ourselves with InvalidTokenHeader.handle_errors('failed to decode JWT token'): data = jwt.decode( token, self.encode_key, algorithms=self.allowed_algorithms, options={'verify_exp': False}, ) self._validate_jwt_data(data, access_type=access_type) return data def _validate_jwt_data(self, data, access_type): """ Validates that the data for a jwt token is valid """ MissingClaimError.require_condition( 'jti' in data, 'Token is missing jti claim', ) BlacklistedError.require_condition( not self.is_blacklisted(data['jti']), 'Token has a blacklisted jti', ) MissingClaimError.require_condition( 'id' in data, 'Token is missing id field', ) MissingClaimError.require_condition( 'exp' in data, 'Token is missing exp claim', ) MissingClaimError.require_condition( REFRESH_EXPIRATION_CLAIM in data, 'Token is missing {} claim'.format(REFRESH_EXPIRATION_CLAIM), ) moment = pendulum.now('UTC').int_timestamp if access_type == AccessType.access: MisusedRegistrationToken.require_condition( IS_REGISTRATION_TOKEN_CLAIM not in data, "registration token used for access") MisusedResetToken.require_condition( IS_RESET_TOKEN_CLAIM not in data, "password reset token used for access") ExpiredAccessError.require_condition( moment <= data['exp'], 'access permission has expired', ) elif access_type == AccessType.refresh: MisusedRegistrationToken.require_condition( IS_REGISTRATION_TOKEN_CLAIM not in data, "registration token used for refresh") MisusedResetToken.require_condition( IS_RESET_TOKEN_CLAIM not in data, "password reset token used for refresh") EarlyRefreshError.require_condition( moment > data['exp'], 'access permission for token has not expired. may not refresh', ) ExpiredRefreshError.require_condition( moment <= data[REFRESH_EXPIRATION_CLAIM], 'refresh permission for token has expired', ) elif access_type == AccessType.register: ExpiredAccessError.require_condition( moment <= data['exp'], 'register permission has expired', ) InvalidRegistrationToken.require_condition( IS_REGISTRATION_TOKEN_CLAIM in data, "invalid registration token used for verification") MisusedResetToken.require_condition( IS_RESET_TOKEN_CLAIM not in data, "password reset token used for registration") elif access_type == AccessType.reset: MisusedRegistrationToken.require_condition( IS_REGISTRATION_TOKEN_CLAIM not in data, "registration token used for reset") ExpiredAccessError.require_condition( moment <= data['exp'], 'reset permission has expired', ) InvalidResetToken.require_condition( IS_RESET_TOKEN_CLAIM in data, "invalid reset token used for verification") def _unpack_header(self, headers): """ Unpacks a jwt token from a request header """ jwt_header = headers.get(self.header_name) MissingToken.require_condition( jwt_header is not None, "JWT token not found in headers under '{}'".format( self.header_name, ), ) match = re.match(self.header_type + r'\s*([\w\.-]+)', jwt_header) InvalidTokenHeader.require_condition( match is not None, "JWT header structure is invalid", ) token = match.group(1) return token def read_token_from_header(self): """ Unpacks a jwt token from the current flask request """ return self._unpack_header(flask.request.headers) def _unpack_cookie(self, cookies): """ Unpacks a jwt token from a request cookies """ jwt_cookie = cookies.get(self.cookie_name) MissingToken.require_condition( jwt_cookie is not None, "JWT token not found in cookie under '{}'".format( self.cookie_name), ) return jwt_cookie def read_token_from_cookie(self): """ Unpacks a jwt token from the current flask request """ return self._unpack_cookie(flask.request.cookies) def read_token(self): exc = None if 'header' in self.jwt_places: try: return self.read_token_from_header() except MissingToken as e: exc = e if 'cookie' in self.jwt_places: try: return self.read_token_from_cookie() except MissingToken as e: exc = e if exc: raise MissingToken("JWT token not found in {}".format( self.jwt_places)) def pack_header_for_user(self, user, override_access_lifespan=None, override_refresh_lifespan=None, **custom_claims): """ Encodes a jwt token and packages it into a header dict for a given user :param: user: The user to package the header for :param: override_access_lifespan: Override's the instance's access lifespan to set a custom duration after which the new token's accessability will expire. May not exceed the refresh_lifespan :param: override_refresh_lifespan: Override's the instance's refresh lifespan to set a custom duration after which the new token's refreshability will expire. :param: custom_claims: Additional claims that should be packed in the payload. Note that any claims supplied here must be JSON compatible types """ token = self.encode_jwt_token( user, override_access_lifespan=override_access_lifespan, override_refresh_lifespan=override_refresh_lifespan, **custom_claims) return {self.header_name: self.header_type + ' ' + token} def send_registration_email(self, email, user=None, template=None, confirmation_sender=None, confirmation_uri=None, subject=None, override_access_lifespan=None): """ Sends a registration email to a new user, containing a time expiring token usable for validation. This requires your application is initialized with a `mail` extension, which supports Flask-Mail's `Message()` object and a `send()` method. Returns a dict containing the information sent, along with the `result` from mail send. :param: user: The user object to tie claim to (username, id, email, etc) :param: template: HTML Template for confirmation email. If not provided, a stock entry is used :param: confirmation_sender: The sender that shoudl be attached to the confirmation email. Overrides the PRAETORIAN_CONFIRMRATION_SENDER config setting :param: confirmation_uri: The uri that should be visited to complete email registration. Should usually be a uri to a frontend or external service that calls a 'finalize' method in the api to complete registration. Will override the PRAETORIAN_CONFIRMATION_URI config setting :param: subject: The registration email subject. Will override the PRAETORIAN_CONFIRMATION_SUBJECT config setting. :param: override_access_lifespan: Overrides the JWT_ACCESS_LIFESPAN to set an access lifespan for the registration token. """ if subject is None: subject = self.confirmation_subject if confirmation_uri is None: confirmation_uri = self.confirmation_uri sender = confirmation_sender or self.confirmation_sender flask.current_app.logger.debug( "Generating token with lifespan: {}".format( override_access_lifespan)) custom_token = self.encode_jwt_token( user, override_access_lifespan=override_access_lifespan, bypass_user_check=True, is_registration_token=True, ) return self.send_token_email(email, user, template, confirmation_sender, confirmation_uri, subject, custom_token=custom_token, sender=sender) def send_reset_email(self, email, template=None, reset_sender=None, reset_uri=None, subject=None, override_access_lifespan=None): """ Sends a password reset email to a user, containing a time expiring token usable for validation. This requires your application is initialized with a `mail` extension, which supports Flask-Mail's `Message()` object and a `send()` method. Returns a dict containing the information sent, along with the `result` from mail send. :param: email: The email address to attempt to send to :param: template: HTML Template for reset email. If not provided, a stock entry is used :param: confirmation_sender: The sender that shoudl be attached to the reset email. Overrides the PRAETORIAN_RESET_SENDER config setting :param: confirmation_uri: The uri that should be visited to complete password reset. Should usually be a uri to a frontend or external service that calls the 'validate_reset_token()' method in the api to complete reset. Will override the PRAETORIAN_RESET_URI config setting :param: subject: The reset email subject. Will override the PRAETORIAN_RESET_SUBJECT config setting. :param: override_access_lifespan: Overrides the JWT_ACCESS_LIFESPAN to set an access lifespan for the registration token. """ if subject is None: subject = self.reset_subject if reset_uri is None: reset_uri = self.reset_uri sender = reset_sender or self.reset_sender user = self.user_class.lookup(email) MissingUserError.require_condition( user is not None, 'Could not find the requested user', ) flask.current_app.logger.debug( "Generating token with lifespan: {}".format( override_access_lifespan)) custom_token = self.encode_jwt_token( user, override_access_lifespan=override_access_lifespan, bypass_user_check=False, is_reset_token=True, ) return self.send_token_email(user.email, user, template, reset_sender, reset_uri, subject, custom_token=custom_token, sender=sender) def send_token_email(self, email, user=None, template=None, action_sender=None, action_uri=None, subject=None, override_access_lifespan=None, custom_token=None, sender='no-reply@praetorian'): """ Sends an email to a user, containing a time expiring token usable for several actions. This requires your application is initialized with a `mail` extension, which supports Flask-Mail's `Message()` object and a `send()` method. Returns a dict containing the information sent, along with the `result` from mail send. :param: email: The email address to use (username, id, email, etc) :param: user: The user object to tie claim to (username, id, email, etc) :param: template: HTML Template for confirmation email. If not provided, a stock entry is used :param: action_sender: The sender that should be attached to the confirmation email. :param: action_uri: The uri that should be visited to complete the token action. :param: subject: The email subject. :param: override_access_lifespan: Overrides the JWT_ACCESS_LIFESPAN to set an access lifespan for the registration token. """ notification = { 'result': None, 'message': None, 'user': str(user), 'email': email, 'token': custom_token, 'subject': subject, 'confirmation_uri': action_uri, # backwards compatibility 'action_uri': action_uri, } PraetorianError.require_condition( action_sender, "A sender is required to send confirmation email", ) PraetorianError.require_condition( custom_token, "A custom_token is required to send notification email", ) if template is None: with open(self.confirmation_template) as fh: template = fh.read() with PraetorianError.handle_errors('fail sending email'): flask.current_app.logger.debug( "NOTIFICATION: {}".format(notification)) jinja_tmpl = jinja2.Template(template) notification['message'] = jinja_tmpl.render(notification).strip() msg = Message(html=notification['message'], sender=action_sender, subject=notification['subject'], recipients=[notification['email']]) flask.current_app.logger.debug("Sending email to {}".format(email)) notification['result'] = flask.current_app.extensions['mail'].send( msg) return notification def get_user_from_registration_token(self, token): """ Gets a user based on the registration token that is supplied. Verifies that the token is a regisration token and that the user can be properly retrieved """ data = self.extract_jwt_token(token, access_type=AccessType.register) flask.current_app.logger.debug("DATA: {}".format(data)) user_id = data.get('id') PraetorianError.require_condition( user_id is not None, "Could not fetch an id from the registration token", ) user = self.user_class.identify(user_id) PraetorianError.require_condition( user is not None, "Could not identify the user from the registration token", ) return user def validate_reset_token(self, token): """ Validates a password reset request based on the reset token that is supplied. Verifies that the token is a reset token and that the user can be properly retrieved """ data = self.extract_jwt_token(token, access_type=AccessType.reset) user_id = data.get('id') PraetorianError.require_condition( user_id is not None, "Could not fetch an id from the reset token", ) user = self.user_class.identify(user_id) PraetorianError.require_condition( user is not None, "Could not identify the user from the reset token", ) return user def hash_password(self, raw_password): """ Hashes a plaintext password using the stored passlib password context """ PraetorianError.require_condition( self.pwd_ctx is not None, "Praetorian must be initialized before this method is available", ) """ `scheme` is now set with self.pwd_ctx.update(default=scheme) due to the depreciation in upcoming passlib 2.0. zillions of warnings suck. """ return self.pwd_ctx.hash(raw_password) def verify_and_update(self, user=None, password=None): """ Validate a password hash contained in the user object is hashed with the defined hash scheme (PRAETORIAN_HASH_SCHEME). If not, raise an Exception of `LegacySchema`, unless the `password` arguement is provided, in which case an attempt to call `user.save()` will be made, updating the hashed password to the currently desired hash scheme (PRAETORIAN_HASH_SCHEME). :param: user: The user object to tie claim to (username, id, email, etc). *MUST* include the hashed password field, defined as `user.password` :param: password: The user's provide password from login. If present, this is used to validate and then attempt to update with the new PRAETORIAN_HASH_SCHEME scheme. """ if self.pwd_ctx.needs_update(user.password): if password: (rv, updated) = self.pwd_ctx.verify_and_update( password, user.password, ) AuthenticationError.require_condition( rv, "Could not verify password", ) user.password = updated else: used_hash = self.pwd_ctx.identify(user.password) desired_hash = self.hash_scheme raise LegacyScheme("Hash using non-current scheme '{}'." "Use '{}' instead.".format( used_hash, desired_hash)) return user
class LoginService(Service): """ A service to validate login via the API. TODO: It's crypto, so without cache, it's not fast. Not ready for replacing Flask one. """ def __init__(self): super().__init__() # Hashing algos pw_hash = self.config.get("SECURITY_PASSWORD_HASH") assert pw_hash is not None, "SECURITY_PASSWORD_HASH not set!" schemes = [pw_hash, 'plaintext'] deprecated = ['auto'] self._pwd_context = CryptContext(schemes=schemes, default=pw_hash, deprecated=deprecated) # Hashing config self.password_salt = self.config.get("SECURITY_PASSWORD_SALT") self.password_hash = None def validate_login(self, username: str, password: str) -> str: # Fetch the one and only user user_qry = self.session.query(User).filter( User.email == username).filter(User.active) db_users = user_qry.all() assert len(db_users) == 1, NOT_AUTHORIZED the_user: User = db_users[0] # verif_ok = self.verify_and_update_password(password, the_user) assert verif_ok, NOT_AUTHORIZED # Sign with the verifying serializer, the salt is Flask's one token = build_serializer().dumps({"user_id": the_user.id}) return token # # Copy/paste/adapt from flask-security # def verify_and_update_password(self, password, user): """Returns ``True`` if the password is valid for the specified user. Additionally, the hashed password in the database is updated if the hashing algorithm happens to have changed. :param password: A plaintext password to verify :param user: The user to verify against """ if self.use_double_hash(user.password): # Core of the job: comparing DB user.password with same-method encoding of the given password verified = self._pwd_context.verify(self.get_hmac(password), user.password) else: # Try with plaintext password. verified = self._pwd_context.verify(password, user.password) if verified and self._pwd_context.needs_update(user.password): # Write a more secure version user.password = self.hash_password(password) self.session.commit() return verified def hash_password(self, password): """Hash the specified plaintext password. It uses the configured hashing options. .. versionadded:: 2.0.2 :param password: The plaintext password to hash """ if self.use_double_hash(): password = self.get_hmac(password).decode('ascii') return self._pwd_context.hash(password) # **self.config.get('PASSWORD_HASH_OPTIONS', default={}).get( # self.password_hash, {}) # ) def get_hmac(self, password): """Returns a Base64 encoded HMAC+SHA512 of the password signed with the salt specified by ``SECURITY_PASSWORD_SALT``. :param password: The password to sign """ salt = self.password_salt if salt is None: raise RuntimeError( 'The configuration value `SECURITY_PASSWORD_SALT` must ' 'not be None when the value of `SECURITY_PASSWORD_HASH` is ' 'set to "%s"' % self.password_hash) # pragma:nocover h = hmac.new(self.encode_string(salt), self.encode_string(password), hashlib.sha512) return base64.b64encode(h.digest()) @staticmethod def encode_string(string): """Encodes a string to bytes, if it isn't already. :param string: The string to encode""" if isinstance(string, str): string = string.encode('utf-8') return string def use_double_hash(self, password_hash=None): """Return a bool indicating whether a password should be hashed twice.""" single_hash = 'PASSWORD_SINGLE_HASH' in self.config # Not the case in EcoTaxa config if single_hash and self.password_salt: raise RuntimeError( 'You may not specify a salt with ' 'SECURITY_PASSWORD_SINGLE_HASH') # pragma:nocover if password_hash is None: is_plaintext = self.password_hash == 'plaintext' else: is_plaintext = self._pwd_context.identify( password_hash) == 'plaintext' return not (is_plaintext or single_hash)