def get_request_monitoring(
self,
privkey: str,
reward_amount: TokenAmount,
monitoring_service_contract_address: Address,
) -> RequestMonitoring:
"""Returns raiden client's RequestMonitoring object"""
non_closing_signer = LocalSigner(decode_hex(privkey))
partner_signed_self = SignedBlindedBalanceProof(
channel_identifier=self.channel_identifier,
token_network_address=self.token_network_address,
nonce=self.nonce,
additional_hash=decode_hex(self.additional_hash),
chain_id=self.chain_id,
signature=self.signature,
balance_hash=decode_hex(self.balance_hash),
)
request_monitoring = RequestMonitoring(
balance_proof=partner_signed_self,
reward_amount=reward_amount,
signature=EMPTY_SIGNATURE,
monitoring_service_contract_address=
monitoring_service_contract_address,
)
request_monitoring.sign(non_closing_signer)
return request_monitoring
def f(chain_id=1, **kwargs):
balance_proof = make_balance_proof(signer=signer, **kwargs)
balance_proof.chain_id = chain_id
partner_signed_balance_proof = SignedBlindedBalanceProof.from_balance_proof_signed_state(
balance_proof)
request_monitoring = RequestMonitoring(
onchain_balance_proof=partner_signed_balance_proof,
reward_amount=TokenAmount(55))
request_monitoring.sign(non_closing_signer)
# usually not a property of RequestMonitoring, but added for convenience in these tests
request_monitoring.non_closing_signer = to_checksum_address( # type: ignore
non_closing_signer.address)
return request_monitoring
def f(amount=1, nonce=1):
balance_proof = make_balance_proof(signer=signer,
amount=amount,
nonce=nonce)
partner_signed_balance_proof = SignedBlindedBalanceProof.from_balance_proof_signed_state(
balance_proof, )
request_monitoring = RequestMonitoring(
onchain_balance_proof=partner_signed_balance_proof,
reward_amount=55,
)
request_monitoring.sign(non_closing_signer)
request_monitoring.non_closing_signer = to_checksum_address(
non_closing_signer.address)
return request_monitoring
def get_request_monitoring(
self, balance_proof: HashedBalanceProof, reward_amount: TokenAmount
) -> RequestMonitoring:
"""Get RequestMonitoring (as sent by the client) message for a given balance proof."""
assert balance_proof.signature
non_closing_signer = LocalSigner(decode_hex(self.privkey))
partner_signed_balance_proof = SignedBlindedBalanceProof(
channel_identifier=balance_proof.channel_identifier,
token_network_address=decode_hex(balance_proof.token_network_address),
nonce=balance_proof.nonce,
additional_hash=decode_hex(balance_proof.additional_hash),
chain_id=balance_proof.chain_id,
signature=decode_hex(balance_proof.signature),
balance_hash=decode_hex(balance_proof.balance_hash),
)
request_monitoring = RequestMonitoring(
onchain_balance_proof=partner_signed_balance_proof, reward_amount=reward_amount
)
request_monitoring.sign(non_closing_signer)
return request_monitoring
def test_request_monitoring():
partner_signer = LocalSigner(PARTNER_PRIVKEY)
balance_proof = make_balance_proof(signer=partner_signer, amount=1)
partner_signed_balance_proof = SignedBlindedBalanceProof.from_balance_proof_signed_state(
balance_proof, )
request_monitoring = RequestMonitoring(
onchain_balance_proof=partner_signed_balance_proof,
reward_amount=55,
)
assert request_monitoring
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
request_monitoring.to_dict()
request_monitoring.sign(signer)
as_dict = request_monitoring.to_dict()
assert RequestMonitoring.from_dict(as_dict) == request_monitoring
packed = request_monitoring.pack(request_monitoring.packed())
assert RequestMonitoring.unpack(packed) == request_monitoring
# RequestMonitoring can be created directly from BalanceProofSignedState
direct_created = RequestMonitoring.from_balance_proof_signed_state(
balance_proof,
reward_amount=55,
)
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
# equality test uses `validated` packed format
assert direct_created == request_monitoring
direct_created.sign(signer)
# Instances created from same balance proof are equal
assert direct_created == request_monitoring
other_balance_proof = make_balance_proof(signer=partner_signer, amount=2)
other_instance = RequestMonitoring.from_balance_proof_signed_state(
other_balance_proof,
reward_amount=55,
)
other_instance.sign(signer)
# different balance proof ==> non-equality
assert other_instance != request_monitoring
# test signature verification
reward_proof_data = pack_reward_proof(
request_monitoring.balance_proof.channel_identifier,
request_monitoring.reward_amount,
request_monitoring.balance_proof.token_network_address,
request_monitoring.balance_proof.chain_id,
request_monitoring.balance_proof.nonce,
)
assert recover(reward_proof_data,
request_monitoring.reward_proof_signature) == ADDRESS
blinded_data = pack_balance_proof_update(
nonce=request_monitoring.balance_proof.nonce,
balance_hash=request_monitoring.balance_proof.balance_hash,
additional_hash=request_monitoring.balance_proof.additional_hash,
canonical_identifier=CanonicalIdentifier(
chain_identifier=request_monitoring.balance_proof.chain_id,
token_network_address=request_monitoring.balance_proof.
token_network_address,
channel_identifier=request_monitoring.balance_proof.
channel_identifier,
),
partner_signature=request_monitoring.balance_proof.signature,
)
assert recover(blinded_data,
request_monitoring.non_closing_signature) == ADDRESS
balance_proof_data = pack_balance_proof(
nonce=request_monitoring.balance_proof.nonce,
balance_hash=request_monitoring.balance_proof.balance_hash,
additional_hash=request_monitoring.balance_proof.additional_hash,
canonical_identifier=CanonicalIdentifier(
chain_identifier=request_monitoring.balance_proof.chain_id,
token_network_address=request_monitoring.balance_proof.
token_network_address,
channel_identifier=request_monitoring.balance_proof.
channel_identifier,
),
)
assert recover(
balance_proof_data,
request_monitoring.balance_proof.signature,
) == PARTNER_ADDRESS
assert request_monitoring.verify_request_monitoring(
PARTNER_ADDRESS, ADDRESS)
def test_tamper_request_monitoring():
""" This test shows ways, how the current implementation of the RequestMonitoring's
signature scheme might be used by an attacker to tamper with the BalanceProof that is
incorporated in the RequestMonitoring message, if not all three signatures are verified."""
properties = factories.BalanceProofSignedStateProperties(
pkey=PARTNER_PRIVKEY)
balance_proof = factories.create(properties)
partner_signed_balance_proof = SignedBlindedBalanceProof.from_balance_proof_signed_state(
balance_proof)
request_monitoring = RequestMonitoring(
onchain_balance_proof=partner_signed_balance_proof, reward_amount=55)
request_monitoring.sign(signer)
# This is the signature, that is supposed to authenticate the message that a monitoring
# service receives from a node. Note: It is generated on a valid Balance proof here and reused
# to authenticate invalid messages throughout the rest of the test.
exploited_signature = request_monitoring.reward_proof_signature
reward_proof_data = pack_reward_proof(
canonical_identifier=factories.make_canonical_identifier(
chain_identifier=request_monitoring.balance_proof.chain_id,
token_network_address=request_monitoring.balance_proof.
token_network_address,
channel_identifier=request_monitoring.balance_proof.
channel_identifier,
),
reward_amount=request_monitoring.reward_amount,
nonce=request_monitoring.balance_proof.nonce,
)
# An attacker might change the balance hash
partner_signed_balance_proof.balance_hash = "tampered".encode()
tampered_balance_hash_request_monitoring = RequestMonitoring(
onchain_balance_proof=partner_signed_balance_proof, reward_amount=55)
tampered_bp = tampered_balance_hash_request_monitoring.balance_proof
tampered_balance_hash_reward_proof_data = pack_reward_proof(
canonical_identifier=factories.make_canonical_identifier(
chain_identifier=tampered_bp.chain_id,
token_network_address=tampered_bp.token_network_address,
channel_identifier=tampered_bp.channel_identifier,
),
reward_amount=tampered_balance_hash_request_monitoring.reward_amount,
nonce=tampered_balance_hash_request_monitoring.balance_proof.nonce,
)
# The signature works/is unaffected by that change...
recovered_address_tampered = recover(
tampered_balance_hash_reward_proof_data, exploited_signature)
assert recover(reward_proof_data,
exploited_signature) == recovered_address_tampered
assert recover(tampered_balance_hash_reward_proof_data,
exploited_signature) == ADDRESS
# ...but overall verification fails
assert not tampered_balance_hash_request_monitoring.verify_request_monitoring(
PARTNER_ADDRESS, ADDRESS)
# An attacker might change the additional_hash
partner_signed_balance_proof.additional_hash = "tampered".encode()
tampered_additional_hash_request_monitoring = RequestMonitoring(
onchain_balance_proof=partner_signed_balance_proof, reward_amount=55)
tampered_bp = tampered_additional_hash_request_monitoring.balance_proof
tampered_additional_hash_reward_proof_data = pack_reward_proof(
canonical_identifier=factories.make_canonical_identifier(
chain_identifier=tampered_bp.chain_id,
token_network_address=tampered_bp.token_network_address,
channel_identifier=tampered_bp.channel_identifier,
),
reward_amount=tampered_additional_hash_request_monitoring.
reward_amount,
nonce=tampered_additional_hash_request_monitoring.balance_proof.nonce,
)
# The signature works/is unaffected by that change...
recovered_address_tampered = recover(
tampered_additional_hash_reward_proof_data, exploited_signature)
assert recover(reward_proof_data,
exploited_signature) == recovered_address_tampered
assert recovered_address_tampered == ADDRESS
# ...but overall verification fails
assert not tampered_balance_hash_request_monitoring.verify_request_monitoring(
PARTNER_ADDRESS, ADDRESS)
# An attacker can change the non_closing_signature
partner_signed_balance_proof.non_closing_signature = "tampered".encode()
tampered_non_closing_signature_request_monitoring = RequestMonitoring(
onchain_balance_proof=partner_signed_balance_proof, reward_amount=55)
tampered_bp = tampered_non_closing_signature_request_monitoring.balance_proof
tampered_non_closing_signature_reward_proof_data = pack_reward_proof(
canonical_identifier=factories.make_canonical_identifier(
chain_identifier=tampered_bp.chain_id,
token_network_address=tampered_bp.token_network_address,
channel_identifier=tampered_bp.channel_identifier,
),
reward_amount=tampered_non_closing_signature_request_monitoring.
reward_amount,
nonce=tampered_non_closing_signature_request_monitoring.balance_proof.
nonce,
)
# The signature works/is unaffected by that change...
recovered_address_tampered = recover(
tampered_non_closing_signature_reward_proof_data, exploited_signature)
assert recover(reward_proof_data,
exploited_signature) == recovered_address_tampered
assert recovered_address_tampered == ADDRESS
# ...but overall verification fails
assert not tampered_non_closing_signature_request_monitoring.verify_request_monitoring(
PARTNER_ADDRESS, ADDRESS)