def _sign(self, M, K):
if (not hasattr(self, 'x')):
raise TypeError('Private key not available in this object')
p1=self.p-1
K = Integer(K)
if (K.gcd(p1)!=1):
raise ValueError('Bad K value: GCD(K,p-1)!=1')
a=pow(self.g, K, self.p)
t=(Integer(M)-self.x*a) % p1
while t<0: t=t+p1
b=(t*K.inverse(p1)) % p1
return [int(a), int(b)]
def _sign(self, M, K):
if (not hasattr(self, 'x')):
raise TypeError('Private key not available in this object')
p1=self.p-1
K = Integer(K)
if (K.gcd(p1)!=1):
raise ValueError('Bad K value: GCD(K,p-1)!=1')
a=pow(self.g, K, self.p)
t=(Integer(M)-self.x*a) % p1
while t<0: t=t+p1
b=(t*K.inverse(p1)) % p1
return map(int, (a, b))
def _generateRSAKey(bits, randfunc=None, e=65537):
"""Modified version of pycryptodome's Crypto.RSA.generate to allow keys of any size."""
if e % 2 == 0 or e < 3:
raise ValueError(
"RSA public exponent must be a positive, odd integer larger than 2."
)
if randfunc is None:
randfunc = Random.get_random_bytes
d = n = Integer(1)
e = Integer(e)
while n.size_in_bits() != bits and d < (1 << (bits // 2)):
# Generate the prime factors of n: p and q.
# By construciton, their product is always
# 2^{bits-1} < p*q < 2^bits.
size_q = bits // 2
size_p = bits - size_q
min_p = min_q = (Integer(1) << (2 * size_q - 1)).sqrt()
if size_q != size_p:
min_p = (Integer(1) << (2 * size_p - 1)).sqrt()
def filter_p(candidate):
return candidate > min_p and (candidate - 1).gcd(e) == 1
p = _generateProbablePrime(exact_bits=size_p,
randfunc=randfunc,
prime_filter=filter_p)
min_distance = Integer(1) << max(0, bits // 2 - 100)
def filter_q(candidate):
return (candidate > min_q and (candidate - 1).gcd(e) == 1
and abs(candidate - p) > min_distance)
q = _generateProbablePrime(exact_bits=size_q,
randfunc=randfunc,
prime_filter=filter_q)
n = p * q
lcm = (p - 1).lcm(q - 1)
d = e.inverse(lcm)
if p > q:
p, q = q, p
u = p.inverse(q)
return RSA.RsaKey(n=n, e=e, d=d, p=p, q=q, u=u)
def construct(rsa_components, consistency_check=True):
r"""Construct an RSA key from a tuple of valid RSA components.
The modulus **n** must be the product of two primes.
The public exponent **e** must be odd and larger than 1.
In case of a private key, the following equations must apply:
.. math::
\begin{align}
p*q &= n \\
e*d &\equiv 1 ( \text{mod lcm} [(p-1)(q-1)]) \\
p*u &\equiv 1 ( \text{mod } q)
\end{align}
Args:
rsa_components (tuple):
A tuple of integers, with at least 2 and no
more than 6 items. The items come in the following order:
1. RSA modulus *n*.
2. Public exponent *e*.
3. Private exponent *d*.
Only required if the key is private.
4. First factor of *n* (*p*).
Optional, but the other factor *q* must also be present.
5. Second factor of *n* (*q*). Optional.
6. CRT coefficient *q*, that is :math:`p^{-1} \text{mod }q`. Optional.
consistency_check (boolean):
If ``True``, the library will verify that the provided components
fulfil the main RSA properties.
Raises:
ValueError: when the key being imported fails the most basic RSA validity checks.
Returns: An RSA key object (:class:`RsaKey`).
"""
class InputComps(object):
pass
input_comps = InputComps()
for (comp, value) in zip(('n', 'e', 'd', 'p', 'q', 'u'), rsa_components):
setattr(input_comps, comp, Integer(value))
n = input_comps.n
e = input_comps.e
if not hasattr(input_comps, 'd'):
key = RsaKey(n=n, e=e)
else:
d = input_comps.d
if hasattr(input_comps, 'q'):
p = input_comps.p
q = input_comps.q
else:
# Compute factors p and q from the private exponent d.
# We assume that n has no more than two factors.
# See 8.2.2(i) in Handbook of Applied Cryptography.
ktot = d * e - 1
# The quantity d*e-1 is a multiple of phi(n), even,
# and can be represented as t*2^s.
t = ktot
while t % 2 == 0:
t //= 2
# Cycle through all multiplicative inverses in Zn.
# The algorithm is non-deterministic, but there is a 50% chance
# any candidate a leads to successful factoring.
# See "Digitalized Signatures and Public Key Functions as Intractable
# as Factorization", M. Rabin, 1979
spotted = False
a = Integer(2)
while not spotted and a < 100:
k = Integer(t)
# Cycle through all values a^{t*2^i}=a^k
while k < ktot:
cand = pow(a, k, n)
# Check if a^k is a non-trivial root of unity (mod n)
if cand != 1 and cand != (n - 1) and pow(cand, 2, n) == 1:
# We have found a number such that (cand-1)(cand+1)=0 (mod n).
# Either of the terms divides n.
p = Integer(n).gcd(cand + 1)
spotted = True
break
k *= 2
# This value was not any good... let's try another!
a += 2
if not spotted:
raise ValueError(
"Unable to compute factors p and q from exponent d.")
# Found !
assert ((n % p) == 0)
q = n // p
if hasattr(input_comps, 'u'):
u = input_comps.u
else:
u = p.inverse(q)
# Build key object
key = RsaKey(n=n, e=e, d=d, p=p, q=q, u=u)
# Verify consistency of the key
if consistency_check:
# Modulus and public exponent must be coprime
if e <= 1 or e >= n:
raise ValueError("Invalid RSA public exponent")
if Integer(n).gcd(e) != 1:
raise ValueError("RSA public exponent is not coprime to modulus")
# For RSA, modulus must be odd
if not n & 1:
raise ValueError("RSA modulus is not odd")
if key.has_private():
# Modulus and private exponent must be coprime
if d <= 1 or d >= n:
raise ValueError("Invalid RSA private exponent")
if Integer(n).gcd(d) != 1:
raise ValueError(
"RSA private exponent is not coprime to modulus")
# Modulus must be product of 2 primes
if p * q != n:
raise ValueError("RSA factors do not match modulus")
if test_probable_prime(p) == COMPOSITE:
raise ValueError("RSA factor p is composite")
if test_probable_prime(q) == COMPOSITE:
raise ValueError("RSA factor q is composite")
# See Carmichael theorem
phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
lcm = phi // (p - 1).gcd(q - 1)
if (e * d % int(lcm)) != 1:
raise ValueError("Invalid RSA condition")
if hasattr(key, 'u'):
# CRT coefficient
if u <= 1 or u >= q:
raise ValueError("Invalid RSA component u")
if (p * u % q) != 1:
raise ValueError("Invalid RSA component u with p")
return key
def generate(bits, randfunc=None, e=65537):
"""Create a new RSA key pair.
The algorithm closely follows NIST `FIPS 186-4`_ in its
sections B.3.1 and B.3.3. The modulus is the product of
two non-strong probable primes.
Each prime passes a suitable number of Miller-Rabin tests
with random bases and a single Lucas test.
Args:
bits (integer):
Key length, or size (in bits) of the RSA modulus.
It must be at least 1024, but **2048 is recommended.**
The FIPS standard only defines 1024, 2048 and 3072.
randfunc (callable):
Function that returns random bytes.
The default is :func:`Cryptodome.Random.get_random_bytes`.
e (integer):
Public RSA exponent. It must be an odd positive integer.
It is typically a small number with very few ones in its
binary representation.
The FIPS standard requires the public exponent to be
at least 65537 (the default).
Returns: an RSA key object (:class:`RsaKey`, with private key).
.. _FIPS 186-4: http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
"""
if bits < 1024:
raise ValueError("RSA modulus length must be >= 1024")
if e % 2 == 0 or e < 3:
raise ValueError(
"RSA public exponent must be a positive, odd integer larger than 2."
)
if randfunc is None:
randfunc = Random.get_random_bytes
d = n = Integer(1)
e = Integer(e)
while n.size_in_bits() != bits and d < (1 << (bits // 2)):
# Generate the prime factors of n: p and q.
# By construciton, their product is always
# 2^{bits-1} < p*q < 2^bits.
size_q = bits // 2
size_p = bits - size_q
min_p = min_q = (Integer(1) << (2 * size_q - 1)).sqrt()
if size_q != size_p:
min_p = (Integer(1) << (2 * size_p - 1)).sqrt()
def filter_p(candidate):
return candidate > min_p and (candidate - 1).gcd(e) == 1
p = generate_probable_prime(exact_bits=size_p,
randfunc=randfunc,
prime_filter=filter_p)
min_distance = Integer(1) << (bits // 2 - 100)
def filter_q(candidate):
return (candidate > min_q and (candidate - 1).gcd(e) == 1
and abs(candidate - p) > min_distance)
q = generate_probable_prime(exact_bits=size_q,
randfunc=randfunc,
prime_filter=filter_q)
n = p * q
lcm = (p - 1).lcm(q - 1)
d = e.inverse(lcm)
if p > q:
p, q = q, p
u = p.inverse(q)
return RsaKey(n=n, e=e, d=d, p=p, q=q, u=u)
def construct(rsa_components, consistency_check=True):
"""Construct an RSA key from a tuple of valid RSA components.
The modulus **n** must be the product of two primes.
The public exponent **e** must be odd and larger than 1.
In case of a private key, the following equations must apply:
- e != 1
- p*q = n
- e*d = 1 mod lcm[(p-1)(q-1)]
- p*u = 1 mod q
:Parameters:
rsa_components : tuple
A tuple of long integers, with at least 2 and no
more than 6 items. The items come in the following order:
1. RSA modulus (*n*).
2. Public exponent (*e*).
3. Private exponent (*d*).
Only required if the key is private.
4. First factor of *n* (*p*).
Optional, but factor q must also be present.
5. Second factor of *n* (*q*). Optional.
6. CRT coefficient, *(1/p) mod q* (*u*). Optional.
consistency_check : boolean
If *True*, the library will verify that the provided components
fulfil the main RSA properties.
:Raise ValueError:
When the key being imported fails the most basic RSA validity checks.
:Return: An RSA key object (`RsaKey`).
"""
class InputComps(object):
pass
input_comps = InputComps()
for (comp, value) in zip(('n', 'e', 'd', 'p', 'q', 'u'), rsa_components):
setattr(input_comps, comp, Integer(value))
n = input_comps.n
e = input_comps.e
if not hasattr(input_comps, 'd'):
key = RsaKey(n=n, e=e)
else:
d = input_comps.d
if hasattr(input_comps, 'q'):
p = input_comps.p
q = input_comps.q
else:
# Compute factors p and q from the private exponent d.
# We assume that n has no more than two factors.
# See 8.2.2(i) in Handbook of Applied Cryptography.
ktot = d * e - 1
# The quantity d*e-1 is a multiple of phi(n), even,
# and can be represented as t*2^s.
t = ktot
while t % 2 == 0:
t //= 2
# Cycle through all multiplicative inverses in Zn.
# The algorithm is non-deterministic, but there is a 50% chance
# any candidate a leads to successful factoring.
# See "Digitalized Signatures and Public Key Functions as Intractable
# as Factorization", M. Rabin, 1979
spotted = False
a = Integer(2)
while not spotted and a < 100:
k = Integer(t)
# Cycle through all values a^{t*2^i}=a^k
while k < ktot:
cand = pow(a, k, n)
# Check if a^k is a non-trivial root of unity (mod n)
if cand != 1 and cand != (n - 1) and pow(cand, 2, n) == 1:
# We have found a number such that (cand-1)(cand+1)=0 (mod n).
# Either of the terms divides n.
p = Integer(n).gcd(cand + 1)
spotted = True
break
k *= 2
# This value was not any good... let's try another!
a += 2
if not spotted:
raise ValueError("Unable to compute factors p and q from exponent d.")
# Found !
assert ((n % p) == 0)
q = n // p
if hasattr(input_comps, 'u'):
u = input_comps.u
else:
u = p.inverse(q)
# Build key object
key = RsaKey(n=n, e=e, d=d, p=p, q=q, u=u)
# Very consistency of the key
fmt_error = False
if consistency_check:
# Modulus and public exponent must be coprime
fmt_error = e <= 1 or e >= n
fmt_error |= Integer(n).gcd(e) != 1
# For RSA, modulus must be odd
fmt_error |= not n & 1
if not fmt_error and key.has_private():
# Modulus and private exponent must be coprime
fmt_error = d <= 1 or d >= n
fmt_error |= Integer(n).gcd(d) != 1
# Modulus must be product of 2 primes
fmt_error |= (p * q != n)
fmt_error |= test_probable_prime(p) == COMPOSITE
fmt_error |= test_probable_prime(q) == COMPOSITE
# See Carmichael theorem
phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
lcm = phi // (p - 1).gcd(q - 1)
fmt_error |= (e * d % int(lcm)) != 1
if hasattr(key, 'u'):
# CRT coefficient
fmt_error |= u <= 1 or u >= q
fmt_error |= (p * u % q) != 1
else:
fmt_error = True
if fmt_error:
raise ValueError("Invalid RSA key components")
return key
def generate(bits, randfunc=None, e=65537):
"""Create a new RSA key.
The algorithm closely follows NIST `FIPS 186-4`_ in its
sections B.3.1 and B.3.3. The modulus is the product of
two non-strong probable primes.
Each prime passes a suitable number of Miller-Rabin tests
with random bases and a single Lucas test.
:Parameters:
bits : integer
Key length, or size (in bits) of the RSA modulus.
It must be at least 1024.
The FIPS standard only defines 1024, 2048 and 3072.
randfunc : callable
Function that returns random bytes.
The default is `Cryptodome.Random.get_random_bytes`.
e : integer
Public RSA exponent. It must be an odd positive integer.
It is typically a small number with very few ones in its
binary representation.
The FIPS standard requires the public exponent to be
at least 65537 (the default).
:Return: An RSA key object (`RsaKey`).
.. _FIPS 186-4: http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
"""
if bits < 1024:
raise ValueError("RSA modulus length must be >= 1024")
if e % 2 == 0 or e < 3:
raise ValueError("RSA public exponent must be a positive, odd integer larger than 2.")
if randfunc is None:
randfunc = Random.get_random_bytes
d = n = Integer(1)
e = Integer(e)
while n.size_in_bits() != bits and d < (1 << (bits // 2)):
# Generate the prime factors of n: p and q.
# By construciton, their product is always
# 2^{bits-1} < p*q < 2^bits.
size_q = bits // 2
size_p = bits - size_q
min_p = min_q = (Integer(1) << (2 * size_q - 1)).sqrt()
if size_q != size_p:
min_p = (Integer(1) << (2 * size_p - 1)).sqrt()
def filter_p(candidate):
return candidate > min_p and (candidate - 1).gcd(e) == 1
p = generate_probable_prime(exact_bits=size_p,
randfunc=randfunc,
prime_filter=filter_p)
min_distance = Integer(1) << (bits // 2 - 100)
def filter_q(candidate):
return (candidate > min_q and
(candidate - 1).gcd(e) == 1 and
abs(candidate - p) > min_distance)
q = generate_probable_prime(exact_bits=size_q,
randfunc=randfunc,
prime_filter=filter_q)
n = p * q
lcm = (p - 1).lcm(q - 1)
d = e.inverse(lcm)
if p > q:
p, q = q, p
u = p.inverse(q)
return RsaKey(n=n, e=e, d=d, p=p, q=q, u=u)
def construct(rsa_components, consistency_check=True):
"""Construct an RSA key from a tuple of valid RSA components.
The modulus **n** must be the product of two primes.
The public exponent **e** must be odd and larger than 1.
In case of a private key, the following equations must apply:
- e != 1
- p*q = n
- e*d = 1 mod lcm[(p-1)(q-1)]
- p*u = 1 mod q
:Parameters:
rsa_components : tuple
A tuple of long integers, with at least 2 and no
more than 6 items. The items come in the following order:
1. RSA modulus (*n*).
2. Public exponent (*e*).
3. Private exponent (*d*).
Only required if the key is private.
4. First factor of *n* (*p*).
Optional, but factor q must also be present.
5. Second factor of *n* (*q*). Optional.
6. CRT coefficient, *(1/p) mod q* (*u*). Optional.
consistency_check : boolean
If *True*, the library will verify that the provided components
fulfil the main RSA properties.
:Raise ValueError:
When the key being imported fails the most basic RSA validity checks.
:Return: An RSA key object (`RsaKey`).
"""
class InputComps(object):
pass
input_comps = InputComps()
for (comp, value) in zip(('n', 'e', 'd', 'p', 'q', 'u'), rsa_components):
setattr(input_comps, comp, Integer(value))
n = input_comps.n
e = input_comps.e
if not hasattr(input_comps, 'd'):
key = RsaKey(n=n, e=e)
else:
d = input_comps.d
if hasattr(input_comps, 'q'):
p = input_comps.p
q = input_comps.q
else:
# Compute factors p and q from the private exponent d.
# We assume that n has no more than two factors.
# See 8.2.2(i) in Handbook of Applied Cryptography.
ktot = d * e - 1
# The quantity d*e-1 is a multiple of phi(n), even,
# and can be represented as t*2^s.
t = ktot
while t % 2 == 0:
t //= 2
# Cycle through all multiplicative inverses in Zn.
# The algorithm is non-deterministic, but there is a 50% chance
# any candidate a leads to successful factoring.
# See "Digitalized Signatures and Public Key Functions as Intractable
# as Factorization", M. Rabin, 1979
spotted = False
a = Integer(2)
while not spotted and a < 100:
k = Integer(t)
# Cycle through all values a^{t*2^i}=a^k
while k < ktot:
cand = pow(a, k, n)
# Check if a^k is a non-trivial root of unity (mod n)
if cand != 1 and cand != (n - 1) and pow(cand, 2, n) == 1:
# We have found a number such that (cand-1)(cand+1)=0 (mod n).
# Either of the terms divides n.
p = Integer(n).gcd(cand + 1)
spotted = True
break
k *= 2
# This value was not any good... let's try another!
a += 2
if not spotted:
raise ValueError("Unable to compute factors p and q from exponent d.")
# Found !
assert ((n % p) == 0)
q = n // p
if hasattr(input_comps, 'u'):
u = input_comps.u
else:
u = p.inverse(q)
# Build key object
key = RsaKey(n=n, e=e, d=d, p=p, q=q, u=u)
# Very consistency of the key
fmt_error = False
if consistency_check:
# Modulus and public exponent must be coprime
fmt_error = e <= 1 or e >= n
fmt_error |= Integer(n).gcd(e) != 1
# For RSA, modulus must be odd
fmt_error |= not n & 1
if not fmt_error and key.has_private():
# Modulus and private exponent must be coprime
fmt_error = d <= 1 or d >= n
fmt_error |= Integer(n).gcd(d) != 1
# Modulus must be product of 2 primes
fmt_error |= (p * q != n)
fmt_error |= test_probable_prime(p) == COMPOSITE
fmt_error |= test_probable_prime(q) == COMPOSITE
# See Carmichael theorem
phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
lcm = phi // (p - 1).gcd(q - 1)
fmt_error |= (e * d % int(lcm)) != 1
if hasattr(key, 'u'):
# CRT coefficient
fmt_error |= u <= 1 or u >= q
fmt_error |= (p * u % q) != 1
else:
fmt_error = True
if fmt_error:
raise ValueError("Invalid RSA key components")
return key
def construct(rsa_components, consistency_check=True):
r"""Construct an RSA key from a tuple of valid RSA components.
The modulus **n** must be the product of two primes.
The public exponent **e** must be odd and larger than 1.
In case of a private key, the following equations must apply:
.. math::
\begin{align}
p*q &= n \\
e*d &\equiv 1 ( \text{mod lcm} [(p-1)(q-1)]) \\
p*u &\equiv 1 ( \text{mod } q)
\end{align}
Args:
rsa_components (tuple):
A tuple of integers, with at least 2 and no
more than 6 items. The items come in the following order:
1. RSA modulus *n*.
2. Public exponent *e*.
3. Private exponent *d*.
Only required if the key is private.
4. First factor of *n* (*p*).
Optional, but the other factor *q* must also be present.
5. Second factor of *n* (*q*). Optional.
6. CRT coefficient *q*, that is :math:`p^{-1} \text{mod }q`. Optional.
consistency_check (boolean):
If ``True``, the library will verify that the provided components
fulfil the main RSA properties.
Raises:
ValueError: when the key being imported fails the most basic RSA validity checks.
Returns: An RSA key object (:class:`RsaKey`).
"""
class InputComps(object):
pass
input_comps = InputComps()
for (comp, value) in zip(('n', 'e', 'd', 'p', 'q', 'u'), rsa_components):
setattr(input_comps, comp, Integer(value))
n = input_comps.n
e = input_comps.e
if not hasattr(input_comps, 'd'):
key = RsaKey(n=n, e=e)
else:
d = input_comps.d
if hasattr(input_comps, 'q'):
p = input_comps.p
q = input_comps.q
else:
# Compute factors p and q from the private exponent d.
# We assume that n has no more than two factors.
# See 8.2.2(i) in Handbook of Applied Cryptography.
ktot = d * e - 1
# The quantity d*e-1 is a multiple of phi(n), even,
# and can be represented as t*2^s.
t = ktot
while t % 2 == 0:
t //= 2
# Cycle through all multiplicative inverses in Zn.
# The algorithm is non-deterministic, but there is a 50% chance
# any candidate a leads to successful factoring.
# See "Digitalized Signatures and Public Key Functions as Intractable
# as Factorization", M. Rabin, 1979
spotted = False
a = Integer(2)
while not spotted and a < 100:
k = Integer(t)
# Cycle through all values a^{t*2^i}=a^k
while k < ktot:
cand = pow(a, k, n)
# Check if a^k is a non-trivial root of unity (mod n)
if cand != 1 and cand != (n - 1) and pow(cand, 2, n) == 1:
# We have found a number such that (cand-1)(cand+1)=0 (mod n).
# Either of the terms divides n.
p = Integer(n).gcd(cand + 1)
spotted = True
break
k *= 2
# This value was not any good... let's try another!
a += 2
if not spotted:
raise ValueError("Unable to compute factors p and q from exponent d.")
# Found !
assert ((n % p) == 0)
q = n // p
if hasattr(input_comps, 'u'):
u = input_comps.u
else:
u = p.inverse(q)
# Build key object
key = RsaKey(n=n, e=e, d=d, p=p, q=q, u=u)
# Verify consistency of the key
if consistency_check:
# Modulus and public exponent must be coprime
if e <= 1 or e >= n:
raise ValueError("Invalid RSA public exponent")
if Integer(n).gcd(e) != 1:
raise ValueError("RSA public exponent is not coprime to modulus")
# For RSA, modulus must be odd
if not n & 1:
raise ValueError("RSA modulus is not odd")
if key.has_private():
# Modulus and private exponent must be coprime
if d <= 1 or d >= n:
raise ValueError("Invalid RSA private exponent")
if Integer(n).gcd(d) != 1:
raise ValueError("RSA private exponent is not coprime to modulus")
# Modulus must be product of 2 primes
if p * q != n:
raise ValueError("RSA factors do not match modulus")
if test_probable_prime(p) == COMPOSITE:
raise ValueError("RSA factor p is composite")
if test_probable_prime(q) == COMPOSITE:
raise ValueError("RSA factor q is composite")
# See Carmichael theorem
phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
lcm = phi // (p - 1).gcd(q - 1)
if (e * d % int(lcm)) != 1:
raise ValueError("Invalid RSA condition")
if hasattr(key, 'u'):
# CRT coefficient
if u <= 1 or u >= q:
raise ValueError("Invalid RSA component u")
if (p * u % q) != 1:
raise ValueError("Invalid RSA component u with p")
return key
