def create_signup_info(cls,
originator_public_key_hash,
nonce):
with cls._lock:
# First we need to create a public/private key pair for the PoET
# enclave to use.
# Counter ID is a placeholder for a hardware counter in a TEE.
poet_private_key = Secp256k1PrivateKey.new_random()
poet_public_key = \
cls._context.get_public_key(poet_private_key)
counter_id = None
# Simulate sealing (encrypting) the signup data.
signup_data = {
'poet_private_key': poet_private_key.as_hex(),
'poet_public_key': poet_public_key.as_hex(),
'counter_id': counter_id
}
sealed_signup_data = \
base64.b64encode(
dict2json(signup_data).encode()).decode('utf-8')
# Build up a fake SGX quote containing:
# 1. The basename
# 2. The report body that contains:
# a. The enclave measurement
# b. The report data SHA256(SHA256(OPK)|PPK)
sgx_basename = \
sgx_structs.SgxBasename(name=cls.__VALID_BASENAME__)
sgx_measurement = \
sgx_structs.SgxMeasurement(
m=cls.__VALID_ENCLAVE_MEASUREMENT__)
hash_input = \
'{0}{1}'.format(
originator_public_key_hash.upper(),
poet_public_key.as_hex().upper()).encode()
report_data = hashlib.sha256(hash_input).digest()
sgx_report_data = sgx_structs.SgxReportData(d=report_data)
sgx_report_body = \
sgx_structs.SgxReportBody(
mr_enclave=sgx_measurement,
report_data=sgx_report_data)
sgx_quote = \
sgx_structs.SgxQuote(
basename=sgx_basename,
report_body=sgx_report_body)
# Create a fake PSE manifest. A base64 encoding of the
# originator public key hash should suffice.
pse_manifest = \
base64.b64encode(originator_public_key_hash.encode())
timestamp = datetime.datetime.now().isoformat()
# Fake our "proof" data.
verification_report = {
'epidPseudonym': cls._anti_sybil_id,
'id': base64.b64encode(
hashlib.sha256(
timestamp.encode()).hexdigest().encode()).decode(),
'isvEnclaveQuoteStatus': 'OK',
'isvEnclaveQuoteBody':
base64.b64encode(sgx_quote.serialize_to_bytes()).decode(),
'pseManifestStatus': 'OK',
'pseManifestHash':
hashlib.sha256(base64.b64decode(pse_manifest)).hexdigest(),
'nonce': nonce,
'timestamp': timestamp
}
# Serialize the verification report, sign it, and then put
# in the proof data
verification_report_json = dict2json(verification_report)
signature = \
cls._report_private_key.sign(
verification_report_json.encode(),
padding.PKCS1v15(),
hashes.SHA256())
proof_data_dict = {
'evidence_payload': {
'pse_manifest': pse_manifest.decode()
},
'verification_report': verification_report_json,
'signature': base64.b64encode(signature).decode()
}
proof_data = dict2json(proof_data_dict)
return \
EnclaveSignupInfo(
poet_public_key=signup_data['poet_public_key'],
proof_data=proof_data,
anti_sybil_id=cls._anti_sybil_id,
sealed_signup_data=sealed_signup_data)
def _verify_signup_info(self, signup_info, originator_public_key_hash,
val_reg_payload, context):
# Verify the attestation verification report signature
proof_data_dict = json.loads(signup_info.proof_data)
verification_report = proof_data_dict.get('verification_report')
if verification_report is None:
raise ValueError('Verification report is missing from proof data')
signature = proof_data_dict.get('signature')
if signature is None:
raise ValueError('Signature is missing from proof data')
# Try to get the report key from the configuration setting. If it
# is not there or we cannot parse it, fail verification.
try:
report_public_key_pem = \
_get_config_setting(
context=context,
key='sawtooth.poet.report_public_key_pem')
report_public_key = \
serialization.load_pem_public_key(
report_public_key_pem.encode(),
backend=backends.default_backend())
except KeyError:
raise \
ValueError(
'Report public key configuration setting '
'(sawtooth.poet.report_public_key_pem) not found.')
except (TypeError, ValueError) as error:
raise ValueError('Failed to parse public key: {}'.format(error))
# Retrieve the valid enclave measurement values, converting the comma-
# delimited list. If it is not there, or fails to parse correctly,
# fail verification.
try:
valid_measurements = \
_get_config_setting(
context=context,
key='sawtooth.poet.valid_enclave_measurements')
valid_enclave_mesaurements = \
[bytes.fromhex(m) for m in valid_measurements.split(',')]
except KeyError:
raise \
ValueError(
'Valid enclave measurements configuration setting '
'(sawtooth.poet.valid_enclave_measurements) not found.')
except ValueError as error:
raise \
ValueError(
'Failed to parse enclave measurement: {}'.format(
valid_measurements))
# Retrieve the valid enclave basename value. If it is not there, or
# fails to parse correctly, fail verification.
try:
valid_basenames = \
_get_config_setting(
context=context,
key='sawtooth.poet.valid_enclave_basenames')
valid_enclave_basenames = \
[bytes.fromhex(b) for b in valid_basenames.split(',')]
except KeyError:
raise \
ValueError(
'Valid enclave basenames configuration setting '
'(sawtooth.poet.valid_enclave_basenames) not found.')
except ValueError:
raise \
ValueError(
'Failed to parse enclave basename: {}'.format(
valid_basenames))
try:
report_public_key.verify(base64.b64decode(signature.encode()),
verification_report.encode(),
padding.PKCS1v15(), hashes.SHA256())
except InvalidSignature:
raise ValueError('Verification report signature is invalid')
verification_report_dict = json.loads(verification_report)
# Verify that the verification report contains an ID field
if 'id' not in verification_report_dict:
raise ValueError('Verification report does not contain an ID')
# Verify that the verification report contains an EPID pseudonym and
# that it matches the anti-Sybil ID
epid_pseudonym = verification_report_dict.get('epidPseudonym')
if epid_pseudonym is None:
raise \
ValueError(
'Verification report does not contain an EPID pseudonym')
if epid_pseudonym != signup_info.anti_sybil_id:
raise \
ValueError(
'The anti-Sybil ID in the verification report [{0}] does '
'not match the one contained in the signup information '
'[{1}]'.format(
epid_pseudonym,
signup_info.anti_sybil_id))
# Verify that the verification report contains a PSE manifest status
# and it is OK
pse_manifest_status = \
verification_report_dict.get('pseManifestStatus')
if pse_manifest_status is None:
raise \
ValueError(
'Verification report does not contain a PSE manifest '
'status')
if pse_manifest_status.upper() != 'OK':
if pse_manifest_status.upper() == 'OUT_OF_DATE':
LOGGER.warning(
'Peer has out of date (but not revoked)'
' hardware, pseManifestStatus: %s', pse_manifest_status)
else:
raise \
ValueError(
'PSE manifest status is {} (i.e., not OK)'.format(
pse_manifest_status))
# Verify that the verification report contains a PSE manifest hash
pse_manifest_hash = \
verification_report_dict.get('pseManifestHash')
if pse_manifest_hash is None:
raise \
ValueError(
'Verification report does not contain a PSE manifest '
'hash')
# Verify that the proof data contains evidence payload
evidence_payload = proof_data_dict.get('evidence_payload')
if evidence_payload is None:
raise ValueError('Evidence payload is missing from proof data')
# Verify that the evidence payload contains a PSE manifest and then
# use it to make sure that the PSE manifest hash is what we expect
pse_manifest = evidence_payload.get('pse_manifest')
if pse_manifest is None:
raise ValueError('Evidence payload does not include PSE manifest')
expected_pse_manifest_hash = \
hashlib.sha256(
base64.b64decode(pse_manifest.encode())).hexdigest()
if pse_manifest_hash.upper() != expected_pse_manifest_hash.upper():
raise \
ValueError(
'PSE manifest hash {0} does not match {1}'.format(
pse_manifest_hash,
expected_pse_manifest_hash))
# Verify that the verification report contains an enclave quote and
# that its status is OK
enclave_quote_status = \
verification_report_dict.get('isvEnclaveQuoteStatus')
if enclave_quote_status is None:
raise \
ValueError(
'Verification report does not contain an enclave quote '
'status')
if enclave_quote_status.upper() != 'OK':
if enclave_quote_status.upper() == 'GROUP_OUT_OF_DATE':
LOGGER.warning(
'Peer has out of date (but not revoked)'
' hardware, isvEnclaveQuoteStatus: %s',
str(enclave_quote_status))
else:
raise \
ValueError(
'Enclave quote status is {} (i.e., not OK)'.format(
enclave_quote_status))
# Verify that the verification report contains an enclave quote
enclave_quote = verification_report_dict.get('isvEnclaveQuoteBody')
if enclave_quote is None:
raise \
ValueError(
'Verification report does not contain an enclave quote')
# The ISV enclave quote body is base 64 encoded, so decode it and then
# create an SGX quote structure from it so we can inspect
sgx_quote = sgx_structs.SgxQuote()
sgx_quote.parse_from_bytes(base64.b64decode(enclave_quote))
# The report body should be SHA256(SHA256(OPK)|PPK)
#
# NOTE - since the code that created the report data is in the enclave
# code, this code needs to be kept in sync with it. Any changes to how
# the report data is created, needs to be reflected in how we re-create
# the report data for verification.
hash_input = \
'{0}{1}'.format(
originator_public_key_hash.upper(),
signup_info.poet_public_key.upper()).encode()
hash_value = hashlib.sha256(hash_input).digest()
expected_report_data = \
hash_value + \
(b'\x00' *
(sgx_structs.SgxReportData.STRUCT_SIZE - len(hash_value)))
if sgx_quote.report_body.report_data.d != expected_report_data:
raise \
ValueError(
'AVR report data [{0}] not equal to [{1}]'.format(
sgx_quote.report_body.report_data.d.hex(),
expected_report_data.hex()))
# Verify that the enclave measurement is in the list of valid
# enclave measurements.
if sgx_quote.report_body.mr_enclave.m not in \
valid_enclave_mesaurements:
raise \
ValueError(
'AVR enclave measurement [{}] not in list of valid '
'enclave measurements [{}]'.format(
sgx_quote.report_body.mr_enclave.m.hex(),
valid_measurements))
# Verify that the enclave basename is in the list of valid
# enclave basenames
if sgx_quote.basename.name not in valid_enclave_basenames:
raise \
ValueError(
'AVR enclave basename [{}] not in list of valid '
'enclave basenames [{}]'.format(
sgx_quote.basename.name.hex(),
valid_basenames))
# Verify that the nonce in the verification report matches the nonce
# in the transaction payload submitted
nonce = verification_report_dict.get('nonce', '')
if nonce != val_reg_payload.signup_info.nonce:
raise \
ValueError(
'AVR nonce [{0}] does not match signup info nonce '
'[{1}]'.format(
nonce,
val_reg_payload.signup_info.nonce))
def test_invalid_enclave_body(self):
"""
Test that a transaction whose enclave_body is invalid returns an
invalid transaction.
"""
signup_info = self.factory.create_signup_info(
self.factory.pubkey_hash, "000")
proof_data = signup_info.proof_data
proof_data_dict = json.loads(proof_data)
# ------------------------------------------------------
# No isvEnclaveQuoteStatus
verification_report = \
json.loads(proof_data_dict["verification_report"])
enclave_status = verification_report["isvEnclaveQuoteStatus"]
verification_report["isvEnclaveQuoteStatus"] = None
signup_info.proof_data = \
self.factory.create_proof_data(
verification_report=verification_report,
evidence_payload=proof_data_dict.get('evidence_payload'))
self._test_bad_signup_info(signup_info)
# ------------------------------------------------------
# Bad isvEnclaveQuoteStatus
verification_report = \
json.loads(proof_data_dict["verification_report"])
verification_report["isvEnclaveQuoteStatus"] = "Bad"
signup_info.proof_data = \
self.factory.create_proof_data(
verification_report=verification_report,
evidence_payload=proof_data_dict.get('evidence_payload'))
self._test_bad_signup_info(signup_info)
# ------------------------------------------------------
# No isvEnclaveQuoteBody
verification_report = \
json.loads(proof_data_dict["verification_report"])
verification_report["isvEnclaveQuoteStatus"] = enclave_status
verification_report['isvEnclaveQuoteBody'] = None
signup_info.proof_data = \
self.factory.create_proof_data(
verification_report=verification_report,
evidence_payload=proof_data_dict.get('evidence_payload'))
self._test_bad_signup_info(signup_info)
# ------------------------------------------------------
# Malformed isvEnclaveQuoteBody (decode the enclave quote, chop off
# the last byte, and re-encode)
verification_report = \
json.loads(proof_data_dict["verification_report"])
verification_report['isvEnclaveQuoteBody'] = \
base64.b64encode(
base64.b64decode(
verification_report['isvEnclaveQuoteBody'].encode())[1:])\
.decode()
signup_info.proof_data = \
self.factory.create_proof_data(
verification_report=verification_report,
evidence_payload=proof_data_dict.get('evidence_payload'))
self._test_bad_signup_info(signup_info)
# ------------------------------------------------------
# Invalid basename
verification_report = \
json.loads(proof_data_dict["verification_report"])
sgx_quote = sgx_structs.SgxQuote()
sgx_quote.parse_from_bytes(
base64.b64decode(
verification_report['isvEnclaveQuoteBody'].encode()))
sgx_quote.basename.name = \
b'\xCC' * sgx_structs.SgxBasename.STRUCT_SIZE
verification_report['isvEnclaveQuoteBody'] = \
base64.b64encode(sgx_quote.serialize_to_bytes()).decode()
signup_info.proof_data = \
self.factory.create_proof_data(
verification_report=verification_report,
evidence_payload=proof_data_dict.get('evidence_payload'))
self._test_bad_signup_info(signup_info)
# ------------------------------------------------------
# Report data is not valid (bad OPK hash)
verification_report = \
json.loads(proof_data_dict["verification_report"])
sgx_quote = sgx_structs.SgxQuote()
sgx_quote.parse_from_bytes(
base64.b64decode(
verification_report['isvEnclaveQuoteBody'].encode()))
hash_input = \
'{0}{1}'.format(
'Not a valid OPK Hash',
self.factory.poet_public_key).upper().encode()
sgx_quote.report_body.report_data.d = \
hashlib.sha256(hash_input).digest()
verification_report['isvEnclaveQuoteBody'] = \
base64.b64encode(sgx_quote.serialize_to_bytes()).decode()
signup_info.proof_data = \
self.factory.create_proof_data(
verification_report=verification_report,
evidence_payload=proof_data_dict.get('evidence_payload'))
self._test_bad_signup_info(signup_info)
# ------------------------------------------------------
# Report data is not valid (bad PPK)
verification_report = \
json.loads(proof_data_dict["verification_report"])
sgx_quote = sgx_structs.SgxQuote()
sgx_quote.parse_from_bytes(
base64.b64decode(
verification_report['isvEnclaveQuoteBody'].encode()))
hash_input = \
'{0}{1}'.format(
self.factory.pubkey_hash,
"Not a valid PPK").encode()
sgx_quote.report_body.report_data.d = \
hashlib.sha256(hash_input).digest()
verification_report['isvEnclaveQuoteBody'] = \
base64.b64encode(sgx_quote.serialize_to_bytes()).decode()
signup_info.proof_data = \
self.factory.create_proof_data(
verification_report=verification_report,
evidence_payload=proof_data_dict.get('evidence_payload'))
self._test_bad_signup_info(signup_info)
# ------------------------------------------------------
# Invalid enclave measurement
verification_report = \
json.loads(proof_data_dict["verification_report"])
sgx_quote = sgx_structs.SgxQuote()
sgx_quote.parse_from_bytes(
base64.b64decode(
verification_report['isvEnclaveQuoteBody'].encode()))
sgx_quote.report_body.mr_enclave.m = \
b'\xCC' * sgx_structs.SgxMeasurement.STRUCT_SIZE
verification_report['isvEnclaveQuoteBody'] = \
base64.b64encode(sgx_quote.serialize_to_bytes()).decode()
signup_info.proof_data = \
self.factory.create_proof_data(
verification_report=verification_report,
evidence_payload=proof_data_dict.get('evidence_payload'))
self._test_bad_signup_info(signup_info)
def verify_signup_info(self, signup_info, originator_public_key_hash,
most_recent_wait_certificate_id):
# Verify the attestation verification report signature
proof_data_dict = json.loads(signup_info.proof_data)
verification_report = proof_data_dict.get('verification_report')
if verification_report is None:
raise ValueError('Verification report is missing from proof data')
signature = proof_data_dict.get('signature')
if signature is None:
raise ValueError('Signature is missing from proof data')
try:
self._report_public_key.verify(
base64.b64decode(signature.encode()),
verification_report.encode(), padding.PKCS1v15(),
hashes.SHA256())
except InvalidSignature:
raise ValueError('Verification report signature is invalid')
verification_report_dict = json.loads(verification_report)
# Verify that the verification report contains an ID field
if 'id' not in verification_report_dict:
raise ValueError('Verification report does not contain an ID')
# Verify that the verification report contains an EPID pseudonym and
# that it matches the anti-Sybil ID
epid_pseudonym = verification_report_dict.get('epidPseudonym')
if epid_pseudonym is None:
raise \
ValueError(
'Verification report does not contain an EPID pseudonym')
if epid_pseudonym != signup_info.anti_sybil_id:
raise \
ValueError(
'The anti-Sybil ID in the verification report [{0}] does '
'not match the one contained in the signup information '
'[{1}]'.format(
epid_pseudonym,
signup_info.anti_sybil_id))
# Verify that the verification report contains a PSE manifest status
# and it is OK
pse_manifest_status = \
verification_report_dict.get('pseManifestStatus')
if pse_manifest_status is None:
raise \
ValueError(
'Verification report does not contain a PSE manifest '
'status')
if pse_manifest_status.upper() != 'OK':
raise \
ValueError(
'PSE manifest status is {} (i.e., not OK)'.format(
pse_manifest_status))
# Verify that the verification report contains a PSE manifest hash
pse_manifest_hash = \
verification_report_dict.get('pseManifestHash')
if pse_manifest_hash is None:
raise \
ValueError(
'Verification report does not contain a PSE manifest '
'hash')
# Verify that the proof data contains evidence payload
evidence_payload = proof_data_dict.get('evidence_payload')
if evidence_payload is None:
raise ValueError('Evidence payload is missing from proof data')
# Verify that the evidence payload contains a PSE manifest and then
# use it to make sure that the PSE manifest hash is what we expect
pse_manifest = evidence_payload.get('pse_manifest')
if pse_manifest is None:
raise ValueError('Evidence payload does not include PSE manifest')
expected_pse_manifest_hash = \
base64.b64encode(
hashlib.sha256(
pse_manifest.encode()).hexdigest().encode()).decode()
if pse_manifest_hash.upper() != expected_pse_manifest_hash.upper():
raise \
ValueError(
'PSE manifest hash {0} does not match {1}'.format(
pse_manifest_hash,
expected_pse_manifest_hash))
# Verify that the verification report contains an enclave quote and
# that its status is OK
enclave_quote_status = \
verification_report_dict.get('isvEnclaveQuoteStatus')
if enclave_quote_status is None:
raise \
ValueError(
'Verification report does not contain an enclave quote '
'status')
if enclave_quote_status.upper() != 'OK':
raise \
ValueError(
'Enclave quote status is {} (i.e., not OK)'.format(
enclave_quote_status))
# Verify that the verification report contains an enclave quote
enclave_quote = verification_report_dict.get('isvEnclaveQuoteBody')
if enclave_quote is None:
raise \
ValueError(
'Verification report does not contain an enclave quote')
# The ISV enclave quote body is base 64 encoded, so decode it and then
# create an SGX quote structure from it so we can inspect
sgx_quote = sgx_structs.SgxQuote()
sgx_quote.parse_from_bytes(base64.b64decode(enclave_quote))
# The report body should be SHA256(SHA256(OPK)|PPK)
#
# NOTE - since the code that created the report data is in the enclave
# code, this code needs to be kept in sync with it. Any changes to how
# the report data is created, needs to be reflected in how we re-create
# the report data for verification.
hash_input = \
'{0}{1}'.format(
originator_public_key_hash.upper(),
signup_info.poet_public_key.upper().upper()).encode()
hash_value = hashlib.sha256(hash_input).digest()
expected_report_data = \
hash_value + \
(b'\x00' *
(sgx_structs.SgxReportData.STRUCT_SIZE - len(hash_value)))
if sgx_quote.report_body.report_data.d != expected_report_data:
raise \
ValueError(
'AVR report data [{0}] not equal to [{1}]'.format(
sgx_quote.report_body.report_data.d.hex(),
expected_report_data.hex()))
# Compare the enclave measurement against the expected valid enclave
# measurement.
#
# NOTE - this is only a temporary check. Instead of checking against
# a predefined enclave measurement value, we should be configured with
# a set of one or more enclave measurement values that we will
# consider as valid.
if sgx_quote.report_body.mr_enclave.m != \
self.__VALID_ENCLAVE_MEASUREMENT__:
raise \
ValueError(
'AVR enclave measurement [{0}] not equal to [{1}]'.format(
sgx_quote.report_body.mr_enclave.m.hex(),
self.__VALID_ENCLAVE_MEASUREMENT__.hex()))
# Compare the enclave basename in the verification report against the
# expected enclave basename.
#
# NOTE - this is only a temporary check. Instead of checking against
# a predefined enclave basenme value, we should be configured with a
# set of one or more enclave basenames that we will consider as valid.
if sgx_quote.basename.name != self.__VALID_BASENAME__:
raise \
ValueError(
'AVR enclave basename [{0}] not equal to [{1}]'.format(
sgx_quote.basename.name.hex(),
self.__VALID_BASENAME__.hex()))
# Verify that the wait certificate ID in the verification report
# matches the provided wait certificate ID. The wait certificate ID
# is stored in the nonce field.
nonce = verification_report_dict.get('nonce')
if nonce is None:
raise \
ValueError(
'Verification report does not have a nonce')
def create_signup_info(cls, originator_public_key_hash,
most_recent_wait_certificate_id):
with cls._lock:
# First we need to create a public/private key pair for the PoET
# enclave to use.
cls._poet_private_key = signing.generate_privkey()
cls._poet_public_key = \
signing.generate_pubkey(cls._poet_private_key)
cls._active_wait_timer = None
# We are going to fake out sealing the signup data. Note that
# the signing module uses strings for both private (WIF encoded)
# and public (hex encoded) key canonical formats. Therefore, we
# don't have to encode before putting in the signup data. This
# also means that on the flip side (unsealing signup data and
# verifying signatures using public keys), we don't have to decode
# before using.
signup_data = {
'poet_public_key': cls._poet_public_key,
'poet_private_key': cls._poet_private_key
}
sealed_signup_data = \
base64.b64encode(bytes(dict2json(signup_data).encode()))
# Build up a fake SGX quote containing:
# 1. The basename
# 2. The report body that contains:
# a. The enclave measurement
# b. The report data SHA256(SHA256(OPK)|PPK)
sgx_basename = \
sgx_structs.SgxBasename(name=cls.__VALID_BASENAME__)
sgx_measurement = \
sgx_structs.SgxMeasurement(
m=cls.__VALID_ENCLAVE_MEASUREMENT__)
hash_input = \
'{0}{1}'.format(
originator_public_key_hash.upper(),
cls._poet_public_key.upper()).encode()
report_data = hashlib.sha256(hash_input).digest()
sgx_report_data = sgx_structs.SgxReportData(d=report_data)
sgx_report_body = \
sgx_structs.SgxReportBody(
mr_enclave=sgx_measurement,
report_data=sgx_report_data)
sgx_quote = \
sgx_structs.SgxQuote(
basename=sgx_basename,
report_body=sgx_report_body)
# Create a fake PSE manifest. A base64 encoding of the
# originator public key hash should suffice.
pse_manifest = \
base64.b64encode(originator_public_key_hash.encode())
timestamp = datetime.datetime.now().isoformat()
# Fake our "proof" data.
verification_report = {
'epidPseudonym':
originator_public_key_hash,
'id':
base64.b64encode(
hashlib.sha256(
timestamp.encode()).hexdigest().encode()).decode(),
'isvEnclaveQuoteStatus':
'OK',
'isvEnclaveQuoteBody':
base64.b64encode(sgx_quote.serialize_to_bytes()).decode(),
'pseManifestStatus':
'OK',
'pseManifestHash':
base64.b64encode(
hashlib.sha256(
pse_manifest).hexdigest().encode()).decode(),
'nonce':
most_recent_wait_certificate_id,
'timestamp':
timestamp
}
# Serialize the verification report, sign it, and then put
# in the proof data
verification_report_json = dict2json(verification_report)
signature = \
cls._report_private_key.sign(
verification_report_json.encode(),
padding.PKCS1v15(),
hashes.SHA256())
proof_data_dict = {
'evidence_payload': {
'pse_manifest': pse_manifest.decode()
},
'verification_report': verification_report_json,
'signature': base64.b64encode(signature).decode()
}
proof_data = dict2json(proof_data_dict)
return \
EnclaveSignupInfo(
poet_public_key=signup_data['poet_public_key'],
proof_data=proof_data,
anti_sybil_id=originator_public_key_hash,
sealed_signup_data=sealed_signup_data)
def do_sgx_quote():
sgx_quote = sgx_structs.SgxQuote()
# typedef uint8_t sgx_epid_group_id_t[4];
# typedef uint16_t sgx_isv_svn_t;
# uint16_t version; /* 0 */
# uint16_t sign_type; /* 2 */
# sgx_epid_group_id_t epid_group_id; /* 4 */
# sgx_isv_svn_t qe_svn; /* 8 */
# sgx_isv_svn_t pce_svn; /* 10 */
# uint32_t extended_epid_group_id; /* 12 */
# sgx_basename_t basename; /* 16 */
# sgx_report_body_t report_body; /* 48 */
# uint32_t signature_len; /* 432 */
# uint8_t signature[]; /* 436 */
# Verify sgx_quote unpacks properly
version = 0x0102
sign_type = 0x0304
epid_group_id = create_random_buffer(4)
qe_svn = 0x0506
pce_svn = 0x0708
extended_epid_group_id = 0x090a0b0c
basename = \
create_random_buffer(
sgx_structs.SgxBasename.STRUCT_SIZE)
svn = \
create_random_buffer(
sgx_structs.SgxCpuSvn.STRUCT_SIZE)
misc_select = 0x0d0e0f10
reserved1 = b'\x00' * 28
flags = 0x1112131415161718
xfrm = 0x191a1b1c1d1e1f20
mr_enclave = \
create_random_buffer(
sgx_structs.SgxMeasurement.STRUCT_SIZE)
reserved2 = b'\x00' * 32
mr_signer = \
create_random_buffer(
sgx_structs.SgxMeasurement.STRUCT_SIZE)
reserved3 = b'\x00' * 96
isv_prod_id = 0x2122
isv_svn = 0x2324
reserved4 = b'\x00' * 60
report_data = \
create_random_buffer(
sgx_structs.SgxReportData.STRUCT_SIZE)
report_body = \
struct.pack(
'<{}sL{}sQQ{}s{}s{}s{}sHH{}s{}s'.format(
len(svn),
len(reserved1),
len(mr_enclave),
len(reserved2),
len(mr_signer),
len(reserved3),
len(reserved4),
len(report_data)
),
svn,
misc_select,
reserved1,
flags,
xfrm,
mr_enclave,
reserved2,
mr_signer,
reserved3,
isv_prod_id,
isv_svn,
reserved4,
report_data)
quote = \
struct.pack(
'<HH{}sHHL{}s{}s'.format(
len(epid_group_id),
len(basename),
len(report_body)),
version,
sign_type,
epid_group_id,
qe_svn,
pce_svn,
extended_epid_group_id,
basename,
report_body)
sgx_quote.parse_from_bytes(quote)
# Add a few bytes so that the signature length is partial. Should
# fail.
bad_quote = quote[:]
for _ in range(3):
bad_quote += create_random_buffer(1)
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
sgx_quote.parse_from_bytes(bad_quote)
# Add a non-zero signature length, but don't add a signature. Should
# fail.
bad_quote = struct.pack('<{}sL'.format(len(quote)), quote, 4)
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
sgx_quote.parse_from_bytes(bad_quote)
# Add a signature that is too short
short_signature = create_random_buffer(31)
bad_quote = \
struct.pack(
'<{}sL{}s'.format(
len(quote),
len(short_signature)),
quote,
len(short_signature) + 1,
short_signature)
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
sgx_quote.parse_from_bytes(bad_quote)
# Add a signature length of zero without a signature and verify
unsigned_quote = struct.pack('<{}sL'.format(len(quote)), quote, 0)
sgx_quote.parse_from_bytes(unsigned_quote)
# Add a good signature and verify
signature = create_random_buffer(32)
signed_quote = \
struct.pack(
'<{}sL{}s'.format(
len(quote),
len(signature)),
quote,
len(signature),
signature)
sgx_quote.parse_from_bytes(signed_quote)
# Reset the object using the field values and verify that we
# get expected serialized buffer
sgx_basename = sgx_structs.SgxBasename(name=basename)
sgx_cpu_svn = sgx_structs.SgxCpuSvn(svn=svn)
sgx_attributes = sgx_structs.SgxAttributes(flags=flags, xfrm=xfrm)
sgx_measurement_mr_enclave = sgx_structs.SgxMeasurement(m=mr_enclave)
sgx_measurement_mr_signer = sgx_structs.SgxMeasurement(m=mr_signer)
sgx_report_data = sgx_structs.SgxReportData(d=report_data)
sgx_report_body = \
sgx_structs.SgxReportBody(
cpu_svn=sgx_cpu_svn,
misc_select=misc_select,
attributes=sgx_attributes,
mr_enclave=sgx_measurement_mr_enclave,
mr_signer=sgx_measurement_mr_signer,
isv_prod_id=isv_prod_id,
isv_svn=isv_svn,
report_data=sgx_report_data)
sgx_quote = sgx_structs.SgxQuote(
version=version,
sign_type=sign_type,
epid_group_id=epid_group_id,
qe_svn=qe_svn,
pce_svn=pce_svn,
extended_epid_group_id=extended_epid_group_id,
basename=sgx_basename,
report_body=sgx_report_body)
assert quote == sgx_quote.serialize_to_bytes()[:len(quote)]
# Verify that zero signature serializes successfully
zero_sign_quote = struct.pack('<{}sL'.format(len(quote)), quote, 0)
assert zero_sign_quote == sgx_quote.serialize_to_bytes()
# Verify that non-zero signature serializes successfully
non_zero_sign_quote = \
struct.pack(
'<{}sL{}s'.format(
len(quote),
len(signature)),
quote,
len(signature),
signature)
sgx_quote.signature_len = len(signature)
sgx_quote.signature = signature
assert non_zero_sign_quote == sgx_quote.serialize_to_bytes()
def create_signup_info(self, originator_public_key_hash, nonce,
pse_manifest_status='OK'):
# currently not used
# _active_wait_timer = None
# We are going to fake out the sealing the signup data.
signup_data = {
'poet_public_key': self.poet_public_key,
'poet_private_key': self._poet_private_key
}
# Build up a fake SGX quote containing:
# 1. The basename
# 2. The report body that contains:
# a. The enclave measurement
# b. The report data SHA256(SHA256(OPK)|PPK)
sgx_basename = \
sgx_structs.SgxBasename(name=self.__VALID_BASENAME__)
sgx_measurement = \
sgx_structs.SgxMeasurement(
m=self.__VALID_ENCLAVE_MEASUREMENT__)
hash_input = \
'{0}{1}'.format(
originator_public_key_hash.upper(),
self.poet_public_key.upper()).encode()
report_data = hashlib.sha256(hash_input).digest()
sgx_report_data = sgx_structs.SgxReportData(d=report_data)
sgx_report_body = \
sgx_structs.SgxReportBody(
mr_enclave=sgx_measurement,
report_data=sgx_report_data)
sgx_quote = \
sgx_structs.SgxQuote(
basename=sgx_basename,
report_body=sgx_report_body)
# Create a fake PSE manifest. A base64 encoding of the
# originator public key hash should suffice.
pse_manifest = \
base64.b64encode(originator_public_key_hash.encode())
timestamp = '2017-02-16T15:21:24.437048'
# Fake our "proof" data.
verification_report = OrderedDict([
('epidPseudonym', originator_public_key_hash),
('id', base64.b64encode(
hashlib.sha256(
timestamp.encode()).hexdigest().encode()).decode()),
('isvEnclaveQuoteStatus', 'OK'),
('isvEnclaveQuoteBody',
base64.b64encode(sgx_quote.serialize_to_bytes()).decode()),
('pseManifestStatus', pse_manifest_status),
('pseManifestHash',
hashlib.sha256(base64.b64decode(pse_manifest)).hexdigest()),
('nonce', nonce),
('timestamp', timestamp)
])
proof_data = \
self.create_proof_data(
verification_report=verification_report,
evidence_payload={
'pse_manifest': pse_manifest.decode()
})
return \
SignUpInfo(
poet_public_key=signup_data['poet_public_key'],
proof_data=proof_data,
anti_sybil_id=originator_public_key_hash,
nonce=nonce)