def test_rounds(self):
self.versus_test(
axl.Grudger(),
axl.SuspiciousTitForTat(),
[C] + [D] * 9,
[D, C] + [D] * 8,
)
def test_rounds(self):
self.versus_test(
axl.TitForTat(),
axl.SuspiciousTitForTat(),
[C, D, C, D, C, D],
[D, C, D, C, D, C],
)
def tscizzle_strategies():
"""The list of strategies used in @tscizzle's Morality Metrics paper."""
strategies = [
axelrod.Cooperator(),
axelrod.Defector(),
axelrod.Eatherley(),
axelrod.Champion(),
axelrod.GTFT(p=0.1),
axelrod.GTFT(p=0.3),
axelrod.GoByMajority(soft=True),
axelrod.GoByMajority(soft=False),
axelrod.TitFor2Tats(),
axelrod.Random(0.8),
axelrod.Random(0.5),
axelrod.Random(0.2),
axelrod.WinStayLoseShift(), # Pavlov
axelrod.TitForTat(),
axelrod.TwoTitsForTat(),
axelrod.Grudger(), # Friedman
axelrod.Tester(),
axelrod.SuspiciousTitForTat(),
axelrod.Joss(0.9),
axelrod.Joss(0.7),
]
return strategies
def test_strategy(self):
# tests states 2, 7, 14 and 15
actions = [(C, C), (C, D), (D, C), (D, D), (D, C), (D, D)]
self.versus_test(opponent=axelrod.Alternator(),
expected_actions=actions)
# tests states 4, 16 and 11
actions = [(C, D), (C, D), (D, C), (D, D), (D, D), (C, C), (C, D)]
self.versus_test(opponent=axelrod.CyclerDDC(),
expected_actions=actions)
# tests states 3, 5 and 12
actions = [(C, D), (C, C), (D, C), (D, D), (D, D), (C, D)]
self.versus_test(opponent=axelrod.SuspiciousTitForTat(),
expected_actions=actions)
# tests state 1
actions = [(C, C), (C, C), (C, C), (C, C)]
self.versus_test(opponent=axelrod.Cooperator(),
expected_actions=actions)
# tests state 6
actions = [(C, D), (C, C), (D, D), (C, C)]
self.versus_test(opponent=axelrod.CyclerDC(),
expected_actions=actions)
def test_strategy(self):
player_history = [C, D, C, D, C, C, C, C, C]
opp_history = [D, C, D, C, D, C, C, C, C]
actions = list(zip(player_history, opp_history))
self.versus_test(axl.SuspiciousTitForTat(), expected_actions=actions)
player_history = [C, C, D, C, D, C, C, C, D, D, D, D, D, D]
opp_history = [C, D] * 7
actions = list(zip(player_history, opp_history))
self.versus_test(axl.Alternator(), expected_actions=actions)
def test_output_from_literature(self):
"""
This strategy is not fully described in the literature, however the
scores for the strategy against a set of opponents is reported
Bruno Beaufils, Jean-Paul Delahaye, Philippe Mathie
"Our Meeting With Gradual: A Good Strategy For The Iterated Prisoner's
Dilemma" Proc. Artif. Life 1996
This test just ensures that the strategy is as was originally defined.
See https://github.com/Axelrod-Python/Axelrod/issues/1294 for another
discussion of this.
"""
players = [
axl.Cooperator(),
axl.Defector(),
axl.Random(),
axl.TitForTat(),
axl.Grudger(),
axl.CyclerDDC(),
axl.CyclerCCD(),
axl.GoByMajority(),
axl.SuspiciousTitForTat(),
axl.Prober(),
self.player(),
axl.WinStayLoseShift(),
]
turns = 1000
tournament = axl.Tournament(players,
turns=turns,
repetitions=1,
seed=75)
results = tournament.play(progress_bar=False)
scores = [
round(average_score_per_turn * 1000, 1)
for average_score_per_turn in results.payoff_matrix[-2]
]
expected_scores = [
3000.0,
915.0,
2763.0,
3000.0,
3000.0,
2219.0,
3472.0,
3000.0,
2996.0,
2999.0,
3000.0,
3000.0,
]
self.assertEqual(scores, expected_scores)
def test_strategy(self):
# Starts by cooperating.
self.first_play_test(C)
player_history = [C, C, D, C, D, C, C, C, D, C, C, C, D, D, D, D, D, D]
opp_history = [C, D] * 9
actions = list(zip(player_history, opp_history))
self.versus_test(axelrod.Alternator(), expected_actions=actions)
player_history = [C, D, C, D, C, C, C, C, C]
opp_history = [D, C, D, C, D, C, C, C, C]
actions = list(zip(player_history, opp_history))
self.versus_test(axelrod.SuspiciousTitForTat(),
expected_actions=actions)
def test_strategy_mutually_cooperative(self):
# tests states 2, 7, 14 and 11
actions = [(C, C), (C, D), (D, C), (D, D), (C, C), (C, D)]
self.versus_test(opponent=axl.Alternator(), expected_actions=actions)
# tests states 1, 4 and 8
actions = [(C, D), (C, D), (D, D), (C, C), (C, C), (C, D)]
self.versus_test(opponent=axl.Cycler(["D", "D", "D", "C", "C"]),
expected_actions=actions)
# tests states 3, 5
actions = [(C, D), (C, C), (D, C), (D, D), (C, D)]
self.versus_test(opponent=axl.SuspiciousTitForTat(),
expected_actions=actions)
def test_strategy(self):
actions = [(C, C)] * 100
self.versus_test(axelrod.Cooperator(), expected_actions=actions)
actions = [(C, D), (C, D), (D, D), (D, D)]
self.versus_test(axelrod.Defector(), expected_actions=actions, seed=1)
actions = [(C, D), (D, D), (D, D), (C, D)]
self.versus_test(axelrod.Defector(), expected_actions=actions, seed=2)
actions = [(C, D), (C, C), (D, C), (C, D), (D, C), (D, D), (C, D), (D, C), (C, D)]
self.versus_test(axelrod.SuspiciousTitForTat(), expected_actions=actions, seed=1)
actions = [(C, C), (C, D), (D, C)] + [(D, D), (C, C)] * 3
self.versus_test(axelrod.Alternator(), expected_actions=actions, seed=2)
actions = [(C, C), (C, D), (C, C)] + [(D, D), (C, C)] * 3
self.versus_test(axelrod.Alternator(), expected_actions=actions, seed=3)
def test_affect_of_strategy(self):
"""Will do opposite of what opponent does."""
P1 = axelrod.SuspiciousTitForTat()
P2 = axelrod.Player()
P1.history = ['D']
P2.history = ['C']
self.assertEqual(P1.strategy(P2), 'D')
P1.history.append('D')
P2.history.append('D')
self.assertEqual(P1.strategy(P2), 'C')
P1.history.append('C')
P2.history.append('D')
self.assertEqual(P1.strategy(P2), 'C')
P1.history.append('C')
P2.history.append('C')
self.assertEqual(P1.strategy(P2), 'D')
def test_rounds(self):
self.versus_test(axelrod.FoolMeOnce(), axelrod.SuspiciousTitForTat(),
[C] * 9, [D] + [C] * 8)
def test_rounds(self):
outcomes = zip()
self.versus_test(axelrod.OmegaTFT(), axelrod.SuspiciousTitForTat(),
[C, D, C, D, C, C, C, C, C],
[D, C, D, C, D, C, C, C, C])
oppScore = []
selfAvgList = []
oppAvgList = []
avgScore = []
oppAvgScore = []
evolveCode = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0,\
0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0] # For final experiments
singEvolveCode = [0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1,\
0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0]
# strategies = [axelrod.Cooperator(), axelrod.Defector()]
# strategies = [axelrod.TitFor2Tats(), axelrod.SuspiciousTitForTat(), axelrod.TitForTat(), axelrod.Prober()]
strategies = [axelrod.Cooperator(), axelrod.Defector(), axelrod.CyclerCCD(),axelrod.HardTitForTat(),\
axelrod.TitFor2Tats(), axelrod.SuspiciousTitForTat(), axelrod.Random(), axelrod.TitForTat(), axelrod.Prober()]
learner = axelrod.LearnerAxel(memory_depth=2, exploreProb=0.1, learnerType=2)
multAxel = axelrod.EvolveAxel(3, evolveCode, 'MULT')
singAxel = axelrod.EvolveAxel(3, evolveCode, 'SING')
ply = learner
# print ply
for p in strategies:
print "Currently playing against strategy:", p
for turn in range(numTurns):
ply.play(p)
selfList = map(ScoreMatrix, zip(ply.history, p.history))
oppList = map(ScoreMatrix, zip(p.history, ply.history))
def test_strategy(self):
"""Starts by defecting"""
P1 = axelrod.SuspiciousTitForTat()
P2 = axelrod.Player()
self.assertEqual(P1.strategy(P2), 'D')
