def encrypt(self, plaintext, context=None):
if not context:
context = {}
session = Session(profile_name=self.profile_name)
kms = session.client('kms', region_name=self.region)
kms_response = kms.generate_data_key(
KeyId=self.kms_key,
EncryptionContext=context,
NumberOfBytes=64,
)
data_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][:32]
hmac_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][32:]
wrapped_key = kms_response['CiphertextBlob']
enc_ctr = Counter.new(128)
encryptor = AES.new(data_key, AES.MODE_CTR, counter=enc_ctr)
c_text = encryptor.encrypt(plaintext)
# compute an HMAC using the hmac key and the ciphertext
hmac = HMAC(hmac_key, msg=c_text, digestmod=SHA256)
b64hmac = hmac.hexdigest()
return EncryptedValue(
b64encode(wrapped_key).decode('utf-8'),
b64encode(c_text).decode('utf-8'),
b64hmac,
)
def _hmacedString(key, string):
"""
Return the SHA-1 HMAC hash of the given key and string.
"""
hash = HMAC(key, digestmod=sha)
hash.update(string)
return hash.digest()
def closeAuction():
key = decrypt(request.form['key'])
check_for_replay_attack(key)
data = json.loads(decrypt_sym(request.form['symdata'], key))
received_mac = request.form['signature']
mac = HMAC(key, msg=request.form['symdata'], digestmod=SHA256)
if (received_mac != mac.hexdigest()):
return 'Data Integrity Compromised!'
creator = json.loads(data['user'])
auction = data['serial_number']
if not confirmSignature(creator["Certificate"], creator["Signature"]):
return "Auction not created: User not authenticated."
r = s.post(auction_repository_add + '/close_auction',
data={
'serial_number': auction,
'user': creator['BI']
})
return r.text
def getSecret(name, version="", region="us-east-1", table="credential-store"):
'''
fetch and decrypt the secret called `name`
'''
secretStore = Table(table, connection=boto.dynamodb2.connect_to_region(region))
if version == "":
# do a consistent fetch of the credential with the highest version
result_set = [x for x in secretStore.query_2(limit=1, reverse=True, consistent=True, name__eq=name)]
if not result_set:
raise ItemNotFound("Item {'name': '%s'} couldn't be found." % name)
material = result_set[0]
else:
material = secretStore.get_item(name=name, version=version)
kms = boto.kms.connect_to_region(region)
# Check the HMAC before we decrypt to verify ciphertext integrity
try:
kms_response = kms.decrypt(b64decode(material['key']))
except:
raise KmsError("Could not decrypt hmac key with KMS")
key = kms_response['Plaintext'][:32]
hmac_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][32:]
hmac = HMAC(hmac_key, msg=b64decode(material['contents']), digestmod=SHA256)
if hmac.hexdigest() != material['hmac']:
raise IntegrityError("Computed HMAC on %s does not match stored HMAC" % name)
dec_ctr = Counter.new(128)
decryptor = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CTR, counter=dec_ctr)
plaintext = decryptor.decrypt(b64decode(material['contents']))
return plaintext
def __init__(self, stash_key, manager_provider, aws_profile=None, aws_region=None, aws_bucket=None):
check_latest_version()
self._aws_manager = manager_provider.aws_manager(aws_profile, aws_region or 'us-east-1')
if aws_bucket is None:
deployment_bucket_name = 'novastash_%s' % self._aws_manager.account_alias
else:
deployment_bucket_name = aws_bucket
key = "%s.txt.enc" % stash_key
existing_stash = self._aws_manager.s3_get(deployment_bucket_name, key)
if existing_stash is None:
raise NovaError("No stash '%s' found!" % stash_key)
else:
contents = existing_stash['Body'].read()
metadata = existing_stash['Metadata']
encryption_key = metadata['encryption-key']
kms_response = self._aws_manager.kms_decrypt(b64decode(encryption_key), {})
key = kms_response['Plaintext'][:32]
hmac_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][32:]
hmac = HMAC(hmac_key, msg=b64decode(contents), digestmod=SHA256)
if hmac.hexdigest() != metadata['hmac']:
raise NovaError("Computed HMAC on '%s' does not match stored HMAC" % stash_key)
dec_ctr = Counter.new(128)
decryptor = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CTR, counter=dec_ctr)
print(decryptor.decrypt(b64decode(contents)).decode("utf-8"))
def putSecret(name, secret, version, kms_key="alias/credstash",
region="us-east-1", context=None):
'''
put a secret called `name` into the secret-store,
protected by the key kms_key
'''
if not context:
context = {}
kms = boto3.client('kms', region_name=region)
# generate a a 64 byte key.
# Half will be for data encryption, the other half for HMAC
# try:
kms_response = kms.generate_data_key(KeyId=kms_key, EncryptionContext=context, NumberOfBytes=64)
# except:
# raise KmsError("Could not generate key using KMS key %s" % kms_key)
data_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][:32]
hmac_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][32:]
wrapped_key = kms_response['CiphertextBlob']
enc_ctr = Counter.new(128)
encryptor = AES.new(data_key, AES.MODE_CTR, counter=enc_ctr)
c_text = encryptor.encrypt(secret)
# compute an HMAC using the hmac key and the ciphertext
hmac = HMAC(hmac_key, msg=c_text, digestmod=SHA256)
b64hmac = hmac.hexdigest()
data = {}
data['name'] = name
data['version'] = version if version != "" else "1"
data['key'] = b64encode(wrapped_key).decode('utf-8')
data['contents'] = b64encode(c_text).decode('utf-8')
data['hmac'] = b64hmac
with open('{0}.{1}.json'.format(name,data['version']), 'w') as fp:
json.dump(data, fp)
def decrypt(self, value, context=None):
if not context:
context = {}
session = Session(profile_name=self.profile_name)
kms = session.client('kms', region_name=self.region)
# Check the HMAC before we decrypt to verify ciphertext integrity
kms_response = kms.decrypt(
CiphertextBlob=b64decode(value.key),
EncryptionContext=context,
)
key = kms_response['Plaintext'][:32]
hmac_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][32:]
hmac = HMAC(
hmac_key,
msg=b64decode(value.contents),
digestmod=SHA256,
)
if hmac.hexdigest() != value.hmac:
raise Exception("Computed HMAC does not match stored HMAC")
dec_ctr = Counter.new(128)
decryptor = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CTR, counter=dec_ctr)
plaintext = decryptor.decrypt(b64decode(
value.contents)).decode("utf-8")
return plaintext
def putSecret(name, secret, version, kms_key="alias/credstash",
region="us-east-1", table="credential-store", context=None):
'''
put a secret called `name` into the secret-store,
protected by the key kms_key
'''
kms = boto.kms.connect_to_region(region)
# generate a a 64 byte key.
# Half will be for data encryption, the other half for HMAC
try:
kms_response = kms.generate_data_key(kms_key, context, 64)
except:
raise KmsError("Could not generate key using KMS key %s" % kms_key)
data_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][:32]
hmac_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][32:]
wrapped_key = kms_response['CiphertextBlob']
enc_ctr = Counter.new(128)
encryptor = AES.new(data_key, AES.MODE_CTR, counter=enc_ctr)
c_text = encryptor.encrypt(secret)
# compute an HMAC using the hmac key and the ciphertext
hmac = HMAC(hmac_key, msg=c_text, digestmod=SHA256)
b64hmac = hmac.hexdigest()
secretStore = Table(table,
connection=boto.dynamodb2.connect_to_region(region))
data = {}
data['name'] = name
data['version'] = version if version != "" else "1"
data['key'] = b64encode(wrapped_key)
data['contents'] = b64encode(c_text)
data['hmac'] = b64hmac
return secretStore.put_item(data=data)
def _hmacedString(key, string):
"""
Return the SHA-1 HMAC hash of the given key and string.
"""
hash = HMAC(key, digestmod=sha)
hash.update(string)
return hash.digest()
def getSecret(name, version="", region=None,
table="credential-store", context=None,
**kwargs):
'''
fetch and decrypt the secret called `name`
'''
if not context:
context = {}
session = get_session(**kwargs)
dynamodb = session.resource('dynamodb', region_name=region)
secrets = dynamodb.Table(table)
if version == "":
# do a consistent fetch of the credential with the highest version
response = secrets.query(Limit=1,
ScanIndexForward=False,
ConsistentRead=True,
KeyConditionExpression=boto3.dynamodb.conditions.Key("name").eq(name))
if response["Count"] == 0:
raise ItemNotFound("Item {'name': '%s'} couldn't be found." % name)
material = response["Items"][0]
else:
response = secrets.get_item(Key={"name": name, "version": version})
if "Item" not in response:
raise ItemNotFound("Item {'name': '%s', 'version': '%s'} couldn't be found." % (name, version))
material = response["Item"]
kms = session.client('kms', region_name=region)
# Check the HMAC before we decrypt to verify ciphertext integrity
try:
kms_response = kms.decrypt(CiphertextBlob=b64decode(material['key']), EncryptionContext=context)
except botocore.exceptions.ClientError as e:
if e.response["Error"]["Code"] == "InvalidCiphertextException":
if context is None:
msg = ("Could not decrypt hmac key with KMS. The credential may "
"require that an encryption context be provided to decrypt "
"it.")
else:
msg = ("Could not decrypt hmac key with KMS. The encryption "
"context provided may not match the one used when the "
"credential was stored.")
else:
msg = "Decryption error %s" % e
raise KmsError(msg)
except Exception as e:
raise KmsError("Decryption error %s" % e)
key = kms_response['Plaintext'][:32]
hmac_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][32:]
hmac = HMAC(hmac_key, msg=b64decode(material['contents']),
digestmod=SHA256)
if hmac.hexdigest() != material['hmac']:
raise IntegrityError("Computed HMAC on %s does not match stored HMAC"
% name)
dec_ctr = Counter.new(128)
decryptor = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CTR, counter=dec_ctr)
plaintext = decryptor.decrypt(b64decode(material['contents'])).decode("utf-8")
return plaintext
def wrap(data, authKey, keyWrapKey):
hmac = HMAC(authKey, digestmod=SHA256)
hmac.update(data)
kwa = hmac.digest()[:8]
iv = os.urandom(16)
cipher = AES.new(keyWrapKey, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
wrapped = cipher.encrypt(pad(data + kwa))
wrapped = wrapped + iv
return wrapped
def getSecret(name, kms, dynamodb,
version="", table="credential-store",
context=None):
'''
fetch and decrypt the secret called `name`
'''
if not context:
context = {}
secrets = dynamodb.Table(table)
if version == "":
# do a consistent fetch of the credential with the highest version
response = secrets.query(Limit=1,
ScanIndexForward=False,
ConsistentRead=True,
KeyConditionExpression=boto3.dynamodb.conditions.Key("name").eq(name))
if response["Count"] == 0:
raise ItemNotFound("Item {'name': '%s'} couldn't be found." % name)
material = response["Items"][0]
else:
response = secrets.get_item(Key={"name": name, "version": version})
if "Item" not in response:
raise ItemNotFound("Item {'name': '%s', 'version': '%s'} couldn't be found." % (name, version))
material = response["Item"]
# Check the HMAC before we decrypt to verify ciphertext integrity
try:
kms_response = kms.decrypt(CiphertextBlob=b64decode(material['key']), EncryptionContext=context)
except botocore.exceptions.ClientError as e:
if e.response["Error"]["Code"] == "InvalidCiphertextException":
if context is None:
msg = ("Could not decrypt hmac key with KMS. The credential may "
"require that an encryption context be provided to decrypt "
"it.")
else:
msg = ("Could not decrypt hmac key with KMS. The encryption "
"context provided may not match the one used when the "
"credential was stored.")
else:
msg = "Decryption error %s" % e
raise KmsError(msg)
except Exception as e:
raise KmsError("Decryption error %s" % e)
key = kms_response['Plaintext'][:32]
hmac_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][32:]
hmac = HMAC(hmac_key, msg=b64decode(material['contents']),
digestmod=SHA256)
if hmac.hexdigest() != material['hmac']:
raise IntegrityError("Computed HMAC on %s does not match stored HMAC"
% name)
dec_ctr = Counter.new(128)
decryptor = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CTR, counter=dec_ctr)
plaintext = decryptor.decrypt(b64decode(material['contents'])).decode("utf-8")
return plaintext
def getSecret(name,
version="",
region="us-east-1",
table="credential-store",
context=None):
'''
fetch and decrypt the secret called `name`
'''
if not context:
context = {}
if version == "":
# do a consistent fetch of the credential with the highest version
# list all files matching pattern
pass
# if not result_set:
# raise ItemNotFound("Item {'name': '%s'} couldn't be found." % name)
# material = result_set[0]
with open("{0}.{1}.json".format(name, version), 'r') as fp:
material = json.load(fp)
kms = boto3.client('kms', region_name=region)
# Check the HMAC before we decrypt to verify ciphertext integrity
try:
kms_response = kms.decrypt(CiphertextBlob=b64decode(material['key']),
EncryptionContext=context)
except InvalidCiphertextException:
if context is None:
msg = ("Could not decrypt hmac key with KMS. The credential may "
"require that an encryption context be provided to decrypt "
"it.")
else:
msg = ("Could not decrypt hmac key with KMS. The encryption "
"context provided may not match the one used when the "
"credential was stored.")
raise KmsError(msg)
except Exception as e:
raise KmsError("Decryption error %s" % e)
key = kms_response['Plaintext'][:32]
hmac_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][32:]
hmac = HMAC(hmac_key,
msg=b64decode(material['contents']),
digestmod=SHA256)
if hmac.hexdigest() != material['hmac']:
raise IntegrityError("Computed HMAC on %s does not match stored HMAC" %
name)
dec_ctr = Counter.new(128)
decryptor = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CTR, counter=dec_ctr)
plaintext = decryptor.decrypt(b64decode(
material['contents'])).decode("utf-8")
return plaintext
def getSecret(name,
version="",
region="us-east-1",
table="credential-store",
context=None):
'''
fetch and decrypt the secret called `name`
'''
if not context:
context = {}
secretStore = Table(table,
connection=boto.dynamodb2.connect_to_region(region))
if version == "":
# do a consistent fetch of the credential with the highest version
result_set = [
x for x in secretStore.query_2(
limit=1, reverse=True, consistent=True, name__eq=name)
]
if not result_set:
raise ItemNotFound("Item {'name': '%s'} couldn't be found." % name)
material = result_set[0]
else:
material = secretStore.get_item(name=name, version=version)
kms = boto3.client('kms', region_name=region)
# Check the HMAC before we decrypt to verify ciphertext integrity
try:
kms_response = kms.decrypt(CiphertextBlob=b64decode(material['key']),
EncryptionContext=context)
except boto.kms.exceptions.InvalidCiphertextException:
if context is None:
msg = ("Could not decrypt hmac key with KMS. The credential may "
"require that an encryption context be provided to decrypt "
"it.")
else:
msg = ("Could not decrypt hmac key with KMS. The encryption "
"context provided may not match the one used when the "
"credential was stored.")
raise KmsError(msg)
except Exception as e:
raise KmsError("Decryption error %s" % e)
key = kms_response['Plaintext'][:32]
hmac_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][32:]
hmac = HMAC(hmac_key,
msg=b64decode(material['contents']),
digestmod=SHA256)
if hmac.hexdigest() != material['hmac']:
raise IntegrityError("Computed HMAC on %s does not match stored HMAC" %
name)
dec_ctr = Counter.new(128)
decryptor = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CTR, counter=dec_ctr)
plaintext = decryptor.decrypt(b64decode(
material['contents'])).decode("utf-8")
return plaintext
def __init__(self, stash_key, value, manager_provider, aws_profile=None, aws_region=None, aws_bucket=None, kms_key='alias/novastash'):
check_latest_version()
self._aws_manager = manager_provider.aws_manager(aws_profile, aws_region or 'us-east-1')
if aws_bucket is None:
deployment_bucket_name = 'novastash_%s' % self._aws_manager.account_alias
else:
deployment_bucket_name = aws_bucket
if not self._aws_manager.kms_key_exists(kms_key):
raise NovaError("Please setup the novastash KMS key.")
self._aws_manager.create_bucket(deployment_bucket_name, "Creating novastash bucket '%s'" % deployment_bucket_name)
# generate a a 64 byte key.
# Half will be for data encryption, the other half for HMAC
kms_response = self._aws_manager.kms_generate_data_key(kms_key, {})
data_key = tobytes(kms_response['Plaintext'][:32])
hmac_key = tobytes(kms_response['Plaintext'][32:])
wrapped_key = tobytes(kms_response['CiphertextBlob'])
enc_ctr = Counter.new(128)
encryptor = AES.new(data_key, AES.MODE_CTR, counter=enc_ctr)
c_text = encryptor.encrypt(tobytes(value))
# compute an HMAC using the hmac key and the ciphertext
hmac = HMAC(hmac_key, msg=c_text, digestmod=SHA256)
b64hmac = hmac.hexdigest()
key = "%s.txt.enc" % stash_key
existing_stash = self._aws_manager.s3_head(deployment_bucket_name, key)
if existing_stash is None:
print(colored("Stashing '%s'" % stash_key))
self._aws_manager.s3_put(
deployment_bucket_name,
b64encode(c_text).decode('utf-8'),
key,
{'encryption-key': b64encode(wrapped_key).decode('utf-8'), 'hmac': b64hmac}
)
else:
perform_overwrite = query_yes_no("Stash '%s' already exists, want to overwrite?" % stash_key, default="no")
if perform_overwrite:
self._aws_manager.s3_put(
deployment_bucket_name,
b64encode(c_text).decode('utf-8'),
key,
{'encryption-key': b64encode(wrapped_key).decode('utf-8'), 'hmac': b64hmac}
)
else:
print(colored("Not stashing anything for key '%s'" % stash_key))
def place_bid():
key = decrypt(request.form['key'])
check_for_replay_attack(key)
data = json.loads(decrypt_sym(request.form['symdata'], key))
received_mac = request.form['signature']
mac = HMAC(key, msg=request.form['symdata'], digestmod=SHA256)
if (received_mac != mac.hexdigest()):
return 'Data Integrity Compromised!'
serial_number = data['serial_number']
auction = get_auction(serial_number)
if auction == None: return json.dumps("Auction does not exist")
if auction.state == "Closed": return json.dumps("Bid refused")
block = get_block_from_dict(json.loads(data['block']))
nonce = data['nonce']
if not block.verifyNonce(nonce, auction.chalenge):
return json.dumps("Bid refused")
r = s.post(auction_manager_add + '/bid_authenticate',
data={
'encrypted_user_data': request.form['encrypted_user_data'],
'user_mac': request.form['user_mac'],
'user_key': request.form['user_key'],
'auction': auction.serial_number,
'value': block.bid.value
})
if r.text == 'False':
return json.dumps("User authentication Failed")
if r.text == 'Invalid':
return json.dumps("Invalid value")
bid_data = json.loads(r.text)
block.bid.user = base64_decode(bid_data['user'].encode())
block.bid.value = base64_decode(bid_data['value'].encode())
if auction.auction_type == "English Auction" and auction.get_last_block(
).bid:
if (auction.get_last_block().bid.value >= block.bid.value):
return json.dumps(
"Bid not added: Value must be higher than highest bid")
auction.add_block(block)
receipt = createReceipt(block)
return json.dumps(("Bid added", receipt))
def compute_hash(key, pkt, pre=None, post=None):
if (pre):
h = HMAC(key, pre, Crypto.Hash.SHA)
h.update(pkt)
else:
h = HMAC(key, pkt, Crypto.Hash.SHA)
if post:
h.update(post)
return h.digest()
def putSecret(name,
secret,
version,
kms_key="alias/credstash",
region=None,
table="credential-store",
context=None,
digest="SHA256",
**kwargs):
'''
put a secret called `name` into the secret-store,
protected by the key kms_key
'''
if not context:
context = {}
session = get_session(**kwargs)
kms = session.client('kms', region_name=region)
# generate a a 64 byte key.
# Half will be for data encryption, the other half for HMAC
try:
kms_response = kms.generate_data_key(KeyId=kms_key,
EncryptionContext=context,
NumberOfBytes=64)
except:
raise KmsError("Could not generate key using KMS key %s" % kms_key)
data_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][:32]
hmac_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][32:]
wrapped_key = kms_response['CiphertextBlob']
enc_ctr = Counter.new(128)
encryptor = AES.new(data_key, AES.MODE_CTR, counter=enc_ctr)
c_text = encryptor.encrypt(secret)
# compute an HMAC using the hmac key and the ciphertext
hmac = HMAC(hmac_key, msg=c_text, digestmod=get_digest(digest))
b64hmac = hmac.hexdigest()
dynamodb = session.resource('dynamodb', region_name=region)
secrets = dynamodb.Table(table)
data = {}
data['name'] = name
data['version'] = version if version != "" else paddedInt(1)
data['key'] = b64encode(wrapped_key).decode('utf-8')
data['contents'] = b64encode(c_text).decode('utf-8')
data['hmac'] = b64hmac
data['digest'] = digest
return secrets.put_item(Item=data,
ConditionExpression=Attr('name').not_exists())
def get_anonymized_user():
"""Return the HMAC value of the current user authenticated with
the HMAC secret.
"""
return HMAC(key=config.WEB_SECRET,
msg=get_user()).digest()[:9].encode('base64').rstrip()
async def upload_loop(init_buf=None):
nonlocal reader, remote_writer, host, port
try:
buf = init_buf
iv_up = random.read(16)
crypto_up = AES.new(enc_key, AES.MODE_CFB, iv_up)
host = host.encode()
req_buf = struct.pack('BB', 0, len(host)) + host + struct.pack(
'!H', port)
mac = HMAC(mac_key, req_buf).digest()[:12]
handshake_buf = iv_up + crypto_up.encrypt(req_buf + mac)
while True:
if buf == None:
buf = await reader.read(65536)
if handshake_buf != None:
remote_writer.write(handshake_buf)
handshake_buf = None
if len(buf) == 0:
break
remote_writer.write(crypto_up.encrypt(buf))
buf = None
await remote_writer.drain()
except ConnectionResetError as e:
pass
except Exception as e:
print(e)
finally:
remote_writer.close()
async def do_request(req_counter):
global req_session
nonlocal req_number, host, port
remote_reader, remote_writer = None, None
try:
iv_up = random.read(16)
crypto_up = AES.new(enc_key, AES.MODE_CFB, iv_up)
req_buf = struct.pack(
'BB', 1, len(host)) + host.encode() + struct.pack('!H', port)
mac = HMAC(mac_key, req_buf).digest()[:12]
handshake_buf = iv_up + crypto_up.encrypt(req_buf + mac)
remote_reader, remote_writer = await asyncio.open_connection(
server_addr, server_port, loop=loop)
req_info = req_session + struct.pack(
'!QQI', req_number, req_counter, len(modified_req))
remote_writer.write(handshake_buf +
crypto_up.encrypt(req_info + modified_req))
iv_down = await remote_reader.readexactly(16)
crypto_down = AES.new(enc_key, AES.MODE_CFB, iv_down)
result_len, = struct.unpack(
'!I', crypto_down.decrypt(await remote_reader.readexactly(4)))
result = crypto_down.decrypt(await
remote_reader.readexactly(result_len))
remote_writer.close()
return result
except Exception:
if remote_writer != None:
remote_writer.close()
raise
def get_anonymized_user():
"""Return the HMAC value of the current user authenticated with
the HMAC secret.
"""
return utils.encode_b64(HMAC(key=config.WEB_SECRET,
msg=get_user()).digest()[:9])
def getSecret(name, version="", region="us-east-1",
table="credential-store", context=None):
'''
fetch and decrypt the secret called `name`
'''
if not context:
context = {}
secretStore = Table(table,
connection=boto.dynamodb2.connect_to_region(region))
if version == "":
# do a consistent fetch of the credential with the highest version
result_set = [x for x in secretStore.query_2(limit=1, reverse=True,
consistent=True,
name__eq=name)]
if not result_set:
raise ItemNotFound("Item {'name': '%s'} couldn't be found." % name)
material = result_set[0]
else:
material = secretStore.get_item(name=name, version=version)
kms = boto3.client('kms', region_name=region)
# Check the HMAC before we decrypt to verify ciphertext integrity
try:
kms_response = kms.decrypt(CiphertextBlob=b64decode(material['key']), EncryptionContext=context)
except boto.kms.exceptions.InvalidCiphertextException:
if context is None:
msg = ("Could not decrypt hmac key with KMS. The credential may "
"require that an encryption context be provided to decrypt "
"it.")
else:
msg = ("Could not decrypt hmac key with KMS. The encryption "
"context provided may not match the one used when the "
"credential was stored.")
raise KmsError(msg)
except Exception as e:
raise KmsError("Decryption error %s" % e)
key = kms_response['Plaintext'][:32]
hmac_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][32:]
hmac = HMAC(hmac_key, msg=b64decode(material['contents']),
digestmod=SHA256)
if hmac.hexdigest() != material['hmac']:
raise IntegrityError("Computed HMAC on %s does not match stored HMAC"
% name)
dec_ctr = Counter.new(128)
decryptor = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CTR, counter=dec_ctr)
plaintext = decryptor.decrypt(b64decode(material['contents'])).decode("utf-8")
return plaintext
def getSecret(name, version="", region="us-east-1",
table="credential-store", context=None):
'''
fetch and decrypt the secret called `name`
'''
if not context:
context = {}
if version == "":
# do a consistent fetch of the credential with the highest version
# list all files matching pattern
pass
# if not result_set:
# raise ItemNotFound("Item {'name': '%s'} couldn't be found." % name)
# material = result_set[0]
with open("{0}.{1}.json".format(name, version), 'r') as fp:
material = json.load(fp)
kms = boto3.client('kms', region_name=region)
# Check the HMAC before we decrypt to verify ciphertext integrity
try:
kms_response = kms.decrypt(CiphertextBlob=b64decode(material['key']), EncryptionContext=context)
except InvalidCiphertextException:
if context is None:
msg = ("Could not decrypt hmac key with KMS. The credential may "
"require that an encryption context be provided to decrypt "
"it.")
else:
msg = ("Could not decrypt hmac key with KMS. The encryption "
"context provided may not match the one used when the "
"credential was stored.")
raise KmsError(msg)
except Exception as e:
raise KmsError("Decryption error %s" % e)
key = kms_response['Plaintext'][:32]
hmac_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][32:]
hmac = HMAC(hmac_key, msg=b64decode(material['contents']),
digestmod=SHA256)
if hmac.hexdigest() != material['hmac']:
raise IntegrityError("Computed HMAC on %s does not match stored HMAC"
% name)
dec_ctr = Counter.new(128)
decryptor = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CTR, counter=dec_ctr)
plaintext = decryptor.decrypt(b64decode(material['contents'])).decode("utf-8")
return plaintext
def unwrap(data, authKey, keyWrapKey):
iv = data[-16:]
cipher = AES.new(keyWrapKey, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
unwrapped = cipher.decrypt(data[:-16])
unwrapped = unpad(unwrapped)
kwa = unwrapped[-8:]
unwrapped = unwrapped[:-8]
hmac = HMAC(authKey, digestmod=SHA256)
hmac.update(unwrapped)
local_kwa = hmac.digest()[:8]
if kwa != local_kwa:
print("Unwrapped kwa does not match")
return unwrapped
def ExtractEntropySeed(rounds, username, password, salt=None):
# Concentrates and then extracts the random entropy provided
# by the password into a seed value for the first hash stage.
# If if an explicit salt value is missing, use a hash of
# the username as if it were the salt.
if salt is None:
salt = SHA512.new(username).digest()
# Confirm the supplied salt meets the minimum length of 64
# octets required, is aligned to a 32 octet boundary and does not
# exceed 1,024 octets. Some implementations may not handle salt
# values longer than 1,024 octets properly.
elif len(salt) < 64:
raise ValueError("The salt, if supplied, must be at least " \
"64 octets in length.")
elif operator.mod(len(salt), 32) != 0:
warnings.warn("The salt, if longer than 64 octets, should " \
"be aligned to a 32 octet boundary.")
elif len(salt) > 1024:
warnings.warn("The salt should not exceed 1,024 octets.")
# For salt values which don't match the 128 octets required for
# an HMAC key value, the salt is hashed twice using a 3 octet
# counter value of 0 and 1, and the outputs are concatenated.
if len(salt) != 128:
key = \
SHA512.new(salt + struct.pack('>I', 0)[1:4]).digest() + \
SHA512.new(salt + struct.pack('>I', 1)[1:4]).digest()
# If the supplied salt is 128 octets use it directly as the key value.
else:
key = salt
# Initialize the HMAC instance using the key created above.
hmac = HMAC(key, None, SHA512)
# Repeat the plaintext password successively based on
# the number of instances specified by the rounds variable.
for unused in range(0, rounds):
hmac.update(password)
# Create the 64 octet seed value.
seed = hmac.digest()
return seed
def ExtractEntropySeed(rounds, username, password, salt=None):
# Concentrates and then extracts the random entropy provided
# by the password into a seed value for the first hash stage.
# If if an explicit salt value is missing, use a hash of
# the username as if it were the salt.
if salt is None:
salt = SHA512.new(username).digest()
# Confirm the supplied salt meets the minimum length of 64
# octets required, is aligned to a 32 octet boundary and does not
# exceed 1,024 octets. Some implementations may not handle salt
# values longer than 1,024 octets properly.
elif len(salt) < 64:
raise ValueError("The salt, if supplied, must be at least " \
"64 octets in length.")
elif operator.mod(len(salt), 32) != 0:
warnings.warn("The salt, if longer than 64 octets, should " \
"be aligned to a 32 octet boundary.")
elif len(salt) > 1024:
warnings.warn("The salt should not exceed 1,024 octets.")
# For salt values which don't match the 128 octets required for
# an HMAC key value, the salt is hashed twice using a 3 octet
# counter value of 0 and 1, and the outputs are concatenated.
if len(salt) != 128:
key = \
SHA512.new(salt + struct.pack('>I', 0)[1:4]).digest() + \
SHA512.new(salt + struct.pack('>I', 1)[1:4]).digest()
# If the supplied salt is 128 octets use it directly as the key value.
else:
key = salt
# Initialize the HMAC instance using the key created above.
hmac = HMAC(key, None, SHA512)
# Repeat the plaintext password successively based on
# the number of instances specified by the rounds variable.
for unused in range(0, rounds):
hmac.update(password)
# Create the 64 octet seed value.
seed = hmac.digest()
return seed
def putSecret(name,
secret,
version,
kms_key="alias/credstash",
region="us-east-1",
table="credential-store",
context=None):
'''
put a secret called `name` into the secret-store,
protected by the key kms_key
'''
if not context:
context = {}
kms = boto3.client('kms', region_name=region)
# generate a a 64 byte key.
# Half will be for data encryption, the other half for HMAC
try:
kms_response = kms.generate_data_key(KeyId=kms_key,
EncryptionContext=context,
NumberOfBytes=64)
except:
raise KmsError("Could not generate key using KMS key %s" % kms_key)
data_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][:32]
hmac_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][32:]
wrapped_key = kms_response['CiphertextBlob']
enc_ctr = Counter.new(128)
encryptor = AES.new(data_key, AES.MODE_CTR, counter=enc_ctr)
c_text = encryptor.encrypt(secret)
# compute an HMAC using the hmac key and the ciphertext
hmac = HMAC(hmac_key, msg=c_text, digestmod=SHA256)
b64hmac = hmac.hexdigest()
secretStore = Table(table,
connection=boto.dynamodb2.connect_to_region(region))
data = {}
data['name'] = name
data['version'] = version if version != "" else "1"
data['key'] = b64encode(wrapped_key).decode('utf-8')
data['contents'] = b64encode(c_text).decode('utf-8')
data['hmac'] = b64hmac
return secretStore.put_item(data=data)
def unlock(self, passphrase):
# might eventually implement the following as specced and in a separate module:
# http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmlenc-core-20021210/Overview.html#aes256-cbc
# http://www.w3.org/2008/xmlsec/Drafts/derived-key/derived-keys.xml
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4051
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6030
# http://www.opensource.apple.com/source/libsecurity_asn1/libsecurity_asn1-29908/asn1/pkcs5.asn1
if self._privateKey:
return
encryption_elem = self._container.getElementsByTagNameNS(XMLENC_NS_URL, 'EncryptionMethod')[0]
# jumping over the structure at the moment, see above
derivation_func = PBKDF2
params_elem = encryption_elem.getElementsByTagNameNS(PKCS5_NS_URL, 'Parameters')[0]
salt_elem = params_elem.getElementsByTagNameNS(PKCS5_NS_URL, 'Salt')[0]
IV = salt = b64decode(salt_elem.firstChild.firstChild.nodeValue)
iterations_elem = params_elem.getElementsByTagNameNS(PKCS5_NS_URL, 'IterationCount')[0]
iterations = int(iterations_elem.firstChild.nodeValue)
key_length_elem = params_elem.getElementsByTagNameNS(PKCS5_NS_URL, 'KeyLength')[0]
key_length = int(key_length_elem.firstChild.nodeValue)
assert key_length % 8 == 0
prf = lambda p, s: HMAC(p, s, SHA256).digest()
key = derivation_func(passphrase, salt, count=iterations, dkLen=(key_length//8), prf=prf)
encryption_scheme = AES
encryption_mode = AES.MODE_CBC
decryptor = encryption_scheme.new(key, mode=encryption_mode, IV=IV)
# then the encrypted data
key_elem = self._container.getElementsByTagNameNS(XMLENC_NS_URL, 'CipherValue')[0]
ciphertext_elem = key_elem.firstChild
ciphertext = b64decode(ciphertext_elem.nodeValue)
padded_plaintext = decryptor.decrypt(ciphertext)
padlen = ord(padded_plaintext[-1])
if padlen not in range(encryption_scheme.block_size) or \
chr(padlen)*padlen != padded_plaintext[-padlen:]:
raise KeyLockedError("Key decryption failed")
plaintext = padded_plaintext[:-padlen]
key_elem = removeIgnorableWhitespace(parseString(plaintext))
keyparams = [RSA.bytes_to_long(b64decode(key_elem.getElementsByTagName(x)[0].firstChild.nodeValue)) for x in ['Modulus', 'Exponent', 'D', 'Q', 'P', 'InverseQ']]
self._privateKey = RSA.construct(tuple(keyparams))
self._publicKey = self._privateKey.publickey()
self.fingerprint = SHA256.new(self._publicKey.exportKey(format='DER')).hexdigest()
def putSecret(name, secret, version, kms_key="alias/credstash",
region=None, table="credential-store", context=None,
digest="SHA256", **kwargs):
'''
put a secret called `name` into the secret-store,
protected by the key kms_key
'''
if not context:
context = {}
session = get_session(**kwargs)
kms = session.client('kms', region_name=region)
# generate a a 64 byte key.
# Half will be for data encryption, the other half for HMAC
try:
kms_response = kms.generate_data_key(
KeyId=kms_key, EncryptionContext=context, NumberOfBytes=64)
except:
raise KmsError("Could not generate key using KMS key %s" % kms_key)
data_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][:32]
hmac_key = kms_response['Plaintext'][32:]
wrapped_key = kms_response['CiphertextBlob']
enc_ctr = Counter.new(128)
encryptor = AES.new(data_key, AES.MODE_CTR, counter=enc_ctr)
c_text = encryptor.encrypt(secret)
# compute an HMAC using the hmac key and the ciphertext
hmac = HMAC(hmac_key, msg=c_text, digestmod=get_digest(digest))
b64hmac = hmac.hexdigest()
dynamodb = session.resource('dynamodb', region_name=region)
secrets = dynamodb.Table(table)
data = {}
data['name'] = name
data['version'] = version if version != "" else paddedInt(1)
data['key'] = b64encode(wrapped_key).decode('utf-8')
data['contents'] = b64encode(c_text).decode('utf-8')
data['hmac'] = b64hmac
data['digest'] = digest
return secrets.put_item(Item=data, ConditionExpression=Attr('name').not_exists())
def srtp_sign_packet(auth_key,
rtp_packet,
roc,
hash_function=Crypto.Hash.SHA,
hash_length=80):
assert (hash_length % 8 == 0)
hash_length = hash_length // 8
h = HMAC(auth_key, rtp_packet + int_to_bytes(roc, 4),
hash_function).digest()
return rtp_packet + h[:hash_length]
def mac_sign(kwargs=None, expires=None, key='', mac_len=0, mac_format='hex'):
key = key or config.SIGN_KEY
if not key:
raise Exception('No key configured for signing the HMAC')
if not kwargs:
raise Exception('No message provided to be signed')
if expires:
kwargs['_expires'] = int(time() + expires)
parts = ["%s=%s" % (key, kwargs[key]) for key in sorted(kwargs.keys())]
msg = "&".join(parts)
hmac = HMAC(str(key), msg=str(msg), digestmod=SHA256Hash())
if mac_format == 'b64':
tag = urlsafe_b64encode(hmac.digest()).rstrip('=')
elif mac_format == 'bin':
tag = hmac.digest()
else:
tag = hmac.hexdigest()
if mac_len:
tag = tag[:mac_len]
kwargs['_mac'] = tag
def srtcp_sign_packet(auth_key,
rtcp_packet,
index,
is_encrypted,
hash_function=Crypto.Hash.SHA,
hash_length=80):
assert (hash_length % 8 == 0)
hash_length = hash_length // 8
index = index % (2**30)
if is_encrypted:
index += 1 << 31
index = int_to_bytes(index, 4)
h = HMAC(auth_key, rtcp_packet + index, hash_function).digest()
return rtcp_packet + index + h[:hash_length]
def srtp_verify_and_strip_signature(auth_key,
rtp_packet,
roc,
hash_function=Crypto.Hash.SHA,
hash_length=80):
assert hash_length % 8 == 0
hash_length = hash_length // 8
h = HMAC(auth_key, rtp_packet[:-hash_length] + int_to_bytes(roc, 4),
hash_function).digest()
if h[:hash_length] == rtp_packet[-hash_length:]:
return rtp_packet[:-hash_length]
else:
raise AuthenticationFailure()
def srtcp_verify_and_strip_signature(auth_key,
rtcp_packet,
hash_function=Crypto.Hash.SHA,
hash_length=80):
assert hash_length % 8 == 0
hash_length = hash_length // 8
h = HMAC(auth_key, rtcp_packet[:-hash_length], hash_function).digest()
if h[:hash_length] == rtcp_packet[-hash_length:]:
packet_i = bytes_to_int(rtcp_packet[-hash_length - 4:-hash_length])
encrypted = packet_i & (1 << 31) != 0
packet_i = packet_i & ((1 << 31) - 1)
return rtcp_packet[:-hash_length - 4], packet_i, encrypted
else:
raise AuthenticationFailure()
def create_auction():
key = decrypt(request.form['key'])
data = json.loads(decrypt_sym(request.form['symdata'], key))
received_mac = request.form['signature']
mac = HMAC(key, msg=request.form['symdata'], digestmod=SHA256)
if (received_mac != mac.hexdigest()):
return 'Data Integrity Compromised!'
name = data['name']
time_limit = datetime.strptime(data['timeLimit'], '%b %d %Y %I:%M%p')
description = data['description']
auction_type = data['auctionType']
creator = data['creator']
bid_validations = (data['bid_validations']
if 'bid_validdations' in data else None)
serial_number = data['serialNumber']
new_auction = auction(name, serial_number, time_limit, description,
auction_type, creator, bid_validations)
print(new_auction.blocks[0].nonce)
now = datetime.now()
if now > new_auction.time_limit:
_close_auction(new_auction)
else:
delay = (new_auction.time_limit - now).total_seconds()
threading.Timer(delay, _close_auction, [new_auction]).start()
auctions.append(new_auction)
print(creator)
return "Auction Created"
def _verify_user(key, user_data, received_mac):
mac = HMAC(key, msg=request.form['encrypted_user_data'], digestmod=SHA256)
if (received_mac != mac.hexdigest()):
return 'Data Integrity Compromised!'
mac = HMAC(key, msg=user_data['encrypted_user_data'], digestmod=SHA256)
if (received_mac != mac.hexdigest()):
return 'Data Integrity Compromised!'
return confirmSignature(user_data['Certificate'], user_data['Signature'])
def createAuction():
key = decrypt(request.form['key'])
check_for_replay_attack(key)
data = json.loads(decrypt_sym(request.form['symdata'], key))
received_mac = request.form['signature']
mac = HMAC(key, msg=request.form['symdata'], digestmod=SHA256)
if (received_mac != mac.hexdigest()):
return 'Data Integrity Compromised!'
name = data['name']
timeLimit = data['timeLimit']
description = data['description']
auctionType = data['auctionType']
creator = json.loads(data['creator'])
if not confirmSignature(creator["Certificate"], creator["Signature"]):
return "Auction not created: User not authenticated."
try:
f = open("serialNumber", "r+")
serialNumber = int(f.readline())
f.seek(0, 0)
except FileNotFoundError:
f = open("serialNumber", "w")
serialNumber = 0
f.write(str(serialNumber + 1))
f.close()
data = {
'serialNumber': serialNumber,
'name': name,
'timeLimit': timeLimit,
'description': description,
'auctionType': auctionType,
'creator': creator['BI']
}
auctions[serialNumber] = (auctionType, Random.get_random_bytes(32))
key = Random.get_random_bytes(32)
encrypted = encrypt_sym(json.dumps(data), key)
mac = HMAC(key, msg=encrypted, digestmod=SHA256)
r = s.post(auction_repository_ip + "/create_auction",
data={
'signature': mac.hexdigest(),
'symdata': encrypted,
'key': encrypt_repo(key)
})
return "Auction " + str(serialNumber) + " created\n"
def index():
url_arg = request.args.get('-')
if url_arg is not None:
_id, _key, _key_hash, iv = b64decode(url_arg).split('||')
if _key_hash == HMAC(HASH_KEY, _key).digest():
_aes = AES.new(_KEY, AES.MODE_CBC, _IV)
key = _aes.decrypt(_key)
encrypted_msg = R.get(_id)
if encrypted_msg is not None:
R.delete(_id)
aes = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
msg = aes.decrypt(b64decode(encrypted_msg))
return render_template('getMessage.html', message=msg.strip())
else:
return render_template('noMessage.html'), 404
return render_template('index.html')
def encrypt(self, data):
# získání key a salt
key_part = SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY[8:]
binary_key = binascii.unhexlify(key_part)
key, salt = binary_key[:16], binary_key[16:]
# Inicializační vektor
iv = Random.new().read(AES.block_size)
# získání šifry.
cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
# konverze do UTF-8
serialized_data = json.dumps(data).encode('utf-8')
# komprese dat
serialized_data = zlib.compress(serialized_data, 9)
# připojení velikosti dat v bajtech (big-endian)
serialized_data = struct.pack('!L',
len(serialized_data)) + serialized_data
# kontrolní součet
digest = HMAC(salt, serialized_data + iv, SHA256Hash()).digest()
# padding
serialized_data += bytes(16 - len(serialized_data) % 16)
# šifrování
encrypted_data = cipher.encrypt(serialized_data)
str = base64.b64encode(iv + digest + encrypted_data)
return str
def _check_hash_match(self, msg, hashed, db):
for k in self.get_keys(db):
h = HMAC(k[1], msg, self.algorithm)
if h.hexdigest() == hashed:
return True
return False
def encode(self, msg, db):
h = HMAC(self.get_current_key(db), msg, self.algorithm)
return h.hexdigest()