def fractional_CRT_split(residues, ps_roots, K, BI_coordinates = None):
if K is QQ:
return fractional_CRT_QQ(residues, ps_roots);
OK = K.ring_of_integers();
BOK = OK.basis();
residues_ZZ = [ r.lift() for r in residues];
primes = [p for p, _ in ps_roots];
lift = CRT_list(residues_ZZ, primes);
lift_coordinates = OK.coordinates(lift);
if BI_coordinates is None:
p_ideals = [ OK.ideal(p, K.gen() - root) for p, root in ps_roots ];
I = prod(p_ideals);
BI = I.basis(); # basis as a ZZ-module
BI_coordinates = [ OK.coordinates(b) for b in BI ];
M = Matrix(Integers(), [ [ kronecker_delta(i,j) for j,_ in enumerate(BOK) ] + [ lift_coordinates[i] ] + [ b[i] for b in BI_coordinates ] for i in range(len(BOK)) ])
# v = short_vector
Kernel_Basis = Matrix(Integers(), M.transpose().kernel().basis())
v =Kernel_Basis.LLL()[0];
#print v[:len(BOK)]
if v[len(BOK)] == 0:
return 0;
return (-1/v[len(BOK)]) * sum( v[i] * b for i, b in enumerate(BOK));
def attack(p, t, a, B):
"""
Solves the hidden number problem using an attack based on the shortest vector problem.
The hidden number problem is defined as finding y such that {x_i - t_i * y + a_i = 0 mod p}.
More information: Breitner J., Heninger N., "Biased Nonce Sense: Lattice Attacks against Weak ECDSA Signatures in Cryptocurrencies"
:param p: the modulus
:param t: the t_i values
:param a: the a_i values
:param B: a bound on the x values
:return: a tuple containing y, and a list of x values
"""
assert len(t) == len(a), "t and a lists should be of equal length."
m = len(t)
M = Matrix(QQ, m + 2, m + 2)
for i in range(m):
M[i, i] = p
M[m] = t + [B / QQ(p), 0]
M[m + 1] = list(map(lambda x: x - B // 2, a)) + [0, B]
L = M.LLL()
for row in L.rows():
y = (int(row[m] * p) // B) % p
if y != 0 and row[m + 1] == B:
return int(y), list(map(lambda x: int(x + B // 2), row[:m]))
def modular_univariate(f, N, m, t, X, early_return=True):
"""
Computes small modular roots of a univariate polynomial.
More information: May A., "New RSA Vulnerabilities Using Lattice Reduction Methods (Section 3.2)"
:param f: the polynomial
:param N: the modulus
:param m: the amount of g shifts to use
:param t: the amount of h shifts to use
:param X: an approximate bound on the roots
:param early_return: try to return as early as possible (default: true)
:return: a generator generating small roots of the polynomial
"""
f = f.monic().change_ring(ZZ)
x = f.parent().gen()
d = f.degree()
B = Matrix(ZZ, d * m + t)
row = 0
logging.debug("Generating g shifts...")
for i in range(m):
for j in range(d):
g = x**j * N**(m - i) * f**i
for col in range(row + 1):
B[row, col] = g(x * X)[col]
row += 1
logging.debug("Generating h shifts...")
for i in range(t):
h = x**i * f**m
h = h(x * X)
for col in range(row + 1):
B[row, col] = h[col]
row += 1
logging.debug("Executing the LLL algorithm...")
B = B.LLL()
logging.debug("Reconstructing polynomials...")
for row in range(B.nrows()):
new_polynomial = 0
for col in range(B.ncols()):
new_polynomial += B[row, col] * x**col
if new_polynomial.is_constant():
continue
new_polynomial = new_polynomial(x / X).change_ring(ZZ)
for x0, _ in new_polynomial.roots():
yield int(x0)
if early_return:
# Assuming that the first "good" polynomial in the lattice doesn't provide roots, we return.
return
def dsa_known_middle(n, signature1, signature2, nonce_bitsize, msb_unknown,
lsb_unknown):
"""
Recovers the (EC)DSA private key and nonces if the middle nonce bits are known.
This is a heuristic extension which might perform worse than the methods to solve the Extended Hidden Number Problem
More information: De Micheli G., Heninger N., "Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example" (Section 5.2.3)
:param n: the modulus
:param signature1: the first signature (a tuple of the message (hash), the r value, the s value, and the known middle bits)
:param signature2: the second signature (a tuple of the message (hash), the r value, the s value, and the known middle bits)
:param nonce_bitsize: the amount of bits of the nonces
:param msb_unknown: the amount of unknown most significant bits of the nonces
:param lsb_unknown: the amount of unknown least significant bits of the nonces
:return: a tuple containing the private key, the nonce of the first signature, and the nonce of the second signature
"""
unknown = max(msb_unknown, lsb_unknown)
K = 2**unknown
l = nonce_bitsize - msb_unknown
h1, r1, s1, a1 = signature1
h2, r2, s2, a2 = signature2
t = -(pow(s1, -1, n) * s2 * r1 * pow(r2, -1, n))
u = pow(s1, -1, n) * r1 * h2 * pow(r2, -1, n) - pow(s1, -1, n) * h1
u_ = 2**lsb_unknown * a1 + 2**lsb_unknown * a2 * t + u
B = Matrix(ZZ, 5)
B[0] = vector(ZZ, [K, K * 2**l, K * t, K * t * 2**l, u_])
B[1] = vector(ZZ, [0, K * n, 0, 0, 0])
B[2] = vector(ZZ, [0, 0, K * n, 0, 0])
B[3] = vector(ZZ, [0, 0, 0, K * n, 0])
B[4] = vector(ZZ, [0, 0, 0, 0, K * n])
B = B.LLL()
M = Matrix(ZZ, 4)
v = []
for row, vec in enumerate(B[:4]):
M[row] = vec[:4].apply_map(lambda x: x // K)
v.append(-vec[4])
x1, y1, x2, y2 = M.solve_right(vector(ZZ, v))
k1 = 2**l * y1 + 2**lsb_unknown * a1 + x1
k2 = 2**l * y2 + 2**lsb_unknown * a2 + x2
private_key1 = pow(r1, -1, n) * (s1 * k1 - h1) % n
private_key2 = pow(r2, -1, n) * (s2 * k2 - h2) % n
assert private_key1 == private_key2
return int(private_key1), int(k1), int(k2)
def attack(n, e):
"""
Recovers the prime factors of a modulus and the private exponent if the private exponent is too small.
More information: Nguyen P. Q., "Public-Key Cryptanalysis"
:param n: the modulus
:param e: the public exponent
:return: a tuple containing the prime factors of the modulus and the private exponent, or None if the private exponent was not found
"""
s = isqrt(n)
lattice = Matrix([[e, s], [n, 0]])
basis = lattice.LLL()
for row in basis.rows():
d = row[1] // s
k = abs(row[0] - e * d) // n
d = abs(d)
phi = (e * d - 1) // k
factors = known_phi.factorize(n, phi)
if factors:
return *factors, d
def modular_bivariate(p, modulus, m, t, xbound, ybound, early_return=True):
"""
Computes small modular roots of a bivariate polynomial.
More information: Herrmann M., May A., "Maximizing Small Root Bounds by Linearization and Applications to Small Secret Exponent RSA"
:param p: the polynomial
:param modulus: the modulus
:param m: the amount of normal shifts to use
:param t: the amount of additional shifts to use
:param xbound: an approximate bound on the x roots
:param ybound: an approximate bound on the y roots
:param early_return: try to return as early as possible (default: true)
:return: a generator generating small roots (tuples of x and y roots) of the polynomial
"""
pr = ZZ["u, x, y"]
u, x, y = pr.gens()
qr = pr.quotient(x * y + 1 - u)
p = qr(p).lift()
ubound = xbound * ybound
shifts = set()
monomials = set()
logging.debug("Generating x shifts...")
for k in range(m + 1):
for i in range(m - k + 1):
shift = x**i * p**k * modulus**(m - k)
shifts.add(shift)
for monomial in shift.monomials():
monomials.add(monomial)
logging.debug("Generating y shifts...")
for j in range(1, t + 1):
for k in range(m // t * j, m + 1):
shift = y**j * p**k * modulus**(m - k)
shift = qr(shift).lift()
shifts.add(shift)
monomial = u**k * y**j
monomials.add(monomial)
shifts = sorted(shifts)
monomials = sorted(monomials)
logging.debug(f"Filling the lattice ({len(shifts)} x {len(monomials)})...")
lattice = Matrix(len(shifts), len(monomials))
for row, shift in enumerate(shifts):
for col, monomial in enumerate(monomials):
lattice[row,
col] = shift.monomial_coefficient(monomial) * monomial(
ubound, xbound, ybound)
logging.debug("Executing the LLL algorithm...")
basis = lattice.LLL()
logging.debug("Reconstructing polynomials...")
v, w = ZZ["v, w"].gens()
new_polynomials = []
for row in range(basis.nrows()):
# Reconstruct the polynomial from reduced basis
new_polynomial = 0
for col, monomial in enumerate(monomials):
new_polynomial += basis[row, col] * monomial(
v * w + 1, v, w) // monomial(ubound, xbound, ybound)
new_polynomials.append(new_polynomial)
logging.debug("Generating resultants...")
for p1 in new_polynomials:
for p2 in new_polynomials:
resultant = p1.resultant(p2, w)
if not resultant.is_constant():
for vroot, _ in resultant.univariate_polynomial().roots():
vroot = int(vroot)
p = p1.subs({v: vroot})
if not p.is_constant():
for wroot, _ in p.univariate_polynomial().roots():
wroot = int(wroot)
yield vroot, wroot
if early_return:
return