def __init__(self, modulus=BlumWilliamsInteger()):
self.modulustype = modulus
class Sig_RSA_Stateless_HW09(PKSig):
"""
This scheme is probablistic and thus time consuming, so we skip it
when running doctests.
#doctest: +SKIP
>>> pksig = Sig_RSA_Stateless_HW09() #doctest:+SKIP
>>> p = integer(13075790812874903063868976368194105132206964291400106069285054021531242344673657224376055832139406140158530256050580761865568307154219348003780027259560207) #doctest:+SKIP
>>> q = integer(12220150399144091059083151334113293594120344494042436487743750419696868216757186059428173175925369884682105191510729093971051869295857706815002710593321543) #doctest:+SKIP
>>> (public_key, secret_key) = pksig.keygen(1024, p, q) #doctest:+SKIP
>>> msg = SHA1(b'this is the message I want to sign.') #doctest:+SKIP
>>> signature = pksig.sign(public_key, secret_key, msg) #doctest:+SKIP
>>> pksig.verify(public_key, msg, signature) #doctest:+SKIP
True
"""
def __init__(self, CH=ChamHash_HW09):
self.BWInt = BlumWilliamsInteger()
self.Prf = Prf()
self.ChameleonHash = CH()
def keygen(self, keyLength=1024, p=0, q=0):
# Generate a Blum-Williams integer N of 'key_length' bits with factorization p,q
if p == 0 or q == 0:
(p, q) = self.BWInt.generatePrimes(int(keyLength / 2))
# Generate random u,h \in QR_N and a random c \in {0,1}^|N|
N = p * q
u = randomQR(N)
h = randomQR(N)
c = randomBits(keyLength) #PRNG_generate_bits(key_length)
K = self.Prf.keygen(keyLength)
self.state = 0
# Generate the Chameleon hash parameters. We do not need the secret params.
(L, secret) = self.ChameleonHash.paramgen(keyLength, p, q)
# Assemble the public and secret keys
pk = {
'length': keyLength,
'N': N,
'u': u,
'h': h,
'c': c,
'K': K,
'L': L
}
sk = {'p': p, 'q': q}
return (pk, sk)
def sign(self, pk, sk, message, s=0):
if debug: print("Sign...")
L, K, c, keyLength, u, h, N = pk['L'], pk['K'], pk['c'], pk[
'length'], pk['u'], pk['h'], pk['N']
p, q = sk['p'], sk['q']
# Use internal state counter if none was provided
if (s == 0):
s = self.state
self.state += 1
s += 1
# Hash the message using the chameleon hash under params L to obtain (x, r)
(x, r) = self.ChameleonHash.hash(L, message)
# Compute e = H_k(s) and check whether it's prime. If not, increment s and repeat.
phi_N = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
e = self.HW_hash(K, c, s, keyLength)
e1 = e % phi_N
e2 = e % N
while (not (isPrime(e2))) or (not gcd(e1, phi_N) == 1):
s += 1
e = self.HW_hash(K, c, s, keyLength)
e1 = e % phi_N
e2 = e % N
e = e1
# Compute B = SQRT(u^x * h)^ceil(log_2(s)) mod N
# Note that SQRT requires the factorization p, q
temp = ((u**x) * h) % N
power = ((((p - 1) * (q - 1)) + 4) / 8)**(math.ceil(log[2](s)))
B = temp**power
sigma1 = (B**(e**-1)) % N
# Update internal state counter and return sig = (sigma1, r, s)
self.state = s
return {'sigma1': sigma1, 'r': r, 's': s, 'e': e}
def verify(self, pk, message, sig):
if debug: print("\nVERIFY\n\n")
sigma1, r, s, e = sig['sigma1'], sig['r'], sig['s'], sig['e']
K, L, c, keyLength, u, h, N = pk['K'], pk['L'], pk['c'], pk[
'length'], pk['u'], pk['h'], pk['N']
# Make sure that 0 < s < 2^{keylength/2}, else reject the signature
if not (0 < s and s < (2**(keyLength / 2))):
return False
# Compute e = H_k(s) and reject the signature if it's not prime
ei = self.HW_hash(K, c, s, keyLength) % N
if not isPrime(ei):
if debug: print("ei not prime")
return False
# Compute Y = sigma1^{2*ceil(log2(s))}
s1 = integer(2**(math.ceil(log[2](s))))
Y = (sigma1**s1) % N
# Hash the mesage using the chameleon hash with fixed randomness r
(x, r2) = self.ChameleonHash.hash(L, message, r)
lhs = (Y**ei) % N
rhs = ((u**x) * h) % N
if debug:
print("lhs =>", lhs)
print("rhs =>", rhs)
# Verify that Y^e = (u^x h) mod N. If so, accept the signature
if lhs == rhs:
return True
# Default: reject the signature
return False
def HW_hash(self, key, c, input, keyLen):
C = integer(c)
input_size = bitsize(c)
input_b = Conversion.IP2OS(input, input_size)
# Return c XOR PRF(k, input), where the output of PRF is keyLength bits
result = C ^ self.Prf.eval(key, input_b)
return result
def __init__(self, CH = ChamHash_HW09):
self.BWInt = BlumWilliamsInteger()
self.Prf = Prf()
self.ChameleonHash = CH()
def __init__(self, CH=ChamHash_HW09):
self.BWInt = BlumWilliamsInteger()
self.Prf = Prf()
self.ChameleonHash = CH()
class Sig_RSA_Stateless_HW09(PKSig):
"""
This scheme is probablistic and thus time consuming, so we skip it
when running doctests.
#doctest: +SKIP
>>> pksig = Sig_RSA_Stateless_HW09() #doctest:+SKIP
>>> p = integer(13075790812874903063868976368194105132206964291400106069285054021531242344673657224376055832139406140158530256050580761865568307154219348003780027259560207) #doctest:+SKIP
>>> q = integer(12220150399144091059083151334113293594120344494042436487743750419696868216757186059428173175925369884682105191510729093971051869295857706815002710593321543) #doctest:+SKIP
>>> (public_key, secret_key) = pksig.keygen(1024, p, q) #doctest:+SKIP
>>> msg = SHA1(b'this is the message I want to sign.') #doctest:+SKIP
>>> signature = pksig.sign(public_key, secret_key, msg) #doctest:+SKIP
>>> pksig.verify(public_key, msg, signature) #doctest:+SKIP
True
"""
def __init__(self, CH = ChamHash_HW09):
self.BWInt = BlumWilliamsInteger()
self.Prf = Prf()
self.ChameleonHash = CH()
def keygen(self, keyLength=1024, p=0, q=0):
# Generate a Blum-Williams integer N of 'key_length' bits with factorization p,q
if p == 0 or q == 0:
(p, q) = self.BWInt.generatePrimes(int(keyLength/2))
# Generate random u,h \in QR_N and a random c \in {0,1}^|N|
N = p * q
u = randomQR(N)
h = randomQR(N)
c = randomBits(keyLength)#PRNG_generate_bits(key_length)
K = self.Prf.keygen(keyLength)
self.state = 0
# Generate the Chameleon hash parameters. We do not need the secret params.
(L, secret) = self.ChameleonHash.paramgen(keyLength, p, q);
# Assemble the public and secret keys
pk = { 'length': keyLength, 'N': N, 'u': u, 'h': h, 'c': c, 'K': K, 'L': L }
sk = { 'p': p, 'q': q }
return (pk, sk);
def sign(self, pk, sk, message, s=0):
if debug: print("Sign...")
L, K, c, keyLength, u, h, N = pk['L'], pk['K'], pk['c'], pk['length'], pk['u'], pk['h'], pk['N']
p, q = sk['p'], sk['q']
# Use internal state counter if none was provided
if (s == 0):
s = self.state
self.state += 1
s += 1
# Hash the message using the chameleon hash under params L to obtain (x, r)
(x, r) = self.ChameleonHash.hash(L, message);
# Compute e = H_k(s) and check whether it's prime. If not, increment s and repeat.
phi_N = (p-1)*(q-1)
e = self.HW_hash(K, c, s, keyLength)
e1 = e % phi_N
e2 = e % N
while (not (isPrime(e2))) or (not gcd(e1, phi_N) == 1):
s += 1
e = self.HW_hash(K, c, s, keyLength)
e1 = e % phi_N
e2 = e % N
e = e1
# Compute B = SQRT(u^x * h)^ceil(log_2(s)) mod N
# Note that SQRT requires the factorization p, q
temp = ((u ** x) * h) % N
power = ((((p-1)*(q-1))+4)/8) ** int(math.ceil(log[2](s)))
B = temp ** power
sigma1 = (B ** (e ** -1)) % N
# Update internal state counter and return sig = (sigma1, r, s)
self.state = s
return { 'sigma1':sigma1, 'r': r, 's': s, 'e':e }
def verify(self, pk, message, sig):
if debug: print("\nVERIFY\n\n")
sigma1, r, s, e = sig['sigma1'], sig['r'], sig['s'], sig['e']
K, L, c, keyLength, u, h, N = pk['K'], pk['L'], pk['c'], pk['length'], pk['u'], pk['h'], pk['N']
# Make sure that 0 < s < 2^{keylength/2}, else reject the signature
if not (0 < s and s < (2 ** int(keyLength/2))):
return False
# Compute e = H_k(s) and reject the signature if it's not prime
ei = self.HW_hash(K, c, s, keyLength) % N
if not isPrime(ei):
if debug: print("ei not prime")
return False
# Compute Y = sigma1^{2*ceil(log2(s))}
s1 = integer(2 ** int(math.ceil(log[2](s))))
Y = (sigma1 ** s1) % N
# Hash the mesage using the chameleon hash with fixed randomness r
(x, r2) = self.ChameleonHash.hash(L, message, r)
lhs = (Y ** ei) % N
rhs = ((u ** x) * h) % N
if debug:
print("lhs =>", lhs)
print("rhs =>", rhs)
# Verify that Y^e = (u^x h) mod N. If so, accept the signature
if lhs == rhs:
return True
# Default: reject the signature
return False
def HW_hash(self, key, c, input, keyLen):
C = integer(c)
input_size = bitsize(c)
input_b = Conversion.IP2OS(input, input_size)
# Return c XOR PRF(k, input), where the output of PRF is keyLength bits
result = C ^ self.Prf.eval(key, input_b)
return result