def __init__(self, server_address, HandlerClass, key_file, cert_file, logRequests=True):
"""Secure XML-RPC server.
It it very similar to SimpleXMLRPCServer but it uses HTTPS for transporting XML data.
"""
logger.debug("SecureXMLRPCServer.__init__, server_address=%s, cert_file=%s"%(server_address,cert_file))
self.logRequests = logRequests
self.interface = None
self.key_file = key_file
self.cert_file = cert_file
self.method_map = {}
# add cache to the request handler
HandlerClass.cache = Cache()
#for compatibility with python 2.4 (centos53)
if sys.version_info < (2, 5):
SimpleXMLRPCServer.SimpleXMLRPCDispatcher.__init__(self)
else:
SimpleXMLRPCServer.SimpleXMLRPCDispatcher.__init__(self, True, None)
SocketServer.BaseServer.__init__(self, server_address, HandlerClass)
ctx = SSL.Context(SSL.SSLv23_METHOD)
ctx.use_privatekey_file(key_file)
ctx.use_certificate_file(cert_file)
# If you wanted to verify certs against known CAs.. this is how you would do it
#ctx.load_verify_locations('/etc/sfa/trusted_roots/plc.gpo.gid')
config = Config()
trusted_cert_files = TrustedRoots(config.get_trustedroots_dir()).get_file_list()
for cert_file in trusted_cert_files:
ctx.load_verify_locations(cert_file)
ctx.set_verify(SSL.VERIFY_PEER | SSL.VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, verify_callback)
ctx.set_verify_depth(5)
ctx.set_app_data(self)
self.socket = SSL.Connection(ctx, socket.socket(self.address_family,
self.socket_type))
self.server_bind()
self.server_activate()
def main():
# Generate command line parser
parser = OptionParser(usage="sfa-start.py [options]")
parser.add_option("-r", "--registry", dest="registry", action="store_true",
help="run registry server", default=False)
parser.add_option("-s", "--slicemgr", dest="sm", action="store_true",
help="run slice manager", default=False)
parser.add_option("-a", "--aggregate", dest="am", action="store_true",
help="run aggregate manager", default=False)
parser.add_option("-c", "--component", dest="cm", action="store_true",
help="run component server", default=False)
parser.add_option("-t", "--trusted-certs", dest="trusted_certs", action="store_true",
help="refresh trusted certs", default=False)
parser.add_option("-d", "--daemon", dest="daemon", action="store_true",
help="Run as daemon.", default=False)
(options, args) = parser.parse_args()
config = Config()
logger.setLevelFromOptVerbose(config.SFA_API_LOGLEVEL)
# ge the server's key and cert
hierarchy = Hierarchy()
auth_info = hierarchy.get_interface_auth_info()
server_key_file = auth_info.get_privkey_filename()
server_cert_file = auth_info.get_gid_filename()
# ensure interface cert is present in trusted roots dir
trusted_roots = TrustedRoots(config.get_trustedroots_dir())
trusted_roots.add_gid(GID(filename=server_cert_file))
if (options.daemon): daemon()
if options.trusted_certs:
install_peer_certs(server_key_file, server_cert_file)
# start registry server
if (options.registry):
from sfa.server.registry import Registry
r = Registry("", config.SFA_REGISTRY_PORT, server_key_file, server_cert_file)
r.start()
if (options.am):
from sfa.server.aggregate import Aggregate
a = Aggregate("", config.SFA_AGGREGATE_PORT, server_key_file, server_cert_file)
a.start()
# start slice manager
if (options.sm):
from sfa.server.slicemgr import SliceMgr
s = SliceMgr("", config.SFA_SM_PORT, server_key_file, server_cert_file)
s.start()
if (options.cm):
from sfa.server.component import Component
c = Component("", config.component_port, server_key_file, server_cert_file)
# c = Component("", config.SFA_COMPONENT_PORT, server_key_file, server_cert_file)
c.start()
def create_default_dirs():
config = Config()
hierarchy = Hierarchy()
config_dir = config.config_path
trusted_certs_dir = config.get_trustedroots_dir()
authorities_dir = hierarchy.basedir
all_dirs = [config_dir, trusted_certs_dir, authorities_dir]
for dir in all_dirs:
if not os.path.exists(dir):
os.makedirs(dir)
def create_default_dirs():
config = Config()
hierarchy = Hierarchy()
config_dir = config.config_path
trusted_certs_dir = config.get_trustedroots_dir()
authorities_dir = hierarchy.basedir
all_dirs = [config_dir, trusted_certs_dir, authorities_dir]
for dir in all_dirs:
if not os.path.exists(dir):
os.makedirs(dir)
def __init__(self):
self.logger = _SfaLogger(logfile='/var/log/sfa_import.log', loggername='importlog')
self.AuthHierarchy = Hierarchy()
self.config = Config()
self.TrustedRoots = TrustedRoots(Config.get_trustedroots_dir(self.config))
self.plc_auth = self.config.get_plc_auth()
self.root_auth = self.config.SFA_REGISTRY_ROOT_AUTH
# connect to planetlab
self.shell = None
if "Url" in self.plc_auth:
from sfa.plc.remoteshell import RemoteShell
self.shell = RemoteShell(self.logger)
else:
import PLC.Shell
self.shell = PLC.Shell.Shell(globals = globals())
def __init__(self,
server_address,
HandlerClass,
key_file,
cert_file,
logRequests=True):
"""Secure XML-RPC server.
It it very similar to SimpleXMLRPCServer but it uses HTTPS for transporting XML data.
"""
logger.debug(
"SecureXMLRPCServer.__init__, server_address=%s, cert_file=%s, key_file=%s"
% (server_address, cert_file, key_file))
logger.debug("SecureXMLRPCServer HandlerClass=%s" % (HandlerClass))
self.logRequests = logRequests
self.interface = None
self.key_file = key_file
self.cert_file = cert_file
self.method_map = {}
# add cache to the request handler
HandlerClass.cache = Cache()
#for compatibility with python 2.4 (centos53)
if sys.version_info < (2, 5):
SimpleXMLRPCServer.SimpleXMLRPCDispatcher.__init__(self)
else:
SimpleXMLRPCServer.SimpleXMLRPCDispatcher.__init__(
self, True, None)
SocketServer.BaseServer.__init__(self, server_address, HandlerClass)
ctx = SSL.Context(SSL.SSLv23_METHOD)
ctx.use_privatekey_file(key_file)
ctx.use_certificate_file(cert_file)
# If you wanted to verify certs against known CAs.. this is how you would do it
#ctx.load_verify_locations('/etc/sfa/trusted_roots/plc.gpo.gid')
config = Config()
trusted_cert_files = TrustedRoots(
config.get_trustedroots_dir()).get_file_list()
for cert_file in trusted_cert_files:
ctx.load_verify_locations(cert_file)
ctx.set_verify(SSL.VERIFY_PEER | SSL.VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
verify_callback)
ctx.set_verify_depth(5)
ctx.set_app_data(self)
self.socket = SSL.Connection(
ctx, socket.socket(self.address_family, self.socket_type))
self.server_bind()
self.server_activate()
def get_trusted_certs(registry=None, verbose=False):
"""
refresh our list of trusted certs.
"""
# define useful variables
config = Config()
data_dir = config.SFA_DATA_DIR
config_dir = config.SFA_CONFIG_DIR
trusted_certs_dir = config.get_trustedroots_dir()
keyfile = data_dir + os.sep + "server.key"
certfile = data_dir + os.sep + "server.cert"
node_gid_file = config_dir + os.sep + "node.gid"
node_gid = GID(filename=node_gid_file)
hrn = node_gid.get_hrn()
# get credential
cred = GetCredential(registry=registry, verbose=verbose)
# make sure server key cert pair exists
create_server_keypair(keyfile=keyfile,
certfile=certfile,
hrn=hrn,
verbose=verbose)
registry = server_proxy(url=registry, keyfile=keyfile, certfile=certfile)
# get the trusted certs and save them in the right place
if verbose:
print "Getting trusted certs from registry"
trusted_certs = registry.get_trusted_certs(cred)
trusted_gid_names = []
for gid_str in trusted_certs:
gid = GID(string=gid_str)
gid.decode()
relative_filename = gid.get_hrn() + ".gid"
trusted_gid_names.append(relative_filename)
gid_filename = trusted_certs_dir + os.sep + relative_filename
if verbose:
print "Writing GID for %s as %s" % (gid.get_hrn(), gid_filename)
gid.save_to_file(gid_filename, save_parents=True)
# remove old certs
all_gids_names = os.listdir(trusted_certs_dir)
for gid_name in all_gids_names:
if gid_name not in trusted_gid_names:
if verbose:
print "Removing old gid ", gid_name
os.unlink(trusted_certs_dir + os.sep + gid_name)
def get_trusted_certs(registry=None, verbose=False):
"""
refresh our list of trusted certs.
"""
# define useful variables
config = Config()
data_dir = config.SFA_DATA_DIR
config_dir = config.SFA_CONFIG_DIR
trusted_certs_dir = config.get_trustedroots_dir()
keyfile = data_dir + os.sep + "server.key"
certfile = data_dir + os.sep + "server.cert"
node_gid_file = config_dir + os.sep + "node.gid"
node_gid = GID(filename=node_gid_file)
hrn = node_gid.get_hrn()
# get credential
cred = GetCredential(registry=registry, verbose=verbose)
# make sure server key cert pair exists
create_server_keypair(keyfile=keyfile, certfile=certfile, hrn=hrn, verbose=verbose)
registry = server_proxy(url=registry, keyfile=keyfile, certfile=certfile)
# get the trusted certs and save them in the right place
if verbose:
print "Getting trusted certs from registry"
trusted_certs = registry.get_trusted_certs(cred)
trusted_gid_names = []
for gid_str in trusted_certs:
gid = GID(string=gid_str)
gid.decode()
relative_filename = gid.get_hrn() + ".gid"
trusted_gid_names.append(relative_filename)
gid_filename = trusted_certs_dir + os.sep + relative_filename
if verbose:
print "Writing GID for %s as %s" % (gid.get_hrn(), gid_filename)
gid.save_to_file(gid_filename, save_parents=True)
# remove old certs
all_gids_names = os.listdir(trusted_certs_dir)
for gid_name in all_gids_names:
if gid_name not in trusted_gid_names:
if verbose:
print "Removing old gid ", gid_name
os.unlink(trusted_certs_dir + os.sep + gid_name)
class Auth:
"""
Credential based authentication
"""
def __init__(self, peer_cert = None, config = None ):
self.peer_cert = peer_cert
self.hierarchy = Hierarchy()
if not config:
self.config = Config()
self.load_trusted_certs()
def load_trusted_certs(self):
self.trusted_cert_list = \
TrustedRoots(self.config.get_trustedroots_dir()).get_list()
self.trusted_cert_file_list = \
TrustedRoots(self.config.get_trustedroots_dir()).get_file_list()
# this convenience methods extracts speaking_for_xrn
# from the passed options using 'geni_speaking_for'
def checkCredentialsSpeaksFor (self, *args, **kwds):
if 'options' not in kwds:
logger.error ("checkCredentialsSpeaksFor was not passed options=options")
return
# remove the options arg
options=kwds['options']; del kwds['options']
# compute the speaking_for_xrn arg and pass it to checkCredentials
if options is None: speaking_for_xrn=None
else: speaking_for_xrn=options.get('geni_speaking_for',None)
kwds['speaking_for_xrn']=speaking_for_xrn
return self.checkCredentials (*args, **kwds)
# do not use mutable as default argument
# http://docs.python-guide.org/en/latest/writing/gotchas/#mutable-default-arguments
def checkCredentials(self, creds, operation, xrns=None,
check_sliver_callback=None,
speaking_for_xrn=None):
if xrns is None: xrns=[]
def log_invalid_cred(cred):
if not isinstance (cred, StringTypes):
logger.info("cannot validate credential %s - expecting a string"%cred)
error="checkCredentials: expected a string, received %s"%(type(cred))
else:
cred_obj=Credential(string=cred)
logger.info("failed to validate credential - dump=%s"%\
cred_obj.dump_string(dump_parents=True))
error = sys.exc_info()[:2]
return error
# if xrns are specified they cannot be None or empty string
if xrns:
for xrn in xrns:
if not xrn:
raise BadArgs("Invalid urn or hrn")
if not isinstance(xrns, list):
xrns = [xrns]
slice_xrns = Xrn.filter_type(xrns, 'slice')
sliver_xrns = Xrn.filter_type(xrns, 'sliver')
# we are not able to validate slivers in the traditional way so
# we make sure not to include sliver urns/hrns in the core validation loop
hrns = [Xrn(xrn).hrn for xrn in xrns if xrn not in sliver_xrns]
valid = []
if not isinstance(creds, list):
creds = [creds]
logger.debug("Auth.checkCredentials with %d creds on hrns=%s"%(len(creds),hrns))
# won't work if either creds or hrns is empty - let's make it more explicit
if not creds: raise Forbidden("no credential provided")
if not hrns: hrns = [None]
error=[None,None]
speaks_for_gid = determine_speaks_for(logger, creds, self.peer_cert,
speaking_for_xrn, self.trusted_cert_list)
if self.peer_cert and \
not self.peer_cert.is_pubkey(speaks_for_gid.get_pubkey()):
valid = creds
else:
for cred in creds:
for hrn in hrns:
try:
self.check(cred, operation, hrn)
valid.append(cred)
except:
error = log_invalid_cred(cred)
# make sure all sliver xrns are validated against the valid credentials
if sliver_xrns:
if not check_sliver_callback:
msg = "sliver verification callback method not found."
msg += " Unable to validate sliver xrns: %s" % sliver_xrns
raise Forbidden(msg)
check_sliver_callback(valid, sliver_xrns)
if not len(valid):
raise Forbidden("Invalid credential %s -- %s"%(error[0],error[1]))
return valid
def check(self, credential, operation, hrn = None):
"""
Check the credential against the peer cert (callerGID) included
in the credential matches the caller that is connected to the
HTTPS connection, check if the credential was signed by a
trusted cert and check if the credential is allowed to perform
the specified operation.
"""
cred = Credential(cred=credential)
self.client_cred = cred
logger.debug("Auth.check: handling hrn=%s and credential=%s"%\
(hrn,cred.pretty_cred()))
if cred.type not in ['geni_sfa']:
raise CredentialNotVerifiable(cred.type, "%s not supported" % cred.type)
self.client_gid = self.client_cred.get_gid_caller()
self.object_gid = self.client_cred.get_gid_object()
# make sure the client_gid is not blank
if not self.client_gid:
raise MissingCallerGID(self.client_cred.pretty_subject())
# validate the client cert if it exists
if self.peer_cert:
self.verifyPeerCert(self.peer_cert, self.client_gid)
# make sure the client is allowed to perform the operation
if operation:
if not self.client_cred.can_perform(operation):
raise InsufficientRights(operation)
if self.trusted_cert_list:
self.client_cred.verify(self.trusted_cert_file_list,
self.config.SFA_CREDENTIAL_SCHEMA)
else:
raise MissingTrustedRoots(self.config.get_trustedroots_dir())
# Make sure the credential's target matches the specified hrn.
# This check does not apply to trusted peers
trusted_peers = [gid.get_hrn() for gid in self.trusted_cert_list]
if hrn and self.client_gid.get_hrn() not in trusted_peers:
target_hrn = self.object_gid.get_hrn()
if not hrn == target_hrn:
raise PermissionError("Target hrn: %s doesn't match specified hrn: %s " % \
(target_hrn, hrn) )
return True
def check_ticket(self, ticket):
"""
Check if the ticket was signed by a trusted cert
"""
if self.trusted_cert_list:
client_ticket = SfaTicket(string=ticket)
client_ticket.verify_chain(self.trusted_cert_list)
else:
raise MissingTrustedRoots(self.config.get_trustedroots_dir())
return True
def verifyPeerCert(self, cert, gid):
# make sure the client_gid matches client's certificate
if not cert.is_pubkey(gid.get_pubkey()):
raise ConnectionKeyGIDMismatch(gid.get_subject()+":"+cert.get_subject())
def verifyGidRequestHash(self, gid, hash, arglist):
key = gid.get_pubkey()
if not key.verify_string(str(arglist), hash):
raise BadRequestHash(hash)
def verifyCredRequestHash(self, cred, hash, arglist):
gid = cred.get_gid_caller()
self.verifyGidRequestHash(gid, hash, arglist)
def validateGid(self, gid):
if self.trusted_cert_list:
gid.verify_chain(self.trusted_cert_list)
def validateCred(self, cred):
if self.trusted_cert_list:
cred.verify(self.trusted_cert_file_list)
def authenticateGid(self, gidStr, argList, requestHash=None):
gid = GID(string = gidStr)
self.validateGid(gid)
# request_hash is optional
if requestHash:
self.verifyGidRequestHash(gid, requestHash, argList)
return gid
def authenticateCred(self, credStr, argList, requestHash=None):
cred = Credential(string = credStr)
self.validateCred(cred)
# request hash is optional
if requestHash:
self.verifyCredRequestHash(cred, requestHash, argList)
return cred
def authenticateCert(self, certStr, requestHash):
cert = Certificate(string=certStr)
# xxx should be validateCred ??
self.validateCred(cert)
def gidNoop(self, gidStr, value, requestHash):
self.authenticateGid(gidStr, [gidStr, value], requestHash)
return value
def credNoop(self, credStr, value, requestHash):
self.authenticateCred(credStr, [credStr, value], requestHash)
return value
def verify_cred_is_me(self, credential):
is_me = False
cred = Credential(string=credential)
caller_gid = cred.get_gid_caller()
caller_hrn = caller_gid.get_hrn()
if caller_hrn != self.config.SFA_INTERFACE_HRN:
raise SfaPermissionDenied(self.config.SFA_INTEFACE_HRN)
return
def get_auth_info(self, auth_hrn):
"""
Given an authority name, return the information for that authority.
This is basically a stub that calls the hierarchy module.
@param auth_hrn human readable name of authority
"""
return self.hierarchy.get_auth_info(auth_hrn)
def veriry_auth_belongs_to_me(self, name):
"""
Verify that an authority belongs to our hierarchy.
This is basically left up to the implementation of the hierarchy
module. If the specified name does not belong, ane exception is
thrown indicating the caller should contact someone else.
@param auth_name human readable name of authority
"""
# get auth info will throw an exception if the authority doesnt exist
self.get_auth_info(name)
def verify_object_belongs_to_me(self, name):
"""
Verify that an object belongs to our hierarchy. By extension,
this implies that the authority that owns the object belongs
to our hierarchy. If it does not an exception is thrown.
@param name human readable name of object
"""
auth_name = self.get_authority(name)
if not auth_name:
auth_name = name
if name == self.config.SFA_INTERFACE_HRN:
return
self.verify_auth_belongs_to_me(auth_name)
def verify_auth_belongs_to_me(self, name):
# get auth info will throw an exception if the authority doesnt exist
self.get_auth_info(name)
def verify_object_permission(self, name):
"""
Verify that the object gid that was specified in the credential
allows permission to the object 'name'. This is done by a simple
prefix test. For example, an object_gid for plc.arizona would
match the objects plc.arizona.slice1 and plc.arizona.
@param name human readable name to test
"""
object_hrn = self.object_gid.get_hrn()
if object_hrn == name:
return
if name.startswith(object_hrn + "."):
return
#if name.startswith(get_authority(name)):
#return
raise PermissionError(name)
def determine_user_rights(self, caller_hrn, reg_record):
"""
Given a user credential and a record, determine what set of rights the
user should have to that record.
This is intended to replace determine_user_rights() and
verify_cancreate_credential()
"""
rl = Rights()
type = reg_record.type
logger.debug("entering determine_user_rights with record %s and caller_hrn %s"%\
(reg_record, caller_hrn))
if type == 'slice':
# researchers in the slice are in the DB as-is
researcher_hrns = [ user.hrn for user in reg_record.reg_researchers ]
# locating PIs attached to that slice
slice_pis=reg_record.get_pis()
pi_hrns = [ user.hrn for user in slice_pis ]
if (caller_hrn in researcher_hrns + pi_hrns):
rl.add('refresh')
rl.add('embed')
rl.add('bind')
rl.add('control')
rl.add('info')
elif type == 'authority':
pi_hrns = [ user.hrn for user in reg_record.reg_pis ]
if (caller_hrn == self.config.SFA_INTERFACE_HRN):
rl.add('authority')
rl.add('sa')
rl.add('ma')
if (caller_hrn in pi_hrns):
rl.add('authority')
rl.add('sa')
# NOTE: for the PL implementation, this 'operators' list
# amounted to users with 'tech' role in that site
# it seems like this is not needed any longer, so for now I just drop that
# operator_hrns = reg_record.get('operator',[])
# if (caller_hrn in operator_hrns):
# rl.add('authority')
# rl.add('ma')
elif type == 'user':
rl.add('refresh')
rl.add('resolve')
rl.add('info')
elif type == 'node':
rl.add('operator')
return rl
def get_authority(self, hrn):
return get_authority(hrn)
def filter_creds_by_caller(self, creds, caller_hrn_list):
"""
Returns a list of creds who's gid caller matches the
specified caller hrn
"""
if not isinstance(creds, list):
creds = [creds]
creds = []
if not isinstance(caller_hrn_list, list):
caller_hrn_list = [caller_hrn_list]
for cred in creds:
try:
tmp_cred = Credential(string=cred)
if tmp_cred.get_gid_caller().get_hrn() in [caller_hrn_list]:
creds.append(cred)
except: pass
return creds
def get_gids(registry=None, verbose=False):
"""
Get the gid for all instantiated slices on this node and store it
in /etc/sfa/slice.gid in the slice's filesystem
"""
# define useful variables
config = Config()
data_dir = config.data_path
config_dir = config.SFA_CONFIG_DIR
trusted_certs_dir = config.get_trustedroots_dir()
keyfile = data_dir + os.sep + "server.key"
certfile = data_dir + os.sep + "server.cert"
node_gid_file = config_dir + os.sep + "node.gid"
node_gid = GID(filename=node_gid_file)
hrn = node_gid.get_hrn()
interface_hrn = config.SFA_INTERFACE_HRN
# get credential
cred = GetCredential(registry=registry, verbose=verbose)
# make sure server key cert pair exists
create_server_keypair(keyfile=keyfile, certfile=certfile, hrn=hrn, verbose=verbose)
registry = server_proxy(url=registry, keyfile=keyfile, certfile=certfile)
if verbose:
print "Getting current slices on this node"
# get a list of slices on this node
from sfa.generic import Generic
generic=Generic.the_flavour()
api = generic.make_api(interface='component')
xids_tuple = api.driver.nodemanager.GetXIDs()
slices = eval(xids_tuple[1])
slicenames = slices.keys()
# generate a list of slices that dont have gids installed
slices_without_gids = []
for slicename in slicenames:
if not os.path.isfile("/vservers/%s/etc/slice.gid" % slicename) \
or not os.path.isfile("/vservers/%s/etc/node.gid" % slicename):
slices_without_gids.append(slicename)
# convert slicenames to hrns
hrns = [slicename_to_hrn(interface_hrn, slicename) \
for slicename in slices_without_gids]
# exit if there are no gids to install
if not hrns:
return
if verbose:
print "Getting gids for slices on this node from registry"
# get the gids
# and save them in the right palce
records = registry.GetGids(hrns, cred)
for record in records:
# if this isnt a slice record skip it
if not record['type'] == 'slice':
continue
slicename = hrn_to_pl_slicename(record['hrn'])
# if this slice isnt really instatiated skip it
if not os.path.exists("/vservers/%(slicename)s" % locals()):
continue
# save the slice gid in /etc/sfa/ in the vservers filesystem
vserver_path = "/vservers/%(slicename)s" % locals()
gid = record['gid']
slice_gid_filename = os.sep.join([vserver_path, "etc", "slice.gid"])
if verbose:
print "Saving GID for %(slicename)s as %(slice_gid_filename)s" % locals()
GID(string=gid).save_to_file(slice_gid_filename, save_parents=True)
# save the node gid in /etc/sfa
node_gid_filename = os.sep.join([vserver_path, "etc", "node.gid"])
if verbose:
print "Saving node GID for %(slicename)s as %(node_gid_filename)s" % locals()
node_gid.save_to_file(node_gid_filename, save_parents=True)
class Auth:
"""
Credential based authentication
"""
def __init__(self, peer_cert=None, config=None):
self.peer_cert = peer_cert
self.hierarchy = Hierarchy()
if not config:
self.config = Config()
self.load_trusted_certs()
def load_trusted_certs(self):
self.trusted_cert_list = TrustedRoots(
self.config.get_trustedroots_dir()).get_list()
self.trusted_cert_file_list = TrustedRoots(
self.config.get_trustedroots_dir()).get_file_list()
def checkCredentials(self,
creds,
operation,
xrns=[],
check_sliver_callback=None,
speaking_for_hrn=None):
def log_invalid_cred(cred):
cred_obj = Credential(string=cred)
logger.debug("failed to validate credential - dump=%s" %
cred_obj.dump_string(dump_parents=True))
error = sys.exc_info()[:2]
return error
# if xrns are specified they cannot be None or empty string
if xrns:
for xrn in xrns:
if not xrn:
raise BadArgs("Invalid urn or hrn")
if not isinstance(xrns, list):
xrns = [xrns]
slice_xrns = Xrn.filter_type(xrns, 'slice')
sliver_xrns = Xrn.filter_type(xrns, 'sliver')
# we are not able to validate slivers in the traditional way so
# we make sure not to include sliver urns/hrns in the core validation loop
hrns = [Xrn(xrn).hrn for xrn in xrns if xrn not in sliver_xrns]
valid = []
speaks_for_cred = None
if not isinstance(creds, list):
creds = [creds]
logger.debug("Auth.checkCredentials with %d creds on hrns=%s" %
(len(creds), hrns))
# won't work if either creds or hrns is empty - let's make it more explicit
if not creds:
raise BadArgs(
"no credential provided") #Forbidden("no credential provided")
if not hrns: hrns = [None]
for cred in creds:
for hrn in hrns:
try:
self.check(cred, operation, hrn)
valid.append(cred)
except:
if speaking_for_hrn:
try:
self.check(cred, operation, speaking_for_hrn)
speaks_for_cred = cred
valid.append(cred)
except:
error = log_invalid_cred(cred)
else:
error = log_invalid_cred(cred)
continue
# make sure all sliver xrns are validated against the valid credentials
if sliver_xrns:
if not check_sliver_callback:
msg = "sliver verification callback method not found."
msg += " Unable to validate sliver xrns: %s" % sliver_xrns
raise Forbidden(msg)
check_sliver_callback(valid, sliver_xrns)
if not len(valid):
raise Forbidden("Invalid credential")
if speaking_for_hrn and not speaks_for_cred:
raise InsufficientRights(
'Access denied: "geni_speaking_for" option specified but no valid speaks for credential found: %s -- %s'
% (error[0], error[1]))
return valid
def check(self, credential, operation, hrn=None):
"""
Check the credential against the peer cert (callerGID included
in the credential matches the caller that is connected to the
HTTPS connection, check if the credential was signed by a
trusted cert and check if the credential is allowed to perform
the specified operation.
"""
cred = Credential(cred=credential)
self.client_cred = cred
logger.debug("Auth.check: handling hrn=%s and credential=%s"%\
(hrn,cred.get_summary_tostring()))
if cred.type not in ['geni_sfa']:
raise CredentialNotVerifiable(cred.type,
"%s not supported" % cred.type)
self.client_gid = self.client_cred.get_gid_caller()
self.object_gid = self.client_cred.get_gid_object()
# make sure the client_gid is not blank
if not self.client_gid:
raise MissingCallerGID(self.client_cred.get_subject())
# validate the client cert if it exists
if self.peer_cert:
self.verifyPeerCert(self.peer_cert, self.client_gid)
# make sure the client is allowed to perform the operation
if operation:
if not self.client_cred.can_perform(operation):
raise InsufficientRights(operation)
if self.trusted_cert_list:
self.client_cred.verify(self.trusted_cert_file_list,
self.config.SFA_CREDENTIAL_SCHEMA)
else:
raise MissingTrustedRoots(self.config.get_trustedroots_dir())
# Make sure the credential's target matches the specified hrn.
# This check does not apply to trusted peers
trusted_peers = [gid.get_hrn() for gid in self.trusted_cert_list]
if hrn and self.client_gid.get_hrn() not in trusted_peers:
target_hrn = self.object_gid.get_hrn()
if not hrn == target_hrn:
raise PermissionError("Target hrn: %s doesn't match specified hrn: %s " % \
(target_hrn, hrn) )
return True
def check_ticket(self, ticket):
"""
Check if the tickt was signed by a trusted cert
"""
if self.trusted_cert_list:
client_ticket = SfaTicket(string=ticket)
client_ticket.verify_chain(self.trusted_cert_list)
else:
raise MissingTrustedRoots(self.config.get_trustedroots_dir())
return True
def verifyPeerCert(self, cert, gid):
# make sure the client_gid matches client's certificate
if not cert.is_pubkey(gid.get_pubkey()):
raise ConnectionKeyGIDMismatch(gid.get_subject() + ":" +
cert.get_subject())
def verifyGidRequestHash(self, gid, hash, arglist):
key = gid.get_pubkey()
if not key.verify_string(str(arglist), hash):
raise BadRequestHash(hash)
def verifyCredRequestHash(self, cred, hash, arglist):
gid = cred.get_gid_caller()
self.verifyGidRequestHash(gid, hash, arglist)
def validateGid(self, gid):
if self.trusted_cert_list:
gid.verify_chain(self.trusted_cert_list)
def validateCred(self, cred):
if self.trusted_cert_list:
cred.verify(self.trusted_cert_file_list)
def authenticateGid(self, gidStr, argList, requestHash=None):
gid = GID(string=gidStr)
self.validateGid(gid)
# request_hash is optional
if requestHash:
self.verifyGidRequestHash(gid, requestHash, argList)
return gid
def authenticateCred(self, credStr, argList, requestHash=None):
cred = Credential(string=credStr)
self.validateCred(cred)
# request hash is optional
if requestHash:
self.verifyCredRequestHash(cred, requestHash, argList)
return cred
def authenticateCert(self, certStr, requestHash):
cert = Certificate(string=certStr)
# xxx should be validateCred ??
self.validateCred(cert)
def gidNoop(self, gidStr, value, requestHash):
self.authenticateGid(gidStr, [gidStr, value], requestHash)
return value
def credNoop(self, credStr, value, requestHash):
self.authenticateCred(credStr, [credStr, value], requestHash)
return value
def verify_cred_is_me(self, credential):
is_me = False
cred = Credential(string=credential)
caller_gid = cred.get_gid_caller()
caller_hrn = caller_gid.get_hrn()
if caller_hrn != self.config.SFA_INTERFACE_HRN:
raise SfaPermissionDenied(self.config.SFA_INTEFACE_HRN)
return
def get_auth_info(self, auth_hrn):
"""
Given an authority name, return the information for that authority.
This is basically a stub that calls the hierarchy module.
@param auth_hrn human readable name of authority
"""
return self.hierarchy.get_auth_info(auth_hrn)
def veriry_auth_belongs_to_me(self, name):
"""
Verify that an authority belongs to our hierarchy.
This is basically left up to the implementation of the hierarchy
module. If the specified name does not belong, ane exception is
thrown indicating the caller should contact someone else.
@param auth_name human readable name of authority
"""
# get auth info will throw an exception if the authority doesnt exist
self.get_auth_info(name)
def verify_object_belongs_to_me(self, name):
"""
Verify that an object belongs to our hierarchy. By extension,
this implies that the authority that owns the object belongs
to our hierarchy. If it does not an exception is thrown.
@param name human readable name of object
"""
auth_name = self.get_authority(name)
if not auth_name:
auth_name = name
if name == self.config.SFA_INTERFACE_HRN:
return
self.verify_auth_belongs_to_me(auth_name)
def verify_auth_belongs_to_me(self, name):
# get auth info will throw an exception if the authority doesnt exist
self.get_auth_info(name)
def verify_object_permission(self, name):
"""
Verify that the object gid that was specified in the credential
allows permission to the object 'name'. This is done by a simple
prefix test. For example, an object_gid for plc.arizona would
match the objects plc.arizona.slice1 and plc.arizona.
@param name human readable name to test
"""
object_hrn = self.object_gid.get_hrn()
logger.debug(
"VERIFY OBJECT PERMISSION. \n\n object_hrn: %s \n name: %s \n get_authority(name): %s"
% (object_hrn, name, get_authority(name)))
if object_hrn == name:
return
if name.startswith(object_hrn + "."):
return
#if name.startswith(get_authority(name)):
#return
raise PermissionError(name)
def determine_user_rights(self, caller_hrn, reg_record):
"""
Given a user credential and a record, determine what set of rights the
user should have to that record.
This is intended to replace determine_user_rights() and
verify_cancreate_credential()
"""
rl = Rights()
type = reg_record.type
logger.debug(
"entering determine_user_rights with record %s and caller_hrn %s" %
(reg_record, caller_hrn))
if type == 'slice':
# researchers in the slice are in the DB as-is
researcher_hrns = [user.hrn for user in reg_record.reg_researchers]
# locating PIs attached to that slice
slice_pis = reg_record.get_pis()
pi_hrns = [user.hrn for user in slice_pis]
if (caller_hrn in researcher_hrns + pi_hrns):
rl.add('refresh')
rl.add('embed')
rl.add('bind')
rl.add('control')
rl.add('info')
elif type == 'authority':
pi_hrns = [user.hrn for user in reg_record.reg_pis]
if (caller_hrn == self.config.SFA_INTERFACE_HRN):
rl.add('authority')
rl.add('sa')
rl.add('ma')
if (caller_hrn in pi_hrns):
rl.add('authority')
rl.add('sa')
# NOTE: for the PL implementation, this 'operators' list
# amounted to users with 'tech' role in that site
# it seems like this is not needed any longer, so for now I just drop that
# operator_hrns = reg_record.get('operator',[])
# if (caller_hrn in operator_hrns):
# rl.add('authority')
# rl.add('ma')
elif type == 'user':
rl.add('refresh')
rl.add('resolve')
rl.add('info')
elif type == 'node':
rl.add('operator')
return rl
def get_authority(self, hrn):
return get_authority(hrn)
def filter_creds_by_caller(self, creds, caller_hrn_list):
"""
Returns a list of creds who's gid caller matches the
specified caller hrn
"""
if not isinstance(creds, list):
creds = [creds]
creds = []
if not isinstance(caller_hrn_list, list):
caller_hrn_list = [caller_hrn_list]
for cred in creds:
try:
tmp_cred = Credential(string=cred)
if tmp_cred.get_gid_caller().get_hrn() in [caller_hrn_list]:
creds.append(cred)
except:
pass
return creds
def get_gids(registry=None, verbose=False):
"""
Get the gid for all instantiated slices on this node and store it
in /etc/sfa/slice.gid in the slice's filesystem
"""
# define useful variables
config = Config()
data_dir = config.data_path
config_dir = config.SFA_CONFIG_DIR
trusted_certs_dir = config.get_trustedroots_dir()
keyfile = data_dir + os.sep + "server.key"
certfile = data_dir + os.sep + "server.cert"
node_gid_file = config_dir + os.sep + "node.gid"
node_gid = GID(filename=node_gid_file)
hrn = node_gid.get_hrn()
interface_hrn = config.SFA_INTERFACE_HRN
# get credential
cred = GetCredential(registry=registry, verbose=verbose)
# make sure server key cert pair exists
create_server_keypair(keyfile=keyfile,
certfile=certfile,
hrn=hrn,
verbose=verbose)
registry = server_proxy(url=registry, keyfile=keyfile, certfile=certfile)
if verbose:
print "Getting current slices on this node"
# get a list of slices on this node
from sfa.generic import Generic
generic = Generic.the_flavour()
api = generic.make_api(interface='component')
xids_tuple = api.driver.nodemanager.GetXIDs()
slices = eval(xids_tuple[1])
slicenames = slices.keys()
# generate a list of slices that dont have gids installed
slices_without_gids = []
for slicename in slicenames:
if not os.path.isfile("/vservers/%s/etc/slice.gid" % slicename) \
or not os.path.isfile("/vservers/%s/etc/node.gid" % slicename):
slices_without_gids.append(slicename)
# convert slicenames to hrns
hrns = [slicename_to_hrn(interface_hrn, slicename) \
for slicename in slices_without_gids]
# exit if there are no gids to install
if not hrns:
return
if verbose:
print "Getting gids for slices on this node from registry"
# get the gids
# and save them in the right palce
records = registry.GetGids(hrns, cred)
for record in records:
# if this isnt a slice record skip it
if not record['type'] == 'slice':
continue
slicename = hrn_to_pl_slicename(record['hrn'])
# if this slice isnt really instatiated skip it
if not os.path.exists("/vservers/%(slicename)s" % locals()):
continue
# save the slice gid in /etc/sfa/ in the vservers filesystem
vserver_path = "/vservers/%(slicename)s" % locals()
gid = record['gid']
slice_gid_filename = os.sep.join([vserver_path, "etc", "slice.gid"])
if verbose:
print "Saving GID for %(slicename)s as %(slice_gid_filename)s" % locals(
)
GID(string=gid).save_to_file(slice_gid_filename, save_parents=True)
# save the node gid in /etc/sfa
node_gid_filename = os.sep.join([vserver_path, "etc", "node.gid"])
if verbose:
print "Saving node GID for %(slicename)s as %(node_gid_filename)s" % locals(
)
node_gid.save_to_file(node_gid_filename, save_parents=True)
class Auth:
"""
Credential based authentication
"""
def __init__(self, peer_cert = None, config = None ):
self.peer_cert = peer_cert
self.hierarchy = Hierarchy()
if not config:
self.config = Config()
self.load_trusted_certs()
def load_trusted_certs(self):
self.trusted_cert_list = TrustedRoots(self.config.get_trustedroots_dir()).get_list()
self.trusted_cert_file_list = TrustedRoots(self.config.get_trustedroots_dir()).get_file_list()
def checkCredentials(self, creds, operation, hrn = None):
valid = []
if not isinstance(creds, list):
creds = [creds]
logger.debug("Auth.checkCredentials with %d creds"%len(creds))
for cred in creds:
try:
self.check(cred, operation, hrn)
valid.append(cred)
except:
cred_obj=Credential(string=cred)
logger.debug("failed to validate credential - dump=%s"%cred_obj.dump_string(dump_parents=True))
error = sys.exc_info()[:2]
continue
if not len(valid):
raise InsufficientRights('Access denied: %s -- %s' % (error[0],error[1]))
return valid
def check(self, cred, operation, hrn = None):
"""
Check the credential against the peer cert (callerGID included
in the credential matches the caller that is connected to the
HTTPS connection, check if the credential was signed by a
trusted cert and check if the credential is allowed to perform
the specified operation.
"""
self.client_cred = Credential(string = cred)
self.client_gid = self.client_cred.get_gid_caller()
self.object_gid = self.client_cred.get_gid_object()
# make sure the client_gid is not blank
if not self.client_gid:
raise MissingCallerGID(self.client_cred.get_subject())
# validate the client cert if it exists
if self.peer_cert:
self.verifyPeerCert(self.peer_cert, self.client_gid)
# make sure the client is allowed to perform the operation
if operation:
if not self.client_cred.can_perform(operation):
raise InsufficientRights(operation)
if self.trusted_cert_list:
self.client_cred.verify(self.trusted_cert_file_list, self.config.SFA_CREDENTIAL_SCHEMA)
else:
raise MissingTrustedRoots(self.config.get_trustedroots_dir())
# Make sure the credential's target matches the specified hrn.
# This check does not apply to trusted peers
trusted_peers = [gid.get_hrn() for gid in self.trusted_cert_list]
if hrn and self.client_gid.get_hrn() not in trusted_peers:
target_hrn = self.object_gid.get_hrn()
if not hrn == target_hrn:
raise PermissionError("Target hrn: %s doesn't match specified hrn: %s " % \
(target_hrn, hrn) )
return True
def check_ticket(self, ticket):
"""
Check if the tickt was signed by a trusted cert
"""
if self.trusted_cert_list:
client_ticket = SfaTicket(string=ticket)
client_ticket.verify_chain(self.trusted_cert_list)
else:
raise MissingTrustedRoots(self.config.get_trustedroots_dir())
return True
def verifyPeerCert(self, cert, gid):
# make sure the client_gid matches client's certificate
if not cert.is_pubkey(gid.get_pubkey()):
raise ConnectionKeyGIDMismatch(gid.get_subject()+":"+cert.get_subject())
def verifyGidRequestHash(self, gid, hash, arglist):
key = gid.get_pubkey()
if not key.verify_string(str(arglist), hash):
raise BadRequestHash(hash)
def verifyCredRequestHash(self, cred, hash, arglist):
gid = cred.get_gid_caller()
self.verifyGidRequestHash(gid, hash, arglist)
def validateGid(self, gid):
if self.trusted_cert_list:
gid.verify_chain(self.trusted_cert_list)
def validateCred(self, cred):
if self.trusted_cert_list:
cred.verify(self.trusted_cert_file_list)
def authenticateGid(self, gidStr, argList, requestHash=None):
gid = GID(string = gidStr)
self.validateGid(gid)
# request_hash is optional
if requestHash:
self.verifyGidRequestHash(gid, requestHash, argList)
return gid
def authenticateCred(self, credStr, argList, requestHash=None):
cred = Credential(string = credStr)
self.validateCred(cred)
# request hash is optional
if requestHash:
self.verifyCredRequestHash(cred, requestHash, argList)
return cred
def authenticateCert(self, certStr, requestHash):
cert = Certificate(string=certStr)
# xxx should be validateCred ??
self.validateCred(cert)
def gidNoop(self, gidStr, value, requestHash):
self.authenticateGid(gidStr, [gidStr, value], requestHash)
return value
def credNoop(self, credStr, value, requestHash):
self.authenticateCred(credStr, [credStr, value], requestHash)
return value
def verify_cred_is_me(self, credential):
is_me = False
cred = Credential(string=credential)
caller_gid = cred.get_gid_caller()
caller_hrn = caller_gid.get_hrn()
if caller_hrn != self.config.SFA_INTERFACE_HRN:
raise SfaPermissionDenied(self.config.SFA_INTEFACE_HRN)
return
def get_auth_info(self, auth_hrn):
"""
Given an authority name, return the information for that authority.
This is basically a stub that calls the hierarchy module.
@param auth_hrn human readable name of authority
"""
return self.hierarchy.get_auth_info(auth_hrn)
def veriry_auth_belongs_to_me(self, name):
"""
Verify that an authority belongs to our hierarchy.
This is basically left up to the implementation of the hierarchy
module. If the specified name does not belong, ane exception is
thrown indicating the caller should contact someone else.
@param auth_name human readable name of authority
"""
# get auth info will throw an exception if the authority doesnt exist
self.get_auth_info(name)
def verify_object_belongs_to_me(self, name):
"""
Verify that an object belongs to our hierarchy. By extension,
this implies that the authority that owns the object belongs
to our hierarchy. If it does not an exception is thrown.
@param name human readable name of object
"""
auth_name = self.get_authority(name)
if not auth_name:
auth_name = name
if name == self.config.SFA_INTERFACE_HRN:
return
self.verify_auth_belongs_to_me(auth_name)
def verify_auth_belongs_to_me(self, name):
# get auth info will throw an exception if the authority doesnt exist
self.get_auth_info(name)
def verify_object_permission(self, name):
"""
Verify that the object gid that was specified in the credential
allows permission to the object 'name'. This is done by a simple
prefix test. For example, an object_gid for plc.arizona would
match the objects plc.arizona.slice1 and plc.arizona.
@param name human readable name to test
"""
object_hrn = self.object_gid.get_hrn()
if object_hrn == name:
return
if name.startswith(object_hrn + "."):
return
#if name.startswith(get_authority(name)):
#return
raise PermissionError(name)
def determine_user_rights(self, caller_hrn, reg_record):
"""
Given a user credential and a record, determine what set of rights the
user should have to that record.
This is intended to replace determine_user_rights() and
verify_cancreate_credential()
"""
rl = Rights()
type = reg_record.type
logger.debug("entering determine_user_rights with record %s and caller_hrn %s"%(reg_record, caller_hrn))
if type == 'slice':
# researchers in the slice are in the DB as-is
researcher_hrns = [ user.hrn for user in reg_record.reg_researchers ]
# locating PIs attached to that slice
slice_pis=reg_record.get_pis()
pi_hrns = [ user.hrn for user in slice_pis ]
if (caller_hrn in researcher_hrns + pi_hrns):
rl.add('refresh')
rl.add('embed')
rl.add('bind')
rl.add('control')
rl.add('info')
elif type == 'authority':
pi_hrns = [ user.hrn for user in reg_record.reg_pis ]
if (caller_hrn == self.config.SFA_INTERFACE_HRN):
rl.add('authority')
rl.add('sa')
rl.add('ma')
if (caller_hrn in pi_hrns):
rl.add('authority')
rl.add('sa')
# NOTE: for the PL implementation, this 'operators' list
# amounted to users with 'tech' role in that site
# it seems like this is not needed any longer, so for now I just drop that
# operator_hrns = reg_record.get('operator',[])
# if (caller_hrn in operator_hrns):
# rl.add('authority')
# rl.add('ma')
elif type == 'user':
rl.add('refresh')
rl.add('resolve')
rl.add('info')
elif type == 'node':
rl.add('operator')
return rl
def get_authority(self, hrn):
return get_authority(hrn)
def filter_creds_by_caller(self, creds, caller_hrn_list):
"""
Returns a list of creds who's gid caller matches the
specified caller hrn
"""
if not isinstance(creds, list):
creds = [creds]
creds = []
if not isinstance(caller_hrn_list, list):
caller_hrn_list = [caller_hrn_list]
for cred in creds:
try:
tmp_cred = Credential(string=cred)
if tmp_cred.get_gid_caller().get_hrn() in [caller_hrn_list]:
creds.append(cred)
except: pass
return creds
def main():
# Generate command line parser
parser = OptionParser(usage="sfa-start.py [options]")
parser.add_option("-r",
"--registry",
dest="registry",
action="store_true",
help="run registry server",
default=False)
parser.add_option("-s",
"--slicemgr",
dest="sm",
action="store_true",
help="run slice manager",
default=False)
parser.add_option("-a",
"--aggregate",
dest="am",
action="store_true",
help="run aggregate manager",
default=False)
parser.add_option("-c",
"--component",
dest="cm",
action="store_true",
help="run component server",
default=False)
parser.add_option("-t",
"--trusted-certs",
dest="trusted_certs",
action="store_true",
help="refresh trusted certs",
default=False)
parser.add_option("-d",
"--daemon",
dest="daemon",
action="store_true",
help="Run as daemon.",
default=False)
(options, args) = parser.parse_args()
config = Config()
logger.setLevelFromOptVerbose(config.SFA_API_LOGLEVEL)
# ge the server's key and cert
hierarchy = Hierarchy()
auth_info = hierarchy.get_interface_auth_info()
server_key_file = auth_info.get_privkey_filename()
server_cert_file = auth_info.get_gid_filename()
# ensure interface cert is present in trusted roots dir
trusted_roots = TrustedRoots(config.get_trustedroots_dir())
trusted_roots.add_gid(GID(filename=server_cert_file))
if (options.daemon): daemon()
if options.trusted_certs:
install_peer_certs(server_key_file, server_cert_file)
# start registry server
if (options.registry):
from sfa.server.registry import Registry
r = Registry("", config.SFA_REGISTRY_PORT, server_key_file,
server_cert_file)
r.start()
if (options.am):
from sfa.server.aggregate import Aggregate
a = Aggregate("", config.SFA_AGGREGATE_PORT, server_key_file,
server_cert_file)
a.start()
# start slice manager
if (options.sm):
from sfa.server.slicemgr import SliceMgr
s = SliceMgr("", config.SFA_SM_PORT, server_key_file, server_cert_file)
s.start()
if (options.cm):
from sfa.server.component import Component
c = Component("", config.component_port, server_key_file,
server_cert_file)
# c = Component("", config.SFA_COMPONENT_PORT, server_key_file, server_cert_file)
c.start()
