def test_secret_revealed(deployed_network, deposit):
app0, app1, app2 = deployed_network
asset_address = app0.raiden.chain.default_registry.asset_addresses()[0]
amount = 10
secret = pending_mediated_transfer(deployed_network, asset_address, amount)
mediated_transfer = get_received_transfer(
channel(app2, app1, asset_address),
0,
)
merkle_proof = channel(app2, app1, asset_address).our_state.locked.get_proof(mediated_transfer)
channel(app2, app1, asset_address).netting_contract.unlock(
[(merkle_proof, mediated_transfer.lock, secret)],
)
gevent.sleep(0.1) # let the task run
assert_synched_channels(
channel(app1, app2, asset_address), deposit - amount, [],
channel(app2, app1, asset_address), deposit + amount, [],
)
assert_synched_channels(
channel(app0, app1, asset_address), deposit - amount, [],
channel(app1, app2, asset_address), deposit + amount, [],
)
def test_settled_lock(token_addresses, raiden_network, settle_timeout, reveal_timeout):
""" Any transfer following a secret revealed must update the locksroot, so
that an attacker cannot reuse a secret to double claim a lock.
"""
token = token_addresses[0]
amount = 30
app0, app1, app2, _ = raiden_network # pylint: disable=unbalanced-tuple-unpacking
address0 = app0.raiden.address
address1 = app1.raiden.address
forward_channel = channel(app0, app1, token)
back_channel = channel(app1, app0, token)
deposit0 = forward_channel.contract_balance
deposit1 = back_channel.contract_balance
token_contract = app0.raiden.chain.token(token)
balance0 = token_contract.balance_of(address0)
balance1 = token_contract.balance_of(address1)
# A pending mediated transfer
identifier = 1
expiration = app0.raiden.chain.block_number() + settle_timeout - reveal_timeout
secret = pending_mediated_transfer(
raiden_network,
token,
amount,
identifier,
expiration,
)
hashlock = sha3(secret)
# Get the proof to unlock the pending lock
secret_transfer = get_received_transfer(back_channel, 0)
lock = back_channel.partner_state.get_lock_by_hashlock(hashlock)
unlock_proof = back_channel.partner_state.compute_proof_for_lock(secret, lock)
# Update the hashlock
claim_lock(raiden_network, identifier, token, secret)
direct_transfer(app0, app1, token, amount, identifier=1)
# The direct transfer locksroot must remove the unlocked lock and update
# the transferred amount, the withdraw must fail.
balance_proof = back_channel.partner_state.balance_proof
back_channel.external_state.close(balance_proof)
with pytest.raises(Exception):
back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.withdraw(
[(unlock_proof, secret_transfer.lock.as_bytes, secret)],
)
settle_expiration = app2.raiden.chain.block_number() + settle_timeout
wait_until_block(app2.raiden.chain, settle_expiration)
back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.settle()
assert token_contract.balance_of(address0) == balance0 + deposit0 - amount * 2
assert token_contract.balance_of(address1) == balance1 + deposit1 + amount * 2
def test_settled_lock(assets_addresses, raiden_network, settle_timeout):
""" Any transfer following a secret revealed must update the locksroot, so
that an attacker cannot reuse a secret to double claim a lock.
"""
asset = assets_addresses[0]
amount = 30
app0, app1, app2, app3 = raiden_network # pylint: disable=unbalanced-tuple-unpacking
# mediated transfer
secret = pending_mediated_transfer(raiden_network, asset, amount)
hashlock = sha3(secret)
# get a proof for the pending transfer
back_channel = channel(app1, app0, asset)
secret_transfer = get_received_transfer(back_channel, 0)
lock = back_channel.our_state.balance_proof.get_lock_by_hashlock(hashlock)
unlock_proof = back_channel.our_state.balance_proof.compute_proof_for_lock(
secret, lock)
# reveal the secret
claim_lock(raiden_network, asset, secret)
# a new transfer to update the hashlock
direct_transfer(app0, app1, asset, amount)
forward_channel = channel(app0, app1, asset)
last_transfer = get_sent_transfer(forward_channel, 1)
# call close giving the secret for a transfer that has being revealed
back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.close(app1.raiden.address,
last_transfer, None)
# check that the double unlock will failed
with pytest.raises(Exception):
back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.unlock(
app1.raiden.address,
[(unlock_proof, secret_transfer.lock.as_bytes, secret)],
)
# forward the block number to allow settle
settle_expiration = app2.raiden.chain.block_number() + settle_timeout
wait_until_block(app2.raiden.chain, settle_expiration)
back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.settle()
participant0 = back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.contract.participants[
app0.raiden.address]
participant1 = back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.contract.participants[
app1.raiden.address]
assert participant0.netted == participant0.deposit - amount * 2
assert participant1.netted == participant1.deposit + amount * 2
def test_settled_lock():
""" After a lock has it's secret revealed and a transfer happened, the lock
cannot be used to net any value with the contract.
"""
deposit = 100
asset = sha3('test_settled_lock')[:20]
amount = 30
# pylint: disable=unbalanced-tuple-unpacking
apps = create_sequential_network(num_nodes=4, deposit=deposit, asset=asset)
# mediated transfer with the secret revealed
transfer(apps[0], apps[3], asset, amount)
# create the latest transfer
direct_transfer(apps[0], apps[1], asset, amount)
secret = '' # need to get the secret
attack_channel = channel(apps[2], apps[1], asset)
secret_transfer = get_received_transfer(attack_channel, 0)
last_transfer = get_received_transfer(attack_channel, 1)
nettingcontract_address = attack_channel.nettingcontract_address
# create a fake proof
merkle_proof = attack_channel.our_state.locked.get_proof(secret_transfer)
# call close giving the secret for a transfer that has being revealed
apps[1].raiden.chain.close(
asset,
nettingcontract_address,
apps[1].raiden.address,
[last_transfer],
[(merkle_proof, secret_transfer.lock, secret)],
)
# forward the block number to allow settle
for _ in range(NettingChannelContract.locked_time):
apps[2].raiden.chain.next_block()
apps[1].raiden.chain.settle(asset, nettingcontract_address)
def test_settled_lock():
""" After a lock has it's secret revealed and a transfer happened, the lock
cannot be used to net any value with the contract.
"""
deposit = 100
asset = sha3('test_settled_lock')[:20]
amount = 30
# pylint: disable=unbalanced-tuple-unpacking
apps = create_sequential_network(num_nodes=4, deposit=deposit, asset=asset)
# mediated transfer with the secret revealed
transfer(apps[0], apps[3], asset, amount)
# create the latest transfer
direct_transfer(apps[0], apps[1], asset, amount)
secret = '' # need to get the secret
attack_channel = channel(apps[2], apps[1], asset)
secret_transfer = get_received_transfer(attack_channel, 0)
last_transfer = get_received_transfer(attack_channel, 1)
nettingcontract_address = attack_channel.nettingcontract_address
# create a fake proof
merkle_proof = attack_channel.our_state.locked.get_proof(secret_transfer)
# call close giving the secret for a transfer that has being revealed
apps[1].raiden.chain.close(
asset,
nettingcontract_address,
apps[1].raiden.address,
[last_transfer],
[(merkle_proof, secret_transfer.lock, secret)],
)
# forward the block number to allow settle
for _ in range(NettingChannelContract.settle_timeout):
apps[2].raiden.chain.next_block()
apps[1].raiden.chain.settle(asset, nettingcontract_address)
def test_settled_lock(assets_addresses, raiden_network, settle_timeout):
""" Any transfer following a secret revealed must update the locksroot, so
that an attacker cannot reuse a secret to double claim a lock.
"""
asset = assets_addresses[0]
amount = 30
app0, app1, app2, app3 = raiden_network # pylint: disable=unbalanced-tuple-unpacking
# mediated transfer
secret = pending_mediated_transfer(raiden_network, asset, amount)
# get a proof for the pending transfer
back_channel = channel(app1, app0, asset)
secret_transfer = get_received_transfer(back_channel, 0)
merkle_proof = back_channel.our_state.locked.get_proof(secret_transfer)
# reveal the secret
register_secret(raiden_network, asset, secret)
# a new transfer to update the hashlock
direct_transfer(app0, app1, asset, amount)
forward_channel = channel(app0, app1, asset)
last_transfer = get_sent_transfer(forward_channel, 1)
# call close giving the secret for a transfer that has being revealed
back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.close(
app1.raiden.address,
last_transfer,
None
)
# check that the double unlock will failed
with pytest.raises(Exception):
back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.unlock(
app1.raiden.address,
[(merkle_proof, secret_transfer.lock.as_bytes, secret)],
)
# forward the block number to allow settle
for _ in range(settle_timeout):
app2.raiden.chain.next_block()
back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.settle()
participant0 = back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.contract.participants[app0.raiden.address]
participant1 = back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.contract.participants[app1.raiden.address]
assert participant0.netted == participant0.deposit - amount * 2
assert participant1.netted == participant1.deposit + amount * 2
def test_secret_revealed(deployed_network, deposit):
app0, app1, app2 = deployed_network
asset_address = app0.raiden.chain.default_registry.asset_addresses()[0]
amount = 10
secret = pending_mediated_transfer(deployed_network, asset_address, amount)
mediated_transfer = get_received_transfer(
channel(app2, app1, asset_address),
0,
)
merkle_proof = channel(
app2, app1,
asset_address).our_state.locked.get_proof(mediated_transfer)
channel(app2, app1, asset_address).netting_contract.unlock(
[(merkle_proof, mediated_transfer.lock, secret)], )
gevent.sleep(0.1) # let the task run
assert_synched_channels(
channel(app1, app2, asset_address),
deposit - amount,
[],
channel(app2, app1, asset_address),
deposit + amount,
[],
)
assert_synched_channels(
channel(app0, app1, asset_address),
deposit - amount,
[],
channel(app1, app2, asset_address),
deposit + amount,
[],
)
def test_start_end_attack(asset_address, raiden_chain, deposit):
""" An attacker can try to steal assets from a hub or the last node in a
path.
The attacker needs to use two addresses (A1 and A2) and connect both to the
hub H, once connected a mediated transfer is initialized from A1 to A2
through H, once the node A2 receives the mediated transfer the attacker
uses the it's know secret and reveal to close and settles the channel H-A2,
without revealing the secret to H's raiden node.
The intention is to make the hub transfer the asset but for him to be
unable to require the asset A1.
"""
amount = 30
asset = asset_address[0]
app0, app1, app2 = raiden_chain # pylint: disable=unbalanced-tuple-unpacking
# the attacker owns app0 and app2 and creates a transfer throught app1
secret = pending_mediated_transfer(
raiden_chain,
asset,
amount,
1 # TODO: fill in identifier
)
hashlock = sha3(secret)
attack_channel = channel(app2, app1, asset)
attack_transfer = get_received_transfer(attack_channel, 0)
attack_contract = attack_channel.external_state.netting_channel.address
hub_contract = channel(app1, app0, asset).external_state.netting_channel.address
# the attacker can create a merkle proof of the locked transfer
lock = attack_channel.our_state.balance_proof.get_lock_by_hashlock(hashlock)
unlock_proof = attack_channel.our_state.balance_proof.compute_proof_for_lock(secret, lock)
# start the settle counter
attack_channel.netting_channel.close(
app2.raiden.address,
attack_transfer,
None
)
# wait until the last block to reveal the secret, hopefully we are not
# missing a block during the test
wait_until_block(app2.raiden.chain, attack_transfer.lock.expiration - 1)
# since the attacker knows the secret he can net the lock
attack_channel.netting_channel.unlock(
[(unlock_proof, attack_transfer.lock, secret)],
)
# XXX: verify that the secret was publicized
# at this point the hub might not know yet the secret, and won't be able to
# claim the asset from the channel A1 - H
# the attacker settle the contract
app2.raiden.chain.next_block()
attack_channel.netting_channel.settle(asset, attack_contract)
# at this point the attack has the "stolen" funds
attack_contract = app2.raiden.chain.asset_hashchannel[asset][attack_contract]
assert attack_contract.participants[app2.raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit + amount
assert attack_contract.participants[app1.raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit - amount
# and the hub's channel A1-H doesn't
hub_contract = app1.raiden.chain.asset_hashchannel[asset][hub_contract]
assert hub_contract.participants[app0.raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit
assert hub_contract.participants[app1.raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit
# to mitigate the attack the Hub _needs_ to use a lower expiration for the
# locked transfer between H-A2 than A1-H, since for A2 to acquire the asset
# it needs to make the secret public in the block chain we publish the
# secret through an event and the Hub will be able to require it's funds
app1.raiden.chain.next_block()
# XXX: verify that the Hub has found the secret, close and settle the channel
# the hub has acquired it's asset
hub_contract = app1.raiden.chain.asset_hashchannel[asset][hub_contract]
assert hub_contract.participants[app0.raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit + amount
assert hub_contract.participants[app1.raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit - amount
def test_settled_lock(assets_addresses, raiden_network, settle_timeout, reveal_timeout):
""" Any transfer following a secret revealed must update the locksroot, so
that an attacker cannot reuse a secret to double claim a lock.
"""
asset = assets_addresses[0]
amount = 30
app0, app1, app2, _ = raiden_network # pylint: disable=unbalanced-tuple-unpacking
address0 = app0.raiden.address
address1 = app1.raiden.address
# mediated transfer
identifier = 1
expiration = app0.raiden.chain.block_number() + settle_timeout - reveal_timeout
secret = pending_mediated_transfer(
raiden_network,
asset,
amount,
identifier,
expiration,
)
hashlock = sha3(secret)
# get a proof for the pending transfer
back_channel = channel(app1, app0, asset)
secret_transfer = get_received_transfer(back_channel, 0)
lock = back_channel.our_state.balance_proof.get_lock_by_hashlock(hashlock)
unlock_proof = back_channel.our_state.balance_proof.compute_proof_for_lock(secret, lock)
# reveal the secret
claim_lock(raiden_network, asset, secret)
# a new transfer to update the hashlock
direct_transfer(app0, app1, asset, amount)
forward_channel = channel(app0, app1, asset)
last_transfer = get_sent_transfer(forward_channel, 1)
# call close giving the secret for a transfer that has being revealed
back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.close(
app1.raiden.address,
last_transfer,
None
)
# check that the double unlock will failed
with pytest.raises(Exception):
back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.unlock(
app1.raiden.address,
[(unlock_proof, secret_transfer.lock.as_bytes, secret)],
)
# forward the block number to allow settle
settle_expiration = app2.raiden.chain.block_number() + settle_timeout
wait_until_block(app2.raiden.chain, settle_expiration)
back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.settle()
participant0 = back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.contract.participants[address0]
participant1 = back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.contract.participants[address1]
assert participant0.netted == participant0.deposit - amount * 2
assert participant1.netted == participant1.deposit + amount * 2
def test_start_end_attack(token_addresses, raiden_chain, deposit,
reveal_timeout):
""" An attacker can try to steal tokens from a hub or the last node in a
path.
The attacker needs to use two addresses (A1 and A2) and connect both to the
hub H, once connected a mediated transfer is initialized from A1 to A2
through H, once the node A2 receives the mediated transfer the attacker
uses the known secret and reveal to close and settles the channel H-A2,
without revealing the secret to H's raiden node.
The intention is to make the hub transfer the token but for him to be
unable to require the token A1.
"""
amount = 30
token = token_addresses[0]
app0, app1, app2 = raiden_chain # pylint: disable=unbalanced-tuple-unpacking
# the attacker owns app0 and app2 and creates a transfer through app1
identifier = 1
expiration = reveal_timeout + 5
secret = pending_mediated_transfer(raiden_chain, token, amount, identifier,
expiration)
hashlock = sha3(secret)
attack_channel = channel(app2, app1, token)
attack_transfer = get_received_transfer(attack_channel, 0)
attack_contract = attack_channel.external_state.netting_channel.address
hub_contract = channel(app1, app0,
token).external_state.netting_channel.address
# the attacker can create a merkle proof of the locked transfer
lock = attack_channel.our_state.balance_proof.get_lock_by_hashlock(
hashlock)
unlock_proof = attack_channel.our_state.balance_proof.compute_proof_for_lock(
secret, lock)
# start the settle counter
attack_channel.netting_channel.close(attack_transfer)
# wait until the last block to reveal the secret, hopefully we are not
# missing a block during the test
wait_until_block(app2.raiden.chain, attack_transfer.lock.expiration - 1)
# since the attacker knows the secret he can net the lock
attack_channel.netting_channel.withdraw(
[(unlock_proof, attack_transfer.lock, secret)], )
# XXX: verify that the secret was publicized
# at this point the hub might not know yet the secret, and won't be able to
# claim the token from the channel A1 - H
# the attacker settle the contract
app2.raiden.chain.next_block()
attack_channel.netting_channel.settle(token, attack_contract)
# at this point the attack has the "stolen" funds
attack_contract = app2.raiden.chain.token_hashchannel[token][
attack_contract]
assert attack_contract.participants[
app2.raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit + amount
assert attack_contract.participants[
app1.raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit - amount
# and the hub's channel A1-H doesn't
hub_contract = app1.raiden.chain.token_hashchannel[token][hub_contract]
assert hub_contract.participants[app0.raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit
assert hub_contract.participants[app1.raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit
# to mitigate the attack the Hub _needs_ to use a lower expiration for the
# locked transfer between H-A2 than A1-H, since for A2 to acquire the token
# it needs to make the secret public in the block chain we publish the
# secret through an event and the Hub will be able to require it's funds
app1.raiden.chain.next_block()
# XXX: verify that the Hub has found the secret, close and settle the channel
# the hub has acquired its token
hub_contract = app1.raiden.chain.token_hashchannel[token][hub_contract]
assert hub_contract.participants[
app0.raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit + amount
assert hub_contract.participants[
app1.raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit - amount
def test_settled_lock(token_addresses, raiden_network, settle_timeout,
reveal_timeout):
""" Any transfer following a secret revealed must update the locksroot, so
that an attacker cannot reuse a secret to double claim a lock.
"""
token = token_addresses[0]
amount = 30
app0, app1, app2, _ = raiden_network # pylint: disable=unbalanced-tuple-unpacking
address0 = app0.raiden.address
address1 = app1.raiden.address
forward_channel = channel(app0, app1, token)
back_channel = channel(app1, app0, token)
deposit0 = forward_channel.contract_balance
deposit1 = back_channel.contract_balance
token_contract = app0.raiden.chain.token(token)
balance0 = token_contract.balance_of(address0)
balance1 = token_contract.balance_of(address1)
# mediated transfer
identifier = 1
expiration = app0.raiden.chain.block_number(
) + settle_timeout - reveal_timeout
secret = pending_mediated_transfer(
raiden_network,
token,
amount,
identifier,
expiration,
)
hashlock = sha3(secret)
# get a proof for the pending transfer
secret_transfer = get_received_transfer(back_channel, 0)
lock = back_channel.our_state.balance_proof.get_lock_by_hashlock(hashlock)
unlock_proof = back_channel.our_state.balance_proof.compute_proof_for_lock(
secret, lock)
# reveal the secret
claim_lock(raiden_network, token, secret)
# a new transfer to update the hashlock
direct_transfer(app0, app1, token, amount)
last_transfer = get_sent_transfer(forward_channel, 1)
# call close giving the secret for a transfer that has being revealed
back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.close(last_transfer)
# check that the double unlock will fail
with pytest.raises(Exception):
back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.withdraw(
[(unlock_proof, secret_transfer.lock.as_bytes, secret)], )
# forward the block number to allow settle
settle_expiration = app2.raiden.chain.block_number() + settle_timeout
wait_until_block(app2.raiden.chain, settle_expiration)
back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.settle()
assert token_contract.balance_of(
address0) == balance0 + deposit0 - amount * 2
assert token_contract.balance_of(
address1) == balance1 + deposit1 + amount * 2
def test_start_end_attack():
""" An attacker can try to steal assets from a hub or the last node in a
path.
The attacker needs to use two addresses (A1 and A2) and connect both to the
hub H, once connected a mediated transfer is initialized from A1 to A2
through H, once the node A2 receives the mediated transfer the attacker
uses the it's know secret and reveal to close and settles the channel H-A2,
without revealing the secret to H's raiden node.
The intention is to make the hub transfer the asset but for him to be
unable to require the asset A1.
"""
asset = sha3('test_two_attack')[:20]
deposit = 100
amount = 30
apps = create_sequential_network(num_nodes=3, deposit=deposit, asset=asset)
# The attacker creates a mediated transfer from it's account A1, to it's
# account A2, throught the hub H
secret = hidden_mediated_transfer(apps, asset, amount)
attack_channel = channel(apps[2], apps[1], asset)
attack_transfer = get_received_transfer(attack_channel, 0)
attack_contract = attack_channel.nettingcontract_address
hub_contract = channel(apps[1], apps[0], asset).nettingcontract_address
# the attacker can create a merkle proof of the locked transfer
merkle_proof = attack_channel.our_state.locked.get_proof(attack_transfer)
# start the settle counter
apps[2].raiden.chain.close(
asset,
attack_contract,
apps[2].raiden.address,
[attack_transfer],
[],
)
# wait until the last block to reveal the secret
for _ in range(attack_transfer.lock.expiration - 1):
apps[2].raiden.chain.next_block()
# since the attacker knows the secret he can net the lock
apps[2].raiden.chain.close(
asset,
attack_contract,
apps[2].raiden.address,
[attack_transfer],
[(merkle_proof, attack_transfer.lock, secret)],
)
# XXX: verify that the secret was publicized
# at this point the hub might not know yet the secret, and won't be able to
# claim the asset from the channel A1 - H
# the attacker settle the contract
apps[2].raiden.chain.next_block()
apps[2].raiden.chain.settle(asset, attack_contract)
# at this point the attack has the "stolen" funds
attack_contract = apps[2].raiden.chain.asset_hashchannel[asset][attack_contract]
assert attack_contract.participants[apps[2].raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit + amount
assert attack_contract.participants[apps[1].raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit - amount
# and the hub's channel A1-H doesn't
hub_contract = apps[1].raiden.chain.asset_hashchannel[asset][hub_contract]
assert hub_contract.participants[apps[0].raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit
assert hub_contract.participants[apps[1].raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit
# to mitigate the attack the Hub _needs_ to use a lower expiration for the
# locked transfer between H-A2 than A1-H, since for A2 to acquire the asset
# it needs to make the secret public in the block chain we publish the
# secret through an event and the Hub will be able to require it's funds
apps[1].raiden.chain.next_block()
# XXX: verify that the Hub has found the secret, close and settle the channel
# the hub has acquired it's asset
hub_contract = apps[1].raiden.chain.asset_hashchannel[asset][hub_contract]
assert hub_contract.participants[apps[0].raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit + amount
assert hub_contract.participants[apps[1].raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit - amount
def test_start_end_attack(asset_address, raiden_chain, deposit):
""" An attacker can try to steal assets from a hub or the last node in a
path.
The attacker needs to use two addresses (A1 and A2) and connect both to the
hub H, once connected a mediated transfer is initialized from A1 to A2
through H, once the node A2 receives the mediated transfer the attacker
uses the it's know secret and reveal to close and settles the channel H-A2,
without revealing the secret to H's raiden node.
The intention is to make the hub transfer the asset but for him to be
unable to require the asset A1.
"""
amount = 30
asset = asset_address[0]
app0, app1, app2 = raiden_chain # pylint: disable=unbalanced-tuple-unpacking
# The attacker creates a mediated transfer from it's account A1, to it's
# account A2, throught the hub H
secret = pending_mediated_transfer(raiden_chain, asset, amount)
attack_channel = channel(app2, app1, asset)
attack_transfer = get_received_transfer(attack_channel, 0)
attack_contract = attack_channel.external_state.netting_channel.address
hub_contract = channel(app1, app0, asset).external_state.netting_channel.address
# the attacker can create a merkle proof of the locked transfer
merkle_proof = attack_channel.our_state.locked.get_proof(attack_transfer)
# start the settle counter
attack_channel.netting_channel.close(
app2.raiden.address,
attack_transfer,
None
)
# wait until the last block to reveal the secret
for _ in range(attack_transfer.lock.expiration - 1):
app2.raiden.chain.next_block()
# since the attacker knows the secret he can net the lock
attack_channel.netting_channel.unlock(
[(merkle_proof, attack_transfer.lock, secret)],
)
# XXX: verify that the secret was publicized
# at this point the hub might not know yet the secret, and won't be able to
# claim the asset from the channel A1 - H
# the attacker settle the contract
app2.raiden.chain.next_block()
attack_channel.netting_channel.settle(asset, attack_contract)
# at this point the attack has the "stolen" funds
attack_contract = app2.raiden.chain.asset_hashchannel[asset][attack_contract]
assert attack_contract.participants[app2.raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit + amount
assert attack_contract.participants[app1.raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit - amount
# and the hub's channel A1-H doesn't
hub_contract = app1.raiden.chain.asset_hashchannel[asset][hub_contract]
assert hub_contract.participants[app0.raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit
assert hub_contract.participants[app1.raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit
# to mitigate the attack the Hub _needs_ to use a lower expiration for the
# locked transfer between H-A2 than A1-H, since for A2 to acquire the asset
# it needs to make the secret public in the block chain we publish the
# secret through an event and the Hub will be able to require it's funds
app1.raiden.chain.next_block()
# XXX: verify that the Hub has found the secret, close and settle the channel
# the hub has acquired it's asset
hub_contract = app1.raiden.chain.asset_hashchannel[asset][hub_contract]
assert hub_contract.participants[app0.raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit + amount
assert hub_contract.participants[app1.raiden.address]['netted'] == deposit - amount
def test_settled_lock(token_addresses, raiden_network, settle_timeout,
reveal_timeout):
""" Any transfer following a secret revealed must update the locksroot, so
that an attacker cannot reuse a secret to double claim a lock.
"""
token = token_addresses[0]
amount = 30
app0, app1, app2, _ = raiden_network # pylint: disable=unbalanced-tuple-unpacking
address0 = app0.raiden.address
address1 = app1.raiden.address
forward_channel = channel(app0, app1, token)
back_channel = channel(app1, app0, token)
deposit0 = forward_channel.contract_balance
deposit1 = back_channel.contract_balance
token_contract = app0.raiden.chain.token(token)
balance0 = token_contract.balance_of(address0)
balance1 = token_contract.balance_of(address1)
# A pending mediated transfer
identifier = 1
expiration = app0.raiden.chain.block_number(
) + settle_timeout - reveal_timeout
secret = pending_mediated_transfer(
raiden_network,
token,
amount,
identifier,
expiration,
)
hashlock = sha3(secret)
# Get the proof to unlock the pending lock
secret_transfer = get_received_transfer(back_channel, 0)
lock = back_channel.partner_state.balance_proof.get_lock_by_hashlock(
hashlock)
unlock_proof = back_channel.partner_state.balance_proof.compute_proof_for_lock(
secret, lock)
# Update the hashlock
claim_lock(raiden_network, identifier, token, secret)
direct_transfer(app0, app1, token, amount, identifier=1)
# The direct transfer locksroot must remove the unlocked lock and update
# the transferred amount, the withdraw must fail.
balance_proof = back_channel.partner_state.balance_proof.balance_proof
back_channel.external_state.close(balance_proof)
with pytest.raises(Exception):
back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.withdraw(
[(unlock_proof, secret_transfer.lock.as_bytes, secret)], )
settle_expiration = app2.raiden.chain.block_number() + settle_timeout
wait_until_block(app2.raiden.chain, settle_expiration)
back_channel.external_state.netting_channel.settle()
assert token_contract.balance_of(
address0) == balance0 + deposit0 - amount * 2
assert token_contract.balance_of(
address1) == balance1 + deposit1 + amount * 2
