def test_GetAvbChainedPartitionArg_withPrivateKey(self):
key = os.path.join(self.testdata_dir, 'testkey.key')
info_dict = {
'avb_avbtool': 'avbtool',
'avb_product_key_path': key,
'avb_product_rollback_index_location': 2,
}
args = common.GetAvbChainedPartitionArg('product', info_dict).split(':')
self.assertEqual(3, len(args))
self.assertEqual('product', args[0])
self.assertEqual('2', args[1])
self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(args[2]))
def test_GetAvbChainedPartitionArg(self):
pubkey = os.path.join(self.testdata_dir, 'testkey.pubkey.pem')
info_dict = {
'avb_avbtool': 'avbtool',
'avb_system_key_path': pubkey,
'avb_system_rollback_index_location': 2,
}
args = common.GetAvbChainedPartitionArg('system', info_dict).split(':')
self.assertEqual(3, len(args))
self.assertEqual('system', args[0])
self.assertEqual('2', args[1])
self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(args[2]))
def AppendVBMetaArgsForPartition(cmd, partition, image):
"""Appends the VBMeta arguments for partition.
It sets up the VBMeta argument by including the partition descriptor from the
given 'image', or by configuring the partition as a chained partition.
Args:
cmd: A list of command args that will be used to generate the vbmeta image.
The argument for the partition will be appended to the list.
partition: The name of the partition (e.g. "system").
image: The path to the partition image.
"""
# Check if chain partition is used.
key_path = OPTIONS.info_dict.get("avb_" + partition + "_key_path")
if key_path:
chained_partition_arg = common.GetAvbChainedPartitionArg(
partition, OPTIONS.info_dict)
cmd.extend(["--chain_partition", chained_partition_arg])
else:
cmd.extend(["--include_descriptors_from_image", image])
def ValidateVerifiedBootImages(input_tmp, info_dict, options):
"""Validates the Verified Boot related images.
For Verified Boot 1.0, it verifies the signatures of the bootable images
(boot/recovery etc), as well as the dm-verity metadata in system images
(system/vendor/product). For Verified Boot 2.0, it calls avbtool to verify
vbmeta.img, which in turn verifies all the descriptors listed in vbmeta.
Args:
input_tmp: The top-level directory of unpacked target-files.zip.
info_dict: The loaded info dict.
options: A dict that contains the user-supplied public keys to be used for
image verification. In particular, 'verity_key' is used to verify the
bootable images in VB 1.0, and the vbmeta image in VB 2.0, where
applicable. 'verity_key_mincrypt' will be used to verify the system
images in VB 1.0.
Raises:
AssertionError: On any verification failure.
"""
# Verified boot 1.0 (images signed with boot_signer and verity_signer).
if info_dict.get('boot_signer') == 'true':
logging.info('Verifying Verified Boot images...')
# Verify the boot/recovery images (signed with boot_signer), against the
# given X.509 encoded pubkey (or falling back to the one in the info_dict if
# none given).
verity_key = options['verity_key']
if verity_key is None:
verity_key = info_dict['verity_key'] + '.x509.pem'
for image in ('boot.img', 'recovery.img', 'recovery-two-step.img'):
if image == 'recovery-two-step.img':
image_path = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'OTA', image)
else:
image_path = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'IMAGES', image)
if not os.path.exists(image_path):
continue
cmd = [
'boot_signer', '-verify', image_path, '-certificate',
verity_key
]
proc = common.Run(cmd)
stdoutdata, _ = proc.communicate()
assert proc.returncode == 0, \
'Failed to verify {} with boot_signer:\n{}'.format(image, stdoutdata)
logging.info('Verified %s with boot_signer (key: %s):\n%s', image,
verity_key, stdoutdata.rstrip())
# Verify verity signed system images in Verified Boot 1.0. Note that not using
# 'elif' here, since 'boot_signer' and 'verity' are not bundled in VB 1.0.
if info_dict.get('verity') == 'true':
# First verify that the verity key is built into the root image (regardless
# of system-as-root).
verity_key_mincrypt = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'ROOT', 'verity_key')
assert os.path.exists(verity_key_mincrypt), 'Missing verity_key'
# Verify /verity_key matches the one given via command line, if any.
if options['verity_key_mincrypt'] is None:
logging.warn(
'Skipped checking the content of /verity_key, as the key file not '
'provided. Use --verity_key_mincrypt to specify.')
else:
expected_key = options['verity_key_mincrypt']
assert filecmp.cmp(expected_key, verity_key_mincrypt, shallow=False), \
"Mismatching mincrypt verity key files"
logging.info('Verified the content of /verity_key')
# For devices with a separate ramdisk (i.e. non-system-as-root), there must
# be a copy in ramdisk.
if info_dict.get("system_root_image") != "true":
verity_key_ramdisk = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'BOOT', 'RAMDISK',
'verity_key')
assert os.path.exists(
verity_key_ramdisk), 'Missing verity_key in ramdisk'
assert filecmp.cmp(
verity_key_mincrypt, verity_key_ramdisk, shallow=False), \
'Mismatching verity_key files in root and ramdisk'
logging.info('Verified the content of /verity_key in ramdisk')
# Then verify the verity signed system/vendor/product images, against the
# verity pubkey in mincrypt format.
for image in ('system.img', 'vendor.img', 'product.img'):
image_path = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'IMAGES', image)
# We are not checking if the image is actually enabled via info_dict (e.g.
# 'system_verity_block_device=...'). Because it's most likely a bug that
# skips signing some of the images in signed target-files.zip, while
# having the top-level verity flag enabled.
if not os.path.exists(image_path):
continue
cmd = [
'verity_verifier', image_path, '-mincrypt', verity_key_mincrypt
]
proc = common.Run(cmd)
stdoutdata, _ = proc.communicate()
assert proc.returncode == 0, \
'Failed to verify {} with verity_verifier (key: {}):\n{}'.format(
image, verity_key_mincrypt, stdoutdata)
logging.info('Verified %s with verity_verifier (key: %s):\n%s',
image, verity_key_mincrypt, stdoutdata.rstrip())
# Handle the case of Verified Boot 2.0 (AVB).
if info_dict.get("avb_enable") == "true":
logging.info('Verifying Verified Boot 2.0 (AVB) images...')
key = options['verity_key']
if key is None:
key = info_dict['avb_vbmeta_key_path']
# avbtool verifies all the images that have descriptors listed in vbmeta.
image = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'IMAGES', 'vbmeta.img')
cmd = [
info_dict['avb_avbtool'], 'verify_image', '--image', image,
'--key', key
]
# Append the args for chained partitions if any.
for partition in common.AVB_PARTITIONS + common.AVB_VBMETA_PARTITIONS:
key_name = 'avb_' + partition + '_key_path'
if info_dict.get(key_name) is not None:
# Use the key file from command line if specified; otherwise fall back
# to the one in info dict.
key_file = options.get(key_name, info_dict[key_name])
chained_partition_arg = common.GetAvbChainedPartitionArg(
partition, info_dict, key_file)
cmd.extend(
["--expected_chain_partition", chained_partition_arg])
proc = common.Run(cmd)
stdoutdata, _ = proc.communicate()
assert proc.returncode == 0, \
'Failed to verify {} with avbtool (key: {}):\n{}'.format(
image, key, stdoutdata)
logging.info('Verified %s with avbtool (key: %s):\n%s', image, key,
stdoutdata.rstrip())
def ValidateVerifiedBootImages(input_tmp, info_dict, options):
"""Validates the Verified Boot related images.
For Verified Boot 1.0, it verifies the signatures of the bootable images
(boot/recovery etc), as well as the dm-verity metadata in system images
(system/vendor/product). For Verified Boot 2.0, it calls avbtool to verify
vbmeta.img, which in turn verifies all the descriptors listed in vbmeta.
Args:
input_tmp: The top-level directory of unpacked target-files.zip.
info_dict: The loaded info dict.
options: A dict that contains the user-supplied public keys to be used for
image verification. In particular, 'verity_key' is used to verify the
bootable images in VB 1.0, and the vbmeta image in VB 2.0, where
applicable. 'verity_key_mincrypt' will be used to verify the system
images in VB 1.0.
Raises:
AssertionError: On any verification failure.
"""
# See bug 159299583
# After commit 5277d1015, some images (e.g. acpio.img and tos.img) are no
# longer copied from RADIO to the IMAGES folder. But avbtool assumes that
# images are in IMAGES folder. So we symlink them.
symlinkIfNotExists(os.path.join(input_tmp, "RADIO"),
os.path.join(input_tmp, "IMAGES"))
# Verified boot 1.0 (images signed with boot_signer and verity_signer).
if info_dict.get('boot_signer') == 'true':
logging.info('Verifying Verified Boot images...')
# Verify the boot/recovery images (signed with boot_signer), against the
# given X.509 encoded pubkey (or falling back to the one in the info_dict if
# none given).
verity_key = options['verity_key']
if verity_key is None:
verity_key = info_dict['verity_key'] + '.x509.pem'
for image in ('boot.img', 'recovery.img', 'recovery-two-step.img'):
if image == 'recovery-two-step.img':
image_path = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'OTA', image)
else:
image_path = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'IMAGES', image)
if not os.path.exists(image_path):
continue
cmd = [
'boot_signer', '-verify', image_path, '-certificate',
verity_key
]
proc = common.Run(cmd)
stdoutdata, _ = proc.communicate()
assert proc.returncode == 0, \
'Failed to verify {} with boot_signer:\n{}'.format(image, stdoutdata)
logging.info('Verified %s with boot_signer (key: %s):\n%s', image,
verity_key, stdoutdata.rstrip())
# Verify verity signed system images in Verified Boot 1.0. Note that not using
# 'elif' here, since 'boot_signer' and 'verity' are not bundled in VB 1.0.
if info_dict.get('verity') == 'true':
# First verify that the verity key is built into the root image (regardless
# of system-as-root).
verity_key_mincrypt = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'ROOT', 'verity_key')
assert os.path.exists(verity_key_mincrypt), 'Missing verity_key'
# Verify /verity_key matches the one given via command line, if any.
if options['verity_key_mincrypt'] is None:
logging.warn(
'Skipped checking the content of /verity_key, as the key file not '
'provided. Use --verity_key_mincrypt to specify.')
else:
expected_key = options['verity_key_mincrypt']
assert filecmp.cmp(expected_key, verity_key_mincrypt, shallow=False), \
"Mismatching mincrypt verity key files"
logging.info('Verified the content of /verity_key')
# For devices with a separate ramdisk (i.e. non-system-as-root), there must
# be a copy in ramdisk.
if info_dict.get("system_root_image") != "true":
verity_key_ramdisk = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'BOOT', 'RAMDISK',
'verity_key')
assert os.path.exists(
verity_key_ramdisk), 'Missing verity_key in ramdisk'
assert filecmp.cmp(
verity_key_mincrypt, verity_key_ramdisk, shallow=False), \
'Mismatching verity_key files in root and ramdisk'
logging.info('Verified the content of /verity_key in ramdisk')
# Then verify the verity signed system/vendor/product images, against the
# verity pubkey in mincrypt format.
for image in ('system.img', 'vendor.img', 'product.img'):
image_path = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'IMAGES', image)
# We are not checking if the image is actually enabled via info_dict (e.g.
# 'system_verity_block_device=...'). Because it's most likely a bug that
# skips signing some of the images in signed target-files.zip, while
# having the top-level verity flag enabled.
if not os.path.exists(image_path):
continue
cmd = [
'verity_verifier', image_path, '-mincrypt', verity_key_mincrypt
]
proc = common.Run(cmd)
stdoutdata, _ = proc.communicate()
assert proc.returncode == 0, \
'Failed to verify {} with verity_verifier (key: {}):\n{}'.format(
image, verity_key_mincrypt, stdoutdata)
logging.info('Verified %s with verity_verifier (key: %s):\n%s',
image, verity_key_mincrypt, stdoutdata.rstrip())
# Handle the case of Verified Boot 2.0 (AVB).
if info_dict.get("avb_enable") == "true":
logging.info('Verifying Verified Boot 2.0 (AVB) images...')
key = options['verity_key']
if key is None:
key = info_dict['avb_vbmeta_key_path']
ValidatePartitionFingerprints(input_tmp, info_dict)
# avbtool verifies all the images that have descriptors listed in vbmeta.
# Using `--follow_chain_partitions` so it would additionally verify chained
# vbmeta partitions (e.g. vbmeta_system).
image = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'IMAGES', 'vbmeta.img')
cmd = [
info_dict['avb_avbtool'], 'verify_image', '--image', image,
'--follow_chain_partitions'
]
# Custom images.
custom_partitions = info_dict.get("avb_custom_images_partition_list",
"").strip().split()
# Append the args for chained partitions if any.
for partition in (common.AVB_PARTITIONS +
common.AVB_VBMETA_PARTITIONS +
tuple(custom_partitions)):
key_name = 'avb_' + partition + '_key_path'
if info_dict.get(key_name) is not None:
if info_dict.get(
'ab_update') != 'true' and partition == 'recovery':
continue
# Use the key file from command line if specified; otherwise fall back
# to the one in info dict.
key_file = options.get(key_name, info_dict[key_name])
chained_partition_arg = common.GetAvbChainedPartitionArg(
partition, info_dict, key_file)
cmd.extend(
['--expected_chain_partition', chained_partition_arg])
# Handle the boot image with a non-default name, e.g. boot-5.4.img
boot_images = info_dict.get("boot_images")
if boot_images:
# we used the 1st boot image to generate the vbmeta. Rename the filename
# to boot.img so that avbtool can find it correctly.
first_image_name = boot_images.split()[0]
first_image_path = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'IMAGES',
first_image_name)
assert os.path.isfile(first_image_path)
renamed_boot_image_path = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'IMAGES',
'boot.img')
os.rename(first_image_path, renamed_boot_image_path)
proc = common.Run(cmd)
stdoutdata, _ = proc.communicate()
assert proc.returncode == 0, \
'Failed to verify {} with avbtool (key: {}):\n{}'.format(
image, key, stdoutdata)
logging.info('Verified %s with avbtool (key: %s):\n%s', image, key,
stdoutdata.rstrip())
# avbtool verifies recovery image for non-A/B devices.
if (info_dict.get('ab_update') != 'true'
and info_dict.get('no_recovery') != 'true'):
image = os.path.join(input_tmp, 'IMAGES', 'recovery.img')
key = info_dict['avb_recovery_key_path']
cmd = [
info_dict['avb_avbtool'], 'verify_image', '--image', image,
'--key', key
]
proc = common.Run(cmd)
stdoutdata, _ = proc.communicate()
assert proc.returncode == 0, \
'Failed to verify {} with avbtool (key: {}):\n{}'.format(
image, key, stdoutdata)
logging.info('Verified %s with avbtool (key: %s):\n%s', image, key,
stdoutdata.rstrip())
