def to_string(self):
ident = self.ident
if ident == IDENT_SCRYPT:
return "$scrypt$ln=%d,r=%d,p=%d$%s$%s" % (
self.rounds,
self.block_size,
self.parallelism,
bascii_to_str(b64s_encode(self.salt)),
bascii_to_str(b64s_encode(self.checksum)),
)
else:
assert ident == IDENT_7
salt = self.salt
try:
salt.decode("ascii")
except UnicodeDecodeError:
raise suppress_cause(
NotImplementedError(
"scrypt $7$ hashes dont support non-ascii salts"))
return bascii_to_str(b"".join([
b"$7$",
h64.encode_int6(self.rounds),
h64.encode_int30(self.block_size),
h64.encode_int30(self.parallelism), self.salt, b"$",
h64.encode_bytes(self.checksum)
]))
def _calc_checksum(self, secret):
if isinstance(secret, pl_unicode):
secret = secret.encode("utf-8")
real_rounds = 1 << self.rounds
result = hashlib.sha512(self.salt.encode("ascii") + secret).digest()
r = 0
while r < real_rounds:
result = hashlib.sha512(result + secret).digest()
r += 1
return h64.encode_bytes(result).decode("ascii")[:self.checksum_size]
def _calc_checksum(self, secret):
# FIXME: can't find definitive policy on how phpass handles non-ascii.
if isinstance(secret, unicode):
secret = secret.encode("utf-8")
real_rounds = 1 << self.rounds
result = md5(self.salt.encode("ascii") + secret).digest()
r = 0
while r < real_rounds:
result = md5(result + secret).digest()
r += 1
return h64.encode_bytes(result).decode("ascii")
def _calc_checksum(self, secret):
# FIXME: can't find definitive policy on how phpass handles non-ascii.
if isinstance(secret, unicode):
secret = secret.encode("utf-8")
real_rounds = 1<<self.rounds
result = md5(self.salt.encode("ascii") + secret).digest()
r = 0
while r < real_rounds:
result = md5(result + secret).digest()
r += 1
return h64.encode_bytes(result).decode("ascii")
def h_scrypt(phrase, rounds, salt):
p = 1
r = 8
log2N = rounds + 7
N = 1 << log2N
bytesalt = salt.encode("ascii")
setting = (b"$7$" + hash64.encode_int6(log2N) + hash64.encode_int30(r) +
hash64.encode_int30(p) + bytesalt)
binhash = raw_scrypt(phrase, salt=bytesalt, p=p, r=r, n=N, dklen=32)
yield (phrase, setting, setting + b'$' + hash64.encode_bytes(binhash))
def h_scrypt(phrase, rounds, salt):
p = 1
r = 8
log2N = rounds + 7
N = 1 << log2N
bytesalt = salt.encode("ascii")
setting = (b"$7$" +
hash64.encode_int6(log2N) +
hash64.encode_int30(r) +
hash64.encode_int30(p) +
bytesalt)
binhash = raw_scrypt(phrase, salt=bytesalt, p=p, r=r, n=N, dklen=32)
yield (phrase, setting, setting + b'$' + hash64.encode_bytes(binhash))
def _calc_checksum(self, secret):
# This function handles both the cisco_pix & cisco_asa formats:
# * PIX had a limit of 16 character passwords, and always appended the username.
# * ASA 7.0 (2005) increases this limit to 32, and conditionally appends the username.
# The two behaviors are controlled based on the _is_asa class-level flag.
asa = self._is_asa
# XXX: No idea what unicode policy is, but all examples are
# 7-bit ascii compatible, so using UTF-8.
if isinstance(secret, unicode):
secret = secret.encode("utf-8")
seclen = len(secret)
# check for truncation (during .hash() calls only)
if self.use_defaults:
self._check_truncate_policy(secret)
# PIX/ASA: Per-user accounts use the first 4 chars of the username as the salt,
# whereas global "enable" passwords don't have any salt at all.
# ASA only: Don't append user if password is 28 or more characters.
user = self.user
if user and not (asa and seclen > 27):
if isinstance(user, unicode):
user = user.encode("utf-8")
secret += user[:4]
# PIX: null-pad or truncate to 16 bytes.
# ASA: increase to 32 bytes if password is 13 or more characters.
if asa and seclen > 12:
padsize = 32
else:
padsize = 16
secret = right_pad_string(secret, padsize)
# md5 digest
hash = md5(secret).digest()
# drop every 4th byte
hash = join_byte_elems(c for i,c in enumerate(hash) if i & 3 < 3)
# encode using Hash64
return h64.encode_bytes(hash).decode("ascii")
def _calc_checksum(self, secret):
"""
This function implements the "encrypted" hash format used by Cisco
PIX & ASA. It's behavior has been confirmed for ASA 9.6,
but is presumed correct for PIX & other ASA releases,
as it fits with known test vectors, and existing literature.
While nearly the same, the PIX & ASA hashes have slight differences,
so this function performs differently based on the _is_asa class flag.
Noteable changes from PIX to ASA include password size limit
increased from 16 -> 32, and other internal changes.
"""
# select PIX vs or ASA mode
asa = self._is_asa
#
# encode secret
#
# per ASA 8.4 documentation,
# http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/asa/asa84/configuration/guide/asa_84_cli_config/ref_cli.html#Supported_Character_Sets,
# it supposedly uses UTF-8 -- though some double-encoding issues have
# been observed when trying to actually *set* a non-ascii password
# via ASDM, and access via SSH seems to strip 8-bit chars.
#
if isinstance(secret, unicode):
secret = secret.encode("utf-8")
#
# check if password too large
#
# Per ASA 9.6 changes listed in
# http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/asa/roadmap/asa_new_features.html,
# prior releases had a maximum limit of 32 characters.
# Testing with an ASA 9.6 system bears this out --
# setting 32-char password for a user account,
# and logins will fail if any chars are appended.
# (ASA 9.6 added new PBKDF2-based hash algorithm,
# which supports larger passwords).
#
# Per PIX documentation
# http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/security/pix/pix50/configuration/guide/commands.html,
# it would not allow passwords > 16 chars.
#
# Thus, we unconditionally throw a password size error here,
# as nothing valid can come from a larger password.
# NOTE: assuming PIX has same behavior, but at 16 char limit.
#
spoil_digest = None
if len(secret) > self.truncate_size:
if self.use_defaults:
# called from hash()
msg = "Password too long (%s allows at most %d bytes)" % (
self.name,
self.truncate_size,
)
raise uh.exc.PasswordSizeError(self.truncate_size, msg=msg)
else:
# called from verify() --
# We don't want to throw error, or return early,
# as that would let attacker know too much. Instead, we set a
# flag to add some dummy data into the md5 digest, so that
# output won't match truncated version of secret, or anything
# else that's fixed and predictable.
spoil_digest = secret + _DUMMY_BYTES
#
# append user to secret
#
# Policy appears to be:
#
# * Nothing appended for enable password (user = "")
#
# * ASA: If user present, but secret is >= 28 chars, nothing appended.
#
# * 1-2 byte users not allowed.
# DEVIATION: we're letting them through, and repeating their
# chars ala 3-char user, to simplify testing.
# Could issue warning in the future though.
#
# * 3 byte user has first char repeated, to pad to 4.
# (observed under ASA 9.6, assuming true elsewhere)
#
# * 4 byte users are used directly.
#
# * 5+ byte users are truncated to 4 bytes.
#
user = self.user
if user:
if isinstance(user, unicode):
user = user.encode("utf-8")
if not asa or len(secret) < 28:
secret += repeat_string(user, 4)
#
# pad / truncate result to limit
#
# While PIX always pads to 16 bytes, ASA increases to 32 bytes IFF
# secret+user > 16 bytes. This makes PIX & ASA have different results
# where secret size in range(13,16), and user is present --
# PIX will truncate to 16, ASA will truncate to 32.
#
if asa and len(secret) > 16:
pad_size = 32
else:
pad_size = 16
secret = right_pad_string(secret, pad_size)
#
# md5 digest
#
if spoil_digest:
# make sure digest won't match truncated version of secret
secret += spoil_digest
digest = md5(secret).digest()
#
# drop every 4th byte
# NOTE: guessing this was done because it makes output exactly
# 16 bytes, which may have been a general 'char password[]'
# size limit under PIX
#
digest = join_byte_elems(c for i, c in enumerate(digest)
if (i + 1) & 3)
#
# encode using Hash64
#
return h64.encode_bytes(digest).decode("ascii")
def _calc_checksum(self, secret):
"""
This function implements the "encrypted" hash format used by Cisco
PIX & ASA. It's behavior has been confirmed for ASA 9.6,
but is presumed correct for PIX & other ASA releases,
as it fits with known test vectors, and existing literature.
While nearly the same, the PIX & ASA hashes have slight differences,
so this function performs differently based on the _is_asa class flag.
Noteable changes from PIX to ASA include password size limit
increased from 16 -> 32, and other internal changes.
"""
# select PIX vs or ASA mode
asa = self._is_asa
#
# encode secret
#
# per ASA 8.4 documentation,
# http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/asa/asa84/configuration/guide/asa_84_cli_config/ref_cli.html#Supported_Character_Sets,
# it supposedly uses UTF-8 -- though some double-encoding issues have
# been observed when trying to actually *set* a non-ascii password
# via ASDM, and access via SSH seems to strip 8-bit chars.
#
if isinstance(secret, unicode):
secret = secret.encode("utf-8")
#
# check if password too large
#
# Per ASA 9.6 changes listed in
# http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/asa/roadmap/asa_new_features.html,
# prior releases had a maximum limit of 32 characters.
# Testing with an ASA 9.6 system bears this out --
# setting 32-char password for a user account,
# and logins will fail if any chars are appended.
# (ASA 9.6 added new PBKDF2-based hash algorithm,
# which supports larger passwords).
#
# Per PIX documentation
# http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/security/pix/pix50/configuration/guide/commands.html,
# it would not allow passwords > 16 chars.
#
# Thus, we unconditionally throw a password size error here,
# as nothing valid can come from a larger password.
# NOTE: assuming PIX has same behavior, but at 16 char limit.
#
spoil_digest = None
if len(secret) > self.truncate_size:
if self.use_defaults:
# called from hash()
msg = "Password too long (%s allows at most %d bytes)" % \
(self.name, self.truncate_size)
raise uh.exc.PasswordSizeError(self.truncate_size, msg=msg)
else:
# called from verify() --
# We don't want to throw error, or return early,
# as that would let attacker know too much. Instead, we set a
# flag to add some dummy data into the md5 digest, so that
# output won't match truncated version of secret, or anything
# else that's fixed and predictable.
spoil_digest = secret + _DUMMY_BYTES
#
# append user to secret
#
# Policy appears to be:
#
# * Nothing appended for enable password (user = "")
#
# * ASA: If user present, but secret is >= 28 chars, nothing appended.
#
# * 1-2 byte users not allowed.
# DEVIATION: we're letting them through, and repeating their
# chars ala 3-char user, to simplify testing.
# Could issue warning in the future though.
#
# * 3 byte user has first char repeated, to pad to 4.
# (observed under ASA 9.6, assuming true elsewhere)
#
# * 4 byte users are used directly.
#
# * 5+ byte users are truncated to 4 bytes.
#
user = self.user
if user:
if isinstance(user, unicode):
user = user.encode("utf-8")
if not asa or len(secret) < 28:
secret += repeat_string(user, 4)
#
# pad / truncate result to limit
#
# While PIX always pads to 16 bytes, ASA increases to 32 bytes IFF
# secret+user > 16 bytes. This makes PIX & ASA have different results
# where secret size in range(13,16), and user is present --
# PIX will truncate to 16, ASA will truncate to 32.
#
if asa and len(secret) > 16:
pad_size = 32
else:
pad_size = 16
secret = right_pad_string(secret, pad_size)
#
# md5 digest
#
if spoil_digest:
# make sure digest won't match truncated version of secret
secret += spoil_digest
digest = md5(secret).digest()
#
# drop every 4th byte
# NOTE: guessing this was done because it makes output exactly
# 16 bytes, which may have been a general 'char password[]'
# size limit under PIX
#
digest = join_byte_elems(c for i, c in enumerate(digest) if (i + 1) & 3)
#
# encode using Hash64
#
return h64.encode_bytes(digest).decode("ascii")