def init_add(self, args):
# command line options can overwrite config values
if "agent_ip" in args:
self.cloudagent_ip = args["agent_ip"]
if 'agent_port' in args and args['agent_port'] is not None:
self.cloudagent_port = args['agent_port']
if 'cv_agent_ip' in args and args['cv_agent_ip'] is not None:
self.cv_cloudagent_ip = args['cv_agent_ip']
else:
self.cv_cloudagent_ip = self.cloudagent_ip
# Make sure all keys exist in dictionary
if "file" not in args:
args["file"] = None
if "keyfile" not in args:
args["keyfile"] = None
if "payload" not in args:
args["payload"] = None
if "ca_dir" not in args:
args["ca_dir"] = None
if "incl_dir" not in args:
args["incl_dir"] = None
if "ca_dir_pw" not in args:
args["ca_dir_pw"] = None
# Set up accepted algorithms
self.accept_tpm_hash_algs = config.get(
'tenant', 'accept_tpm_hash_algs').split(',')
self.accept_tpm_encryption_algs = config.get(
'tenant', 'accept_tpm_encryption_algs').split(',')
self.accept_tpm_signing_algs = config.get(
'tenant', 'accept_tpm_signing_algs').split(',')
# Set up PCR values
tpm_policy = config.get('tenant', 'tpm_policy')
if "tpm_policy" in args and args["tpm_policy"] is not None:
tpm_policy = args["tpm_policy"]
self.tpm_policy = TPM_Utilities.readPolicy(tpm_policy)
logger.info(f"TPM PCR Mask from policy is {self.tpm_policy['mask']}")
vtpm_policy = config.get('tenant', 'vtpm_policy')
if "vtpm_policy" in args and args["vtpm_policy"] is not None:
vtpm_policy = args["vtpm_policy"]
self.vtpm_policy = TPM_Utilities.readPolicy(vtpm_policy)
logger.info(f"TPM PCR Mask from policy is {self.vtpm_policy['mask']}")
# Read command-line path string IMA whitelist
wl_data = None
if "ima_whitelist" in args and args["ima_whitelist"] is not None:
# Auto-enable IMA (or-bit mask)
self.tpm_policy['mask'] = "0x%X" % (
int(self.tpm_policy['mask'], 0) + (1 << common.IMA_PCR))
if type(args["ima_whitelist"]) in [str, str]:
if args["ima_whitelist"] == "default":
args["ima_whitelist"] = config.get('tenant',
'ima_whitelist')
wl_data = ima.read_whitelist(args["ima_whitelist"])
elif type(args["ima_whitelist"]) is list:
wl_data = args["ima_whitelist"]
else:
raise UserError("Invalid whitelist provided")
# Read command-line path string IMA exclude list
excl_data = None
if "ima_exclude" in args and args["ima_exclude"] is not None:
if type(args["ima_exclude"]) in [str, str]:
if args["ima_exclude"] == "default":
args["ima_exclude"] = config.get('tenant',
'ima_excludelist')
excl_data = ima.read_excllist(args["ima_exclude"])
elif type(args["ima_exclude"]) is list:
excl_data = args["ima_exclude"]
else:
raise UserError("Invalid exclude list provided")
# Set up IMA
if TPM_Utilities.check_mask(self.tpm_policy['mask'], common.IMA_PCR) or \
TPM_Utilities.check_mask(self.vtpm_policy['mask'], common.IMA_PCR):
# Process IMA whitelists
self.ima_whitelist = ima.process_whitelists(wl_data, excl_data)
# if none
if (args["file"] is None and args["keyfile"] is None
and args["ca_dir"] is None):
raise UserError(
"You must specify one of -k, -f, or --cert to specify the key/contents to be securely delivered to the agent"
)
if args["keyfile"] is not None:
if args["file"] is not None or args["ca_dir"] is not None:
raise UserError(
"You must specify one of -k, -f, or --cert to specify the key/contents to be securely delivered to the agent"
)
# read the keys in
if type(args["keyfile"]) is dict and "data" in args["keyfile"]:
if type(args["keyfile"]["data"]) is list and len(
args["keyfile"]["data"]) == 1:
keyfile = args["keyfile"]["data"][0]
if keyfile is None:
raise UserError("Invalid key file contents")
f = io.StringIO(keyfile)
else:
raise UserError("Invalid key file provided")
else:
f = open(args["keyfile"], 'r')
self.K = base64.b64decode(f.readline())
self.U = base64.b64decode(f.readline())
self.V = base64.b64decode(f.readline())
f.close()
# read the payload in (opt.)
if type(args["payload"]) is dict and "data" in args["payload"]:
if type(args["payload"]["data"]) is list and len(
args["payload"]["data"]) > 0:
self.payload = args["payload"]["data"][0]
else:
if args["payload"] is not None:
f = open(args["payload"], 'r')
self.payload = f.read()
f.close()
if args["file"] is not None:
if args["keyfile"] is not None or args["ca_dir"] is not None:
raise UserError(
"You must specify one of -k, -f, or --cert to specify the key/contents to be securely delivered to the agent"
)
if type(args["file"]) is dict and "data" in args["file"]:
if type(args["file"]["data"]) is list and len(
args["file"]["data"]) > 0:
contents = args["file"]["data"][0]
if contents is None:
raise UserError("Invalid file payload contents")
else:
raise UserError("Invalid file payload provided")
else:
with open(args["file"], 'r') as f:
contents = f.read()
ret = user_data_encrypt.encrypt(contents)
self.K = ret['k']
self.U = ret['u']
self.V = ret['v']
self.payload = ret['ciphertext']
if args["ca_dir"] is None and args["incl_dir"] is not None:
raise UserError(
"--include option is only valid when used with --cert")
if args["ca_dir"] is not None:
if args["file"] is not None or args["keyfile"] is not None:
raise UserError(
"You must specify one of -k, -f, or --cert to specify the key/contents to be securely delivered to the agent"
)
if args["ca_dir"] == 'default':
args["ca_dir"] = common.CA_WORK_DIR
if "ca_dir_pw" in args and args["ca_dir_pw"] is not None:
ca_util.setpassword(args["ca_dir_pw"])
if not os.path.exists(args["ca_dir"]) or not os.path.exists(
"%s/cacert.crt" % args["ca_dir"]):
logger.warning(" CA directory does not exist. Creating...")
ca_util.cmd_init(args["ca_dir"])
if not os.path.exists("%s/%s-private.pem" %
(args["ca_dir"], self.agent_uuid)):
ca_util.cmd_mkcert(args["ca_dir"], self.agent_uuid)
cert_pkg, serial, subject = ca_util.cmd_certpkg(
args["ca_dir"], self.agent_uuid)
# support revocation
if not os.path.exists(
"%s/RevocationNotifier-private.pem" % args["ca_dir"]):
ca_util.cmd_mkcert(args["ca_dir"], "RevocationNotifier")
rev_package, _, _ = ca_util.cmd_certpkg(args["ca_dir"],
"RevocationNotifier")
# extract public and private keys from package
sf = io.BytesIO(rev_package)
with zipfile.ZipFile(sf) as zf:
privkey = zf.read("RevocationNotifier-private.pem")
cert = zf.read("RevocationNotifier-cert.crt")
# put the cert of the revoker into the cert package
sf = io.BytesIO(cert_pkg)
with zipfile.ZipFile(sf, 'a',
compression=zipfile.ZIP_STORED) as zf:
zf.writestr('RevocationNotifier-cert.crt', cert)
# add additional files to zip
if args["incl_dir"] is not None:
if type(args["incl_dir"]) is dict and "data" in args[
"incl_dir"] and "name" in args["incl_dir"]:
if type(args["incl_dir"]["data"]) is list and type(
args["incl_dir"]["name"]) is list:
if len(args["incl_dir"]["data"]) != len(
args["incl_dir"]["name"]):
raise UserError("Invalid incl_dir provided")
for i in range(len(args["incl_dir"]["data"])):
zf.writestr(
os.path.basename(
args["incl_dir"]["name"][i]),
args["incl_dir"]["data"][i])
else:
if os.path.exists(args["incl_dir"]):
files = next(os.walk(args["incl_dir"]))[2]
for filename in files:
with open(
"%s/%s" % (args["incl_dir"], filename),
'rb') as f:
zf.writestr(os.path.basename(f.name),
f.read())
else:
logger.warn(
f'Specified include directory {args["incl_dir"]} does not exist. Skipping...'
)
cert_pkg = sf.getvalue()
# put the private key into the data to be send to the CV
self.revocation_key = privkey
# encrypt up the cert package
ret = user_data_encrypt.encrypt(cert_pkg)
self.K = ret['k']
self.U = ret['u']
self.V = ret['v']
self.metadata = {'cert_serial': serial, 'subject': subject}
self.payload = ret['ciphertext']
if self.payload is not None and len(self.payload) > config.getint(
'tenant', 'max_payload_size'):
raise UserError("Payload size %s exceeds max size %d" % (len(
self.payload), config.getint('tenant', 'max_payload_size')))
def do_GET(self):
"""This method services the GET request typically from either the Tenant or the Cloud Verifier.
Only tenant and cloudverifier uri's are supported. Both requests require a nonce parameter.
The Cloud verifier requires an additional mask paramter. If the uri or parameters are incorrect, a 400 response is returned.
"""
logger.info("GET invoked from %s with uri: %s", self.client_address,
self.path)
rest_params = web_util.get_restful_params(self.path)
if rest_params is None:
web_util.echo_json_response(
self, 405,
"Not Implemented: Use /version, /keys/ or /quotes/ interfaces")
return
if "version" in rest_params:
version_info = {
"supported_version": keylime_api_version.current_version()
}
web_util.echo_json_response(self, 200, "Success", version_info)
return
if not rest_params["api_version"]:
web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, "API Version not supported")
return
if "keys" in rest_params and rest_params["keys"] == "verify":
if self.server.K is None:
logger.info(
"GET key challenge returning 400 response. bootstrap key not available"
)
web_util.echo_json_response(
self, 400, "Bootstrap key not yet available.")
return
if "challenge" not in rest_params:
logger.info(
"GET key challenge returning 400 response. No challenge provided"
)
web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400,
"No challenge provided.")
return
challenge = rest_params["challenge"]
response = {}
response["hmac"] = crypto.do_hmac(self.server.K, challenge)
web_util.echo_json_response(self, 200, "Success", response)
logger.info("GET key challenge returning 200 response.")
# If agent pubkey requested
elif "keys" in rest_params and rest_params["keys"] == "pubkey":
response = {}
response["pubkey"] = self.server.rsapublickey_exportable
web_util.echo_json_response(self, 200, "Success", response)
logger.info("GET pubkey returning 200 response.")
return
elif "quotes" in rest_params:
nonce = rest_params.get("nonce", None)
pcrmask = rest_params.get("mask", None)
ima_ml_entry = rest_params.get("ima_ml_entry", "0")
# if the query is not messed up
if nonce is None:
logger.warning(
"GET quote returning 400 response. nonce not provided as an HTTP parameter in request"
)
web_util.echo_json_response(
self, 400,
"nonce not provided as an HTTP parameter in request")
return
# Sanitization assurance (for tpm.run() tasks below)
if not (nonce.isalnum() and
(pcrmask is None or validators.valid_hex(pcrmask))
and ima_ml_entry.isalnum()):
logger.warning(
"GET quote returning 400 response. parameters should be strictly alphanumeric"
)
web_util.echo_json_response(
self, 400, "parameters should be strictly alphanumeric")
return
if len(nonce) > tpm_instance.MAX_NONCE_SIZE:
logger.warning(
"GET quote returning 400 response. Nonce is too long (max size %i): %i",
tpm_instance.MAX_NONCE_SIZE,
len(nonce),
)
web_util.echo_json_response(
self, 400,
f"Nonce is too long (max size {tpm_instance.MAX_NONCE_SIZE}): {len(nonce)}"
)
return
hash_alg = tpm_instance.defaults["hash"]
quote = tpm_instance.create_quote(
nonce, self.server.rsapublickey_exportable, pcrmask, hash_alg)
imaMask = pcrmask
# Allow for a partial quote response (without pubkey)
enc_alg = tpm_instance.defaults["encrypt"]
sign_alg = tpm_instance.defaults["sign"]
if "partial" in rest_params and (rest_params["partial"] is None
or rest_params["partial"] == "1"):
response = {
"quote": quote,
"hash_alg": hash_alg,
"enc_alg": enc_alg,
"sign_alg": sign_alg,
}
else:
response = {
"quote": quote,
"hash_alg": hash_alg,
"enc_alg": enc_alg,
"sign_alg": sign_alg,
"pubkey": self.server.rsapublickey_exportable,
}
response["boottime"] = self.server.boottime
# return a measurement list if available
if TPM_Utilities.check_mask(imaMask, config.IMA_PCR):
ima_ml_entry = int(ima_ml_entry)
if ima_ml_entry > self.server.next_ima_ml_entry:
ima_ml_entry = 0
ml, nth_entry, num_entries = ima.read_measurement_list(
self.server.ima_log_file, ima_ml_entry)
if num_entries > 0:
response["ima_measurement_list"] = ml
response["ima_measurement_list_entry"] = nth_entry
self.server.next_ima_ml_entry = num_entries
# similar to how IMA log retrievals are triggered by IMA_PCR, we trigger boot logs with MEASUREDBOOT_PCRs
# other possibilities would include adding additional data to rest_params to trigger boot log retrievals
# generally speaking, retrieving the 15Kbytes of a boot log does not seem significant compared to the
# potential Mbytes of an IMA measurement list.
if TPM_Utilities.check_mask(imaMask, config.MEASUREDBOOT_PCRS[0]):
if not self.server.tpm_log_file_data:
logger.warning("TPM2 event log not available: %s",
config.MEASUREDBOOT_ML)
else:
response[
"mb_measurement_list"] = self.server.tpm_log_file_data
web_util.echo_json_response(self, 200, "Success", response)
logger.info("GET %s quote returning 200 response.",
rest_params["quotes"])
return
else:
logger.warning("GET returning 400 response. uri not supported: %s",
self.path)
web_util.echo_json_response(self, 400, "uri not supported")
return
def process_allowlist(self, args):
# Set up PCR values
tpm_policy = config.get('tenant', 'tpm_policy')
if "tpm_policy" in args and args["tpm_policy"] is not None:
tpm_policy = args["tpm_policy"]
self.tpm_policy = TPM_Utilities.readPolicy(tpm_policy)
logger.info("TPM PCR Mask from policy is %s", self.tpm_policy['mask'])
vtpm_policy = config.get('tenant', 'vtpm_policy')
if "vtpm_policy" in args and args["vtpm_policy"] is not None:
vtpm_policy = args["vtpm_policy"]
self.vtpm_policy = TPM_Utilities.readPolicy(vtpm_policy)
logger.info("TPM PCR Mask from policy is %s", self.vtpm_policy['mask'])
if args.get("ima_sign_verification_keys") is not None:
# Auto-enable IMA (or-bit mask)
self.tpm_policy['mask'] = "0x%X" % (
int(self.tpm_policy['mask'], 0) | (1 << config.IMA_PCR))
# Add all IMA file signing verification keys to a keyring
ima_keyring = ima_file_signatures.ImaKeyring()
for filename in args["ima_sign_verification_keys"]:
pubkey = ima_file_signatures.get_pubkey_from_file(filename)
if not pubkey:
raise UserError(
"File '%s' is not a file with a key" % filename)
ima_keyring.add_pubkey(pubkey)
self.ima_sign_verification_keys = ima_keyring.to_string()
# Read command-line path string allowlist
al_data = None
if "allowlist" in args and args["allowlist"] is not None:
self.enforce_pcrs(list(self.tpm_policy.keys()), [ config.IMA_PCR ], "IMA")
# Auto-enable IMA (or-bit mask)
self.tpm_policy['mask'] = "0x%X" % (
int(self.tpm_policy['mask'], 0) | (1 << config.IMA_PCR))
if isinstance(args["allowlist"], str):
if args["allowlist"] == "default":
args["allowlist"] = config.get('tenant', 'allowlist')
al_data = ima.read_allowlist(args["allowlist"], args["allowlist_checksum"], args["allowlist_sig"], args["allowlist_sig_key"])
elif isinstance(args["allowlist"], list):
al_data = args["allowlist"]
else:
raise UserError("Invalid allowlist provided")
# Read command-line path string IMA exclude list
excl_data = None
if "ima_exclude" in args and args["ima_exclude"] is not None:
if isinstance(args["ima_exclude"], str):
if args["ima_exclude"] == "default":
args["ima_exclude"] = config.get(
'tenant', 'ima_excludelist')
excl_data = ima.read_excllist(args["ima_exclude"])
elif isinstance(args["ima_exclude"], list):
excl_data = args["ima_exclude"]
else:
raise UserError("Invalid exclude list provided")
# Set up IMA
if TPM_Utilities.check_mask(self.tpm_policy['mask'], config.IMA_PCR) or \
TPM_Utilities.check_mask(self.vtpm_policy['mask'],
config.IMA_PCR):
# Process allowlists
self.allowlist = ima.process_allowlists(al_data, excl_data)
# Read command-line path string TPM event log (measured boot) reference state
mb_refstate_data = None
if "mb_refstate" in args and args["mb_refstate"] is not None:
self.enforce_pcrs(list(self.tpm_policy.keys()), config.MEASUREDBOOT_PCRS, "measured boot")
# Auto-enable TPM event log mesured boot (or-bit mask)
for _pcr in config.MEASUREDBOOT_PCRS :
self.tpm_policy['mask'] = "0x%X" % (
int(self.tpm_policy['mask'], 0) | (1 << _pcr))
logger.info("TPM PCR Mask automatically modified is %s to include IMA/Event log PCRs", self.tpm_policy['mask'])
if isinstance(args["mb_refstate"], str):
if args["mb_refstate"] == "default":
args["mb_refstate"] = config.get('tenant', 'mb_refstate')
mb_refstate_data = measured_boot.read_mb_refstate(args["mb_refstate"])
else:
raise UserError("Invalid measured boot reference state (intended state) provided")
# Set up measured boot (TPM event log) reference state
if TPM_Utilities.check_mask(self.tpm_policy['mask'], config.MEASUREDBOOT_PCRS[2]) :
# Process measured boot reference state
self.mb_refstate = measured_boot.process_refstate(mb_refstate_data)
def do_GET(self):
"""This method services the GET request typically from either the Tenant or the Cloud Verifier.
Only tenant and cloudverifier uri's are supported. Both requests require a nonce parameter.
The Cloud verifier requires an additional mask paramter. If the uri or parameters are incorrect, a 400 response is returned.
"""
logger.info('GET invoked from %s with uri: %s', self.client_address,
self.path)
rest_params = config.get_restful_params(self.path)
if rest_params is None:
config.echo_json_response(
self, 405,
"Not Implemented: Use /keys/ or /quotes/ interfaces")
return
if "keys" in rest_params and rest_params['keys'] == 'verify':
if self.server.K is None:
logger.info(
'GET key challenge returning 400 response. bootstrap key not available'
)
config.echo_json_response(self, 400,
"Bootstrap key not yet available.")
return
challenge = rest_params['challenge']
response = {}
response['hmac'] = crypto.do_hmac(self.server.K, challenge)
config.echo_json_response(self, 200, "Success", response)
logger.info('GET key challenge returning 200 response.')
# If agent pubkey requested
elif "keys" in rest_params and rest_params["keys"] == "pubkey":
response = {}
response['pubkey'] = self.server.rsapublickey_exportable
config.echo_json_response(self, 200, "Success", response)
logger.info('GET pubkey returning 200 response.')
return
elif "quotes" in rest_params:
nonce = rest_params['nonce']
pcrmask = rest_params['mask'] if 'mask' in rest_params else None
vpcrmask = rest_params['vmask'] if 'vmask' in rest_params else None
# if the query is not messed up
if nonce is None:
logger.warning(
'GET quote returning 400 response. nonce not provided as an HTTP parameter in request'
)
config.echo_json_response(
self, 400,
"nonce not provided as an HTTP parameter in request")
return
# Sanitization assurance (for tpm.run() tasks below)
if not (nonce.isalnum() and
(pcrmask is None or pcrmask.isalnum()) and
(vpcrmask is None or vpcrmask.isalnum())):
logger.warning(
'GET quote returning 400 response. parameters should be strictly alphanumeric'
)
config.echo_json_response(
self, 400, "parameters should be strictly alphanumeric")
return
# identity quotes are always shallow
hash_alg = tpm_instance.defaults['hash']
if not tpm_instance.is_vtpm(
) or rest_params["quotes"] == 'identity':
quote = tpm_instance.create_quote(
nonce, self.server.rsapublickey_exportable, pcrmask,
hash_alg)
imaMask = pcrmask
# Allow for a partial quote response (without pubkey)
enc_alg = tpm_instance.defaults['encrypt']
sign_alg = tpm_instance.defaults['sign']
if "partial" in rest_params and (rest_params["partial"] is None
or int(rest_params["partial"],
0) == 1):
response = {
'quote': quote,
'hash_alg': hash_alg,
'enc_alg': enc_alg,
'sign_alg': sign_alg,
}
else:
response = {
'quote': quote,
'hash_alg': hash_alg,
'enc_alg': enc_alg,
'sign_alg': sign_alg,
'pubkey': self.server.rsapublickey_exportable,
}
# return a measurement list if available
if TPM_Utilities.check_mask(imaMask, config.IMA_PCR):
if not os.path.exists(config.IMA_ML):
logger.warning("IMA measurement list not available: %s",
config.IMA_ML)
else:
with open(config.IMA_ML, 'r') as f:
ml = f.read()
response['ima_measurement_list'] = ml
# similar to how IMA log retrievals are triggered by IMA_PCR, we trigger boot logs with MEASUREDBOOT_PCRs
# other possibilities would include adding additional data to rest_params to trigger boot log retrievals
# generally speaking, retrieving the 15Kbytes of a boot log does not seem significant compared to the
# potential Mbytes of an IMA measurement list.
if TPM_Utilities.check_mask(imaMask, config.MEASUREDBOOT_PCRS[0]):
if not os.path.exists(config.MEASUREDBOOT_ML):
logger.warning("TPM2 event log not available: %s",
config.MEASUREDBOOT_ML)
else:
with open(config.MEASUREDBOOT_ML, 'rb') as f:
el = base64.b64encode(f.read())
response['mb_measurement_list'] = el
config.echo_json_response(self, 200, "Success", response)
logger.info('GET %s quote returning 200 response.',
rest_params["quotes"])
return
else:
logger.warning('GET returning 400 response. uri not supported: %s',
self.path)
config.echo_json_response(self, 400, "uri not supported")
return
def do_GET(self):
"""This method services the GET request typically from either the Tenant or the Cloud Verifier.
Only tenant and cloudverifier uri's are supported. Both requests require a nonce parameter.
The Cloud verifier requires an additional mask paramter. If the uri or parameters are incorrect, a 400 response is returned.
"""
logger.info('GET invoked from ' + str(self.client_address) +
' with uri:' + self.path)
rest_params = common.get_restful_params(self.path)
if rest_params is None:
common.echo_json_response(
self, 405,
"Not Implemented: Use /keys/ or /quotes/ interfaces")
return
if "keys" in rest_params and rest_params['keys'] == 'verify':
if self.server.K is None:
logger.info(
'GET key challenge returning 400 response. bootstrap key not available'
)
common.echo_json_response(self, 400,
"Bootstrap key not yet available.")
return
challenge = rest_params['challenge']
response = {}
response['hmac'] = crypto.do_hmac(self.server.K, challenge)
common.echo_json_response(self, 200, "Success", response)
logger.info('GET key challenge returning 200 response.')
# If agent pubkey requested
elif "keys" in rest_params and rest_params["keys"] == "pubkey":
response = {}
response['pubkey'] = self.server.rsapublickey_exportable
common.echo_json_response(self, 200, "Success", response)
logger.info('GET pubkey returning 200 response.')
return
elif "quotes" in rest_params:
nonce = rest_params['nonce']
pcrmask = rest_params['mask'] if 'mask' in rest_params else None
vpcrmask = rest_params['vmask'] if 'vmask' in rest_params else None
# if the query is not messed up
if nonce is None:
logger.warning(
'GET quote returning 400 response. nonce not provided as an HTTP parameter in request'
)
common.echo_json_response(
self, 400,
"nonce not provided as an HTTP parameter in request")
return
# Sanitization assurance (for tpm.run() tasks below)
if not (nonce.isalnum() and
(pcrmask is None or pcrmask.isalnum()) and
(vpcrmask is None or vpcrmask.isalnum())):
logger.warning(
'GET quote returning 400 response. parameters should be strictly alphanumeric'
)
common.echo_json_response(
self, 400, "parameters should be strictly alphanumeric")
return
# identity quotes are always shallow
hash_alg = tpm.defaults['hash']
if not tpm.is_vtpm() or rest_params["quotes"] == 'identity':
quote = tpm.create_quote(nonce,
self.server.rsapublickey_exportable,
pcrmask, hash_alg)
imaMask = pcrmask
else:
quote = tpm.create_deep_quote(
nonce, self.server.rsapublickey_exportable, vpcrmask,
pcrmask)
imaMask = vpcrmask
# Allow for a partial quote response (without pubkey)
enc_alg = tpm.defaults['encrypt']
sign_alg = tpm.defaults['sign']
if "partial" in rest_params and (rest_params["partial"] is None
or int(rest_params["partial"],
0) == 1):
response = {
'quote': quote,
'tpm_version': tpm_version,
'hash_alg': hash_alg,
'enc_alg': enc_alg,
'sign_alg': sign_alg,
}
else:
response = {
'quote': quote,
'tpm_version': tpm_version,
'hash_alg': hash_alg,
'enc_alg': enc_alg,
'sign_alg': sign_alg,
'pubkey': self.server.rsapublickey_exportable,
}
# return a measurement list if available
if TPM_Utilities.check_mask(imaMask, common.IMA_PCR):
if not os.path.exists(common.IMA_ML):
logger.warn("IMA measurement list not available: %s" %
(common.IMA_ML))
else:
with open(common.IMA_ML, 'r') as f:
ml = f.read()
response['ima_measurement_list'] = ml
common.echo_json_response(self, 200, "Success", response)
logger.info('GET %s quote returning 200 response.' %
(rest_params["quotes"]))
return
else:
logger.warning('GET returning 400 response. uri not supported: ' +
self.path)
common.echo_json_response(self, 400, "uri not supported")
return
def init_add(self, args):
""" Set up required values. Command line options can overwrite these config values
Arguments:
args {[string]} -- agent_ip|agent_port|cv_agent_ip
"""
if "agent_ip" in args:
self.agent_ip = args["agent_ip"]
if 'agent_port' in args and args['agent_port'] is not None:
self.agent_port = args['agent_port']
if 'cv_agent_ip' in args and args['cv_agent_ip'] is not None:
self.cv_cloudagent_ip = args['cv_agent_ip']
else:
self.cv_cloudagent_ip = self.agent_ip
# Make sure all keys exist in dictionary
if "file" not in args:
args["file"] = None
if "keyfile" not in args:
args["keyfile"] = None
if "payload" not in args:
args["payload"] = None
if "ca_dir" not in args:
args["ca_dir"] = None
if "incl_dir" not in args:
args["incl_dir"] = None
if "ca_dir_pw" not in args:
args["ca_dir_pw"] = None
# Set up accepted algorithms
self.accept_tpm_hash_algs = config.get(
'tenant', 'accept_tpm_hash_algs').split(',')
self.accept_tpm_encryption_algs = config.get(
'tenant', 'accept_tpm_encryption_algs').split(',')
self.accept_tpm_signing_algs = config.get(
'tenant', 'accept_tpm_signing_algs').split(',')
# Set up PCR values
tpm_policy = config.get('tenant', 'tpm_policy')
if "tpm_policy" in args and args["tpm_policy"] is not None:
tpm_policy = args["tpm_policy"]
self.tpm_policy = TPM_Utilities.readPolicy(tpm_policy)
logger.info(f"TPM PCR Mask from policy is {self.tpm_policy['mask']}")
vtpm_policy = config.get('tenant', 'vtpm_policy')
if "vtpm_policy" in args and args["vtpm_policy"] is not None:
vtpm_policy = args["vtpm_policy"]
self.vtpm_policy = TPM_Utilities.readPolicy(vtpm_policy)
logger.info(f"TPM PCR Mask from policy is {self.vtpm_policy['mask']}")
if args.get("ima_sign_verification_keys") is not None:
# Auto-enable IMA (or-bit mask)
self.tpm_policy['mask'] = "0x%X" % (int(self.tpm_policy['mask'], 0)
| (1 << config.IMA_PCR))
# Add all IMA file signing verification keys to a keyring
ima_keyring = ima_file_signatures.ImaKeyring()
for filename in args["ima_sign_verification_keys"]:
pubkey = ima_file_signatures.get_pubkey_from_file(filename)
if not pubkey:
raise UserError("File '%s' is not a file with a key" %
filename)
ima_keyring.add_pubkey(pubkey)
self.ima_sign_verification_keys = ima_keyring.to_string()
# Read command-line path string allowlist
al_data = None
if "allowlist" in args and args["allowlist"] is not None:
self.enforce_pcrs(list(self.tpm_policy.keys()), [config.IMA_PCR],
"IMA")
# Auto-enable IMA (or-bit mask)
self.tpm_policy['mask'] = "0x%X" % (int(self.tpm_policy['mask'], 0)
| (1 << config.IMA_PCR))
if isinstance(args["allowlist"], str):
if args["allowlist"] == "default":
args["allowlist"] = config.get('tenant', 'allowlist')
al_data = ima.read_allowlist(args["allowlist"])
elif isinstance(args["allowlist"], list):
al_data = args["allowlist"]
else:
raise UserError("Invalid allowlist provided")
# Read command-line path string IMA exclude list
excl_data = None
if "ima_exclude" in args and args["ima_exclude"] is not None:
if isinstance(args["ima_exclude"], str):
if args["ima_exclude"] == "default":
args["ima_exclude"] = config.get('tenant',
'ima_excludelist')
excl_data = ima.read_excllist(args["ima_exclude"])
elif isinstance(args["ima_exclude"], list):
excl_data = args["ima_exclude"]
else:
raise UserError("Invalid exclude list provided")
# Set up IMA
if TPM_Utilities.check_mask(self.tpm_policy['mask'], config.IMA_PCR) or \
TPM_Utilities.check_mask(self.vtpm_policy['mask'], config.IMA_PCR):
# Process allowlists
self.allowlist = ima.process_allowlists(al_data, excl_data)
# Read command-line path string TPM2 event log template
if "mb_refstate" in args and args["mb_refstate"] is not None:
self.enforce_pcrs(list(self.tpm_policy.keys()),
config.MEASUREDBOOT_PCRS, "measured boot")
# Auto-enable TPM2 event log (or-bit mask)
for _pcr in config.MEASUREDBOOT_PCRS:
self.tpm_policy['mask'] = "0x%X" % (int(
self.tpm_policy['mask'], 0) | (1 << _pcr))
logger.info(
f"TPM PCR Mask automatically modified is {self.tpm_policy['mask']} to include IMA/Event log PCRs"
)
if isinstance(args["mb_refstate"], str):
if args["mb_refstate"] == "default":
args["mb_refstate"] = config.get('tenant', 'mb_refstate')
al_data = 'test'
elif isinstance(args["mb_refstate"], list):
al_data = args["mb_refstate"]
else:
raise UserError(
"Invalid measured boot reference state (intended state) provided"
)
# if none
if (args["file"] is None and args["keyfile"] is None
and args["ca_dir"] is None):
raise UserError(
"You must specify one of -k, -f, or --cert to specify the key/contents to be securely delivered to the agent"
)
if args["keyfile"] is not None:
if args["file"] is not None or args["ca_dir"] is not None:
raise UserError(
"You must specify one of -k, -f, or --cert to specify the key/contents to be securely delivered to the agent"
)
# read the keys in
if isinstance(args["keyfile"], dict) and "data" in args["keyfile"]:
if isinstance(args["keyfile"]["data"], list) and len(
args["keyfile"]["data"]) == 1:
keyfile = args["keyfile"]["data"][0]
if keyfile is None:
raise UserError("Invalid key file contents")
f = io.StringIO(keyfile)
else:
raise UserError("Invalid key file provided")
else:
f = open(args["keyfile"], 'r')
self.K = base64.b64decode(f.readline())
self.U = base64.b64decode(f.readline())
self.V = base64.b64decode(f.readline())
f.close()
# read the payload in (opt.)
if isinstance(args["payload"], dict) and "data" in args["payload"]:
if isinstance(args["payload"]["data"],
list) and len(args["payload"]["data"]) > 0:
self.payload = args["payload"]["data"][0]
else:
if args["payload"] is not None:
f = open(args["payload"], 'r')
self.payload = f.read()
f.close()
if args["file"] is not None:
if args["keyfile"] is not None or args["ca_dir"] is not None:
raise UserError(
"You must specify one of -k, -f, or --cert to specify the key/contents to be securely delivered to the agent"
)
if isinstance(args["file"], dict) and "data" in args["file"]:
if isinstance(args["file"]["data"],
list) and len(args["file"]["data"]) > 0:
contents = args["file"]["data"][0]
if contents is None:
raise UserError("Invalid file payload contents")
else:
raise UserError("Invalid file payload provided")
else:
with open(args["file"], 'r') as f:
contents = f.read()
ret = user_data_encrypt.encrypt(contents)
self.K = ret['k']
self.U = ret['u']
self.V = ret['v']
self.payload = ret['ciphertext']
if args["ca_dir"] is None and args["incl_dir"] is not None:
raise UserError(
"--include option is only valid when used with --cert")
if args["ca_dir"] is not None:
if args["file"] is not None or args["keyfile"] is not None:
raise UserError(
"You must specify one of -k, -f, or --cert to specify the key/contents to be securely delivered to the agent"
)
if args["ca_dir"] == 'default':
args["ca_dir"] = config.CA_WORK_DIR
if "ca_dir_pw" in args and args["ca_dir_pw"] is not None:
ca_util.setpassword(args["ca_dir_pw"])
if not os.path.exists(args["ca_dir"]) or not os.path.exists(
"%s/cacert.crt" % args["ca_dir"]):
logger.warning(" CA directory does not exist. Creating...")
ca_util.cmd_init(args["ca_dir"])
if not os.path.exists("%s/%s-private.pem" %
(args["ca_dir"], self.agent_uuid)):
ca_util.cmd_mkcert(args["ca_dir"], self.agent_uuid)
cert_pkg, serial, subject = ca_util.cmd_certpkg(
args["ca_dir"], self.agent_uuid)
# support revocation
if not os.path.exists(
"%s/RevocationNotifier-private.pem" % args["ca_dir"]):
ca_util.cmd_mkcert(args["ca_dir"], "RevocationNotifier")
rev_package, _, _ = ca_util.cmd_certpkg(args["ca_dir"],
"RevocationNotifier")
# extract public and private keys from package
sf = io.BytesIO(rev_package)
with zipfile.ZipFile(sf) as zf:
privkey = zf.read("RevocationNotifier-private.pem")
cert = zf.read("RevocationNotifier-cert.crt")
# put the cert of the revoker into the cert package
sf = io.BytesIO(cert_pkg)
with zipfile.ZipFile(sf, 'a',
compression=zipfile.ZIP_STORED) as zf:
zf.writestr('RevocationNotifier-cert.crt', cert)
# add additional files to zip
if args["incl_dir"] is not None:
if isinstance(args["incl_dir"], dict) and "data" in args[
"incl_dir"] and "name" in args["incl_dir"]:
if isinstance(args["incl_dir"]["data"],
list) and isinstance(
args["incl_dir"]["name"], list):
if len(args["incl_dir"]["data"]) != len(
args["incl_dir"]["name"]):
raise UserError("Invalid incl_dir provided")
for i in range(len(args["incl_dir"]["data"])):
zf.writestr(
os.path.basename(
args["incl_dir"]["name"][i]),
args["incl_dir"]["data"][i])
else:
if os.path.exists(args["incl_dir"]):
files = next(os.walk(args["incl_dir"]))[2]
for filename in files:
with open(
"%s/%s" % (args["incl_dir"], filename),
'rb') as f:
zf.writestr(os.path.basename(f.name),
f.read())
else:
logger.warning(
f'Specified include directory {args["incl_dir"]} does not exist. Skipping...'
)
cert_pkg = sf.getvalue()
# put the private key into the data to be send to the CV
self.revocation_key = privkey
# encrypt up the cert package
ret = user_data_encrypt.encrypt(cert_pkg)
self.K = ret['k']
self.U = ret['u']
self.V = ret['v']
self.metadata = {'cert_serial': serial, 'subject': subject}
self.payload = ret['ciphertext']
if self.payload is not None and len(self.payload) > config.getint(
'tenant', 'max_payload_size'):
raise UserError("Payload size %s exceeds max size %d" % (len(
self.payload), config.getint('tenant', 'max_payload_size')))