def ValidateCertificateSignature(self, signed_cert, signing_cert):
"""Given a cert signed by another cert, validates the signature."""
# First the naive way -- note this does not check expiry / use etc.
signed = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(der_encoder.encode(signed_cert), default_backend())
signing = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(der_encoder.encode(signing_cert), default_backend())
verifier = signing.public_key().verifier(signed.signature, padding.PKCS1v15(), signed.signature_hash_algorithm)
verifier.update(signed.tbs_certificate_bytes)
try:
verifier.verify()
except Exception as e:
raise Asn1Error('1: Validation of cert signature failed: {}'.format(e))
def get_certificate(self, certificate):
cert = requests.get(certificate)
if cert.status_code != 200:
raise ClientError('Certificate fetch failed: {}'.format(
cert.json()['detail']))
return x509.load_der_x509_certificate(cert.content, backend)
def findCertificateFor( self, subject ):
# Defer loading the Certificates from disk until they are requested.
#
if self._trustedCertificates is None:
self._trustedCertificates = []
paths = glob.glob( os.path.join( self._directoryPath, '*.{0}'.format( self._fileExtension ) ) )
for path in paths:
with open( path, 'rb' ) as inputFile:
data = inputFile.read()
if self._fileExtension == '.der':
certificate = x509.load_der_x509_certificate( data, backends.default_backend() )
elif self._fileExtension == '.pem':
certificate = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate( data, backends.default_backend() )
else:
logging.ERROR( 'Unsupported Certificate file extension: {0}.'.format( self._fileExtension ) )
# logging.WARNING( 'The file {0} does not have the specified extension: {1}.'.format( path, self._fileExtension ) )
self._trustedCertificates.append( certificate )
for certificate in self._trustedCertificates:
# Is this doing a value comparison? -rds
if certificate.subject == subject:
return certificate
def main():
tls_name = '77fa5113ab6a532ce2e6901f3bd3351c0db5845e0b1b5fb09907808d._smimecert.getdnsapi.org'
if len(sys.argv) == 2:
tls_name = sys.argv[1]
c = getdns.Context()
extensions = { 'dnssec_return_status' : getdns.EXTENSION_TRUE }
results = c.general(tls_name, request_type=getdns.RRTYPE_TLSA, extensions=extensions)
if results.replies_full['status'] != getdns.RESPSTATUS_GOOD:
print 'query status is {0}'.format(results.status)
sys.exit(1)
else:
record = get_first_secure_response(results)
cert_record = record['rdata']['certificate_association_data']
try:
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(bytes(cert_record), default_backend())
rsakey = cert.public_key()
encrypted = rsakey.encrypt("A chunk of text", padding.OAEP(
mgf=padding.MGF1(algorithm=hashes.SHA1()),
algorithm=hashes.SHA1(),
label=None) )
print encrypted.encode('base64')
except Exception as e:
print ('Error: {0}'.format(e.message))
sys.exit(1)
def get_cert(email, dump=False):
"""
Get E-cert from HKPost LDAP server
"""
# Connect to server
server = Server('ldap1.hongkongpost.gov.hk', get_info=ALL)
conn = Connection(server, auto_bind=True)
conn.start_tls()
# Get RSA cert
conn.search('o=hongkong post e-cert (personal),c=hk', '(sn='+email+'*)')
a = json.loads(conn.entries[-1].entry_to_json())['dn']
OU = a[a.find('OU=')+3:a.find('OU=')+13]
conn.search('EMAIL='+email+',OU='+str(OU)+
',o=hongkong post e-cert (personal),c=hk',
'(objectclass=*)', search_scope=LEVEL,
dereference_aliases=DEREF_BASE,
attributes=[ALL_ATTRIBUTES, ALL_OPERATIONAL_ATTRIBUTES])
cert = conn.entries[0].entry_get_raw_attribute("userCertificate;binary")[0]
# Cert info
if dump:
print(conn.entries[0].entry_get_dn())
print(base64.b64encode(cert))
# get x509 der public
pub_key = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(cert, default_backend()).public_key()
return pub_key
def test_transports_from_cert(self):
provider = MetadataProvider(EMPTY_RESOLVER)
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(ATTESTATION_CERT_WITH_TRANSPORT,
default_backend())
attestation = provider.get_attestation(cert)
assert attestation.transports == Transport.USB | Transport.NFC
def scan(self, offset=0, maxlen=None):
for hit in super(CertScanner, self).scan(offset=offset, maxlen=maxlen):
signature = self.address_space.read(hit + 4, 3)
size = self.profile.Object(
"unsigned be short", offset=hit+2, vm=self.address_space)
description = None
if signature.startswith(b"\x30\x82"):
data = self.address_space.read(hit, size + 4)
if x509:
try:
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(data, default_backend())
description = dict((
attr.oid._name, attr.value) for attr in cert.subject)
except Exception:
pass
yield hit, "X509", data, description
elif signature.startswith(b"\x02\x01\x00"):
data = self.address_space.read(hit, size + 4)
if x509:
try:
pem = (b"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n" +
base64.b64encode(data) +
b"-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----")
key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(
pem, password=None, backend=default_backend())
description = ""
except Exception:
pass
yield hit, "RSA", data, description
def verify_hit(self, hit, address_space):
signature = address_space.read(hit + 4, 3)
size = self.profile.Object(
"unsigned be short", offset=hit+2, vm=address_space)
description = None
if signature.startswith(b"\x30\x82"):
data = address_space.read(hit, size + 4)
if x509:
try:
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(data, default_backend())
description = dict((
attr.oid._name, attr.value) for attr in cert.subject)
except Exception:
pass
return "X509", data, description
elif signature.startswith(b"\x02\x01\x00"):
data = address_space.read(hit, size + 4)
if x509:
try:
pem = (b"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n" +
base64.b64encode(data) +
b"-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----")
key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(
pem, password=None, backend=default_backend())
description = ""
except Exception:
pass
return "RSA", data, description
return None, None, None
def token_signature_key(self):
cache_alias = self.get_setting("token_signature_key_cache_alias", DEFAULT_CACHE_ALIAS)
cache = caches[cache_alias]
cache_key = ":".join([
"allauth_adfs",
"ADFSOAuth2Adapter",
md5(self.federation_metadata_url).hexdigest(),
"token_signature_key",
])
pub = cache.get(cache_key)
if pub is None:
xml = self.federation_metadata_xml
signature = xml.getElementsByTagName("ds:Signature")[0]
cert_b64 = signature.getElementsByTagName("X509Certificate")[0].firstChild.nodeValue
cert_str = decode_payload_segment(cert_b64)
cert_obj = load_der_x509_certificate(cert_str, default_backend())
pub = cert_obj.public_key().public_bytes(
encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
)
timeout = self.get_setting("token_signature_key_cache_timeout", 0, required=False)
cache.set(cache_key, pub, timeout)
return pub
def complete_login(self, request, app, token, **kwargs):
cert_der = base64.b64decode(self.cert)
x509_cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(cert_der, backend=x509_backend)
jwt_token = jwt.decode(token.token, key=x509_cert.public_key(),
leeway=10, options={'verify_aud': False})
data = self.clean_attributes(jwt_token)
return self.get_provider().sociallogin_from_response(request, data)
def on_get(self, req, resp):
ids = req.get_param("ids")
if isinstance(ids, str):
ids = ids.split(",")
codes = set([j for j in ids if re.match("[3-6]\d{10}", j)])
if not codes:
raise falcon.HTTPBadRequest("No id codes specified")
users = dict()
for serial, esteid, digiid in self.get_certificates(ids):
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(esteid, default_backend())
common_name, = cert.subject.get_attributes_for_oid(NameOID.COMMON_NAME)
given_name, = cert.subject.get_attributes_for_oid(NameOID.GIVEN_NAME)
surname, = cert.subject.get_attributes_for_oid(NameOID.SURNAME)
ext = cert.extensions.get_extension_for_oid(ExtensionOID.SUBJECT_ALTERNATIVE_NAME)
mail, = ext.value.get_values_for_type(x509.RFC822Name)
slug = (given_name.value[0] + surname.value).replace("-", "").replace(" ", "")
username = unicodedata.normalize("NFKD", slug.lower()).encode("ascii", "ignore")
century = str((int(serial[0])-1) // 2 + 18)
users[serial] = dict(
gender="M" if serial[0] in "13579" else "F",
birthday = datetime.strptime(century + serial[1:7], "%Y%m%d").date(),
cn=common_name.value,
gn=given_name.value.title(),
sn=surname.value.title(),
mail=mail,
name=username,
certificates = [b64encode(j) for j in (esteid,digiid) if j],
)
return users
def read_certificate(self, slot):
data = _parse_tlv_dict(self.get_data(OBJ.from_slot(slot)))
if TAG.CERT_INFO in data: # Not available in attestation slot
if data[TAG.CERT_INFO] != b'\0':
raise ValueError('Compressed certificates are not supported!')
return x509.load_der_x509_certificate(data[TAG.CERTIFICATE],
default_backend())
def got_cert(certr):
objects.append(
Certificate(
x509.load_der_x509_certificate(
certr.body, default_backend())
.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM)))
return certr
def bind(user, version, registration_data, client_data, description=''):
security_user = SecurityUser.from_user(user, current_app.private_userdb)
enrollment_data = session.pop('_u2f_enroll_', None)
if not enrollment_data:
current_app.logger.error('Found no U2F enrollment data in session.')
return {'_error': True, 'message': 'security.u2f.missing_enrollment_data'}
data = {
'version': version,
'registrationData': registration_data,
'clientData': client_data
}
device, der_cert = complete_registration(enrollment_data, data, current_app.config['U2F_FACETS'])
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(der_cert, default_backend())
pem_cert = crypto.dump_certificate(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, cert)
if not isinstance(pem_cert, six.string_types):
pem_cert = pem_cert.decode('utf-8')
u2f_token = U2F(version=device['version'], keyhandle=device['keyHandle'], app_id=device['appId'],
public_key=device['publicKey'], attest_cert=pem_cert, description=description,
application='eduid_security', created_ts=True)
security_user.credentials.add(u2f_token)
save_and_sync_user(security_user)
current_app.stats.count(name='u2f_token_bind')
return {
'message': 'security.u2f_register_success',
'credentials': compile_credential_list(security_user)
}
def getThumbprintFromx509():
###
# cryptography library
###
filename = "/home/dougie/onedrive/orion/security/jwt/cert.der"
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(data=open(filename, "rb").read(), backend=default_backend())
# Issuer
orgName = cert.issuer.get_attributes_for_oid(NameOID.ORGANIZATION_NAME) #organizationName
print("Issuer: {}".format(orgName[0].value))
# SHA1 fingerprint (byte array)
fp = cert.fingerprint(hashes.SHA1())
# Convert from Binary to Hex String
raw_fp = binascii.hexlify(fp)
# Convert hex to string
fingerprint = raw_fp.decode('utf-8')
#WS02 method of encoding the fingerprint
print("SHA1 -crypto thumbprint: {}".format(fingerprint)) #hex encoded
fingerprint_enc = base64.b64encode(fingerprint.encode())
print("SHA1 -crypto (encoded wso2): {}".format(fingerprint_enc.decode('utf-8')))
# Base64 URL Encoded fingerprint (x5t)
# Could use one of the following wso2 or base64 url encoded der
# base64.b64encode(fingerprint.encode())
# fingerprint_bytes_enc.decode('utf-8').rstrip('=')
fingerprint_bytes_enc = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(fp)
x5t = fingerprint_bytes_enc.decode('utf-8').rstrip('=')
print("SHA1 -crypto (encoded)",x5t)
def load_certificate(path):
_, ext = os.path.splitext(path)
with open(path, "rb") as f:
if ext == ".pem":
return x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(f.read(), default_backend())
else:
return x509.load_der_x509_certificate(f.read(), default_backend())
def test_provider(self):
provider = MetadataProvider(YUBICO_RESOLVER)
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(ATTESTATION_CERT,
default_backend())
attestation = provider.get_attestation(cert)
assert attestation.trusted
def test_sct_embedding():
if not os.environ.get('BOULDER_CONFIG_DIR', '').startswith("test/config-next"):
return
certr, authzs = auth_and_issue([random_domain()])
certBytes = urllib2.urlopen(certr.uri).read()
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(certBytes, default_backend())
# make sure there is no poison extension
try:
cert.extensions.get_extension_for_oid(x509.ObjectIdentifier("1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.3"))
raise Exception("certificate contains CT poison extension")
except x509.ExtensionNotFound:
# do nothing
pass
# make sure there is a SCT list extension
try:
sctList = cert.extensions.get_extension_for_oid(x509.ObjectIdentifier("1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2"))
except x509.ExtensionNotFound:
raise Exception("certificate doesn't contain SCT list extension")
if len(sctList.value) != 2:
raise Exception("SCT list contains wrong number of SCTs")
for sct in sctList.value:
if sct.version != x509.certificate_transparency.Version.v1:
raise Exception("SCT contains wrong version")
if sct.entry_type != x509.certificate_transparency.LogEntryType.PRE_CERTIFICATE:
raise Exception("SCT contains wrong entry type")
delta = sct.timestamp - datetime.datetime.now()
if abs(delta) > datetime.timedelta(hours=1):
raise Exception("Delta between SCT timestamp and now was too great "
"%s vs %s (%s)" % (sct.timestamp, datetime.datetime.now(), delta))
def verify_sig(self, encoded_cert):
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(encoded_cert, default_backend())
crypto.verify(
self.ca.cert,
cert.signature,
cert.tbs_certificate_bytes,
'sha256')
def b642cert(data):
"""
Return cert_dict similar to old rsa_x509_pem backend. Shouldn't
be used by new code.
@param data The certificate as base64 string (i.e. pem without header/footer)
"""
cert = load_der_x509_certificate(standard_b64decode(data), backend=default_backend())
return _cert2dict(cert)
def add_device(self, bind_data, cert_der, transports=0):
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(cert_der, default_backend())
certificate = db.session.query(Certificate) \
.filter(Certificate.fingerprint == _calculate_fingerprint(cert)) \
.first()
if certificate is None:
certificate = Certificate(cert)
return Device(self, bind_data, certificate, transports)
def _cert_fingerprint(cert_pem):
if "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE" in cert_pem:
cert = load_pem_x509_certificate(cert_pem, backend=default_backend())
else:
cert = load_der_x509_certificate(base64.standard_b64decode(cert_pem), backend=default_backend())
fingerprint = hexlify(cert.fingerprint(hashes.SHA1())).lower().decode('ascii')
fingerprint = ":".join([fingerprint[x:x + 2] for x in xrange(0, len(fingerprint), 2)])
return fingerprint, cert
def resolve(self, cert):
if isinstance(cert, bytes):
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(cert, default_backend())
issuer = cert.issuer \
.get_attributes_for_oid(NameOID.COMMON_NAME)[0].value
for issuer in self._certs.get(issuer, []):
if self._verify_cert(cert, issuer.public_key()):
return self._metadata[issuer]
return None
def get_user_details(self, response):
leeway = self.setting('LEEWAY', self.LEEWAY)
cert_der = base64.b64decode(self.cert)
x509_cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(cert_der, backend=x509_backend)
jwt_token = jwt.decode(response['access_token'], key=x509_cert.public_key(), leeway=leeway, options={
'verify_aud': False
})
return self.clean_attributes(jwt_token)
def load_der_x509_certificate(data):
"""
Load an X.509 certificate in DER format.
:returns: a ``IPACertificate`` object.
:raises: ``ValueError`` if unable to load the certificate.
"""
return IPACertificate(
crypto_x509.load_der_x509_certificate(data, backend=default_backend())
)
def get_attestation(self, device_or_cert):
if isinstance(device_or_cert, Device):
device = device_or_cert
if device.certificate_id not in self._cache:
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(device.certificate.der,
default_backend())
attestation = self._provider.get_attestation(cert)
self._cache[device.certificate_id] = attestation
return self._cache[device.certificate_id]
else:
return self._provider.get_attestation(device_or_cert)
def _get_client_identity(self):
certificate_data = self._connection.getpeercert(binary_form=True)
try:
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(
certificate_data,
backends.default_backend()
)
except Exception:
# This should never get raised "in theory," as the ssl socket
# should fail to connect non-TLS connections before the session
# gets created. This is a failsafe in case that protection fails.
raise exceptions.PermissionDenied(
"Failure loading the client certificate from the session "
"connection. Could not retrieve client identity."
)
if self._enable_tls_client_auth:
try:
extended_key_usage = cert.extensions.get_extension_for_oid(
x509.oid.ExtensionOID.EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE
).value
except x509.ExtensionNotFound:
raise exceptions.PermissionDenied(
"The extended key usage extension is missing from the "
"client certificate. Session client identity unavailable."
)
if x509.oid.ExtendedKeyUsageOID.CLIENT_AUTH not in \
extended_key_usage:
raise exceptions.PermissionDenied(
"The extended key usage extension is not marked for "
"client authentication in the client certificate. Session "
"client identity unavailable."
)
client_identities = cert.subject.get_attributes_for_oid(
x509.oid.NameOID.COMMON_NAME
)
if len(client_identities) > 0:
if len(client_identities) > 1:
self._logger.warning(
"Multiple client identities found. Using the first "
"one processed."
)
client_identity = client_identities[0].value
self._logger.info(
"Session client identity: {0}".format(client_identity)
)
return client_identity
else:
raise exceptions.PermissionDenied(
"The client certificate does not define a subject common "
"name. Session client identity unavailable."
)
def test_versioning_older(self):
resolver = create_resolver(YUBICO)
newer = json.loads(json.dumps(YUBICO))
newer['trustedCertificates'] = []
resolver.add_metadata(newer)
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(ATTESTATION_CERT, default_backend())
metadata = resolver.resolve(cert)
assert metadata.identifier == '2fb54029-7613-4f1d-94f1-fb876c14a6fe'
def _data_from_options(self, **options):
issuer = None
subject = None
if not self.certmapdata_options & set(options):
raise RequirementError(name=u'certmapdata')
if ({u'issuer', u'subject'} & set(options) and
{u'ipacertmapdata', u'certificate'} & set(options)):
raise MutuallyExclusiveError(reason=u'Mutually exclusive options '
u'provided at the same time.')
if u'issuer' in options and u'subject' not in options:
raise RequirementError(name=u'subject')
if u'subject' in options and u'issuer' not in options:
raise RequirementError(name=u'issuer')
if {u'ipacertmapdata', u'certificate'} & set(options):
try:
data = options[u'ipacertmapdata']
except KeyError:
data = []
else:
if not isinstance(data, list):
data = [data]
try:
certs = options[u'certificate']
except KeyError:
certs = []
else:
if not isinstance(certs, list):
certs = [certs]
for cert in certs:
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(
base64.b64decode(cert),
backend=default_backend()
)
issuer = DN(cert.issuer).x500_text()
subject = DN(cert.subject).x500_text()
data.append(
u'X509:<I>{i}<S>{s}'.format(i=issuer, s=subject)
)
else:
issuer = DN(options[u'issuer']).x500_text()
subject = DN(options[u'subject']).x500_text()
data = [u'X509:<I>{i}<S>{s}'.format(i=issuer, s=subject)]
return set(data)
def test_versioning_newer(self):
resolver = create_resolver(YUBICO)
newer = json.loads(json.dumps(YUBICO))
newer['version'] = newer['version'] + 1
newer['trustedCertificates'] = []
resolver.add_metadata(newer)
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(ATTESTATION_CERT, default_backend())
metadata = resolver.resolve(cert)
assert metadata is None
def read_tshark(self, path):
"""Read TCP and UDP packets from file given by path.
Parameters
----------
path : string
Path to .pcap file to read.
Returns
-------
result : np.array of shape=(n_packets, n_features)
Where features consist of:
[0]: Filename of capture
[1]: Protocol TCP/UDP
[2]: TCP/UDP stream identifier
[3]: Timestamp of packet
[4]: Length of packet
[5]: IP packet source
[6]: IP packet destination
[7]: TCP/UDP packet source port
[8]: TCP/UDP packet destination port
[9]: SSL/TLS certificate if exists, else None
"""
# Create Tshark command
command = ["tshark", "-r", path, "-Tfields",
"-e", "frame.time_epoch",
"-e", "tcp.stream",
"-e", "udp.stream",
"-e", "ip.proto",
"-e", "ip.src",
"-e", "tcp.srcport",
"-e", "udp.srcport",
"-e", "ip.dst",
"-e", "tcp.dstport",
"-e", "udp.dstport",
"-e", "ip.len",
"-e", "ssl.handshake.certificate"]
# Initialise result
result = list()
# Call Tshark on packets
process = Popen(command, stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE)
# Get output
out, err = process.communicate()
# Read each packet
for packet in filter(None, out.decode('utf-8').split('\n')):
# Get all data from packets
packet = packet.split()
# Perform check on packets
if len(packet) < 8: continue
# Perform check on multiple ip addresses
packet[3] = packet[3].split(',')[0]
packet[5] = packet[5].split(',')[0]
packet[7] = packet[7].replace(',', '')
# Parse certificate
if len(packet) > 8:
# Get first certificate
cert = packet[8].split(',')[0]
# Transform to hex
cert = bytes.fromhex(cert.replace(':', ''))
# Read as certificate
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(cert, default_backend())
# Set packet as serial number
packet[8] = cert.serial_number
else:
packet.append(None)
# Add packet to result
result.append([path] + packet)
# Get result as numpy array
result = np.asarray(result)
# Check if any items exist
if not result.shape[0]:
return np.zeros((0, 8), dtype=object)
# Change protocol number to text
protocols = {'17': 'udp', '6': 'tcp'}
result[:, 3] = [protocols.get(x, 'unknown') for x in result[:, 3]]
# Return in original order
return result[:, [0, 3, 2, 1, 8, 4, 6, 5, 7, 9]]
def read_pyshark(self, path):
"""Read TCP and UDP packets from file given by path.
Parameters
----------
path : string
Path to .pcap file to read.
Returns
-------
result : np.array of shape=(n_packets, n_features)
Where features consist of:
[0]: Filename of capture
[1]: Protocol TCP/UDP
[2]: TCP/UDP stream identifier
[3]: Timestamp of packet
[4]: Length of packet
[5]: IP packet source
[6]: IP packet destination
[7]: TCP/UDP packet source port
[8]: TCP/UDP packet destination port
[9]: SSL/TLS certificate if exists, else None
"""
# If verbose, print which file is currently being read
if self.verbose:
counter_a = 0
counter_b = 0
# Read pcap file
pcap = iter(pyshark.FileCapture(path))
# Initialise result
result = list()
# Loop over packets
while True:
try:
packet = next(pcap)
except:
break
if not ("TCP" in packet or "UDP" in packet):
counter_b += 1
continue
if self.verbose:
counter_a += 1
counter_b += 1
print("Reading {}... {}/{} packets".format(path, counter_a, counter_b), end='\r')
# Get required packet data
d = [path,
packet.layers[2].layer_name, # Get
packet.layers[2].stream, # Get stream ID
packet.sniff_timestamp, # Get packet timestamp
packet.length, # Get packet length
packet.layers[1].src, # Get source IP or IPv6 (fixed)
packet.layers[1].dst, # Get destination IP or IPv6 (fixed)
packet.layers[2].srcport, # Get source port
packet.layers[2].dstport, # Get destination port
None]
# Check whether SSL/TLS certificate is in packet
if "SSL" in packet and\
packet.ssl.get("handshake_certificate") is not None:
# Get certificate
cert = packet.ssl.get('handshake_certificate')
# Parse cert to bytes
cert = bytes.fromhex(cert.replace(':', ''))
# Parse x509 certificate as DER
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(cert,
default_backend())
# Get serial number - TODO extend with other features?
d[-1] = cert.serial_number
# Append data item to result
result.append(d)
# Close capture
pcap.close()
if self.verbose:
print()
# Return result as numpy array
return np.array(result)
def handle(self, name, key, pem, **options):
if not os.path.exists(ca_settings.CA_DIR):
try:
with wrap_file_exceptions():
os.makedirs(ca_settings.CA_DIR)
except PermissionError:
pem.close()
key.close()
raise CommandError(
'%s: Could not create CA_DIR: Permission denied.' %
ca_settings.CA_DIR)
# FileNotFoundError shouldn't happen, whole point of this block is to create it
password = options['password']
import_password = options['import_password']
parent = options['parent']
pem_data = pem.read()
key_data = key.read()
crl_url = '\n'.join(options['crl_url'])
# close reader objects (otherwise we get a ResourceWarning)
key.close()
pem.close()
ca = CertificateAuthority(name=name,
parent=parent,
issuer_url=options['issuer_url'],
issuer_alt_name=options['issuer_alt_name'],
crl_url=crl_url)
# load public key
try:
pem_loaded = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(
pem_data, default_backend())
except Exception:
try:
pem_loaded = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(
pem_data, default_backend())
except Exception:
raise CommandError('Unable to load public key.')
ca.x509 = pem_loaded
ca.private_key_path = ca_storage.generate_filename(
'%s.key' % ca.serial.replace(':', ''))
# load private key
try:
key_loaded = serialization.load_pem_private_key(
key_data, import_password, default_backend())
except Exception:
try:
key_loaded = serialization.load_der_private_key(
key_data, import_password, default_backend())
except Exception:
raise CommandError('Unable to load private key.')
if password is None:
encryption = serialization.NoEncryption()
else:
encryption = serialization.BestAvailableEncryption(password)
# write private key to file
pem = key_loaded.private_bytes(encoding=Encoding.PEM,
format=PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL,
encryption_algorithm=encryption)
perm_denied = '%s: Permission denied: Could not open file for writing' % ca.private_key_path
try:
with wrap_file_exceptions():
ca_storage.save(ca.private_key_path, ContentFile(pem))
except PermissionError:
raise CommandError(perm_denied)
# Only save CA to database if we loaded all data and copied private key
ca.save()
def load_certificate(cert_data):
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(cert_data, default_backend())
return cert
def verify_android_key(
*,
attestation_statement: AttestationStatement,
attestation_object: bytes,
client_data_json: bytes,
credential_public_key: bytes,
pem_root_certs_bytes: List[bytes],
) -> bool:
"""Verify an "android-key" attestation statement
See https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#sctn-android-key-attestation
Also referenced: https://source.android.com/security/keystore/attestation
"""
if not attestation_statement.sig:
raise InvalidRegistrationResponse(
"Attestation statement was missing signature (Android Key)")
if not attestation_statement.alg:
raise InvalidRegistrationResponse(
"Attestation statement was missing algorithm (Android Key)")
if not attestation_statement.x5c:
raise InvalidRegistrationResponse(
"Attestation statement was missing x5c (Android Key)")
# Validate certificate chain
try:
# Include known root certificates for this attestation format
pem_root_certs_bytes.append(google_hardware_attestation_root_1)
pem_root_certs_bytes.append(google_hardware_attestation_root_2)
validate_certificate_chain(
x5c=attestation_statement.x5c,
pem_root_certs_bytes=pem_root_certs_bytes,
)
except InvalidCertificateChain as err:
raise InvalidRegistrationResponse(f"{err} (Android Key)")
# Extract attStmt bytes from attestation_object
attestation_dict = cbor2.loads(attestation_object)
authenticator_data_bytes = attestation_dict["authData"]
# Generate a hash of client_data_json
client_data_hash = hashlib.sha256()
client_data_hash.update(client_data_json)
client_data_hash_bytes = client_data_hash.digest()
verification_data = b"".join([
authenticator_data_bytes,
client_data_hash_bytes,
])
# Verify that sig is a valid signature over the concatenation of authenticatorData
# and clientDataHash using the public key in the first certificate in x5c with the
# algorithm specified in alg.
attestation_cert_bytes = attestation_statement.x5c[0]
attestation_cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(attestation_cert_bytes,
default_backend())
attestation_cert_pub_key = attestation_cert.public_key()
try:
verify_signature(
public_key=attestation_cert_pub_key,
signature_alg=attestation_statement.alg,
signature=attestation_statement.sig,
data=verification_data,
)
except InvalidSignature:
raise InvalidRegistrationResponse(
"Could not verify attestation statement signature (Android Key)")
# Verify that the public key in the first certificate in x5c matches the
# credentialPublicKey in the attestedCredentialData in authenticatorData.
attestation_cert_pub_key_bytes = attestation_cert_pub_key.public_bytes(
Encoding.DER,
PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
)
# Convert our raw public key bytes into the same format cryptography generates for
# the cert subject key
decoded_pub_key = decode_credential_public_key(credential_public_key)
pub_key_crypto = decoded_public_key_to_cryptography(decoded_pub_key)
pub_key_crypto_bytes = pub_key_crypto.public_bytes(
Encoding.DER,
PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
)
if attestation_cert_pub_key_bytes != pub_key_crypto_bytes:
raise InvalidRegistrationResponse(
"Certificate public key did not match credential public key (Android Key)"
)
# Verify that the attestationChallenge field in the attestation certificate
# extension data is identical to clientDataHash.
ext_key_description_oid = "1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.1.17"
try:
cert_extensions = attestation_cert.extensions
ext_key_description: Extension = cert_extensions.get_extension_for_oid(
ObjectIdentifier(ext_key_description_oid))
except ExtensionNotFound:
raise InvalidRegistrationResponse(
f"Certificate missing extension {ext_key_description_oid} (Android Key)"
)
# Peel apart the Extension into an UnrecognizedExtension, then the bytes we actually
# want
ext_value_wrapper: UnrecognizedExtension = ext_key_description.value
ext_value: bytes = ext_value_wrapper.value
parsed_ext = KeyDescription.load(ext_value)
# Verify the following using the appropriate authorization list from the attestation
# certificate extension data:
software_enforced: AuthorizationList = parsed_ext["softwareEnforced"]
tee_enforced: AuthorizationList = parsed_ext["teeEnforced"]
# The AuthorizationList.allApplications field is not present on either authorization
# list (softwareEnforced nor teeEnforced), since PublicKeyCredential MUST be scoped
# to the RP ID.
if software_enforced["allApplications"].native is not None:
raise InvalidRegistrationResponse(
"allApplications field was present in softwareEnforced (Android Key)"
)
if tee_enforced["allApplications"].native is not None:
raise InvalidRegistrationResponse(
"allApplications field was present in teeEnforced (Android Key)")
# The value in the AuthorizationList.origin field is equal to KM_ORIGIN_GENERATED.
origin = tee_enforced["origin"].native
if origin != KeyOrigin.GENERATED:
raise InvalidRegistrationResponse(
f"teeEnforced.origin {origin} was not {KeyOrigin.GENERATED}")
# The value in the AuthorizationList.purpose field is equal to KM_PURPOSE_SIGN.
purpose = tee_enforced["purpose"].native
if purpose != [KeyPurpose.SIGN]:
raise InvalidRegistrationResponse(
f"teeEnforced.purpose {purpose} was not [{KeyPurpose.SIGN}]")
return True
def parse_leaf_cert_crypto(leaf_cert):
#print(leaf_cert)
crypto_x509_cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(leaf_cert,default_backend())
print(crypto_x509_cert.serial_number)
print(crypto_x509_cert.public_key)
print('Label:', attr['CKA_LABEL'])
private_key = session.findObjects([
(PyKCS11.CKA_CLASS, PyKCS11.CKO_PRIVATE_KEY),
(PyKCS11.CKA_LABEL, 'CITIZEN AUTHENTICATION KEY')
])[0]
mechanism = PyKCS11.Mechanism(PyKCS11.CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS, None)
text = b'text to sign'
signature = bytes(session.sign(private_key, text, mechanism))
print(signature)
# cert = session.findObjects([
# (PyKCS11.CKA_CLASS, PyKCS11.CKO_PRIVATE_KEY),
# (PyKCS11.CKA_LABEL,'CITIZEN AUTHENTICATION CERTIFICATE')]
# )[0]
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(bytes(attr['CKA_VALUE']),
default_backend())
print(cert)
print(cert.public_bytes(encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM))
with open('cc_cert.pem', 'wb') as f:
f.write(cert.public_bytes(encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM))
print()
print(cert.public_key().public_bytes(
encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo))
def setUp(self):
der, msg = pem_to_der(os.getenv('CERT_FILE', 'crt.pem'))
if der:
self.cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(der)
else:
self.fail(msg)
def attest(self, slot):
return x509.load_der_x509_certificate(self.send_cmd(INS.ATTEST, slot),
default_backend())
def local_cert_loader(cert):
backend = default_backend()
if b'-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----' in cert:
return load_pem_x509_certificate(cert, backend)
return load_der_x509_certificate(cert, backend)
def __init__(self, allow_rooted=False, ca=_GSR2_DER):
self.allow_rooted = allow_rooted
self._ca = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(ca, default_backend())
def main(uuid_c):
print("|--------------------------------------|")
print("| SECURE MEDIA CLIENT |")
print("|--------------------------------------|\n")
# Get a list of media files
print("Contacting Server")
CLIENT_CIPHERSUITS = ["AES256_CBC_SHA256", "AES256_CBC_SHA512", "AES256_GCM_SHA256", "AES256_GCM_SHA512", "ChaCha20_None_SHA256", "ChaCha20_None_SHA512"]
lib ='/usr/local/lib/libpteidpkcs11.so'
pkcs11 = PyKCS11.PyKCS11Lib()
pkcs11.load(lib)
slots = pkcs11.getSlotList()
slot = slots[0]
session = pkcs11.openSession(slot)
obj = session.findObjects([(PyKCS11.CKA_CLASS, PyKCS11.CKO_CERTIFICATE),
(PyKCS11.CKA_LABEL, 'CITIZEN AUTHENTICATION CERTIFICATE')])[0]
all_atributes = [PyKCS11.CKA_VALUE]
attributes = session.getAttributeValue(obj, all_atributes)[0]
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(bytes(attributes))
cc_cert_pem = cert.public_bytes(encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM)
cc_private_key = session.findObjects([(
PyKCS11.CKA_CLASS, PyKCS11.CKO_PRIVATE_KEY),
(PyKCS11.CKA_LABEL,'CITIZEN AUTHENTICATION KEY')])[0]
mechanism = PyKCS11.Mechanism(PyKCS11.CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS, None)
data = {"uuid": uuid_c, "client_ciphersuits": CLIENT_CIPHERSUITS, "cc_cert": cc_cert_pem.decode('latin')}
data = json.dumps(data)
signature = bytes(session.sign(cc_private_key, data, mechanism))
payload = {"data": data, "signature": base64.b64encode(signature).decode('latin')}
req = requests.get(f'{SERVER_URL}/api/protocols', data= json.dumps(payload))
req = req.json()
data_signed = json.loads(req["data"])
algorithms_modes_digests = data_signed["ciphersuit"].split("_")
algorithm = algorithms_modes_digests[0]
mode = algorithms_modes_digests[1]
digest_c = algorithms_modes_digests[2]
signature = base64.b64decode(req["signature"].encode())
with open("Certification_Authority.crt", "rb") as CA_cert_file:
CA_cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(CA_cert_file.read())
CA_public_key = CA_cert.public_key()
server_cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(data_signed["server_cert"].encode())
server_public_key_rsa = server_cert.public_key()
#Verificar o certificado
CA_public_key.verify(
server_cert.signature,
server_cert.tbs_certificate_bytes,
paddingAsymetric.PKCS1v15(),
server_cert.signature_hash_algorithm,
)
#verificar assinatura
if digest_c == "SHA256":
server_public_key_rsa.verify(
signature,
req["data"].encode(),
paddingAsymetric.PSS(
mgf=paddingAsymetric.MGF1(hashes.SHA256()),
salt_length=paddingAsymetric.PSS.MAX_LENGTH
),
hashes.SHA256()
)
elif digest_c == "SHA512":
server_public_key_rsa.verify(
signature,
req["data"].encode(),
paddingAsymetric.PSS(
mgf=paddingAsymetric.MGF1(hashes.SHA512()),
salt_length=paddingAsymetric.PSS.MAX_LENGTH
),
hashes.SHA512()
)
else:
print("Erro")
sys.exit(0)
#Certificados do client e private key
with open("Client_Certificate.pem", "rb") as key_file:
client_cert_private_key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(
key_file.read(),
password=None,
)
with open("Client_Certificate.crt", "rb") as cert_file:
client_cert = cert_file.read()
data = json.dumps({ "uuid_c": uuid_c, "client_cert": client_cert.decode('latin') })
signature = client_sign(digest_c, data)
payload = { "data": data, "signature": base64.b64encode(signature).decode('latin')}
req = requests.get(f'{SERVER_URL}/api/key', data=json.dumps(payload))
req = req.json()
signature = base64.b64decode(req["signature"].encode())
message = req["message"].encode()
req = json.loads(message)
#Verificar o certificado
CA_public_key.verify(
server_cert.signature,
server_cert.tbs_certificate_bytes,
paddingAsymetric.PKCS1v15(),
server_cert.signature_hash_algorithm,
)
#Verificar a assinatura
if digest_c == "SHA256":
server_public_key_rsa.verify(
signature,
message,
paddingAsymetric.PSS(
mgf=paddingAsymetric.MGF1(hashes.SHA256()),
salt_length=paddingAsymetric.PSS.MAX_LENGTH
),
hashes.SHA256()
)
elif digest_c == "SHA512":
server_public_key_rsa.verify(
signature,
message,
paddingAsymetric.PSS(
mgf=paddingAsymetric.MGF1(hashes.SHA512()),
salt_length=paddingAsymetric.PSS.MAX_LENGTH
),
hashes.SHA512()
)
else:
print("Erro")
sys.exit(0)
parameters_pem = req["parameters"].encode()
server_pub_key_pem = req["server_pub_key"].encode()
server_pub_key = load_pem_public_key(server_pub_key_pem)
parameters = load_pem_parameters(parameters_pem)
client_private_key = parameters.generate_private_key()
client_pub_key_pem = client_private_key.public_key().public_bytes(
encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo
)
client_shared_key = client_private_key.exchange(server_pub_key)
if digest_c == "SHA256":
shared_key_derived = HKDF(
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
length=32,
salt=None,
info=b'handshake data',
).derive(client_shared_key)
elif digest_c == "SHA512":
shared_key_derived = HKDF(
algorithm=hashes.SHA512(),
length=32,
salt=None,
info=b'handshake data',
).derive(client_shared_key)
else:
print("Erro ao derivar a shared key")
sys.exit(0)
data = {"uuid": uuid_c, "client_pub_key": client_pub_key_pem.decode('utf-8')}
data = json.dumps(data)
signature = client_sign(digest_c, data)
payload = {"data": data, "signature": base64.b64encode(signature).decode('latin') }
req = requests.post(url=f'{SERVER_URL}/api/shared_key', data=json.dumps(payload))
req = requests.get(f'{SERVER_URL}/api/list')
if req.status_code == 200:
print("Got Server List")
media_list = req.json()
# Present a simple selection menu
idx = 0
print("MEDIA CATALOG\n")
for item in media_list:
print(f'{idx} - {media_list[idx]["name"]}')
print("----")
while True:
selection = input("Select a media file number (q to quit): ")
if selection.strip() == 'q':
sys.exit(0)
if not selection.isdigit():
continue
selection = int(selection)
if 0 <= selection < len(media_list):
break
# Example: Download first file
media_item = media_list[selection]
print(f"Playing {media_item['name']}")
# Detect if we are running on Windows or Linux
# You need to have ffplay or ffplay.exe in the current folder
# In alternative, provide the full path to the executable
if os.name == 'nt':
proc = subprocess.Popen(['ffplay.exe', '-i', '-'], stdin=subprocess.PIPE)
else:
proc = subprocess.Popen(['ffplay', '-i', '-'], stdin=subprocess.PIPE)
# Get data from server and send it to the ffplay stdin through a pipe
for chunk in range(media_item['chunks'] + 1):
if algorithm == "AES256":
if mode == "CBC":
media_id, iv = encrypt_AES(shared_key_derived, media_item["id"].encode(), "CBC")
iv = base64.b64encode(iv).decode('latin')
chunk, iv2 = encrypt_AES(shared_key_derived, str(chunk).encode(), "CBC")
iv2 = base64.b64encode(iv2).decode('latin')
info = json.dumps({"uuid": uuid_c, "iv": iv, "iv2": iv2})
elif mode == "GCM":
media_id, iv, tag1 = encrypt_AES(shared_key_derived, media_item["id"].encode(), "GCM")
iv = base64.b64encode(iv).decode('latin')
tag1 = base64.b64encode(tag1).decode('latin')
chunk, iv2, tag2 = encrypt_AES(shared_key_derived, str(chunk).encode(), "GCM")
iv2 = base64.b64encode(iv2).decode('latin')
tag2 = base64.b64encode(tag2).decode('latin')
info = json.dumps({"uuid": uuid_c, "iv": iv, "iv2": iv2, "tag1": tag1, "tag2": tag2})
elif algorithm == "ChaCha20":
media_id, nonce = encrypt_ChaCha20(shared_key_derived, media_item["id"].encode())
nonce = base64.b64encode(nonce).decode('latin')
chunk, nonce2 = encrypt_ChaCha20(shared_key_derived, str(chunk).encode())
nonce2 = base64.b64encode(nonce2).decode('latin')
info = json.dumps({"uuid": uuid_c, "nonce": nonce, "nonce_chunk": nonce2})
else:
print("erro")
sys.exit(0)
media_id = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(media_id).decode('latin')
chunk = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(chunk).decode('latin')
signature = client_sign(digest_c, info)
payload = { "data": info, "signature": base64.b64encode(signature).decode('latin') }
req = requests.get(f'{SERVER_URL}/api/download?id={media_id}&chunk={chunk}', data=json.dumps(payload))
req = req.json()
signature = base64.b64decode(req["signature"].encode())
#verificar assinatura
if digest_c == "SHA256":
server_public_key_rsa.verify(
signature,
req["data"].encode(),
paddingAsymetric.PSS(
mgf=paddingAsymetric.MGF1(hashes.SHA256()),
salt_length=paddingAsymetric.PSS.MAX_LENGTH
),
hashes.SHA256()
)
elif digest_c == "SHA512":
server_public_key_rsa.verify(
signature,
req["data"].encode(),
paddingAsymetric.PSS(
mgf=paddingAsymetric.MGF1(hashes.SHA512()),
salt_length=paddingAsymetric.PSS.MAX_LENGTH
),
hashes.SHA512()
)
else:
print("Erro")
sys.exit(0)
req = json.loads(req["data"])
if algorithm == "AES256":
try:
data_encrypted = req["data"].encode()
data_encrypted = base64.b64decode(data_encrypted)
iv = req["iv"].encode()
iv = base64.b64decode(iv)
MAC = req["MAC"].encode()
MAC = base64.b64decode(MAC)
salt = req["salt"].encode()
salt = base64.b64decode(salt)
except:
print(req["error"])
proc.kill()
break
return 0
if digest_c == "SHA256":
kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
length=32,
salt=salt,
iterations=100000,
)
key = kdf.derive(shared_key_derived)
elif digest_c == "SHA512":
kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(
algorithm=hashes.SHA512(),
length=32,
salt=salt,
iterations=100000,
)
key = kdf.derive(shared_key_derived)
else:
print("Erro")
sys.exit(0)
c = cmac.CMAC(algorithms.AES(key))
c.update(data_encrypted)
c.verify(MAC)
if mode == "CBC":
data = decrypt_AES(key, iv, data_encrypted, "CBC")
elif mode == "GCM":
tag = req["tag"].encode()
tag = base64.b64decode(tag)
data = decrypt_AES(key, iv, data_encrypted, "GCM", tag)
info = json.loads(data.decode('latin'))
data = info["data"]
data = binascii.a2b_base64(data)
elif algorithm == "ChaCha20": #CHACHA20 Funciona
try:
nonce = req["nonce"].encode()
nonce = base64.b64decode(nonce)
data_encrypted = req["data"].encode()
data_encrypted = base64.b64decode(data_encrypted)
MAC = req["MAC"].encode()
MAC = base64.b64decode(MAC)
salt = req["salt"].encode()
salt = base64.b64decode(salt)
except:
print(req["error"])
proc.kill()
break
return 0
if digest_c == "SHA256":
kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
length=32,
salt=salt,
iterations=100000,
)
key = kdf.derive(shared_key_derived)
h = hmac.HMAC(key, hashes.SHA256())
h.update(data_encrypted)
h.verify(MAC)
elif digest_c == "SHA512":
kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(
algorithm=hashes.SHA512(),
length=32,
salt=salt,
iterations=100000,
)
key = kdf.derive(shared_key_derived)
h = hmac.HMAC(key, hashes.SHA512())
h.update(data_encrypted)
h.verify(MAC)
else:
print("ERRO")
sys.exit(0)
data = decrypt_ChaCha20(key, nonce, data_encrypted)
info = json.loads(data.decode('latin'))
data = info["data"]
data = binascii.a2b_base64(data)
else:
print("Erro")
sys.exit(0)
try:
proc.stdin.write(data)
except:
break
context.check_hostname = False
context.load_verify_locations('/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt')
conn = context.wrap_socket(socket.socket(socket.AF_INET), server_hostname=host)
conn.do_handshake_on_connect = True
conn.connect((host, port))
print(conn.cipher())
print(conn.version())
cert = ssl.get_server_certificate((host, port))
import cryptography
from cryptography import x509
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
der = ssl.PEM_cert_to_DER_cert(cert)
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(der, default_backend())
pprint.pprint(cert)
stats = context.session_stats()
pprint.pprint(stats)
conn.sendall(b"OPTIONS / HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: localhost\r\n\r\n")
print("Connection information")
pprint.pprint(conn.recv(1024).split(b"\r\n"))
conn.close()
def get_signature(options, manifestInput, enc_data):
signatures = manifestGet(manifestInput, 'signature.signatures') or []
input_hash = manifestGet(manifestInput, 'signature.hash') or b''
signing_tool = manifestGet(manifestInput, 'signing-tool') or ''
if getattr(options, 'signing_tool', None):
signing_tool = options.signing_tool
# There should always be a signing key or signing tool on create.
if not signing_tool and not getattr(options, 'private_key', None):
if 'private-key' in manifestInput:
try:
options.private_key = open(manifestInput['private-key'], 'r')
except:
LOG.critical(
'No private key specified and default key ({}) cannot be opened'
.format(manifestInput['private-key']))
sys.exit(1)
else:
LOG.critical(
'Resource is not signed and no signing key is provided.')
sys.exit(1)
# Get SHA-256 hash of content and sign it using private key
sha_content = utils.sha_hash(enc_data)
if len(signatures):
# If a signature is provided in the input json, then the encoded content must match the provided hash
# Signature validation is not performed, since this would require certificate acquisition, which may not be
# possible
if sha_content != binascii.a2b_hex(input_hash):
LOG.critical(
'Manifest hash provided in input file does not match hashed output'
)
LOG.critical('Expected: {0}'.format(input_hash))
LOG.critical('Actual: {0}'.format(binascii.b2a_hex(sha_content)))
sys.exit(1)
# TODO: perform best-effort signature validation
signature = None
if signing_tool:
# get the key id
key_id = manifestGet(manifestInput, 'signing-key-id')
if hasattr(options, 'signing_key_id') and options.signing_key_id:
key_id = options.signing_key_id
digest_algo = 'sha256'
infile = None
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False) as f:
infile = f.name
f.write(enc_data)
f.flush()
LOG.debug('Temporary manifest file: {}'.format(infile))
outfile = None
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False) as f:
outfile = f.name
LOG.debug('Temporary signature file: {}'.format(outfile))
try:
cmd = [signing_tool, digest_algo, key_id, infile, outfile]
LOG.debug('Running "{}" to sign manifest.'.format(' '.join(cmd)))
# This command line is constructed internally, so we ignore bandit
# warnings about executing a Popen. See:
# https://bandit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/plugins/b603_subprocess_without_shell_equals_true.html
p = subprocess.Popen(cmd) #nosec
p.wait()
if p.returncode != 0:
LOG.critical('Signing tool failed.')
sys.exit(1)
with open(outfile, 'rb') as f:
signature = f.read()
except:
LOG.critical('Failed to execute signing tool.')
sys.exit(1)
finally:
os.unlink(infile)
os.unlink(outfile)
LOG.debug('Signature: {}'.format(
binascii.b2a_hex(signature).decode('utf-8')))
elif hasattr(options, 'private_key') and options.private_key:
sk = ecdsa.SigningKey.from_pem(options.private_key.read())
signature = sk.sign_digest(sha_content,
sigencode=ecdsa.util.sigencode_der)
certificates = []
# pick a signature block with no signature in it.
inputCerts = manifestGet(manifestInput, 'certificates') or []
# If no certificate was provided in the manifest input or in options,
if len(inputCerts) == 0:
# then load the default certificate
inputCerts = manifestInput.get('default-certificates', [])
# If there is still no certificate,
if len(inputCerts) == 0:
# Search through all signature blocks for one that contains certificates but no signature
for idx, sb in enumerate(signatures):
if not 'signature' in sb:
inputCerts = sb.get('certificates', [])
# This signature will be appended later so we must trim it.
del signatures[idx]
break
for idx, cert in enumerate(inputCerts):
if not any(k in cert for k in ('file', 'uri')):
LOG.critical(
'Could not find "file" or "uri" property for certificate')
sys.exit(1)
# If 'file', we just use the content in local file
if 'file' in cert:
fPath = cert['file']
if not os.path.isabs(fPath):
fPath = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(options.input_file.name),
cert['file'])
content = utils.read_file(fPath)
# Else we download the file contents
else:
content = utils.download_file(cert['uri'])
# Figure our which extension the certificate has
contentPath = cert['file'] if 'file' in cert else cert['uri']
ext = contentPath.rsplit('.', 1)[1]
# Read the certificate file, and get DER encoded data
if ext == 'pem':
lines = content.replace(" ", '').split()
content = binascii.a2b_base64(''.join(lines[1:-1]))
# Verify the certificate hash algorithm
# Extract subjectPublicKeyInfo field from X.509 certificate (see RFC3280)
# fingerprint = utils.sha_hash(content)
cPath = cert['file'] if 'file' in cert else cert['uri']
certObj = None
try:
certObj = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(
content, cryptoBackends.default_backend())
except ValueError as e:
LOG.critical("X.509 Certificate Error in ({file}): {error}".format(
error=e, file=cPath))
sys.exit(1)
if not certObj:
LOG.critical(
"({file}) is not a valid certificate".format(file=cPath))
sys.exit(1)
if not isinstance(certObj.signature_hash_algorithm,
cryptoHashes.SHA256):
LOG.critical(
"In ({file}): Only SHA256 certificates are supported by the Device Management Update client at this time."
.format(file=cPath))
sys.exit(1)
fingerprint = certObj.fingerprint(cryptoHashes.SHA256())
LOG.debug(
'Creating certificate reference ({}) from {} with fingerprint {}'.
format(idx, contentPath, fingerprint))
uri = ''
if 'uri' in cert:
uri = cert['uri']
certificates.append(
CertificateReference(fingerprint=fingerprint, uri=uri))
LOG.debug(
'Signed hash ({}) of encoded content ({} bytes) with resulting signature {}'
.format(sha_content, len(enc_data), signature))
if signature:
signatures.append(
SignatureBlock(signature=signature, certificates=certificates))
return ResourceSignature(hash=sha_content, signatures=signatures)
def import_files(self,
files,
import_keys=False,
key_password=None,
key_nickname=None):
"""
Import certificates and a single private key from multiple files
The files may be in PEM and DER certificate, PKCS#7 certificate chain,
PKCS#8 and raw private key and PKCS#12 formats.
:param files: Names of files to import
:param import_keys: Whether to import private keys
:param key_password: Password to decrypt private keys
:param key_nickname: Nickname of the private key to import from PKCS#12
files
"""
key_file = None
extracted_key = None
extracted_certs = []
for filename in files:
try:
with open(filename, 'rb') as f:
data = f.read()
except IOError as e:
raise RuntimeError("Failed to open %s: %s" %
(filename, e.strerror))
# Try to parse the file as PEM file
matches = list(
re.finditer(br'-----BEGIN (.+?)-----(.*?)-----END \1-----',
data, re.DOTALL))
if matches:
loaded = False
for match in matches:
body = match.group()
label = match.group(1)
line = len(data[:match.start() + 1].splitlines())
if label in (b'CERTIFICATE', b'X509 CERTIFICATE',
b'X.509 CERTIFICATE'):
try:
cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(body)
except ValueError as e:
if label != b'CERTIFICATE':
logger.warning(
"Skipping certificate in %s at line %s: "
"%s", filename, line, e)
continue
else:
extracted_certs.append(cert)
loaded = True
continue
if label in (b'PKCS7', b'PKCS #7 SIGNED DATA',
b'CERTIFICATE'):
try:
certs = x509.pkcs7_to_certs(body)
except ipautil.CalledProcessError as e:
if label == b'CERTIFICATE':
logger.warning(
"Skipping certificate in %s at line %s: "
"%s", filename, line, e)
else:
logger.warning(
"Skipping PKCS#7 in %s at line %s: %s",
filename, line, e)
continue
else:
extracted_certs.extend(certs)
loaded = True
continue
if label in (b'PRIVATE KEY', b'ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY',
b'RSA PRIVATE KEY', b'DSA PRIVATE KEY',
b'EC PRIVATE KEY'):
if not import_keys:
continue
if key_file:
raise RuntimeError(
"Can't load private key from both %s and %s" %
(key_file, filename))
# the args -v2 aes256 -v2prf hmacWithSHA256 are needed
# on OpenSSL 1.0.2 (fips mode). As soon as FreeIPA
# requires OpenSSL 1.1.0 we'll be able to drop them
args = [
paths.OPENSSL,
'pkcs8',
'-topk8',
'-v2',
'aes256',
'-v2prf',
'hmacWithSHA256',
'-passout',
'file:' + self.pwd_file,
]
if ((label != b'PRIVATE KEY' and key_password)
or label == b'ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY'):
key_pwdfile = ipautil.write_tmp_file(key_password)
args += [
'-passin',
'file:' + key_pwdfile.name,
]
try:
result = ipautil.run(args,
stdin=body,
capture_output=True)
except ipautil.CalledProcessError as e:
logger.warning(
"Skipping private key in %s at line %s: %s",
filename, line, e)
continue
else:
extracted_key = result.raw_output
key_file = filename
loaded = True
continue
if loaded:
continue
raise RuntimeError("Failed to load %s" % filename)
# Try to load the file as DER certificate
try:
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(data)
except ValueError:
pass
else:
extracted_certs.append(cert)
continue
# Try to import the file as PKCS#12 file
if import_keys:
try:
self.import_pkcs12(filename, key_password)
except Pkcs12ImportUnknownError:
# the file may not be a PKCS#12 file,
# go to the generic error about unrecognized format
pass
except RuntimeError as e:
raise RuntimeError("Failed to load %s: %s" %
(filename, str(e)))
else:
if key_file:
raise RuntimeError(
"Can't load private key from both %s and %s" %
(key_file, filename))
key_file = filename
server_certs = self.find_server_certs()
if key_nickname:
for nickname, _trust_flags in server_certs:
if nickname == key_nickname:
break
else:
raise RuntimeError(
"Server certificate \"%s\" not found in %s" %
(key_nickname, filename))
else:
if len(server_certs) > 1:
raise RuntimeError(
"%s server certificates found in %s, "
"expecting only one" %
(len(server_certs), filename))
continue
# Supported formats were tried but none succeeded
raise RuntimeError("Failed to load %s: unrecognized format" %
filename)
if import_keys and not key_file:
raise RuntimeError("No server certificates found in %s" %
(', '.join(files)))
for cert in extracted_certs:
nickname = str(DN(cert.subject))
self.add_cert(cert, nickname, EMPTY_TRUST_FLAGS)
if extracted_key:
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile() as in_file, \
tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile() as out_file:
for cert in extracted_certs:
in_file.write(cert.public_bytes(x509.Encoding.PEM))
in_file.write(extracted_key)
in_file.flush()
out_password = ipautil.ipa_generate_password()
out_pwdfile = ipautil.write_tmp_file(out_password)
args = [
paths.OPENSSL,
'pkcs12',
'-export',
'-in',
in_file.name,
'-out',
out_file.name,
'-passin',
'file:' + self.pwd_file,
'-passout',
'file:' + out_pwdfile.name,
]
try:
ipautil.run(args)
except ipautil.CalledProcessError as e:
raise RuntimeError(
"No matching certificate found for private key from "
"%s" % key_file)
self.import_pkcs12(out_file.name, out_password)
def test_invalid_der(self, backend):
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
x509.load_der_x509_certificate(b"notacert", backend)
def handle_echo(reader, writer):
global conn_cnt
conn_cnt += 1
srvwrk = ServerWorker(conn_cnt)
#Certificados
passwd = b"1234"
#ler pkcs12 Servidor
p12S = crypto.load_pkcs12(open("p12/Servidor.p12", 'rb').read(), passwd)
private_keyS2 = crypto.dump_privatekey(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM,
p12S.get_privatekey())
private_keyS = serialization.load_pem_private_key(
private_keyS2, password=None, backend=default_backend())
#ler certificado Servidor
certificadoS = crypto.dump_certificate(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM,
p12S.get_certificate())
while True:
data = yield from reader.read(100)
if data[:1] == b'E': break
# --------------------------------- Diffie Hellman --------------------------------- #
if data[:1] == b'y':
y = data[1:]
writer.write(b'OK')
continue
if data[:1] == b'p':
p = data[1:]
writer.write(b'OK')
continue
if data[:1] == b'g':
g = data[1:]
shared_key, b_y = dhPK(int.from_bytes(y, 'big'),
int.from_bytes(g, 'big'),
int.from_bytes(p, 'big'))
#Envio das assinaturas, de g^x e g^y
sig_servidor = sig_create(b_y)
sig_cliente = sig_create(y)
writer.write(b'K' + b_y)
writer.write(b'S' + sig_cliente + sig_servidor)
data = yield from reader.read(513)
#Recebe as assinaturas
if data[:1] == b's':
sig_cliente = data[1:257]
sig_servidor = data[257:]
sig_verify(sig_cliente, y)
sig_verify(sig_servidor, b_y)
#continue
data = yield from reader.read(1268)
if data[:1] == b'c':
certificadoC = data[1:]
#public key do certificado
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(certificadoC,
default_backend())
#public Key
pk = cert.public_key()
serialized_public_key = pk.public_bytes(
serialization.Encoding.DER,
serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo)
#validação
with open('certificados/CA.pem', 'r') as cert_file:
cert = cert_file.read()
trusted_certs = (cert, cert)
verified = verify_chain_of_trust(certificadoC, trusted_certs)
if verified:
print('\n \n Certificate verified \n \n')
else:
print('Certificado não é válido \n')
continue
# -------------------------------------
if not data: continue
addr = writer.get_extra_info('peername')
#nonce = data[1:9]
#cipher = ChaCha20.new(key=shared_key, nonce=nonce)
#msg = cipher.decrypt(data[9:])
res = srvwrk.respond(data[1:], addr)
if not res: break
#res = b'M' + cipher.encrypt(res)
res = b'M' + res
writer.write(res)
yield from writer.drain()
print("[%d]" % srvwrk.id)
writer.close()
def do_POST(self):
"""This method handles the POST requests to add agents to the Registrar Server.
Currently, only agents resources are available for POSTing, i.e. /agents. All other POST uri's
will return errors. POST requests require an an agent_id identifying the agent to add, and json
block sent in the body with 2 entries: ek and aik.
"""
session = SessionManager().make_session(engine)
rest_params = config.get_restful_params(self.path)
if rest_params is None:
config.echo_json_response(
self, 405, "Not Implemented: Use /agents/ interface")
return
if "agents" not in rest_params:
config.echo_json_response(self, 400, "uri not supported")
logger.warning(
'POST agent returning 400 response. uri not supported: ' +
self.path)
return
agent_id = rest_params["agents"]
if agent_id is None:
config.echo_json_response(self, 400, "agent id not found in uri")
logger.warning(
'POST agent returning 400 response. agent id not found in uri '
+ self.path)
return
try:
content_length = int(self.headers.get('Content-Length', 0))
if content_length == 0:
config.echo_json_response(self, 400,
"Expected non zero content length")
logger.warning(
'POST for ' + agent_id +
' returning 400 response. Expected non zero content length.'
)
return
post_body = self.rfile.read(content_length)
json_body = json.loads(post_body)
ekcert = json_body['ekcert']
aik_tpm = json_body['aik_tpm']
initialize_tpm = tpm()
if ekcert is None or ekcert == 'emulator':
logger.warning('Agent %s did not submit an ekcert' % agent_id)
ek_tpm = json_body['ek_tpm']
else:
if 'ek_tpm' in json_body:
# This would mean the agent submitted both a non-None ekcert, *and*
# an ek_tpm... We can deal with it by just ignoring the ek_tpm they sent
logger.warning(
'Overriding ek_tpm for agent %s from ekcert' %
agent_id)
# If there's an EKCert, we just overwrite their ek_tpm
# Note, we don't validate the EKCert here, other than the implicit
# "is it a valid x509 cert" check. So it's still untrusted.
# This will be validated by the tenant.
ek509 = load_der_x509_certificate(
base64.b64decode(ekcert),
backend=default_backend(),
)
ek_tpm = base64.b64encode(
tpm2_objects.ek_low_tpm2b_public_from_pubkey(
ek509.public_key(), ))
aik_attrs = tpm2_objects.get_tpm2b_public_object_attributes(
base64.b64decode(aik_tpm), )
if aik_attrs != tpm2_objects.AK_EXPECTED_ATTRS:
config.echo_json_response(self, 400, "Invalid AK attributes")
logger.warning(
"Agent %s submitted AIK with invalid attributes! %s (provided) != %s (expected)",
agent_id,
tpm2_objects.object_attributes_description(aik_attrs),
tpm2_objects.object_attributes_description(
tpm2_objects.AK_EXPECTED_ATTRS),
)
return
# try to encrypt the AIK
(blob, key) = initialize_tpm.encryptAIK(
agent_id,
base64.b64decode(ek_tpm),
base64.b64decode(aik_tpm),
)
# special behavior if we've registered this uuid before
regcount = 1
try:
agent = session.query(RegistrarMain).filter_by(
agent_id=agent_id).first()
except NoResultFound:
agent = None
except SQLAlchemyError as e:
logger.error(f'SQLAlchemy Error: {e}')
raise
if agent is not None:
# keep track of how many ek-ekcerts have registered on this uuid
regcount = agent.regcount
if agent.ek_tpm != ek_tpm or agent.ekcert != ekcert:
logger.warning(
'WARNING: Overwriting previous registration for this UUID with new ek-ekcert pair!'
)
regcount += 1
# force overwrite
logger.info('Overwriting previous registration for this UUID.')
try:
session.query(RegistrarMain).filter_by(
agent_id=agent_id).delete()
session.commit()
except SQLAlchemyError as e:
logger.error(f'SQLAlchemy Error: {e}')
raise
# Add values to database
d = {}
d['agent_id'] = agent_id
d['ek_tpm'] = ek_tpm
d['aik_tpm'] = aik_tpm
d['ekcert'] = ekcert
d['virtual'] = int(ekcert == 'virtual')
d['active'] = int(False)
d['key'] = key
d['provider_keys'] = {}
d['regcount'] = regcount
try:
session.add(RegistrarMain(**d))
session.commit()
except SQLAlchemyError as e:
logger.error(f'SQLAlchemy Error: {e}')
raise
response = {
'blob': blob,
}
config.echo_json_response(self, 200, "Success", response)
logger.info('POST returning key blob for agent_id: ' + agent_id)
except Exception as e:
config.echo_json_response(self, 400, "Error: %s" % e)
logger.warning("POST for " + agent_id +
" returning 400 response. Error: %s" % e)
logger.exception(e)
import base64
from cryptography import x509
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import load_pem_private_key
YUBICO_SAMPLE_PUBLIC_CERT = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(
data=base64.b64decode(b"""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"""),
backend=default_backend())
YUBICO_SAMPLE_PRIVATE_KEY = load_pem_private_key(
b"""
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIMyk3gKcDg5lsYdl48fZoIFORhAc9cQxmn2Whv/+ya+2oAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAEO+GX3XN+mD2fsN4J51xDyAZdSd6aJeiL4kQDHP4QiGRWww8DLOG0
lnhXcKoxn4w5SAgK3ZozFpwxf1whrx2BLQ==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
""",
password=None,
backend=default_backend(),
)
def verify(self):
try:
# Step 1.
#
# Perform JSON deserialization on the clientDataJSON field
# of the AuthenticatorAttestationResponse object to extract
# the client data C claimed as collected during the credential
# creation.
credential_id = self.registration_response.get('id')
raw_id = self.registration_response.get('rawId')
attestation_object = self.registration_response.get('attObj')
client_data = self.registration_response.get('clientData')
credential_type = self.registration_response.get('type')
decoded_cd = _webauthn_b64_decode(client_data)
cd = json.loads(decoded_cd)
# Step 2.
#
# Verify that the type in C is the string webauthn.create.
received_type = cd.get('type')
if not _verify_type(received_type, TYPE_CREATE):
raise RegistrationRejectedException('Invalid type.')
# Step 3.
#
# Verify that the challenge in C matches the challenge that
# was sent to the authenticator in the create() call.
received_challenge = cd.get('challenge')
if not _verify_challenge(received_challenge, self.challenge):
raise RegistrationRejectedException(
'Unable to verify challenge.')
# Step 4.
#
# Verify that the origin in C matches the Relying Party's origin.
if not _verify_origin(cd, self.origin):
raise RegistrationRejectedException('Unable to verify origin.')
# Step 5.
#
# Verify that the tokenBindingId in C matches the Token
# Binding ID for the TLS connection over which the
# attestation was obtained.
if not _verify_token_binding_id(cd):
raise RegistrationRejectedException(
'Unable to verify token binding ID.')
# Step 6.
#
# Verify that the clientExtensions in C is a proper subset
# of the extensions requested by the RP and that the
# authenticatorExtensions in C is also a proper subset of
# the extensions requested by the RP.
if not _verify_client_extensions(cd):
raise RegistrationRejectedException(
'Unable to verify client extensions.')
if not _verify_authenticator_extensions(cd):
raise RegistrationRejectedException(
'Unable to verify authenticator extensions.')
# Step 7.
#
# Compute the hash of clientDataJSON using the algorithm
# identified by C.hashAlgorithm.
client_data_hash = _get_client_data_hash(cd, decoded_cd)
# Step 8.
#
# Perform CBOR decoding on the attestationObject field of
# the AuthenticatorAttestationResponse structure to obtain
# the attestation statement format fmt, the authenticator
# data authData, and the attestation statement attStmt.
att_obj = cbor2.loads(_webauthn_b64_decode(attestation_object))
att_stmt = att_obj.get('attStmt')
auth_data = att_obj.get('authData')
fmt = att_obj.get('fmt')
if not auth_data or len(auth_data) < 37:
raise RegistrationRejectedException(
'Auth data must be at least 37 bytes.')
# Step 9.
#
# Verify that the RP ID hash in authData is indeed the
# SHA-256 hash of the RP ID expected by the RP.
auth_data_rp_id_hash = _get_auth_data_rp_id_hash(auth_data)
if not _verify_rp_id_hash(auth_data_rp_id_hash, self.rp_id):
raise RegistrationRejectedException(
'Unable to verify RP ID hash.')
# Step 10.
#
# Determine the attestation statement format by performing
# an USASCII case-sensitive match on fmt against the set of
# supported WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifier
# values. The up-to-date list of registered WebAuthn
# Attestation Statement Format Identifier values is maintained
# in the in the IANA registry of the same name
# [WebAuthn-Registries].
if not _verify_attestation_statement_format(fmt):
raise RegistrationRejectedException(
'Unable to verify attestation statement format.')
# From authenticatorData, extract the claimed RP ID hash, the
# claimed credential ID and the claimed credential public key.
attestation_data = auth_data[37:]
aaguid = attestation_data[:16]
credential_id_len = struct.unpack('!H', attestation_data[16:18])[0]
cred_id = attestation_data[18:18 + credential_id_len]
b64_cred_id = _webauthn_b64_encode(cred_id)
credential_pub_key = attestation_data[18 + credential_id_len:]
# The [=credential public key=] encoded in COSE_Key format, as
# defined in Section 7 of [[#RFC8152]], using the
# [=CTAP canonical CBOR encoding form=].
# The COSE_Key-encoded [=credential public key=] MUST contain the optional "alg"
# parameter and MUST NOT contain any other optional parameters
# The "alg" parameter MUST contain a {{COSEAlgorithmIdentifier}} value.
# The encoded [=credential public key=] MUST also contain any additional
# required parameters stipulated by the relevant key type specification,
# i.e., required for the key type "kty" and algorithm "alg"
# (see Section 8 of[[RFC8152]]).
cpk = cbor2.loads(credential_pub_key)
# Credential public key parameter names via the COSE_Key spec (for ES256).
alg_key = 3
x_key = -2
y_key = -3
if alg_key not in cpk:
raise RegistrationRejectedException(
"Credential public key missing required algorithm parameter."
)
required_keys = {alg_key, x_key, y_key}
cpk_keys = cpk.keys()
if not set(cpk_keys).issuperset(required_keys):
raise RegistrationRejectedException(
'Credential public key must match COSE_Key spec.')
# A COSEAlgorithmIdentifier's value is a number identifying
# a cryptographic algorithm. The algorithm identifiers SHOULD
# be values registered in the IANA COSE Algorithms registry
# [IANA-COSE-ALGS-REG], for instance, -7 for "ES256" and -257
# for "RS256".
# https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/cose.xhtml#algorithms
# For now we are only supporting ES256 as an algorithm.
ES256 = -7
if cpk[alg_key] != ES256:
raise RegistrationRejectedException('Unsupported algorithm.')
x = long(cpk[x_key].encode('hex'), 16)
y = long(cpk[y_key].encode('hex'), 16)
user_ec = EllipticCurvePublicNumbers(
x, y, SECP256R1()).public_key(backend=default_backend())
encoded_user_pub_key = _encode_public_key(user_ec)
# Verify public key length [65 bytes].
if len(encoded_user_pub_key) != 65:
raise RegistrationRejectedException('Bad public key.')
if fmt == 'fido-u2f':
# Step 11.
#
# Verify that attStmt is a correct, validly-signed attestation
# statement, using the attestation statement format fmt's
# verification procedure given authenticator data authData and
# the hash of the serialized client data computed in step 6.
# Verify that the given attestation statement is valid CBOR
# conforming to the syntax defined above.
if 'x5c' not in att_stmt or 'sig' not in att_stmt:
raise RegistrationRejectedException(
'Attestation statement must be a valid CBOR object.')
# If x5c is not a certificate for an ECDSA public key over the
# P-256 curve, stop verification and return an error.
# Let authenticatorData denote the authenticator data claimed
# to have been used for the attestation, and let clientDataHash
# denote the hash of the serialized client data.
# If clientDataHash is 256 bits long, set tbsHash to this value.
# Otherwise set tbsHash to the SHA-256 hash of clientDataHash.
if len(client_data_hash) == 32:
tbs_hash = client_data_hash
else:
tbs_hash = hashlib.sha256(client_data_hash).digest()
# Generate the claimed to-be-signed data as specified in
# [FIDO-U2F-Message-Formats] section 4.3, with the application
# parameter set to the claimed RP ID hash, the challenge
# parameter set to tbsHash, the key handle parameter set to
# the claimed credential ID of the given credential, and the
# user public key parameter set to the claimed credential
# public key.
cert = att_stmt.get('x5c')[0]
x509_attestation_cert = load_der_x509_certificate(
cert, default_backend())
public_key = x509_attestation_cert.public_key()
signature = att_stmt['sig']
bytes_to_sign = ''.join([
'\0', auth_data_rp_id_hash, tbs_hash, cred_id,
encoded_user_pub_key
])
# Verify that the sig is a valid ECDSA P-256 signature over the
# to-be-signed data constructed above.
# The signature is to be verified by the relying party using the
# public key certified in the attestation certificate. The relying
# party should also verify that the attestation certificate was
# issued by a trusted certification authority.
try:
public_key.verify(signature, bytes_to_sign,
ECDSA(SHA256()))
except InvalidSignature:
raise RegistrationRejectedException(
'Invalid signature received.')
# If successful, return attestation type Basic with the trust
# path set to x5c.
# Possible attestation types: Basic, Privacy CA,
# Self Attestation, ECDAA
attestation_type = AT_BASIC
trust_path = x509_attestation_cert
# Step 12.
#
# If validation is successful, obtain a list of acceptable trust
# anchors (attestation root certificates or ECDAA-Issuer public
# keys) for that attestation type and attestation statement format
# fmt, from a trusted source or from policy. For example, the FIDO
# Metadata Service [FIDOMetadataService] provides one way to obtain
# such information, using the AAGUID in the attestation data
# contained in authData.
trust_anchors = _get_trust_anchors(attestation_type, fmt,
self.trust_anchor_dir)
if not trust_anchors and self.trusted_attestation_cert_required:
raise RegistrationRejectedException(
'No trust anchors available to verify attestation certificate.'
)
# Step 13.
#
# Assess the attestation trustworthiness using the outputs of the
# verification procedure in step 10, as follows:
#
# * If self attestation was used, check if self attestation is
# acceptable under Relying Party policy.
# * If ECDAA was used, verify that the identifier of the
# ECDAA-Issuer public key used is included in the set of
# acceptable trust anchors obtained in step 11.
# * Otherwise, use the X.509 certificates returned by the
# verification procedure to verify that the attestation
# public key correctly chains up to an acceptable root
# certificate.
if attestation_type == AT_SELF_ATTESTATION:
if not self.self_attestation_permitted:
raise RegistrationRejectedException(
'Self attestation is not permitted.')
elif attestation_type == AT_PRIVACY_CA:
raise NotImplementedError(
'Privacy CA attestation type is not currently supported.'
)
elif attestation_type == AT_ECDAA:
raise NotImplementedError(
'ECDAA attestation type is not currently supported.')
elif attestation_type == AT_BASIC:
if self.trusted_attestation_cert_required:
if not _is_trusted_attestation_cert(
trust_path, trust_anchors):
raise RegistrationRejectedException(
'Untrusted attestation certificate.')
else:
raise RegistrationRejectedException(
'Unknown attestation type.')
# Step 14.
#
# If the attestation statement attStmt verified successfully and is
# found to be trustworthy, then register the new credential with the
# account that was denoted in the options.user passed to create(),
# by associating it with the credential ID and credential public key
# contained in authData's attestation data, as appropriate for the
# Relying Party's systems.
# Step 15.
#
# If the attestation statement attStmt successfully verified but is
# not trustworthy per step 12 above, the Relying Party SHOULD fail
# the registration ceremony.
#
# NOTE: However, if permitted by policy, the Relying Party MAY
# register the credential ID and credential public key but
# treat the credential as one with self attestation (see
# 5.3.3 Attestation Types). If doing so, the Relying Party
# is asserting there is no cryptographic proof that the
# public key credential has been generated by a particular
# authenticator model. See [FIDOSecRef] and [UAFProtocol]
# for a more detailed discussion.
elif fmt == 'none':
# `none` - indicates that the Relying Party is not interested in
# authenticator attestation.
if not self.none_attestation_permitted:
raise RegistrationRejectedException(
'Authenticator attestation is required.')
else:
raise RegistrationRejectedException('Invalid format.')
sc = auth_data[33:37]
sign_count = struct.unpack('!I', sc)[0]
credential = WebAuthnCredential(
self.rp_id, self.origin, b64_cred_id,
base64.b64encode(encoded_user_pub_key), sign_count)
return credential
except Exception as e:
raise RegistrationRejectedException(
'Registration rejected. Error: {}.'.format(e))
]
cert_chain_raw_bad_ee = [
bytearray.fromhex(
'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'
),
bytearray.fromhex(
'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'
),
bytearray.fromhex(
'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'
)
]
try:
cert_chain_good = [
x509.load_der_x509_certificate(cert, default_backend())
for cert in cert_chain_raw_good
]
check_cert_chain(cert_chain_good, kAPPLE_WEBAUTHN_AUTHORITY_ROOT)
except Exception as e:
print('No exception was expected, aborting. Got: {}'.format(e))
raise
excepted = False
try:
cert_chain_bad = [
x509.load_der_x509_certificate(cert, default_backend())
for cert in cert_chain_raw_bad
]
check_cert_chain(cert_chain_bad, kAPPLE_WEBAUTHN_AUTHORITY_ROOT)
except Exception as e:
def parse_server_certificate(self, tls_cert_msg, client, server, ts):
"""
Parses the certificate message
"""
connection_key = "{}-{}".format(client, server)
assert isinstance(tls_cert_msg, dpkt.ssl.TLSCertificate)
self.count_certificate_messages += 1
_tree = RootCATree.RootCATree(node_class=CertNode.CertNode)
pre = None
for crt in reversed(tls_cert_msg.certificates):
try:
cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(crt, default_backend())
except Exception as e:
self.count_parsing_errors += 1
self.logger.debug(binascii.hexlify(crt))
self.logger.warning("[-] Parsing certificate failed.")
self.logger.warning("[-] Error: {}".format(e))
self.logger.warning(
"[-] Error occurred on connection: {}".format(
connection_key))
self.logger.warning("[-] Skip this certificate chain...")
return
try:
if cert.extensions.get_extension_for_oid(
x509.ExtensionOID.BASIC_CONSTRAINTS).value.ca:
_tree.create_node(tag=cert.subject.rfc4514_string(),
identifier=binascii.hexlify(
cert.fingerprint(hashes.SHA256())),
data=cert,
parent=pre)
pre = binascii.hexlify(cert.fingerprint(hashes.SHA256()))
except exceptions.DuplicatedNodeIdError:
self.logger.info("[*] Node already exists: {}".format(
cert.fingerprint(hashes.SHA256())))
pass
except Exception as ex:
if 'basicConstraints' in str(ex):
pass
else:
self.logger.warning("[-] Error: {}".format(ex))
self.logger.warning(
"[-] Error occurred on connection: {}".format(
connection_key))
self.logger.warning("[-] Skip this certificate chain...")
return
self.logger.info(
"[*] Try to find parent for each node in all root ca trees...")
for node in _tree.all_nodes():
self.logger.info("[*] Try to find parent for node: {}".format(
node.tag))
found = False
try:
akid = node.data.extensions.get_extension_for_oid(
x509.ExtensionOID.AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER
).value.key_identifier
for ca_tree in self.root_ca_tree_list:
found = ca_tree.search_nodes(node, ts)
if found:
break
if not found:
self.logger.info("[*] No Root certificate found")
self.logger.info("[*] AKID exist: {}".format(
binascii.hexlify(akid.decode())))
self.logger.info("[*] Maybe this cert is a root CA cert")
# check root node of the ca tree list
help_found = False
for _ca_tree in self.root_ca_tree_list:
root = _ca_tree.get_node(_ca_tree.root)
if _ca_tree.check_if_is_root_ca(root, node, ts):
help_found = True
break
if not help_found:
self.logger.warning("[!] Nothing found to this cert")
self.cert_with_no_parent.append(node.data)
except Exception as ex:
if 'authorityKeyIdentifier' in str(ex):
self.logger.info(
"[*] The Searching certificate has no authority key identifier. Maybe this cert is a root CA cert"
)
# check root node of the ca tree list
help_found = False
for _ca_tree in self.root_ca_tree_list:
root = _ca_tree.get_node(_ca_tree.root)
if _ca_tree.check_if_is_root_ca(root, node, ts):
help_found = True
break
if not help_found:
self.logger.warning("[!] Nothing found to this cert")
self.cert_with_no_parent.append(node.data)
else:
self.logger.error(str(ex))
self.logger.info("[*] End of this certificate message reached...")
def get_certificate(self) -> x509.Certificate:
"""Read an Opaque object from the YubiHSM, parsed as a certificate.
:return: The certificate stored for the object.
"""
return x509.load_der_x509_certificate(self.get(), default_backend())
def __init__(self, server_cert):
require_cryptography(self)
self.server_cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(
server_cert, default_backend())
self.key_size = self.server_cert.public_key().key_size // 8
def load_der_certificate(data):
"""
Loads a DER X.509 certificate.
"""
return x509.load_der_x509_certificate(data, default_backend())
def writeUpdateDefaults(options):
if os.path.isfile(defaults.updateResources) and not (hasattr(
options, 'force') and options.force):
LOG.warning(
'{} already exists, not overwriting. Use --force to write anyway.'.
format(defaults.updateResources))
return
with open(defaults.updateResources, 'w') as defaultResources:
# Format the device UUIDs
vendorId = ', '.join(
['0x%x' % x for x in bytes(uuid.UUID(options.vendor_id).bytes)])
classId = ', '.join(
['0x%x' % x for x in bytes(uuid.UUID(options.class_id).bytes)])
certFp = ''
cert = ''
str_ski = ''
# Read the certificate
if not hasattr(options, 'psk') or not options.psk:
options.certificate.seek(0)
cstr = options.certificate.read()
try:
# Load the certificate.
certObj = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(
cstr, default_backend())
except ValueError as e:
raise ValueError('Error loading {}: {}'.format(
options.certificate.name, e.message))
# Calculate the certificate fingerprint
c_hash = certObj.fingerprint(hashes.SHA256())
# Format the certificate fingerprint
certFp = ', '.join(['0x%x' % x for x in bytes(c_hash[:16])
]) + ',\n ' + ', '.join(
['0x%x' % x for x in bytes(c_hash[16:])])
# Calculate the subjectKeyIdentifier
try:
c_ski = certObj.extensions.get_extension_for_oid(
x509.oid.ExtensionOID.SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER).value.digest
str_ski = ', '.join(
['0x%x' % x
for x in bytes(c_ski[:16])]) + ',\n ' + ', '.join(
['0x%x' % x for x in bytes(c_ski[16:])])
except x509.ExtensionNotFound as e:
LOG.warning('No Subject Key Identifier present in certificate')
# Format the certificate
CByteArray = ['0x%x' % x for x in bytes(cstr)]
CLineList = [
', '.join(CByteArray[i:i + 16])
for i in range(0, len(CByteArray), 16)
]
cert = ',\n '.join(CLineList)
defaultResources.write(
templates.UpdateDefaultResources.format(
vendorId=vendorId,
classId=classId,
certFp=certFp,
ski=str_ski,
cert=cert,
psk=', '.join(['0x%x' % x for x in bytes(options.psk)]),
pskId=', '.join(['0x%x' % x for x in bytes(options.psk_id)])))
LOG.info('Wrote default resource values to {}'.format(
defaults.updateResources))
def get_loaded_cert(self):
# just for the CC
cc_cert = self.session.findObjects([(CKA_CLASS, CKO_CERTIFICATE)])[0]
cc_certDer = bytes(
self.session.getAttributeValue(cc_cert, [CKA_VALUE], True)[0])
return x509.load_der_x509_certificate(cc_certDer, default_backend())
result = client.make_credential(create_options["publicKey"], pin=pin)
js = {}
attestation_object = result[0]
client_data = result[1]
js_result_auth = {}
js_result_auth['attestation_object'] = {}
js_result_auth['attestation_object']['att_statement'] = {}
js_result_auth['attestation_object']['att_statement'][
'alg'] = attestation_object.att_statement['alg']
js_result_auth['attestation_object']['att_statement']['sig'] = str(
binascii.hexlify(attestation_object.att_statement['sig']))
x5c = []
for elem in attestation_object.att_statement['x5c']:
c = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(elem)
x5c.append(str(c.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM)))
js_result_auth['attestation_object']['att_statement']['x5c'] = copy.copy(x5c)
js_result_auth['attestation_object']['data'] = str(attestation_object.data)
js_result_auth['attestation_object']['auth_data'] = {}
auth_data = attestation_object.auth_data
js_result_auth['attestation_object']['auth_data'][
'counter'] = auth_data.counter
js_result_auth['attestation_object']['auth_data'][
'extensions'] = auth_data.extensions
js_result_auth['attestation_object']['auth_data']['flags'] = auth_data.flags
js_result_auth['attestation_object']['auth_data']['credential_data'] = {}
js_result_auth['attestation_object']['auth_data']['credential_data'][
'aaguid'] = str(uuid.UUID(bytes=auth_data.credential_data.aaguid))
js_result_auth['attestation_object']['auth_data']['credential_data'][
'credential_id'] = str(
def create_pem_bundle(destination,
urls=None,
resource_dir=None,
set_env_var=True):
"""create a PEM formatted certificate bundle from the specified resources
Args:
destination(str, required):
pathname for created pem bundle file
urls(iterable, optional, default=None):
passed to `download_resources` if specified, else the existing contents of `resource_dir` are processed;
`urls` and/or `resource_dir` must be specified
resource_dir(str, optional, default=None):
location of resources to process; passed to `download_resources` along with `urls` if both specified, else
a temporary location is utilized
set_env_var(bool, optional, default=True):
determines whether the `DOD_CA_CERTS_PEM_PATH` environmental variable is set with the value of created pem
bundle pathname
Returns:
pathname of created pem bundle file
"""
if resource_dir is not None:
assert os.exists(resource_dir)
assert os.is_dir(resource_dir)
else:
assert urls is not None # `urls` or `resource_dir` must be specified
if urls is not None:
resource_dir = download_resources(urls, resource_dir)
# create empty bytes stream
pem_bundle = "# Bundle Created: {} \n".format(datetime.now()).encode()
# get file list
files = sorted(os.listdir(resource_dir))
# process CAs first then Roots
for type in ['ca', 'root']:
for file in files:
if any([file.endswith(ext) for ext in cert_exts]):
fpath = os.path.join(resource_dir, file)
if file.lower().find(type) > -1 and os.path.isfile(fpath):
with open(fpath, 'rb') as f:
contents = f.read()
try:
cert = load_der_x509_certificate(
contents, backend=default_backend())
except ValueError:
try:
cert = load_pem_x509_certificate(
contents, backend=default_backend())
except ValueError:
log.warning(
'Unable to load public key from: {}'.
format(file))
continue
# add cert's info and public key in PEM format to the bytes stream
pem_bundle += describe_cert(cert).encode()
pem_bundle += cert.public_bytes(Encoding.PEM)
destination = os.path.abspath(destination)
with open(destination, 'wb') as f:
f.write(pem_bundle)
if set_env_var:
os.environ['DOD_CA_CERTS_PEM_PATH'] = destination
log.info('Set DOD_CA_CERTS_PEM_PATH environment variable')
return destination
def check_remote(self, instance):
if not self._server:
raise ConfigurationError(
'You must specify `server` in your configuration file.')
try:
self.log.debug('Checking that TLS service check can connect')
sock = self.create_connection()
except Exception as e:
self.log.debug('Error occurred while connecting to socket: %s',
str(e))
self.service_check(self.SERVICE_CHECK_CAN_CONNECT,
self.CRITICAL,
tags=self._tags,
message=str(e))
return
else:
self.log.debug('TLS check able to connect')
self.service_check(self.SERVICE_CHECK_CAN_CONNECT,
self.OK,
tags=self._tags)
# Get the cert & TLS version from the connection
with closing(sock):
self.log.debug('Getting cert and TLS protocol version')
try:
with closing(
self.tls_context.wrap_socket(
sock, server_hostname=self._server_hostname)
) as secure_sock:
der_cert = secure_sock.getpeercert(binary_form=True)
protocol_version = secure_sock.version()
self.log.debug(
'Received serialized peer certificate and TLS protocol version %s',
protocol_version)
except Exception as e:
# https://docs.python.org/3/library/ssl.html#ssl.SSLCertVerificationError
err_code = getattr(e, 'verify_code', None)
message = getattr(e, 'verify_message', str(e))
self.log.debug(
'Error occurred while getting cert and TLS version from connection: %s',
str(e))
self.service_check(self.SERVICE_CHECK_VALIDATION,
self.CRITICAL,
tags=self._tags,
message=message)
# There's no sane way to tell it to not validate just the expiration
# This only works on Python 3.7+, see: https://bugs.python.org/issue28182
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/0b45d8eec051fd9816b6bf46a975fa461ffc983d/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h#L109
if err_code == 10:
self.service_check(self.SERVICE_CHECK_EXPIRATION,
self.CRITICAL,
tags=self._tags,
message='Certificate has expired')
return
# Load https://cryptography.io/en/latest/x509/reference/#cryptography.x509.Certificate
try:
self.log.debug('Deserializing peer certificate')
cert = load_der_x509_certificate(der_cert, default_backend())
self.log.debug('Deserialized peer certificate: %s', cert)
except Exception as e:
self.log.debug('Error while deserializing peer certificate: %s',
str(e))
self.service_check(
self.SERVICE_CHECK_VALIDATION,
self.CRITICAL,
tags=self._tags,
message='Unable to parse the certificate: {}'.format(e),
)
return
self.check_protocol_version(protocol_version)
self.validate_certificate(cert)
self.check_age(cert)