def _requests_to_bytes_iter(self):
# Take the requests out of self._coalesce_requests, actually make
# the requests, and generate the bytes from the responses.
#
# Yields 2-tuples (segment-name, byte-chunk). The segment name is
# used for logging.
for data_or_req, seg_etag, seg_size in self._coalesce_requests():
if isinstance(data_or_req, bytes): # ugly, awful overloading
yield ('data segment', data_or_req)
continue
seg_req = data_or_req
seg_resp = seg_req.get_response(self.app)
if not is_success(seg_resp.status_int):
close_if_possible(seg_resp.app_iter)
raise SegmentError(
'While processing manifest %s, '
'got %d while retrieving %s' %
(self.name, seg_resp.status_int, seg_req.path))
elif (
(seg_etag and (seg_resp.etag != seg_etag)) or
(seg_size and
(seg_resp.content_length != seg_size) and not seg_req.range)):
# The content-length check is for security reasons. Seems
# possible that an attacker could upload a >1mb object and
# then replace it with a much smaller object with same
# etag. Then create a big nested SLO that calls that
# object many times which would hammer our obj servers. If
# this is a range request, don't check content-length
# because it won't match.
close_if_possible(seg_resp.app_iter)
raise SegmentError(
'Object segment no longer valid: '
'%(path)s etag: %(r_etag)s != %(s_etag)s or '
'%(r_size)s != %(s_size)s.' % {
'path': seg_req.path,
'r_etag': seg_resp.etag,
'r_size': seg_resp.content_length,
's_etag': seg_etag,
's_size': seg_size
})
else:
self.current_resp = seg_resp
seg_hash = None
if seg_resp.etag and not seg_req.headers.get('Range'):
# Only calculate the MD5 if it we can use it to validate
seg_hash = hashlib.md5()
document_iters = maybe_multipart_byteranges_to_document_iters(
seg_resp.app_iter, seg_resp.headers['Content-Type'])
for chunk in itertools.chain.from_iterable(document_iters):
if seg_hash:
seg_hash.update(chunk)
yield (seg_req.path, chunk)
close_if_possible(seg_resp.app_iter)
if seg_hash and seg_hash.hexdigest() != seg_resp.etag:
raise SegmentError(
"Bad MD5 checksum in %(name)s for %(seg)s: headers had"
" %(etag)s, but object MD5 was actually %(actual)s" % {
'seg': seg_req.path,
'etag': seg_resp.etag,
'name': self.name,
'actual': seg_hash.hexdigest()
})
def _internal_iter(self):
bytes_left = self.response_body_length
try:
for seg_req, seg_etag, seg_size in self._coalesce_requests():
seg_resp = seg_req.get_response(self.app)
if not is_success(seg_resp.status_int):
close_if_possible(seg_resp.app_iter)
raise SegmentError(
'While processing manifest %s, '
'got %d while retrieving %s' %
(self.name, seg_resp.status_int, seg_req.path))
elif ((seg_etag and (seg_resp.etag != seg_etag))
or (seg_size and (seg_resp.content_length != seg_size)
and not seg_req.range)):
# The content-length check is for security reasons. Seems
# possible that an attacker could upload a >1mb object and
# then replace it with a much smaller object with same
# etag. Then create a big nested SLO that calls that
# object many times which would hammer our obj servers. If
# this is a range request, don't check content-length
# because it won't match.
close_if_possible(seg_resp.app_iter)
raise SegmentError(
'Object segment no longer valid: '
'%(path)s etag: %(r_etag)s != %(s_etag)s or '
'%(r_size)s != %(s_size)s.' % {
'path': seg_req.path,
'r_etag': seg_resp.etag,
'r_size': seg_resp.content_length,
's_etag': seg_etag,
's_size': seg_size
})
else:
self.current_resp = seg_resp
seg_hash = None
if seg_resp.etag and not seg_req.headers.get('Range'):
# Only calculate the MD5 if it we can use it to validate
seg_hash = hashlib.md5()
document_iters = maybe_multipart_byteranges_to_document_iters(
seg_resp.app_iter, seg_resp.headers['Content-Type'])
for chunk in itertools.chain.from_iterable(document_iters):
if seg_hash:
seg_hash.update(chunk)
if bytes_left is None:
yield chunk
elif bytes_left >= len(chunk):
yield chunk
bytes_left -= len(chunk)
else:
yield chunk[:bytes_left]
bytes_left -= len(chunk)
close_if_possible(seg_resp.app_iter)
raise SegmentError(
'Too many bytes for %(name)s; truncating in '
'%(seg)s with %(left)d bytes left' % {
'name': self.name,
'seg': seg_req.path,
'left': bytes_left
})
close_if_possible(seg_resp.app_iter)
if seg_hash and seg_hash.hexdigest() != seg_resp.etag:
raise SegmentError(
"Bad MD5 checksum in %(name)s for %(seg)s: headers had"
" %(etag)s, but object MD5 was actually %(actual)s" % {
'seg': seg_req.path,
'etag': seg_resp.etag,
'name': self.name,
'actual': seg_hash.hexdigest()
})
if bytes_left:
raise SegmentError(
'Not enough bytes for %s; closing connection' % self.name)
except (ListingIterError, SegmentError) as err:
self.logger.error(err)
if not self.validated_first_segment:
raise
finally:
if self.current_resp:
close_if_possible(self.current_resp.app_iter)
def _requests_to_bytes_iter(self):
# Take the requests out of self._coalesce_requests, actually make
# the requests, and generate the bytes from the responses.
#
# Yields 2-tuples (segment-name, byte-chunk). The segment name is
# used for logging.
for data_or_req, seg_etag, seg_size in self._coalesce_requests():
if isinstance(data_or_req, bytes): # ugly, awful overloading
yield ('data segment', data_or_req)
continue
seg_req = data_or_req
seg_resp = seg_req.get_response(self.app)
if not is_success(seg_resp.status_int):
# Error body should be short
body = seg_resp.body
if not six.PY2:
body = body.decode('utf8')
msg = 'While processing manifest %s, got %d (%s) ' \
'while retrieving %s' % (
self.name, seg_resp.status_int,
body if len(body) <= 60 else body[:57] + '...',
seg_req.path)
if is_server_error(seg_resp.status_int):
self.logger.error(msg)
raise HTTPServiceUnavailable(request=seg_req,
content_type='text/plain')
raise SegmentError(msg)
elif (
(seg_etag and (seg_resp.etag != seg_etag)) or
(seg_size and
(seg_resp.content_length != seg_size) and not seg_req.range)):
# The content-length check is for security reasons. Seems
# possible that an attacker could upload a >1mb object and
# then replace it with a much smaller object with same
# etag. Then create a big nested SLO that calls that
# object many times which would hammer our obj servers. If
# this is a range request, don't check content-length
# because it won't match.
close_if_possible(seg_resp.app_iter)
raise SegmentError(
'Object segment no longer valid: '
'%(path)s etag: %(r_etag)s != %(s_etag)s or '
'%(r_size)s != %(s_size)s.' % {
'path': seg_req.path,
'r_etag': seg_resp.etag,
'r_size': seg_resp.content_length,
's_etag': seg_etag,
's_size': seg_size
})
else:
self.current_resp = seg_resp
resp_len = 0
seg_hash = None
if seg_resp.etag and not seg_req.headers.get('Range'):
# Only calculate the MD5 if it we can use it to validate
seg_hash = md5(usedforsecurity=False)
document_iters = maybe_multipart_byteranges_to_document_iters(
seg_resp.app_iter, seg_resp.headers['Content-Type'])
for chunk in itertools.chain.from_iterable(document_iters):
if seg_hash:
seg_hash.update(chunk)
resp_len += len(chunk)
yield (seg_req.path, chunk)
close_if_possible(seg_resp.app_iter)
if seg_hash:
if resp_len != seg_resp.content_length:
raise SegmentError(
"Bad response length for %(seg)s as part of %(name)s: "
"headers had %(from_headers)s, but response length "
"was actually %(actual)s" % {
'seg': seg_req.path,
'from_headers': seg_resp.content_length,
'name': self.name,
'actual': resp_len
})
if seg_hash.hexdigest() != seg_resp.etag:
raise SegmentError(
"Bad MD5 checksum for %(seg)s as part of %(name)s: "
"headers had %(etag)s, but object MD5 was actually "
"%(actual)s" % {
'seg': seg_req.path,
'etag': seg_resp.etag,
'name': self.name,
'actual': seg_hash.hexdigest()
})
def _internal_iter(self):
bytes_left = self.response_body_length
try:
for seg_req, seg_etag, seg_size in self._coalesce_requests():
seg_resp = seg_req.get_response(self.app)
if not is_success(seg_resp.status_int):
close_if_possible(seg_resp.app_iter)
raise SegmentError(
'While processing manifest %s, '
'got %d while retrieving %s' %
(self.name, seg_resp.status_int, seg_req.path))
elif ((seg_etag and (seg_resp.etag != seg_etag)) or
(seg_size and (seg_resp.content_length != seg_size) and
not seg_req.range)):
# The content-length check is for security reasons. Seems
# possible that an attacker could upload a >1mb object and
# then replace it with a much smaller object with same
# etag. Then create a big nested SLO that calls that
# object many times which would hammer our obj servers. If
# this is a range request, don't check content-length
# because it won't match.
close_if_possible(seg_resp.app_iter)
raise SegmentError(
'Object segment no longer valid: '
'%(path)s etag: %(r_etag)s != %(s_etag)s or '
'%(r_size)s != %(s_size)s.' %
{'path': seg_req.path, 'r_etag': seg_resp.etag,
'r_size': seg_resp.content_length,
's_etag': seg_etag,
's_size': seg_size})
else:
self.current_resp = seg_resp
seg_hash = None
if seg_resp.etag and not seg_req.headers.get('Range'):
# Only calculate the MD5 if it we can use it to validate
seg_hash = hashlib.md5()
document_iters = maybe_multipart_byteranges_to_document_iters(
seg_resp.app_iter,
seg_resp.headers['Content-Type'])
for chunk in itertools.chain.from_iterable(document_iters):
if seg_hash:
seg_hash.update(chunk)
if bytes_left is None:
yield chunk
elif bytes_left >= len(chunk):
yield chunk
bytes_left -= len(chunk)
else:
yield chunk[:bytes_left]
bytes_left -= len(chunk)
close_if_possible(seg_resp.app_iter)
raise SegmentError(
'Too many bytes for %(name)s; truncating in '
'%(seg)s with %(left)d bytes left' %
{'name': self.name, 'seg': seg_req.path,
'left': bytes_left})
close_if_possible(seg_resp.app_iter)
if seg_hash and seg_hash.hexdigest() != seg_resp.etag:
raise SegmentError(
"Bad MD5 checksum in %(name)s for %(seg)s: headers had"
" %(etag)s, but object MD5 was actually %(actual)s" %
{'seg': seg_req.path, 'etag': seg_resp.etag,
'name': self.name, 'actual': seg_hash.hexdigest()})
if bytes_left:
raise SegmentError(
'Not enough bytes for %s; closing connection' % self.name)
except (ListingIterError, SegmentError) as err:
self.logger.error(err)
if not self.validated_first_segment:
raise
finally:
if self.current_resp:
close_if_possible(self.current_resp.app_iter)
def _requests_to_bytes_iter(self):
# Take the requests out of self._coalesce_requests, actually make
# the requests, and generate the bytes from the responses.
#
# Yields 2-tuples (segment-name, byte-chunk). The segment name is
# used for logging.
for data_or_req, seg_etag, seg_size in self._coalesce_requests():
if isinstance(data_or_req, bytes): # ugly, awful overloading
yield ('data segment', data_or_req)
continue
seg_req = data_or_req
seg_resp = seg_req.get_response(self.app)
if not is_success(seg_resp.status_int):
close_if_possible(seg_resp.app_iter)
raise SegmentError(
'While processing manifest %s, '
'got %d while retrieving %s' %
(self.name, seg_resp.status_int, seg_req.path))
elif ((seg_etag and (seg_resp.etag != seg_etag)) or
(seg_size and (seg_resp.content_length != seg_size) and
not seg_req.range)):
# The content-length check is for security reasons. Seems
# possible that an attacker could upload a >1mb object and
# then replace it with a much smaller object with same
# etag. Then create a big nested SLO that calls that
# object many times which would hammer our obj servers. If
# this is a range request, don't check content-length
# because it won't match.
close_if_possible(seg_resp.app_iter)
raise SegmentError(
'Object segment no longer valid: '
'%(path)s etag: %(r_etag)s != %(s_etag)s or '
'%(r_size)s != %(s_size)s.' %
{'path': seg_req.path, 'r_etag': seg_resp.etag,
'r_size': seg_resp.content_length,
's_etag': seg_etag,
's_size': seg_size})
else:
self.current_resp = seg_resp
seg_hash = None
if seg_resp.etag and not seg_req.headers.get('Range'):
# Only calculate the MD5 if it we can use it to validate
seg_hash = hashlib.md5()
document_iters = maybe_multipart_byteranges_to_document_iters(
seg_resp.app_iter,
seg_resp.headers['Content-Type'])
for chunk in itertools.chain.from_iterable(document_iters):
if seg_hash:
seg_hash.update(chunk)
yield (seg_req.path, chunk)
close_if_possible(seg_resp.app_iter)
if seg_hash and seg_hash.hexdigest() != seg_resp.etag:
raise SegmentError(
"Bad MD5 checksum in %(name)s for %(seg)s: headers had"
" %(etag)s, but object MD5 was actually %(actual)s" %
{'seg': seg_req.path, 'etag': seg_resp.etag,
'name': self.name, 'actual': seg_hash.hexdigest()})
