async def hsm_status(self, h=None):
# refresh HSM status
b4 = STATUS.hsm.get('active', False)
try:
b4_nlc = STATUS.hsm.get('next_local_code')
h = h or (await self.send_recv(CCProtocolPacker.hsm_status()))
STATUS.hsm = h = json_loads(h)
STATUS.notify_watchers()
except MissingColdcard:
h = {}
if h.get('next_local_code') and STATUS.psbt_hash:
if b4_nlc != h.next_local_code:
STATUS.local_code = calc_local_pincode(
a2b_hex(STATUS.psbt_hash), h.next_local_code)
else:
# won't be required
STATUS.local_code = None
if ('summary' in h) and h.summary and not BP.get(
'priv_over_ux') and not BP.get('summary'):
logging.info("Captured CC's summary of the policy")
BP['summary'] = h.summary
BP.save()
# has it just transitioned into HSM mode?
if STATUS.connected and STATUS.hsm.active and not b4:
await self.activated_hsm()
return STATUS.hsm
async def activated_hsm(self):
# just connected to a Coldcard w/ HSM active already
# - ready storage locker, decrypt and use those settings
logging.info("Coldcard now in HSM mode. Fetching storage locker.")
try:
sl = await self.get_storage_locker()
except CCProtoError as exc:
if 'consumed' in str(exc):
import os, sys
msg = "Coldcard refused access to storage locker. Reboot it and enter HSM again"
logging.error(msg)
print(msg, file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
else:
raise
try:
import policy
xk = policy.decode_sl(sl)
except:
logging.error("Unable to parse contents of storage locker: %r" %
sl)
return
if BP.open(xk):
# unable to read our settings specific to this CC? Go to defaults
# or continue?
logging.error(
"Unable to read bunker settings for this Coldcard; forging on")
else:
STATUS.sl_loaded = True
if BP.get(
'tor_enabled',
False) and not (STATUS.force_local_mode or STATUS.setup_mode):
# get onto Tor as a HS
from torsion import TOR
STATUS.tor_enabled = True
logging.info(f"Starting hidden service: %s" % BP['onion_addr'])
asyncio.create_task(TOR.start_tunnel())
h = STATUS.hsm
if ('summary' in h) and h.summary and not BP.get(
'priv_over_ux') and not BP.get('summary'):
logging.info("Captured CC's summary of the policy")
BP['summary'] = h.summary
BP.save()
STATUS.reset_pending_auth()
STATUS.notify_watchers()
async def captcha_image(request):
# make a captcha image, but always the same one per session
ses = await get_session(request)
if ses.new:
return HTTPNotFound()
from make_captcha import RansomCaptcha, MegaGifCaptcha, TOKEN_CHARS
import random
if 'captcha' in ses:
# dont let them retry?
code = ses['captcha']
else:
code = ''.join(random.sample(TOKEN_CHARS, 8))
ses['captcha'] = code
easy = BP.get('easy_captcha', settings.EASY_CAPTCHA)
if easy:
itype, data = RansomCaptcha(seed=code).draw(code, foreground='#444')
else:
itype, data = MegaGifCaptcha(seed=code).draw(code, foreground='#444')
return web.Response(body=data, content_type='image/'+itype,
headers = {'Cache-Control': 'no-cache'})
def update_sl(proposed):
# We control the set_sl/allow_sl values solely for bunker purposes (sl=storage locker)
# try to use any value already provided (but unlikely)
xk = proposed.get('set_sl', None) or None
if xk:
try:
xk = decode_sl(xk)
except:
logging.error(
"Unable to decode existing storage locker; replacing",
exc_info=1)
xk = None
if not xk:
# capture settings key
xk = BP.key
assert len(xk) == 32
proposed['set_sl'] = b64encode(b'Bunk' + xk).decode('ascii')
if xk != BP.key:
# re-use existing key, and switch over to using new/eixsting key
BP.delete_file()
BP.set_secret(xk)
BP.save()
else:
logging.info("Re-using old secret for holding Bunker settings")
# simple fixed value for how many times we can re-read the storage locker
proposed['allow_sl'] = 13 if BP.get('allow_reboots', True) else 1
async def homepage(request):
# may take some details from the policy, and cook up into more useful forms
ss = BP.get('summary', None) if STATUS.hsm.get('active') else None
# coldcard tells us when we'll need a local code, by providing seed value
nl = bool('next_local_code' in STATUS.hsm)
return await add_shared_ctx(request, policy_summary=ss, needs_local=nl)
async def login_post(request):
# they must have a current session already
# - hope this is enough against CSRF
# - TODO: some rate limiting here, without DoS attacks
ses = await get_session(request)
form = await request.post()
ok = False
if ses.new:
logging.warn("Bad login attempt (no cookie)")
elif (time.time() - ses.created) > settings.MAX_LOGIN_WAIT_TIME:
ses.invalidate()
logging.warn("Stale login attempt (cookie too old)")
elif ses.get('kiddie', 0):
logging.warn("Keeping the kiddies at bay")
else:
captcha = form.get('captcha', '').lower()
pw = form.get('password', None)
if not captcha or not pw:
# keep same captcha; they just pressed enter
ok = False
else:
expect = BP.get('master_pw', settings.MASTER_PW) # XXX scrypt(pw)
expect_code = ses.pop('captcha', None)
ok = (pw == expect) and (captcha == expect_code)
if not ok:
# fail; do nothing visible (but they will get new captcha)
dest = URL(request.headers.get('referer', '/login'))
return HTTPFound(dest)
# SUCCESS
accept_user_login(ses)
# try to put them back where they were before
try:
dest = URL(request.headers.get('referer', '')).query.get('u', '/')
except:
dest = '/'
logging.warn(f"Good login from user, sending to: {dest}")
return HTTPFound(dest)
async def tools_page(request):
# various random things I've been talked into
# - message signing useul tho
if BP.get('policy'):
paths = BP['policy'].get('msg_paths') or []
paths = set(i.replace('*', '999') for i in paths)
else:
# priv_over_ux: we don't know, but some useful ones
paths = ['m', "m/0/0", "m/44'/0'/0'/0/0", "m/49'/0'/0'/0/0",
"m/84'/0'/0/0" ]
paths = list(sorted(paths, key=lambda x: (len(x.split('/')), x.split('/'))))
return await add_shared_ctx(request, msg_paths=paths)
def reset_pending_auth(self):
# clear and setup pending auth list
from persist import BP
# make a list of users that might need to auth
ul = self.hsm.get('users')
if not ul:
if BP.get('policy'):
ul = set()
try:
for r in BP['policy']['rules']:
ul.union(r.users)
except KeyError: pass
ul = list(sorted(ul))
# they might have picked privacy over UX, so provide some "slots"
# regardless of above.
if not ul:
ul = ['' for i in range(5)]
# construct an obj for UX purposes, but keep the actual secrets separate
self.pending_auth = [ObjectStruct(name=n, has_name=bool(n),
has_guess='', totp=0) for n in ul]
self._auth_guess = [None]*len(ul)
async def ws_api_handler(ses, send_json, req, orig_request): # handle_api
#
# Handle incoming requests over websocket; send back results.
# req = already json parsed request coming in
# send_json() = means to send the response back
#
action = req.action
args = getattr(req, 'args', None)
#logging.warn("API action=%s (%r)" % (action, args)) # MAJOR info leak XXX
logging.debug(f"API action={action}")
if action == '_connected':
logging.info("Websocket connected: %r" % args)
# can send special state update at this point, depending on the page
elif action == 'start_hsm_btn':
await Connection().hsm_start()
await send_json(show_flash_msg=APPROVE_CTA)
elif action == 'delete_user':
name, = args
assert 1 <= len(name) <= MAX_USERNAME_LEN, "bad username length"
await Connection().delete_user(name.encode('utf8'))
# assume it worked, so UX updates right away
try:
STATUS.hsm.users.remove(name)
except ValueError:
pass
STATUS.notify_watchers()
elif action == 'create_user':
name, authmode, new_pw = args
assert 1 <= len(name) <= MAX_USERNAME_LEN, "bad username length"
assert ',' not in name, "no commas in names"
if authmode == 'totp':
mode = USER_AUTH_TOTP | USER_AUTH_SHOW_QR
new_pw = ''
elif authmode == 'rand_pw':
mode = USER_AUTH_HMAC | USER_AUTH_SHOW_QR
new_pw = ''
elif authmode == 'give_pw':
mode = USER_AUTH_HMAC
else:
raise ValueError(authmode)
await Connection().create_user(name.encode('utf8'), mode, new_pw)
# assume it worked, so UX updates right away
try:
STATUS.hsm.users = list(set(STATUS.hsm.users + [name]))
except ValueError:
pass
STATUS.notify_watchers()
elif action == 'submit_policy':
# get some JSON w/ everything the user entered.
p, save_copy = args
proposed = policy.web_cleanup(json_loads(p))
policy.update_sl(proposed)
await Connection().hsm_start(proposed)
STATUS.notify_watchers()
await send_json(show_flash_msg=APPROVE_CTA)
if save_copy:
d = policy.desensitize(proposed)
await send_json(local_download=dict(data=json_dumps(d, indent=2),
filename=f'hsm-policy-{STATUS.xfp}.json.txt'))
elif action == 'download_policy':
proposed = policy.web_cleanup(json_loads(args[0]))
await send_json(local_download=dict(data=json_dumps(proposed, indent=2),
filename=f'hsm-policy-{STATUS.xfp}.json.txt'))
elif action == 'import_policy':
# they are uploading a JSON capture, but need values we can load in Vue
proposed = args[0]
cooked = policy.web_cookup(proposed)
await send_json(vue_app_cb=dict(update_policy=cooked),
show_flash_msg="Policy file imported.")
elif action == 'pick_onion_addr':
from torsion import TOR
addr, pk = await TOR.pick_onion_addr()
await send_json(vue_app_cb=dict(new_onion_addr=[addr, pk]))
elif action == 'pick_master_pw':
pw = b64encode(os.urandom(12)).decode('ascii')
pw = pw.replace('/', 'S').replace('+', 'p')
assert '=' not in pw
await send_json(vue_app_cb=dict(new_master_pw=pw))
elif action == 'new_bunker_config':
from torsion import TOR
# save and apply config values
nv = json_loads(args[0])
assert 4 <= len(nv.master_pw) < 200, "Master password must be at least 4 chars long"
# copy in simple stuff
for fn in [ 'tor_enabled', 'master_pw', 'easy_captcha', 'allow_reboots']:
if fn in nv:
BP[fn] = nv[fn]
# update onion stuff only if PK is known (ie. they changed it)
if nv.get('onion_pk', False) or False:
for fn in [ 'onion_addr', 'onion_pk']:
if fn in nv:
BP[fn] = nv[fn]
BP.save()
await send_json(show_flash_msg="Bunker settings encrypted and saved to disk.")
STATUS.tor_enabled = BP['tor_enabled']
STATUS.notify_watchers()
if not BP['tor_enabled']:
await TOR.stop_tunnel()
elif BP.get('onion_pk') and not (STATUS.force_local_mode or STATUS.setup_mode) \
and TOR.get_current_addr() != BP.get('onion_addr'):
# disconnect/reconnect
await TOR.start_tunnel()
elif action == 'sign_message':
# sign a short text message
# - lots more checking could be done here, but CC does it anyway
msg_text, path, addr_fmt = args
addr_fmt = AF_P2WPKH if addr_fmt != 'classic' else AF_CLASSIC
try:
sig, addr = await Connection().sign_text_msg(msg_text, path, addr_fmt)
except:
# get the spinner to stop: error msg will be "refused by policy" typically
await send_json(vue_app_cb=dict(msg_signing_result='(failed)'))
raise
sig = b64encode(sig).decode('ascii').replace('\n', '')
await send_json(vue_app_cb=dict(msg_signing_result=f'{sig}\n{addr}'))
elif action == 'upload_psbt':
# receiving a PSBT for signing
size, digest, contents = args
psbt = b64decode(contents)
assert len(psbt) == size, "truncated/padded in transit"
assert sha256(psbt).hexdigest() == digest, "corrupted in transit"
STATUS.import_psbt(psbt)
STATUS.notify_watchers()
elif action == 'clear_psbt':
STATUS.clear_psbt()
STATUS.notify_watchers()
elif action == 'preview_psbt':
STATUS.psbt_preview = 'Wait...'
STATUS.notify_watchers()
try:
txt = await Connection().sign_psbt(STATUS._pending_psbt, flags=STXN_VISUALIZE)
txt = txt.decode('ascii')
# force some line splits, especially for bech32, 32-byte values (p2wsh)
probs = re.findall(r'([a-zA-Z0-9]{36,})', txt)
for p in probs:
txt = txt.replace(p, p[0:30] + '\u22ef\n\u22ef' + p[30:])
STATUS.psbt_preview = txt
except:
# like if CC doesn't like the keys, whatever ..
STATUS.psbt_preview = None
raise
finally:
STATUS.notify_watchers()
elif action == 'auth_set_name':
idx, name = args
assert 0 <= len(name) <= MAX_USERNAME_LEN
assert 0 <= idx < len(STATUS.pending_auth)
STATUS.pending_auth[idx].name = name
STATUS.notify_watchers()
elif action == 'auth_offer_guess':
idx, ts, guess = args
assert 0 <= idx < len(STATUS.pending_auth)
STATUS.pending_auth[idx].totp = ts
STATUS.pending_auth[idx].has_guess = 'x'*len(guess)
STATUS._auth_guess[idx] = guess
STATUS.notify_watchers()
elif action == 'submit_psbt':
# they want to sign it now
expect_hash, send_immediately, finalize, wants_dl = args
assert expect_hash == STATUS.psbt_hash, "hash mismatch"
if send_immediately: assert finalize, "must finalize b4 send"
logging.info("Starting to sign...")
STATUS.busy_signing = True
STATUS.notify_watchers()
try:
dev = Connection()
# do auth steps first (no feedback given)
for pa, guess in zip(STATUS.pending_auth, STATUS._auth_guess):
if pa.name and guess:
await dev.user_auth(pa.name, guess, int(pa.totp), a2b_hex(STATUS.psbt_hash))
STATUS.reset_pending_auth()
try:
result = await dev.sign_psbt(STATUS._pending_psbt, finalize=finalize)
logging.info("Done signing")
msg = "Transaction signed."
if send_immediately:
msg += '<br><br>' + broadcast_txn(result)
await send_json(show_modal=True, html=Markup(msg), selector='.js-api-success')
result = (b2a_hex(result) if finalize else b64encode(result)).decode('ascii')
fname = 'transaction.txt' if finalize else ('signed-%s.psbt'%STATUS.psbt_hash[-6:])
if wants_dl:
await send_json(local_download=dict(data=result, filename=fname,
is_b64=(not finalize)))
await dev.hsm_status()
except CCUserRefused:
logging.error("Coldcard refused to sign txn")
await dev.hsm_status()
r = STATUS.hsm.get('last_refusal', None)
if not r:
raise HTMLErroMsg('Refused by local user.')
else:
raise HTMLErrorMsg(f"Rejected by Coldcard.<br><br>{r}")
finally:
STATUS.busy_signing = False
STATUS.notify_watchers()
elif action == 'shutdown_bunker':
await send_json(show_flash_msg="Bunker is shutdown.")
await asyncio.sleep(0.25)
logging.warn("User-initiated shutdown")
asyncio.get_running_loop().stop()
sys.exit(0)
elif action == 'leave_setup_mode':
# During setup process, they want to go Tor mode; which I consider leaving
# setup mode ... in particular, logins are required.
# - button label is "Start Tor" tho ... so user doesn't see it that way
assert STATUS.setup_mode, 'not in setup mode?'
assert BP['tor_enabled'], 'Tor not enabled (need to save?)'
addr = BP['onion_addr']
assert addr and '.onion' in addr, "Bad address?"
STATUS.setup_mode = False
await send_json(show_flash_msg="Tor hidden service has been enabled. "
"It may take a few minutes for the website to become available")
STATUS.notify_watchers()
from torsion import TOR
logging.info(f"Starting hidden service: %s" % addr)
asyncio.create_task(TOR.start_tunnel())
elif action == 'logout_everyone':
# useful for running battles...
# - changes crypto key for cookies, so they are all invalid immediately.
from aiohttp_session.nacl_storage import NaClCookieStorage
import nacl
logging.warning("Logout of everyone!")
# reset all session cookies
storage = orig_request.get('aiohttp_session_storage')
assert isinstance(storage, NaClCookieStorage)
storage._secretbox = nacl.secret.SecretBox(os.urandom(32))
# kick everyone off (bonus step)
for w in web_sockets:
try:
await send_json(redirect='/logout', _ws=w)
await w.close()
except:
pass
else:
raise NotImplementedError(action)