def gen_clsag_sig(self, ring_size=11, index=None):
msg = bytearray(random.getrandbits(8) for _ in range(32))
amnt = crypto.sc_init(random.randint(0, 0xFFFFFF) + 12)
priv = crypto.random_scalar()
msk = crypto.random_scalar()
alpha = crypto.random_scalar()
P = crypto.scalarmult_base(priv)
C = crypto.add_keys2(msk, amnt, crypto.xmr_H())
Cp = crypto.add_keys2(alpha, amnt, crypto.xmr_H())
ring = []
for i in range(ring_size - 1):
tk = TmpKey(
crypto.encodepoint(
crypto.scalarmult_base(crypto.random_scalar())),
crypto.encodepoint(
crypto.scalarmult_base(crypto.random_scalar())),
)
ring.append(tk)
index = index if index is not None else random.randint(0, len(ring))
ring.insert(index, TmpKey(crypto.encodepoint(P),
crypto.encodepoint(C)))
ring2 = list(ring)
mg_buffer = []
self.assertTrue(
crypto.point_eq(crypto.scalarmult_base(priv),
crypto.decodepoint(ring[index].dest)))
self.assertTrue(
crypto.point_eq(
crypto.scalarmult_base(crypto.sc_sub(msk, alpha)),
crypto.point_sub(crypto.decodepoint(ring[index].commitment),
Cp),
))
mlsag2.generate_clsag_simple(
msg,
ring,
CtKey(dest=priv, mask=msk),
alpha,
Cp,
index,
mg_buffer,
)
sD = crypto.decodepoint(mg_buffer[-1])
sc1 = crypto.decodeint(mg_buffer[-2])
scalars = [crypto.decodeint(x) for x in mg_buffer[1:-2]]
H = crypto.new_point()
sI = crypto.new_point()
crypto.hash_to_point_into(H, crypto.encodepoint(P))
crypto.scalarmult_into(sI, H, priv) # I = p*H
return msg, scalars, sc1, sI, sD, ring2, Cp
def test_h_pow(self):
hp = crypto.gen_Hpow(10)
self.assertEqual(crypto.encodepoint(hp[0]),
crypto.encodepoint(crypto.xmr_H()))
for i in range(1, 10):
crypto.check_ed25519point(hp[i])
self.assertEqual(
crypto.encodepoint(hp[i]),
crypto.encodepoint(
crypto.scalarmult(crypto.xmr_H(), crypto.sc_init(2**i))),
)
def ver_range(C=None, rsig=None, use_bulletproof=False, decode=True):
"""
Verifies that \sum Ci = C and that each Ci is a commitment to 0 or 2^i
:param C:
:param rsig:
:param use_bulletproof: bulletproof
:param decode: decodes encoded range proof
:return:
"""
n = ATOMS
CiH = [None] * n
C_tmp = crypto.identity()
c_H = crypto.xmr_H()
if decode and not use_bulletproof:
rsig = monero.recode_rangesig(rsig, encode=False, copy=True)
if not use_bulletproof:
for i in range(0, n):
CiH[i] = crypto.point_sub(rsig.Ci[i], c_H)
C_tmp = crypto.point_add(C_tmp, rsig.Ci[i])
c_H = crypto.point_double(c_H)
if C is not None and not crypto.point_eq(C_tmp, C):
return 0
if use_bulletproof:
bp = bulletproof.BulletProofBuilder()
return bp.verify(rsig)
return mlsag2.ver_borromean(rsig.Ci, CiH, rsig.asig.s0, rsig.asig.s1,
rsig.asig.ee)
def ecdh_decode_simple(rv, sk, i):
"""
Decodes ECDH from the transaction, checks mask (decoding validity).
"""
if i >= len(rv.ecdhInfo):
raise ValueError("Bad index")
if len(rv.outPk) != len(rv.ecdhInfo):
raise ValueError("outPk vs ecdhInfo mismatch")
ecdh_info = rv.ecdhInfo[i]
ecdh_info = recode_ecdh(ecdh_info, False)
ecdh_info = ring_ct.ecdh_decode(ecdh_info, derivation=crypto.encodeint(sk))
c_tmp = crypto.add_keys2(ecdh_info.mask, ecdh_info.amount, crypto.xmr_H())
if not crypto.point_eq(c_tmp, crypto.decodepoint(rv.outPk[i].mask)):
raise ValueError("Amount decoded incorrectly")
return ecdh_info.amount, ecdh_info.mask
def decode_rct(rv, sk, i):
"""
c.f. http:#eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 5.1.1
Uses the attached ecdh info to find the amounts represented by each output commitment
must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number
:param rv:
:param sk:
:param i:
:return:
"""
decodedTuple = ecdh_decode(rv.ecdhInfo[i], sk)
mask = decodedTuple.mask
amount = decodedTuple.amount
C = rv.outPk[i].mask
H = crypto.xmr_H()
Ctmp = crypto.point_add(crypto.scalarmult_base(mask), crypto.scalarmult(H, amount))
if not crypto.point_eq(crypto.point_sub(C, Ctmp), crypto.identity()):
logger.warning("warning, amount decoded incorrectly, will be unable to spend")
return amount
def prove_range_mem(amount, last_mask=None):
"""
Memory optimized range proof.
Gives C, and mask such that \sumCi = C
c.f. http:#eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 5.1
Ci is a commitment to either 0 or 2^i, i=0,...,63
thus this proves that "amount" is in [0, 2^ATOMS]
mask is a such that C = aG + bH, and b = amount
:param amount:
:param last_mask: ai[ATOMS-1] will be computed as \sum_{i=0}^{ATOMS-2} a_i - last_mask
:return: sumCi, mask, RangeSig.
sumCi is Pedersen commitment on the amount value. sumCi = aG + amount*H
mask is "a" from the Pedersent commitment above.
"""
n = ATOMS
bb = d2b(amount, n) # gives binary form of bb in "digits" binary digits
ai = [None] * len(bb)
Ci = [None] * len(bb)
a = crypto.sc_0()
C = crypto.identity()
alpha = mlsag2.key_zero_vector(n)
s1 = mlsag2.key_zero_vector(n)
c_H = crypto.xmr_H()
kck = crypto.get_keccak() # ee computation
# First pass, generates: ai, alpha, Ci, ee, s1
for ii in range(n):
ai[ii] = crypto.random_scalar()
if last_mask is not None and ii == ATOMS - 1:
ai[ii] = crypto.sc_sub(last_mask, a)
a = crypto.sc_add(
a, ai[ii]
) # creating the total mask since you have to pass this to receiver...
alpha[ii] = crypto.random_scalar()
L = crypto.scalarmult_base(alpha[ii])
if bb[ii] == 0:
Ci[ii] = crypto.scalarmult_base(ai[ii])
else:
Ci[ii] = crypto.point_add(crypto.scalarmult_base(ai[ii]), c_H)
C = crypto.point_add(C, Ci[ii])
if bb[ii] == 0:
s1[ii] = crypto.random_scalar()
c = crypto.hash_to_scalar(crypto.encodepoint(L))
L = crypto.add_keys2(s1[ii], c, crypto.point_sub(Ci[ii], c_H))
kck.update(crypto.encodepoint(L))
else:
kck.update(crypto.encodepoint(L))
c_H = crypto.point_double(c_H)
# Compute ee, memory cleanup
ee = crypto.decodeint(kck.digest())
del kck
# Second phase computes: s0, s1
c_H = crypto.xmr_H()
s0 = mlsag2.key_zero_vector(n)
for jj in range(n):
if not bb[jj]:
s0[jj] = crypto.sc_mulsub(ai[jj], ee, alpha[jj])
else:
s0[jj] = crypto.random_scalar()
LL = crypto.add_keys2(s0[jj], ee, Ci[jj])
cc = crypto.hash_to_scalar(crypto.encodepoint(LL))
s1[jj] = crypto.sc_mulsub(ai[jj], cc, alpha[jj])
c_H = crypto.point_double(c_H)
A = xmrtypes.BoroSig()
A.s0, A.s1, A.ee = s0, s1, ee
R = xmrtypes.RangeSig()
R.asig = A
R.Ci = Ci
return C, a, R
def prove_range_chunked(amount, last_mask=None):
a = crypto.sc_init(0)
si = crypto.sc_init(0)
c = crypto.sc_init(0)
ee = crypto.sc_init(0)
tmp_ai = crypto.sc_init(0)
tmp_alpha = crypto.sc_init(0)
C_acc = crypto.identity()
C_h = crypto.xmr_H()
C_tmp = crypto.identity()
L = crypto.identity()
Zero = crypto.identity()
kck = crypto.get_keccak()
ai = bytearray(32 * 64)
alphai = bytearray(32 * 64)
buff = bytearray(32)
Cis = bytearray(32 * 64)
s0s = bytearray(32 * 64)
s1s = bytearray(32 * 64)
ee_bin = bytearray(32)
for ii in range(64):
crypto.random_scalar_into(tmp_ai)
if last_mask is not None and ii == 63:
crypto.sc_sub_into(tmp_ai, last_mask, a)
crypto.sc_add_into(a, a, tmp_ai)
crypto.random_scalar_into(tmp_alpha)
crypto.scalarmult_base_into(L, tmp_alpha)
crypto.scalarmult_base_into(C_tmp, tmp_ai)
# C_tmp += &Zero if BB(ii) == 0 else &C_h
crypto.point_add_into(C_tmp, C_tmp, Zero if
((amount >> ii) & 1) == 0 else C_h)
crypto.point_add_into(C_acc, C_acc, C_tmp)
# Set Ci[ii] to sigs
crypto.encodepoint_into(Cis, C_tmp, ii << 5)
crypto.encodeint_into(ai, tmp_ai, ii << 5)
crypto.encodeint_into(alphai, tmp_alpha, ii << 5)
if ((amount >> ii) & 1) == 0:
crypto.random_scalar_into(si)
crypto.encodepoint_into(buff, L)
crypto.hash_to_scalar_into(c, buff)
crypto.point_sub_into(C_tmp, C_tmp, C_h)
crypto.add_keys2_into(L, si, c, C_tmp)
crypto.encodeint_into(s1s, si, ii << 5)
crypto.encodepoint_into(buff, L)
kck.update(buff)
crypto.point_double_into(C_h, C_h)
# Compute ee
tmp_ee = kck.digest()
crypto.decodeint_into(ee, tmp_ee)
del (tmp_ee, kck)
C_h = crypto.xmr_H()
gc.collect()
# Second pass, s0, s1
for ii in range(64):
crypto.decodeint_into(tmp_alpha, alphai, ii << 5)
crypto.decodeint_into(tmp_ai, ai, ii << 5)
if ((amount >> ii) & 1) == 0:
crypto.sc_mulsub_into(si, tmp_ai, ee, tmp_alpha)
crypto.encodeint_into(s0s, si, ii << 5)
else:
crypto.random_scalar_into(si)
crypto.encodeint_into(s0s, si, ii << 5)
crypto.decodepoint_into(C_tmp, Cis, ii << 5)
crypto.add_keys2_into(L, si, ee, C_tmp)
crypto.encodepoint_into(buff, L)
crypto.hash_to_scalar_into(c, buff)
crypto.sc_mulsub_into(si, tmp_ai, c, tmp_alpha)
crypto.encodeint_into(s1s, si, ii << 5)
crypto.point_double_into(C_h, C_h)
crypto.encodeint_into(ee_bin, ee)
del (ai, alphai, buff, tmp_ai, tmp_alpha, si, c, ee, C_tmp, C_h, L, Zero)
gc.collect()
return C_acc, a, [s0s, s1s, ee_bin, Cis]
async def gen_input(self,
value=1,
sub_major=None,
sub_minor=0,
additionals=False):
creds = self.src_keys
r = self.random_scalar()
R = crypto.scalarmult_base(r)
additional_keys = []
Additional = None
sub_major = sub_major if sub_major is not None else self.account_idx
is_sub = sub_major != 0 or sub_minor != 0
if sub_major != self.account_idx:
logger.warning(
"Generating input with different major subindex, cannot be spent in the resulting "
"transaction")
kssec = monero.get_subaddress_secret_key(creds.view_key_private,
major=sub_major,
minor=sub_minor)
kssub = crypto.sc_add(
kssec,
creds.spend_key_private) if is_sub else creds.spend_key_private
kvsub = crypto.sc_mul(creds.view_key_private,
kssub) if is_sub else creds.view_key_private
KSSUB, KVSUB = monero.generate_sub_address_keys(
creds.view_key_private, creds.spend_key_public, sub_major,
sub_minor)
if not crypto.point_eq(KSSUB, crypto.scalarmult_base(kssub)):
raise ValueError("Invariant error")
oidx = self.prng.randint(0, 12)
additionals_cnt = self.prng.randint(oidx + 1, 2 * oidx + 1)
deriv = crypto.generate_key_derivation(KVSUB, r)
kout = crypto.derive_secret_key(deriv, oidx, kssub)
KOUT = crypto.derive_public_key(deriv, oidx, KSSUB)
if not crypto.point_eq(KOUT, crypto.scalarmult_base(kout)):
raise ValueError("Invariant error")
if additionals:
if is_sub:
Additional = crypto.scalarmult(KSSUB, r)
else:
Additional = crypto.scalarmult_base(r)
else:
if is_sub:
R = crypto.scalarmult(KSSUB, r)
amnt = crypto.sc_init(value)
msk = self.random_scalar() # commitment mask
C = crypto.add_keys2(msk, amnt, crypto.xmr_H())
ring = []
for i in range(self.ring_size - 1):
tk = CtKey(
dest=crypto.encodepoint(self.random_pub()),
mask=crypto.encodepoint(self.random_pub()),
)
ring.append(tk)
index = self.prng.randint(0, len(ring))
ring.insert(
index,
CtKey(dest=crypto.encodepoint(KOUT), mask=crypto.encodepoint(C)))
if additionals:
additional_keys = [
self.random_pub() for _ in range(additionals_cnt)
]
additional_keys[oidx] = Additional
src = TxSourceEntry()
src.outputs = [(self.random_glob_idx(), x) for x in ring]
src.real_output = index
src.real_out_tx_key = crypto.encodepoint(R)
src.real_out_additional_tx_keys = [
crypto.encodepoint(x) for x in additional_keys
]
src.real_output_in_tx_index = oidx
src.amount = value
src.rct = True
src.mask = crypto.encodeint(msk)
src.multisig_kLRki = MultisigKLRki(K=crypto.ZERO,
L=crypto.ZERO,
R=crypto.ZERO,
ki=crypto.ZERO)
td = TransferDetails()
td.m_internal_output_index = oidx
td.m_global_output_index = src.outputs[index][0]
td.m_mask = src.mask
td.m_amount = value
td.m_subaddr_index = SubaddressIndex(major=sub_major, minor=sub_minor)
td.m_rct = True
td.m_txid = self.random_bytes(32)
td.m_block_height = self.prng.randint(0, 0xFFFF)
td.m_spent = False
td.m_spent_height = 0
td.m_key_image_known = True
td.m_key_image_requested = False
td.m_key_image_partial = False
td.m_multisig_k = []
td.m_multisig_info = []
td.m_uses = []
td.m_pk_index = 0
td.m_tx = self.gen_tx_prefix(self.prng.randint(1, 10), additionals_cnt)
td.m_tx.vout[oidx].target.key = crypto.encodepoint(KOUT)
extras = []
extras.append(TxExtraNonce(nonce=self.random_bytes(8)))
extras.append(TxExtraPubKey(pub_key=src.real_out_tx_key))
if src.real_out_additional_tx_keys:
extras.append(
TxExtraAdditionalPubKeys(data=src.real_out_additional_tx_keys))
td.m_tx.extra = await self.dump_extra_fields(extras)
tmpsubs = {}
monero.compute_subaddresses(creds, sub_major, [sub_minor], tmpsubs)
xi, ki, rderiv = self.check_input(src, creds, tmpsubs)
if not crypto.sc_eq(xi, kout):
raise ValueError("Invariant error")
td.m_key_image = crypto.encodepoint(ki)
self.sources.append(src)
self.selected_transfers.append(len(self.transfers))
self.transfers.append(td)
self.sources_creds.append(creds)
if not crypto.point_eq(
crypto.decodepoint(src.outputs[src.real_output][1].dest),
crypto.scalarmult_base(kout)):
raise ValueError("Invariant error")
return self
def test_h(self):
H = unhexlify(
b"8b655970153799af2aeadc9ff1add0ea6c7251d54154cfa92c173a0dd39c1f94"
)
self.assertEqual(crypto.encodepoint(crypto.xmr_H()), H)