def test_prioritised_transactions(self):
# Ensure that fee deltas used via prioritisetransaction are
# correctly used by replacement logic
# 1. Check that feeperkb uses modified fees
tx0_outpoint = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], int(1.1*COIN))
tx1a = CTransaction()
tx1a.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
tx1a.vout = [CTxOut(1 * COIN, CScript([b'a' * 35]))]
tx1a_hex = txToHex(tx1a)
tx1a_txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx1a_hex, True)
# Higher fee, but the actual fee per KB is much lower.
tx1b = CTransaction()
tx1b.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
tx1b.vout = [CTxOut(int(0.001*COIN), CScript([b'a'*740000]))]
tx1b_hex = txToHex(tx1b)
# Verify tx1b cannot replace tx1a.
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "insufficient fee", self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, tx1b_hex, True)
# Use prioritisetransaction to set tx1a's fee to 0.
self.nodes[0].prioritisetransaction(txid=tx1a_txid, fee_delta=int(-0.1*COIN))
# Now tx1b should be able to replace tx1a
tx1b_txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx1b_hex, True)
assert(tx1b_txid in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool())
# 2. Check that absolute fee checks use modified fee.
tx1_outpoint = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], int(1.1*COIN))
tx2a = CTransaction()
tx2a.vin = [CTxIn(tx1_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
tx2a.vout = [CTxOut(1 * COIN, CScript([b'a' * 35]))]
tx2a_hex = txToHex(tx2a)
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx2a_hex, True)
# Lower fee, but we'll prioritise it
tx2b = CTransaction()
tx2b.vin = [CTxIn(tx1_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
tx2b.vout = [CTxOut(int(1.01 * COIN), CScript([b'a' * 35]))]
tx2b.rehash()
tx2b_hex = txToHex(tx2b)
# Verify tx2b cannot replace tx2a.
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "insufficient fee", self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, tx2b_hex, True)
# Now prioritise tx2b to have a higher modified fee
self.nodes[0].prioritisetransaction(txid=tx2b.hash, fee_delta=int(0.1*COIN))
# tx2b should now be accepted
tx2b_txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx2b_hex, True)
assert(tx2b_txid in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool())
def test_too_many_replacements(self):
"""Replacements that evict too many transactions are rejected"""
# Try directly replacing more than MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT
# transactions
# Start by creating a single transaction with many outputs
initial_nValue = 10*COIN
utxo = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], initial_nValue)
fee = int(0.0001*COIN)
split_value = int((initial_nValue-fee)/(MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT+1))
outputs = []
for i in range(MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT+1):
outputs.append(CTxOut(split_value, CScript([1])))
splitting_tx = CTransaction()
splitting_tx.vin = [CTxIn(utxo, nSequence=0)]
splitting_tx.vout = outputs
splitting_tx_hex = txToHex(splitting_tx)
txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(splitting_tx_hex, True)
txid = int(txid, 16)
# Now spend each of those outputs individually
for i in range(MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT+1):
tx_i = CTransaction()
tx_i.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(txid, i), nSequence=0)]
tx_i.vout = [CTxOut(split_value - fee, CScript([b'a' * 35]))]
tx_i_hex = txToHex(tx_i)
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx_i_hex, True)
# Now create doublespend of the whole lot; should fail.
# Need a big enough fee to cover all spending transactions and have
# a higher fee rate
double_spend_value = (split_value-100*fee)*(MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT+1)
inputs = []
for i in range(MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT+1):
inputs.append(CTxIn(COutPoint(txid, i), nSequence=0))
double_tx = CTransaction()
double_tx.vin = inputs
double_tx.vout = [CTxOut(double_spend_value, CScript([b'a']))]
double_tx_hex = txToHex(double_tx)
# This will raise an exception
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "too many potential replacements", self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, double_tx_hex, True)
# If we remove an input, it should pass
double_tx = CTransaction()
double_tx.vin = inputs[0:-1]
double_tx.vout = [CTxOut(double_spend_value, CScript([b'a']))]
double_tx_hex = txToHex(double_tx)
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(double_tx_hex, True)
def test_simple_doublespend(self):
"""Simple doublespend"""
tx0_outpoint = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], int(1.1*COIN))
# make_utxo may have generated a bunch of blocks, so we need to sync
# before we can spend the coins generated, or else the resulting
# transactions might not be accepted by our peers.
self.sync_all()
feeout = CTxOut(int(0.1*COIN), CScript())
tx1a = CTransaction()
tx1a.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
tx1a.vout = [CTxOut(1 * COIN, CScript([b'a' * 35])), feeout]
tx1a_hex = txToHex(tx1a)
tx1a_txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx1a_hex, True)
self.sync_all()
# Should fail because we haven't changed the fee
tx1b = CTransaction()
tx1b.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
tx1b.vout = [CTxOut(1 * COIN, CScript([b'b' * 35])), feeout]
tx1b_hex = txToHex(tx1b)
# This will raise an exception due to insufficient fee
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "insufficient fee", self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, tx1b_hex, True)
# This will raise an exception due to transaction replacement being disabled
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "txn-mempool-conflict", self.nodes[1].sendrawtransaction, tx1b_hex, True)
# Extra 0.1 BTC fee
tx1b = CTransaction()
tx1b.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
tx1b.vout = [CTxOut(int(0.9 * COIN), CScript([b'b' * 35])), feeout, feeout]
tx1b_hex = txToHex(tx1b)
# Replacement still disabled even with "enough fee"
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "txn-mempool-conflict", self.nodes[1].sendrawtransaction, tx1b_hex, True)
# Works when enabled
tx1b_txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx1b_hex, True)
mempool = self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
assert (tx1a_txid not in mempool)
assert (tx1b_txid in mempool)
assert_equal(tx1b_hex, self.nodes[0].getrawtransaction(tx1b_txid))
# Second node is running mempoolreplacement=0, will not replace originally-seen txn
mempool = self.nodes[1].getrawmempool()
assert tx1a_txid in mempool
assert tx1b_txid not in mempool
def branch(prevout, initial_value, max_txs, tree_width=5, fee=0.0001*COIN, _total_txs=None):
if _total_txs is None:
_total_txs = [0]
if _total_txs[0] >= max_txs:
return
txout_value = (initial_value - fee) // tree_width
if txout_value < fee:
return
vout = [CTxOut(txout_value, CScript([i+1]))
for i in range(tree_width)]
tx = CTransaction()
tx.vin = [CTxIn(prevout, nSequence=0)]
tx.vout = vout
tx_hex = txToHex(tx)
assert(len(tx.serialize()) < 100000)
txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx_hex, True)
yield tx
_total_txs[0] += 1
txid = int(txid, 16)
for i, txout in enumerate(tx.vout):
for x in branch(COutPoint(txid, i), txout_value,
max_txs,
tree_width=tree_width, fee=fee,
_total_txs=_total_txs):
yield x
def test_new_unconfirmed_inputs(self):
"""Replacements that add new unconfirmed inputs are rejected"""
confirmed_utxo = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], int(1.1*COIN))
unconfirmed_utxo = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], int(0.1*COIN), False)
tx1 = CTransaction()
tx1.vin = [CTxIn(confirmed_utxo)]
tx1.vout = [CTxOut(1 * COIN, CScript([b'a' * 35]))]
tx1_hex = txToHex(tx1)
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx1_hex, True)
tx2 = CTransaction()
tx2.vin = [CTxIn(confirmed_utxo), CTxIn(unconfirmed_utxo)]
tx2.vout = tx1.vout
tx2_hex = txToHex(tx2)
# This will raise an exception
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "replacement-adds-unconfirmed", self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, tx2_hex, True)
def test_replacement_feeperkb(self):
"""Replacement requires fee-per-KB to be higher"""
tx0_outpoint = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], int(1.1*COIN))
tx1a = CTransaction()
tx1a.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
tx1a.vout = [CTxOut(1 * COIN, CScript([b'a' * 35]))]
tx1a_hex = txToHex(tx1a)
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx1a_hex, True)
# Higher fee, but the fee per KB is much lower, so the replacement is
# rejected.
tx1b = CTransaction()
tx1b.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
tx1b.vout = [CTxOut(int(0.001*COIN), CScript([b'a'*999000]))]
tx1b_hex = txToHex(tx1b)
# This will raise an exception due to insufficient fee
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "insufficient fee", self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, tx1b_hex, True)
def test_bip68_not_consensus(self):
assert(get_bip9_status(self.nodes[0], 'csv')['status'] != 'active')
txid = self.nodes[0].sendtoaddress(self.nodes[0].getnewaddress(), 2)
tx1 = FromHex(CTransaction(), self.nodes[0].getrawtransaction(txid))
tx1.rehash()
# Make an anyone-can-spend transaction
tx2 = CTransaction()
tx2.nVersion = 1
tx2.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(tx1.sha256, 0), nSequence=0)]
tx2.vout = [CTxOut(int(tx1.vout[0].nValue - self.relayfee*COIN), CScript([b'a']))]
# sign tx2
tx2_raw = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithwallet(ToHex(tx2))["hex"]
tx2 = FromHex(tx2, tx2_raw)
tx2.rehash()
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(ToHex(tx2))
# Now make an invalid spend of tx2 according to BIP68
sequence_value = 100 # 100 block relative locktime
tx3 = CTransaction()
tx3.nVersion = 2
tx3.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(tx2.sha256, 0), nSequence=sequence_value)]
tx3.vout = [CTxOut(int(tx2.vout[0].nValue - self.relayfee * COIN), CScript([b'a' * 35]))]
tx3.rehash()
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, NOT_FINAL_ERROR, self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, ToHex(tx3))
# make a block that violates bip68; ensure that the tip updates
tip = int(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), 16)
block = create_block(tip, create_coinbase(self.nodes[0].getblockcount()+1))
block.nVersion = 3
block.vtx.extend([tx1, tx2, tx3])
block.hashMerkleRoot = block.calc_merkle_root()
block.rehash()
add_witness_commitment(block)
block.solve()
self.nodes[0].submitblock(bytes_to_hex_str(block.serialize(True)))
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), block.hash)
def test_doublespend_chain(self):
"""Doublespend of a long chain"""
initial_nValue = 50*COIN
tx0_outpoint = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], initial_nValue)
prevout = tx0_outpoint
remaining_value = initial_nValue
chain_txids = []
while remaining_value > 10*COIN:
remaining_value -= 1*COIN
tx = CTransaction()
tx.vin = [CTxIn(prevout, nSequence=0)]
feeout = CTxOut(1*COIN)
tx.vout = [CTxOut(remaining_value, CScript([1, OP_DROP] * 15 + [1])), feeout]
tx_hex = txToHex(tx)
txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx_hex, True)
chain_txids.append(txid)
prevout = COutPoint(int(txid, 16), 0)
# Whether the double-spend is allowed is evaluated by including all
# child fees - 40 BTC - so this attempt is rejected.
dbl_tx = CTransaction()
dbl_tx.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
dbl_tx.vout = [CTxOut(initial_nValue - 30 * COIN, CScript([1] * 35)), CTxOut(30*COIN)]
dbl_tx_hex = txToHex(dbl_tx)
# This will raise an exception due to insufficient fee
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "insufficient fee", self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, dbl_tx_hex, True)
# Accepted with sufficient fee
dbl_tx = CTransaction()
dbl_tx.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
dbl_tx.vout = [CTxOut(1 * COIN, CScript([1] * 35)), CTxOut(49*COIN)]
dbl_tx_hex = txToHex(dbl_tx)
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(dbl_tx_hex, True)
mempool = self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
for doublespent_txid in chain_txids:
assert(doublespent_txid not in mempool)
def test_disable_flag(self):
# Create some unconfirmed inputs
new_addr = self.nodes[0].getnewaddress()
self.nodes[0].sendtoaddress(new_addr, 2) # send 2 BTC
utxos = self.nodes[0].listunspent(0, 0)
assert len(utxos) > 0
utxo = utxos[0]
tx1 = CTransaction()
value = int(satoshi_round(utxo["amount"] - self.relayfee)*COIN)
# Check that the disable flag disables relative locktime.
# If sequence locks were used, this would require 1 block for the
# input to mature.
sequence_value = SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_DISABLE_FLAG | 1
tx1.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(int(utxo["txid"], 16), utxo["vout"]), nSequence=sequence_value)]
tx1.vout = [CTxOut(value, CScript([b'a']))]
tx1_signed = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithwallet(ToHex(tx1))["hex"]
tx1_id = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx1_signed)
tx1_id = int(tx1_id, 16)
# This transaction will enable sequence-locks, so this transaction should
# fail
tx2 = CTransaction()
tx2.nVersion = 2
sequence_value = sequence_value & 0x7fffffff
tx2.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(tx1_id, 0), nSequence=sequence_value)]
tx2.vout = [CTxOut(int(value - self.relayfee * COIN), CScript([b'a' * 35]))]
tx2.rehash()
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, NOT_FINAL_ERROR, self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, ToHex(tx2))
# Setting the version back down to 1 should disable the sequence lock,
# so this should be accepted.
tx2.nVersion = 1
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(ToHex(tx2))
def test_spends_of_conflicting_outputs(self):
"""Replacements that spend conflicting tx outputs are rejected"""
utxo1 = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], int(1.2*COIN))
utxo2 = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], 3*COIN)
tx1a = CTransaction()
tx1a.vin = [CTxIn(utxo1, nSequence=0)]
tx1a.vout = [CTxOut(int(1.1 * COIN), CScript([b'a' * 35]))]
tx1a_hex = txToHex(tx1a)
tx1a_txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx1a_hex, True)
tx1a_txid = int(tx1a_txid, 16)
# Direct spend an output of the transaction we're replacing.
tx2 = CTransaction()
tx2.vin = [CTxIn(utxo1, nSequence=0), CTxIn(utxo2, nSequence=0)]
tx2.vin.append(CTxIn(COutPoint(tx1a_txid, 0), nSequence=0))
tx2.vout = tx1a.vout
tx2_hex = txToHex(tx2)
# This will raise an exception
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx", self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, tx2_hex, True)
# Spend tx1a's output to test the indirect case.
tx1b = CTransaction()
tx1b.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(tx1a_txid, 0), nSequence=0)]
tx1b.vout = [CTxOut(1 * COIN, CScript([b'a' * 35]))]
tx1b_hex = txToHex(tx1b)
tx1b_txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx1b_hex, True)
tx1b_txid = int(tx1b_txid, 16)
tx2 = CTransaction()
tx2.vin = [CTxIn(utxo1, nSequence=0), CTxIn(utxo2, nSequence=0),
CTxIn(COutPoint(tx1b_txid, 0))]
tx2.vout = tx1a.vout
tx2_hex = txToHex(tx2)
# This will raise an exception
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx", self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, tx2_hex, True)
def make_utxo(node, amount, confirmed=True, scriptPubKey=CScript([1])):
"""Create a txout with a given amount and scriptPubKey
Mines coins as needed.
confirmed - txouts created will be confirmed in the blockchain;
unconfirmed otherwise.
"""
fee = 1*COIN
while node.getbalance()['bitcoin'] < satoshi_round((amount + fee)/COIN):
node.generate(100)
new_addr = node.getnewaddress()
unblinded_addr = node.validateaddress(new_addr)["unconfidential"]
txidstr = node.sendtoaddress(new_addr, satoshi_round((amount+fee)/COIN))
tx1 = node.getrawtransaction(txidstr, 1)
txid = int(txidstr, 16)
i = None
for i, txout in enumerate(tx1['vout']):
if txout['scriptPubKey']['type'] == "fee":
continue # skip fee outputs
if txout['scriptPubKey']['addresses'] == [unblinded_addr]:
break
assert i is not None
tx2 = CTransaction()
tx2.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(txid, i))]
tx1raw = CTransaction()
tx1raw.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(node.getrawtransaction(txidstr))))
feeout = CTxOut(CTxOutValue(tx1raw.vout[i].nValue.getAmount() - amount))
tx2.vout = [CTxOut(amount, scriptPubKey), feeout]
tx2.rehash()
signed_tx = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(txToHex(tx2))
txid = node.sendrawtransaction(signed_tx['hex'], True)
# If requested, ensure txouts are confirmed.
if confirmed:
mempool_size = len(node.getrawmempool())
while mempool_size > 0:
node.generate(1)
new_size = len(node.getrawmempool())
# Error out if we have something stuck in the mempool, as this
# would likely be a bug.
assert(new_size < mempool_size)
mempool_size = new_size
return COutPoint(int(txid, 16), 0)
def make_utxo(node, amount, confirmed=True, scriptPubKey=CScript([1])):
"""Create a txout with a given amount and scriptPubKey
Mines coins as needed.
confirmed - txouts created will be confirmed in the blockchain;
unconfirmed otherwise.
"""
fee = 1*COIN
while node.getbalance() < satoshi_round((amount + fee)/COIN):
node.generate(100)
new_addr = node.getnewaddress()
txid = node.sendtoaddress(new_addr, satoshi_round((amount+fee)/COIN))
tx1 = node.getrawtransaction(txid, 1)
txid = int(txid, 16)
i = None
for i, txout in enumerate(tx1['vout']):
if txout['scriptPubKey']['addresses'] == [new_addr]:
break
assert i is not None
tx2 = CTransaction()
tx2.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(txid, i))]
tx2.vout = [CTxOut(amount, scriptPubKey)]
tx2.rehash()
signed_tx = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(txToHex(tx2))
txid = node.sendrawtransaction(signed_tx['hex'], True)
# If requested, ensure txouts are confirmed.
if confirmed:
mempool_size = len(node.getrawmempool())
while mempool_size > 0:
node.generate(1)
new_size = len(node.getrawmempool())
# Error out if we have something stuck in the mempool, as this
# would likely be a bug.
assert(new_size < mempool_size)
mempool_size = new_size
return COutPoint(int(txid, 16), 0)
def test_nonzero_locks(orig_tx, node, relayfee, use_height_lock):
sequence_value = 1
if not use_height_lock:
sequence_value |= SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_TYPE_FLAG
tx = CTransaction()
tx.nVersion = 2
tx.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(orig_tx.sha256, 0), nSequence=sequence_value)]
tx.vout = [CTxOut(int(orig_tx.vout[0].nValue - relayfee * COIN), CScript([b'a' * 35]))]
tx.rehash()
if (orig_tx.hash in node.getrawmempool()):
# sendrawtransaction should fail if the tx is in the mempool
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, NOT_FINAL_ERROR, node.sendrawtransaction, ToHex(tx))
else:
# sendrawtransaction should succeed if the tx is not in the mempool
node.sendrawtransaction(ToHex(tx))
return tx
def test_too_many_replacements(self):
"""Replacements that evict too many transactions are rejected"""
# Try directly replacing more than MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT
# transactions
# Start by creating a single transaction with many outputs
initial_nValue = 10 * COIN
utxo = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], initial_nValue)
fee = int(0.0001 * COIN)
split_value = int((initial_nValue - fee) / (MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT + 1))
outputs = []
for _ in range(MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT + 1):
outputs.append(CTxOut(split_value, CScript([1])))
splitting_tx = CTransaction()
splitting_tx.vin = [CTxIn(utxo, nSequence=0)]
splitting_tx.vout = outputs + [
CTxOut(
int(initial_nValue -
(MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT + 1) * split_value))
]
splitting_tx_hex = txToHex(splitting_tx)
txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(splitting_tx_hex, 0)
txid = int(txid, 16)
# Now spend each of those outputs individually
for i in range(MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT + 1):
tx_i = CTransaction()
tx_i.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(txid, i), nSequence=0)]
tx_i.vout = [
CTxOut(split_value - fee, DUMMY_P2WPKH_SCRIPT),
CTxOut(fee)
]
tx_i_hex = txToHex(tx_i)
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx_i_hex, 0)
# Now create doublespend of the whole lot; should fail.
# Need a big enough fee to cover all spending transactions and have
# a higher fee rate
double_spend_value = (split_value -
100 * fee) * (MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT + 1)
inputs = []
for i in range(MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT + 1):
inputs.append(CTxIn(COutPoint(txid, i), nSequence=0))
double_tx = CTransaction()
double_tx.vin = inputs
double_tx.vout = [
CTxOut(double_spend_value, CScript([b'a'])),
CTxOut(
int(split_value * (MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT + 1) -
double_spend_value))
]
double_tx_hex = txToHex(double_tx)
# This will raise an exception
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "too many potential replacements",
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction,
double_tx_hex, 0)
# If we remove an input, it should pass
double_tx = CTransaction()
double_tx.vin = inputs[0:-1]
double_tx.vout = [
CTxOut(double_spend_value, CScript([b'a'])),
CTxOut(
int(split_value * (MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT) -
double_spend_value))
]
double_tx_hex = txToHex(double_tx)
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(double_tx_hex, 0)
def test_sequence_lock_unconfirmed_inputs(self):
# Store height so we can easily reset the chain at the end of the test
cur_height = self.nodes[0].getblockcount()
# Create a mempool tx.
txid = self.nodes[0].sendtoaddress(self.nodes[0].getnewaddress(), 2)
tx1 = FromHex(CTransaction(), self.nodes[0].getrawtransaction(txid))
tx1.rehash()
# Anyone-can-spend mempool tx.
# Sequence lock of 0 should pass.
tx2 = CTransaction()
tx2.nVersion = 2
tx2.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(tx1.sha256, 0), nSequence=0)]
tx2.vout = [CTxOut(int(tx1.vout[0].nValue - self.relayfee*COIN), CScript([b'a']))]
tx2_raw = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithwallet(ToHex(tx2))["hex"]
tx2 = FromHex(tx2, tx2_raw)
tx2.rehash()
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx2_raw)
# Create a spend of the 0th output of orig_tx with a sequence lock
# of 1, and test what happens when submitting.
# orig_tx.vout[0] must be an anyone-can-spend output
def test_nonzero_locks(orig_tx, node, relayfee, use_height_lock):
sequence_value = 1
if not use_height_lock:
sequence_value |= SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_TYPE_FLAG
tx = CTransaction()
tx.nVersion = 2
tx.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(orig_tx.sha256, 0), nSequence=sequence_value)]
tx.vout = [CTxOut(int(orig_tx.vout[0].nValue - relayfee * COIN), CScript([b'a' * 35]))]
tx.rehash()
if (orig_tx.hash in node.getrawmempool()):
# sendrawtransaction should fail if the tx is in the mempool
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, NOT_FINAL_ERROR, node.sendrawtransaction, ToHex(tx))
else:
# sendrawtransaction should succeed if the tx is not in the mempool
node.sendrawtransaction(ToHex(tx))
return tx
test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=True)
test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=False)
# Now mine some blocks, but make sure tx2 doesn't get mined.
# Use prioritisetransaction to lower the effective feerate to 0
self.nodes[0].prioritisetransaction(txid=tx2.hash, fee_delta=int(-self.relayfee*COIN))
cur_time = int(time.time())
for i in range(10):
self.nodes[0].setmocktime(cur_time + 600)
self.nodes[0].generate(1)
cur_time += 600
assert tx2.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=True)
test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=False)
# Mine tx2, and then try again
self.nodes[0].prioritisetransaction(txid=tx2.hash, fee_delta=int(self.relayfee*COIN))
# Advance the time on the node so that we can test timelocks
self.nodes[0].setmocktime(cur_time+600)
self.nodes[0].generate(1)
assert tx2.hash not in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
# Now that tx2 is not in the mempool, a sequence locked spend should
# succeed
tx3 = test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=False)
assert tx3.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
self.nodes[0].generate(1)
assert tx3.hash not in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
# One more test, this time using height locks
tx4 = test_nonzero_locks(tx3, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=True)
assert tx4.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
# Now try combining confirmed and unconfirmed inputs
tx5 = test_nonzero_locks(tx4, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=True)
assert tx5.hash not in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
utxos = self.nodes[0].listunspent()
tx5.vin.append(CTxIn(COutPoint(int(utxos[0]["txid"], 16), utxos[0]["vout"]), nSequence=1))
tx5.vout[0].nValue += int(utxos[0]["amount"]*COIN)
raw_tx5 = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithwallet(ToHex(tx5))["hex"]
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, NOT_FINAL_ERROR, self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, raw_tx5)
# Test mempool-BIP68 consistency after reorg
#
# State of the transactions in the last blocks:
# ... -> [ tx2 ] -> [ tx3 ]
# tip-1 tip
# And currently tx4 is in the mempool.
#
# If we invalidate the tip, tx3 should get added to the mempool, causing
# tx4 to be removed (fails sequence-lock).
self.nodes[0].invalidateblock(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash())
assert tx4.hash not in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
assert tx3.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
# Now mine 2 empty blocks to reorg out the current tip (labeled tip-1 in
# diagram above).
# This would cause tx2 to be added back to the mempool, which in turn causes
# tx3 to be removed.
tip = int(self.nodes[0].getblockhash(self.nodes[0].getblockcount()-1), 16)
height = self.nodes[0].getblockcount()
for i in range(2):
block = create_block(tip, create_coinbase(height), cur_time)
block.set_base_version(3)
block.rehash()
block.solve()
tip = block.sha256
height += 1
self.nodes[0].submitblock(ToHex(block))
cur_time += 1
mempool = self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
assert tx3.hash not in mempool
assert tx2.hash in mempool
# Reset the chain and get rid of the mocktimed-blocks
self.nodes[0].setmocktime(0)
self.nodes[0].invalidateblock(self.nodes[0].getblockhash(cur_height+1))
self.nodes[0].generate(10)
def test_sequence_lock_unconfirmed_inputs(self):
# Store height so we can easily reset the chain at the end of the test
cur_height = self.nodes[0].getblockcount()
# Create a mempool tx.
txid = self.nodes[0].sendtoaddress(self.nodes[0].getnewaddress(),
2000000)
tx1 = FromHex(CTransaction(), self.nodes[0].getrawtransaction(txid))
tx1.rehash()
# As the fees are calculated prior to the transaction being signed,
# there is some uncertainty that calculate fee provides the correct
# minimal fee. Since regtest coins are free, let's go ahead and
# increase the fee by an order of magnitude to ensure this test
# passes.
fee_multiplier = 10
# Anyone-can-spend mempool tx.
# Sequence lock of 0 should pass.
tx2 = CTransaction()
tx2.nVersion = 2
tx2.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(tx1.sha256, 0), nSequence=0)]
tx2.vout = [CTxOut(int(0), CScript([b'a']))]
tx2.vout[0].nValue = tx1.vout[0].nValue - \
fee_multiplier * self.nodes[0].calculate_fee(tx2)
tx2_raw = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithwallet(ToHex(tx2))["hex"]
tx2 = FromHex(tx2, tx2_raw)
tx2.rehash()
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx2_raw)
# Create a spend of the 0th output of orig_tx with a sequence lock
# of 1, and test what happens when submitting.
# orig_tx.vout[0] must be an anyone-can-spend output
def test_nonzero_locks(orig_tx, node, use_height_lock):
sequence_value = 1
if not use_height_lock:
sequence_value |= SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_TYPE_FLAG
tx = CTransaction()
tx.nVersion = 2
tx.vin = [
CTxIn(COutPoint(orig_tx.sha256, 0), nSequence=sequence_value)
]
tx.vout = [
CTxOut(
int(orig_tx.vout[0].nValue -
fee_multiplier * node.calculate_fee(tx)),
CScript([b'a']))
]
pad_tx(tx)
tx.rehash()
if (orig_tx.hash in node.getrawmempool()):
# sendrawtransaction should fail if the tx is in the mempool
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, NOT_FINAL_ERROR,
node.sendrawtransaction, ToHex(tx))
else:
# sendrawtransaction should succeed if the tx is not in the
# mempool
node.sendrawtransaction(ToHex(tx))
return tx
test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], use_height_lock=True)
test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], use_height_lock=False)
# Now mine some blocks, but make sure tx2 doesn't get mined.
# Use prioritisetransaction to lower the effective feerate to 0
self.nodes[0].prioritisetransaction(txid=tx2.hash,
fee_delta=-fee_multiplier *
self.nodes[0].calculate_fee(tx2))
cur_time = int(time.time())
for _ in range(10):
self.nodes[0].setmocktime(cur_time + 600)
self.nodes[0].generate(1)
cur_time += 600
assert tx2.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], use_height_lock=True)
test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], use_height_lock=False)
# Mine tx2, and then try again
self.nodes[0].prioritisetransaction(txid=tx2.hash,
fee_delta=fee_multiplier *
self.nodes[0].calculate_fee(tx2))
# Advance the time on the node so that we can test timelocks
self.nodes[0].setmocktime(cur_time + 600)
# Save block template now to use for the reorg later
tmpl = self.nodes[0].getblocktemplate()
self.nodes[0].generate(1)
assert tx2.hash not in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
# Now that tx2 is not in the mempool, a sequence locked spend should
# succeed
tx3 = test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], use_height_lock=False)
assert tx3.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
self.nodes[0].generate(1)
assert tx3.hash not in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
# One more test, this time using height locks
tx4 = test_nonzero_locks(tx3, self.nodes[0], use_height_lock=True)
assert tx4.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
# Now try combining confirmed and unconfirmed inputs
tx5 = test_nonzero_locks(tx4, self.nodes[0], use_height_lock=True)
assert tx5.hash not in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
utxos = self.nodes[0].listunspent()
tx5.vin.append(
CTxIn(COutPoint(int(utxos[0]["txid"], 16), utxos[0]["vout"]),
nSequence=1))
tx5.vout[0].nValue += int(utxos[0]["amount"] * XEC)
raw_tx5 = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithwallet(ToHex(tx5))["hex"]
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, NOT_FINAL_ERROR,
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, raw_tx5)
# Test mempool-BIP68 consistency after reorg
#
# State of the transactions in the last blocks:
# ... -> [ tx2 ] -> [ tx3 ]
# tip-1 tip
# And currently tx4 is in the mempool.
#
# If we invalidate the tip, tx3 should get added to the mempool, causing
# tx4 to be removed (fails sequence-lock).
self.nodes[0].invalidateblock(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash())
assert tx4.hash not in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
assert tx3.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
# Now mine 2 empty blocks to reorg out the current tip (labeled tip-1 in
# diagram above).
# This would cause tx2 to be added back to the mempool, which in turn causes
# tx3 to be removed.
for i in range(2):
block = create_block(tmpl=tmpl, ntime=cur_time)
block.rehash()
block.solve()
tip = block.sha256
assert_equal(None if i == 1 else 'inconclusive',
self.nodes[0].submitblock(ToHex(block)))
tmpl = self.nodes[0].getblocktemplate()
tmpl['previousblockhash'] = f"{tip:x}"
tmpl['transactions'] = []
cur_time += 1
mempool = self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
assert tx3.hash not in mempool
assert tx2.hash in mempool
# Reset the chain and get rid of the mocktimed-blocks
self.nodes[0].setmocktime(0)
self.nodes[0].invalidateblock(self.nodes[0].getblockhash(cur_height +
1))
self.nodes[0].generate(10)
def test_opt_in(self):
"""Replacing should only work if orig tx opted in"""
tx0_outpoint = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], int(1.1 * COIN))
# Create a non-opting in transaction
tx1a = CTransaction()
tx1a.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0xffffffff)]
tx1a.vout = [CTxOut(1 * COIN, DUMMY_P2WPKH_SCRIPT)]
tx1a_hex = txToHex(tx1a)
tx1a_txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx1a_hex, 0)
# This transaction isn't shown as replaceable
assert_equal(
self.nodes[0].getmempoolentry(tx1a_txid)['bip125-replaceable'],
False)
# Shouldn't be able to double-spend
tx1b = CTransaction()
tx1b.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
tx1b.vout = [CTxOut(int(0.9 * COIN), DUMMY_P2WPKH_SCRIPT)]
tx1b_hex = txToHex(tx1b)
# This will raise an exception
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "txn-mempool-conflict",
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, tx1b_hex, 0)
tx1_outpoint = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], int(1.1 * COIN))
# Create a different non-opting in transaction
tx2a = CTransaction()
tx2a.vin = [CTxIn(tx1_outpoint, nSequence=0xfffffffe)]
tx2a.vout = [CTxOut(1 * COIN, DUMMY_P2WPKH_SCRIPT)]
tx2a_hex = txToHex(tx2a)
tx2a_txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx2a_hex, 0)
# Still shouldn't be able to double-spend
tx2b = CTransaction()
tx2b.vin = [CTxIn(tx1_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
tx2b.vout = [CTxOut(int(0.9 * COIN), DUMMY_P2WPKH_SCRIPT)]
tx2b_hex = txToHex(tx2b)
# This will raise an exception
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "txn-mempool-conflict",
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, tx2b_hex, 0)
# Now create a new transaction that spends from tx1a and tx2a
# opt-in on one of the inputs
# Transaction should be replaceable on either input
tx1a_txid = int(tx1a_txid, 16)
tx2a_txid = int(tx2a_txid, 16)
tx3a = CTransaction()
tx3a.vin = [
CTxIn(COutPoint(tx1a_txid, 0), nSequence=0xffffffff),
CTxIn(COutPoint(tx2a_txid, 0), nSequence=0xfffffffd)
]
tx3a.vout = [
CTxOut(int(0.9 * COIN), CScript([b'c'])),
CTxOut(int(0.9 * COIN), CScript([b'd']))
]
tx3a_hex = txToHex(tx3a)
tx3a_txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx3a_hex, 0)
# This transaction is shown as replaceable
assert_equal(
self.nodes[0].getmempoolentry(tx3a_txid)['bip125-replaceable'],
True)
tx3b = CTransaction()
tx3b.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(tx1a_txid, 0), nSequence=0)]
tx3b.vout = [CTxOut(int(0.5 * COIN), DUMMY_P2WPKH_SCRIPT)]
tx3b_hex = txToHex(tx3b)
tx3c = CTransaction()
tx3c.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(tx2a_txid, 0), nSequence=0)]
tx3c.vout = [CTxOut(int(0.5 * COIN), DUMMY_P2WPKH_SCRIPT)]
tx3c_hex = txToHex(tx3c)
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx3b_hex, 0)
# If tx3b was accepted, tx3c won't look like a replacement,
# but make sure it is accepted anyway
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx3c_hex, 0)
def run_test(self):
node = self.nodes[0] # convenience reference to the node
self.bootstrap_p2p() # Add one p2p connection to the node
best_block = self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash()
tip = int(best_block, 16)
best_block_time = self.nodes[0].getblock(best_block)['time']
block_time = best_block_time + 1
privkey = b"aa3680d5d48a8283413f7a108367c7299ca73f553735860a87b08f39395618b7"
key = CECKey()
key.set_secretbytes(privkey)
key.set_compressed(True)
pubkey = CPubKey(key.get_pubkey())
pubkeyhash = hash160(pubkey)
SCRIPT_PUB_KEY = CScript([
CScriptOp(OP_DUP),
CScriptOp(OP_HASH160), pubkeyhash,
CScriptOp(OP_EQUALVERIFY),
CScriptOp(OP_CHECKSIG)
])
self.log.info("Create a new block with an anyone-can-spend coinbase.")
height = 1
block = create_block(tip, create_coinbase(height, pubkey), block_time)
block.solve(self.signblockprivkey)
# Save the coinbase for later
block1 = block
tip = block.sha256
node.p2p.send_blocks_and_test([block], node, success=True)
# b'\x64' is OP_NOTIF
# Transaction will be rejected with code 16 (REJECT_INVALID)
self.log.info('Test a transaction that is rejected')
tx1 = create_tx_with_script(block1.vtx[0],
0,
script_sig=b'\x64' * 35,
amount=50 * COIN - 12000)
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([tx1],
node,
success=False,
expect_disconnect=False)
# Make two p2p connections to provide the node with orphans
# * p2ps[0] will send valid orphan txs (one with low fee)
# * p2ps[1] will send an invalid orphan tx (and is later disconnected for that)
self.reconnect_p2p(num_connections=2)
self.log.info('Test orphan transaction handling ... ')
# Create a root transaction that we withhold until all dependend transactions
# are sent out and in the orphan cache
tx_withhold = CTransaction()
tx_withhold.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(block1.vtx[0].malfixsha256, 0)))
tx_withhold.vout.append(
CTxOut(nValue=50 * COIN - 12000, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY))
tx_withhold.calc_sha256()
(sighash, err) = SignatureHash(CScript([pubkey, OP_CHECKSIG]),
tx_withhold, 0, SIGHASH_ALL)
signature = key.sign(sighash) + b'\x01' # 0x1 is SIGHASH_ALL
tx_withhold.vin[0].scriptSig = CScript([signature])
# Our first orphan tx with some outputs to create further orphan txs
tx_orphan_1 = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_1.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_withhold.malfixsha256, 0)))
tx_orphan_1.vout = [
CTxOut(nValue=10 * COIN, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY)
] * 3
tx_orphan_1.calc_sha256()
(sighash, err) = SignatureHash(SCRIPT_PUB_KEY, tx_orphan_1, 0,
SIGHASH_ALL)
signature = key.sign(sighash) + b'\x01' # 0x1 is SIGHASH_ALL
tx_orphan_1.vin[0].scriptSig = CScript([signature, pubkey])
# A valid transaction with low fee
tx_orphan_2_no_fee = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_2_no_fee.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_1.malfixsha256, 0)))
tx_orphan_2_no_fee.vout.append(
CTxOut(nValue=10 * COIN, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY))
(sighash, err) = SignatureHash(SCRIPT_PUB_KEY, tx_orphan_2_no_fee, 0,
SIGHASH_ALL)
signature = key.sign(sighash) + b'\x01' # 0x1 is SIGHASH_ALL
tx_orphan_2_no_fee.vin[0].scriptSig = CScript([signature, pubkey])
# A valid transaction with sufficient fee
tx_orphan_2_valid = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_2_valid.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_1.malfixsha256, 1)))
tx_orphan_2_valid.vout.append(
CTxOut(nValue=10 * COIN - 12000, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY))
tx_orphan_2_valid.calc_sha256()
(sighash, err) = SignatureHash(SCRIPT_PUB_KEY, tx_orphan_2_valid, 0,
SIGHASH_ALL)
signature = key.sign(sighash) + b'\x01' # 0x1 is SIGHASH_ALL
tx_orphan_2_valid.vin[0].scriptSig = CScript([signature, pubkey])
# An invalid transaction with negative fee
tx_orphan_2_invalid = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_2_invalid.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_1.malfixsha256, 2)))
tx_orphan_2_invalid.vout.append(
CTxOut(nValue=11 * COIN, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY))
(sighash, err) = SignatureHash(SCRIPT_PUB_KEY, tx_orphan_2_invalid, 0,
SIGHASH_ALL)
signature = key.sign(sighash) + b'\x01' # 0x1 is SIGHASH_ALL
tx_orphan_2_invalid.vin[0].scriptSig = CScript([signature, pubkey])
self.log.info('Send the orphans ... ')
# Send valid orphan txs from p2ps[0]
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test(
[tx_orphan_1, tx_orphan_2_no_fee, tx_orphan_2_valid],
node,
success=False)
# Send invalid tx from p2ps[1]
node.p2ps[1].send_txs_and_test([tx_orphan_2_invalid],
node,
success=False)
assert_equal(0,
node.getmempoolinfo()['size']) # Mempool should be empty
assert_equal(2, len(node.getpeerinfo())) # p2ps[1] is still connected
self.log.info('Send the withhold tx ... ')
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([tx_withhold], node, success=True)
# Transactions that should end up in the mempool
expected_mempool = {
t.hashMalFix
for t in [
tx_withhold, # The transaction that is the root for all orphans
tx_orphan_1, # The orphan transaction that splits the coins
tx_orphan_2_valid, # The valid transaction (with sufficient fee)
]
}
# Transactions that do not end up in the mempool
# tx_orphan_no_fee, because it has too low fee (p2ps[0] is not disconnected for relaying that tx)
# tx_orphan_invaid, because it has negative fee (p2ps[1] is disconnected for relaying that tx)
wait_until(lambda: 1 == len(node.getpeerinfo()),
timeout=12) # p2ps[1] is no longer connected
assert_equal(expected_mempool, set(node.getrawmempool()))
# restart node with sending BIP61 messages disabled, check that it disconnects without sending the reject message
self.log.info(
'Test a transaction that is rejected, with BIP61 disabled')
self.restart_node(0, ['-enablebip61=0', '-persistmempool=0'])
self.reconnect_p2p(num_connections=1)
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([tx1],
node,
success=False,
expect_disconnect=False)
# send_txs_and_test will have waited for disconnect, so we can safely check that no reject has been received
assert_equal(node.p2p.reject_code_received, None)
def test_witness_block_size(self):
# TODO: Test that non-witness carrying blocks can't exceed 1MB
# Skipping this test for now; this is covered in p2p-fullblocktest.py
# Test that witness-bearing blocks are limited at ceil(base + wit/4) <= 1MB.
block = self.build_next_block()
assert len(self.utxo) > 0
# Create a P2WSH transaction.
# The witness program will be a bunch of OP_2DROP's, followed by OP_TRUE.
# This should give us plenty of room to tweak the spending tx's
# virtual size.
NUM_DROPS = 200 # 201 max ops per script!
NUM_OUTPUTS = 50
witness_program = CScript([OP_2DROP] * NUM_DROPS + [OP_TRUE])
witness_hash = uint256_from_str(sha256(witness_program))
script_pubkey = CScript([OP_0, ser_uint256(witness_hash)])
prevout = COutPoint(self.utxo[0].sha256, self.utxo[0].n)
value = self.utxo[0].nValue
parent_tx = CTransaction()
parent_tx.vin.append(CTxIn(prevout, b""))
child_value = int(value / NUM_OUTPUTS)
for i in range(NUM_OUTPUTS):
parent_tx.vout.append(CTxOut(child_value, script_pubkey))
parent_tx.vout[0].nValue -= 50000
assert parent_tx.vout[0].nValue > 0
parent_tx.rehash()
filler_size = 3150
child_tx = CTransaction()
for i in range(NUM_OUTPUTS):
child_tx.vin.append(CTxIn(COutPoint(parent_tx.sha256, i), b""))
child_tx.vout = [CTxOut(value - 100000, CScript([OP_TRUE]))]
for i in range(NUM_OUTPUTS):
child_tx.wit.vtxinwit.append(CTxInWitness())
child_tx.wit.vtxinwit[-1].scriptWitness.stack = [
b'a' * filler_size
] * (2 * NUM_DROPS) + [witness_program]
child_tx.rehash()
self.update_witness_block_with_transactions(block,
[parent_tx, child_tx])
vsize = get_virtual_size(block)
assert_greater_than(MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE, vsize)
additional_bytes = (MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE - vsize) * 4
i = 0
while additional_bytes > 0:
# Add some more bytes to each input until we hit MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE+1
extra_bytes = min(additional_bytes + 1, 55)
block.vtx[-1].wit.vtxinwit[int(
i / (2 * NUM_DROPS))].scriptWitness.stack[
i % (2 * NUM_DROPS)] = b'a' * (filler_size + extra_bytes)
additional_bytes -= extra_bytes
i += 1
block.vtx[0].vout.pop() # Remove old commitment
add_witness_commitment(block)
block.solve()
vsize = get_virtual_size(block)
assert_equal(vsize, MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE + 1)
# Make sure that our test case would exceed the old max-network-message
# limit
assert len(block.serialize()) > 2 * 1024 * 1024
test_witness_block(self.nodes[0],
self.test_node,
block,
accepted=False)
# Now resize the second transaction to make the block fit.
cur_length = len(block.vtx[-1].wit.vtxinwit[0].scriptWitness.stack[0])
block.vtx[-1].wit.vtxinwit[0].scriptWitness.stack[0] = b'a' * (
cur_length - 1)
block.vtx[0].vout.pop()
add_witness_commitment(block)
block.solve()
assert get_virtual_size(block) == MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE
test_witness_block(self.nodes[0], self.test_node, block, accepted=True)
# Update available utxo's
self.utxo.pop(0)
self.utxo.append(
UTXO(block.vtx[-1].sha256, 0, block.vtx[-1].vout[0].nValue))
def run_test(self):
node = self.nodes[0] # convenience reference to the node
self.bootstrap_p2p() # Add one p2p connection to the node
best_block = self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash()
tip = int(best_block, 16)
best_block_time = self.nodes[0].getblock(best_block)['time']
block_time = best_block_time + 1
self.log.info("Create a new block with an anyone-can-spend coinbase.")
height = 1
block = create_block(tip, create_coinbase(height), block_time)
block.nVersion = 0x20000000
block.solve()
# Save the coinbase for later
block1 = block
tip = block.sha256
node.p2p.send_blocks_and_test([block], node, success=True)
self.log.info("Mature the block.")
self.nodes[0].generate(100)
# b'\x64' is OP_NOTIF
# Transaction will be rejected with code 16 (REJECT_INVALID)
# and we get disconnected immediately
self.log.info('Test a transaction that is rejected')
tx1 = create_tx_with_script(block1.vtx[0], 0, script_sig=b'\x64' * 35, amount=50 * COIN - 12000)
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([tx1], node, success=False, expect_disconnect=True)
# Make two p2p connections to provide the node with orphans
# * p2ps[0] will send valid orphan txs (one with low fee)
# * p2ps[1] will send an invalid orphan tx (and is later disconnected for that)
self.reconnect_p2p(num_connections=2)
self.log.info('Test orphan transaction handling ... ')
# Create a root transaction that we withhold until all dependend transactions
# are sent out and in the orphan cache
SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE = b'\x51\x75' * 15 + b'\x51'
tx_withhold = CTransaction()
tx_withhold.vin.append(CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(block1.vtx[0].sha256, 0)))
tx_withhold.vout.append(CTxOut(nValue=50 * COIN - 12000, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
tx_withhold.calc_sha256()
# Our first orphan tx with some outputs to create further orphan txs
tx_orphan_1 = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_1.vin.append(CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_withhold.sha256, 0)))
tx_orphan_1.vout = [CTxOut(nValue=10 * COIN, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE)] * 3
tx_orphan_1.calc_sha256()
# A valid transaction with low fee
tx_orphan_2_no_fee = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_2_no_fee.vin.append(CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_1.sha256, 0)))
tx_orphan_2_no_fee.vout.append(CTxOut(nValue=10 * COIN, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
# A valid transaction with sufficient fee
tx_orphan_2_valid = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_2_valid.vin.append(CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_1.sha256, 1)))
tx_orphan_2_valid.vout.append(CTxOut(nValue=10 * COIN - 12000, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
tx_orphan_2_valid.calc_sha256()
# An invalid transaction with negative fee
tx_orphan_2_invalid = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_2_invalid.vin.append(CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_1.sha256, 2)))
tx_orphan_2_invalid.vout.append(CTxOut(nValue=11 * COIN, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
self.log.info('Send the orphans ... ')
# Send valid orphan txs from p2ps[0]
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([tx_orphan_1, tx_orphan_2_no_fee, tx_orphan_2_valid], node, success=False)
# Send invalid tx from p2ps[1]
node.p2ps[1].send_txs_and_test([tx_orphan_2_invalid], node, success=False)
assert_equal(0, node.getmempoolinfo()['size']) # Mempool should be empty
assert_equal(2, len(node.getpeerinfo())) # p2ps[1] is still connected
self.log.info('Send the withhold tx ... ')
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([tx_withhold], node, success=True)
# Transactions that should end up in the mempool
expected_mempool = {
t.hash
for t in [
tx_withhold, # The transaction that is the root for all orphans
tx_orphan_1, # The orphan transaction that splits the coins
tx_orphan_2_valid, # The valid transaction (with sufficient fee)
]
}
# Transactions that do not end up in the mempool
# tx_orphan_no_fee, because it has too low fee (p2ps[0] is not disconnected for relaying that tx)
# tx_orphan_invaid, because it has negative fee (p2ps[1] is disconnected for relaying that tx)
wait_until(lambda: 1 == len(node.getpeerinfo()), timeout=12) # p2ps[1] is no longer connected
assert_equal(expected_mempool, set(node.getrawmempool()))
# restart node with sending BIP61 messages disabled, check that it disconnects without sending the reject message
self.log.info('Test a transaction that is rejected, with BIP61 disabled')
self.restart_node(0, ['-enablebip61=0', '-persistmempool=0'])
self.reconnect_p2p(num_connections=1)
with node.assert_debug_log(expected_msgs=[
"{} from peer=0 was not accepted: mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (Invalid OP_IF construction) (code 16)".format(tx1.hash),
"disconnecting peer=0",
]):
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([tx1], node, success=False, expect_disconnect=True)
# send_txs_and_test will have waited for disconnect, so we can safely check that no reject has been received
assert_equal(node.p2p.reject_code_received, None)
def test_prioritised_transactions(self):
# Ensure that fee deltas used via prioritisetransaction are
# correctly used by replacement logic
# 1. Check that feeperkb uses modified fees
tx0_outpoint = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], int(1.1 * COIN))
tx1a = CTransaction()
tx1a.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
tx1a.vout = [CTxOut(1 * COIN, CScript([b'a' * 35]))]
tx1a_hex = txToHex(tx1a)
tx1a_txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx1a_hex, True)
# Higher fee, but the actual fee per KB is much lower.
tx1b = CTransaction()
tx1b.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
tx1b.vout = [CTxOut(int(0.001 * COIN), CScript([b'a' * 740000]))]
tx1b_hex = txToHex(tx1b)
# Verify tx1b cannot replace tx1a.
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "insufficient fee",
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, tx1b_hex,
True)
# Use prioritisetransaction to set tx1a's fee to 0.
self.nodes[0].prioritisetransaction(txid=tx1a_txid,
fee_delta=int(-0.1 * COIN))
# Now tx1b should be able to replace tx1a
tx1b_txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx1b_hex, True)
assert (tx1b_txid in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool())
# 2. Check that absolute fee checks use modified fee.
tx1_outpoint = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], int(1.1 * COIN))
tx2a = CTransaction()
tx2a.vin = [CTxIn(tx1_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
tx2a.vout = [CTxOut(1 * COIN, CScript([b'a' * 35]))]
tx2a_hex = txToHex(tx2a)
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx2a_hex, True)
# Lower fee, but we'll prioritise it
tx2b = CTransaction()
tx2b.vin = [CTxIn(tx1_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
tx2b.vout = [CTxOut(int(1.01 * COIN), CScript([b'a' * 35]))]
tx2b.rehash()
tx2b_hex = txToHex(tx2b)
# Verify tx2b cannot replace tx2a.
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "insufficient fee",
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, tx2b_hex,
True)
# Now prioritise tx2b to have a higher modified fee
self.nodes[0].prioritisetransaction(txid=tx2b.hash,
fee_delta=int(0.1 * COIN))
# tx2b should now be accepted
tx2b_txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx2b_hex, True)
assert (tx2b_txid in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool())
def run_test(self):
node = self.nodes[0] # convenience reference to the node
self.bootstrap_p2p() # Add one p2p connection to the node
best_block = self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash()
tip = int(best_block, 16)
best_block_time = self.nodes[0].getblock(best_block)['time']
block_time = best_block_time + 1
self.log.info("Create a new block with an anyone-can-spend coinbase.")
height = 1
block = create_block(tip, create_coinbase(height), block_time)
block.solve()
# Save the coinbase for later
block1 = block
tip = block.sha256
node.p2p.send_blocks_and_test([block], node, success=True)
self.log.info("Mature the block.")
self.nodes[0].generate(100)
# b'\x64' is OP_NOTIF
# Transaction will be rejected with code 16 (REJECT_INVALID)
# and we get disconnected immediately
self.log.info('Test a transaction that is rejected')
tx1 = create_tx_with_script(block1.vtx[0],
0,
script_sig=b'\x64' * 35,
amount=50 * COIN - 12000)
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([tx1],
node,
success=False,
expect_disconnect=True)
# Make two p2p connections to provide the node with orphans
# * p2ps[0] will send valid orphan txs (one with low fee)
# * p2ps[1] will send an invalid orphan tx (and is later disconnected for that)
self.reconnect_p2p(num_connections=2)
self.log.info('Test orphan transaction handling ... ')
# Create a root transaction that we withhold until all dependend transactions
# are sent out and in the orphan cache
SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE = b'\x51\x75' * 15 + b'\x51'
tx_withhold = CTransaction()
tx_withhold.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(block1.vtx[0].sha256, 0)))
tx_withhold.vout.append(
CTxOut(nValue=50 * COIN - 12000,
scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
tx_withhold.calc_sha256()
# Our first orphan tx with some outputs to create further orphan txs
tx_orphan_1 = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_1.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_withhold.sha256, 0)))
tx_orphan_1.vout = [
CTxOut(nValue=10 * COIN, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE)
] * 3
tx_orphan_1.calc_sha256()
# A valid transaction with low fee
tx_orphan_2_no_fee = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_2_no_fee.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_1.sha256, 0)))
tx_orphan_2_no_fee.vout.append(
CTxOut(nValue=10 * COIN, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
# A valid transaction with sufficient fee
tx_orphan_2_valid = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_2_valid.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_1.sha256, 1)))
tx_orphan_2_valid.vout.append(
CTxOut(nValue=10 * COIN - 12000,
scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
tx_orphan_2_valid.calc_sha256()
# An invalid transaction with negative fee
tx_orphan_2_invalid = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_2_invalid.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_1.sha256, 2)))
tx_orphan_2_invalid.vout.append(
CTxOut(nValue=11 * COIN, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
self.log.info('Send the orphans ... ')
# Send valid orphan txs from p2ps[0]
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test(
[tx_orphan_1, tx_orphan_2_no_fee, tx_orphan_2_valid],
node,
success=False)
# Send invalid tx from p2ps[1]
node.p2ps[1].send_txs_and_test([tx_orphan_2_invalid],
node,
success=False)
assert_equal(0,
node.getmempoolinfo()['size']) # Mempool should be empty
assert_equal(2, len(node.getpeerinfo())) # p2ps[1] is still connected
self.log.info('Send the withhold tx ... ')
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([tx_withhold], node, success=True)
# Transactions that should end up in the mempool
expected_mempool = {
t.hash
for t in [
tx_withhold, # The transaction that is the root for all orphans
tx_orphan_1, # The orphan transaction that splits the coins
tx_orphan_2_valid, # The valid transaction (with sufficient fee)
]
}
# Transactions that do not end up in the mempool
# tx_orphan_no_fee, because it has too low fee (p2ps[0] is not disconnected for relaying that tx)
# tx_orphan_invaid, because it has negative fee (p2ps[1] is disconnected for relaying that tx)
wait_until(lambda: 1 == len(node.getpeerinfo()),
timeout=12) # p2ps[1] is no longer connected
assert_equal(expected_mempool, set(node.getrawmempool()))
# restart node with sending BIP61 messages disabled, check that it disconnects without sending the reject message
self.log.info(
'Test a transaction that is rejected, with BIP61 disabled')
self.restart_node(0, ['-enablebip61=0', '-persistmempool=0'])
self.reconnect_p2p(num_connections=1)
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([tx1],
node,
success=False,
expect_disconnect=True)
# send_txs_and_test will have waited for disconnect, so we can safely check that no reject has been received
assert_equal(node.p2p.reject_code_received, None)
def test_sequence_lock_unconfirmed_inputs(self):
# Store height so we can easily reset the chain at the end of the test
cur_height = self.nodes[0].getblockcount()
# Create a mempool tx.
txid = self.nodes[0].sendtoaddress(self.nodes[0].getnewaddress(), 2)
tx1 = FromHex(CTransaction(), self.nodes[0].getrawtransaction(txid))
tx1.rehash()
# Anyone-can-spend mempool tx.
# Sequence lock of 0 should pass.
tx2 = CTransaction()
tx2.nFeatures = 2
tx2.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(tx1.malfixsha256, 0), nSequence=0)]
tx2.vout = [CTxOut(int(tx1.vout[0].nValue - self.relayfee*COIN), CScript([b'a']))]
tx2_raw = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithwallet(ToHex(tx2), [], "ALL", self.options.scheme)["hex"]
tx2 = FromHex(tx2, tx2_raw)
tx2.rehash()
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx2_raw)
# Create a spend of the 0th output of orig_tx with a sequence lock
# of 1, and test what happens when submitting.
# orig_tx.vout[0] must be an anyone-can-spend output
def test_nonzero_locks(orig_tx, node, relayfee, use_height_lock):
sequence_value = 1
if not use_height_lock:
sequence_value |= SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_TYPE_FLAG
tx = CTransaction()
tx.nFeatures = 2
tx.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(orig_tx.malfixsha256, 0), nSequence=sequence_value)]
tx.vout = [CTxOut(int(orig_tx.vout[0].nValue - relayfee * COIN), CScript([b'a' * 35]))]
tx.rehash()
if (orig_tx.hash in node.getrawmempool()):
# sendrawtransaction should fail if the tx is in the mempool
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, NOT_FINAL_ERROR, node.sendrawtransaction, ToHex(tx))
else:
# sendrawtransaction should succeed if the tx is not in the mempool
node.sendrawtransaction(ToHex(tx))
return tx
test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=True)
test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=False)
# Now mine some blocks, but make sure tx2 doesn't get mined.
# Use prioritisetransaction to lower the effective feerate to 0
self.nodes[0].prioritisetransaction(txid=tx2.hash, fee_delta=int(-self.relayfee*COIN))
cur_time = int(time.time())
for i in range(10):
self.nodes[0].setmocktime(cur_time + 600)
self.nodes[0].generate(1, self.signblockprivkey)
cur_time += 600
assert(tx2.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool())
test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=True)
test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=False)
# Mine tx2, and then try again
self.nodes[0].prioritisetransaction(txid=tx2.hash, fee_delta=int(self.relayfee*COIN))
# Advance the time on the node so that we can test timelocks
self.nodes[0].setmocktime(cur_time+600)
self.nodes[0].generate(1, self.signblockprivkey)
assert(tx2.hash not in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool())
# Now that tx2 is not in the mempool, a sequence locked spend should
# succeed
tx3 = test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=False)
assert(tx3.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool())
self.nodes[0].generate(1, self.signblockprivkey)
assert(tx3.hash not in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool())
# One more test, this time using height locks
tx4 = test_nonzero_locks(tx3, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=True)
assert(tx4.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool())
# Now try combining confirmed and unconfirmed inputs
tx5 = test_nonzero_locks(tx4, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=True)
assert(tx5.hash not in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool())
utxos = self.nodes[0].listunspent()
tx5.vin.append(CTxIn(COutPoint(int(utxos[0]["txid"], 16), utxos[0]["vout"]), nSequence=1))
tx5.vout[0].nValue += int(utxos[0]["amount"]*COIN)
raw_tx5 = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithwallet(ToHex(tx5), [], "ALL", self.options.scheme)["hex"]
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, NOT_FINAL_ERROR, self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, raw_tx5)
# Test mempool-BIP68 consistency after reorg
#
# State of the transactions in the last blocks:
# ... -> [ tx2 ] -> [ tx3 ]
# tip-1 tip
# And currently tx4 is in the mempool.
#
# If we invalidate the tip, tx3 should get added to the mempool, causing
# tx4 to be removed (fails sequence-lock).
self.nodes[0].invalidateblock(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash())
assert(tx4.hash not in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool())
assert(tx3.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool())
# Now mine 2 empty blocks to reorg out the current tip (labeled tip-1 in
# diagram above).
# This would cause tx2 to be added back to the mempool, which in turn causes
# tx3 to be removed.
tip = int(self.nodes[0].getblockhash(self.nodes[0].getblockcount()-1), 16)
height = self.nodes[0].getblockcount()
for i in range(2):
block = create_block(tip, create_coinbase(height), cur_time)
block.rehash()
block.solve(self.signblockprivkey)
tip = block.sha256
height += 1
self.nodes[0].submitblock(ToHex(block))
cur_time += 1
mempool = self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
assert(tx3.hash not in mempool)
assert(tx2.hash in mempool)
# Reset the chain and get rid of the mocktimed-blocks
self.nodes[0].setmocktime(0)
self.nodes[0].invalidateblock(self.nodes[0].getblockhash(cur_height+1))
self.nodes[0].generate(10, self.signblockprivkey)
def run_test(self):
node = self.nodes[0]
self.log.info('Start with empty mempool, and 200 blocks')
self.mempool_size = 0
assert_equal(node.getblockcount(), 200)
assert_equal(node.getmempoolinfo()['size'], self.mempool_size)
coins = node.listunspent()
self.log.info('Should not accept garbage to testmempoolaccept')
assert_raises_rpc_error(-3, 'Expected type array, got string', lambda: node.testmempoolaccept(rawtxs='ff00baar'))
assert_raises_rpc_error(-8, 'Array must contain exactly one raw transaction for now', lambda: node.testmempoolaccept(rawtxs=['ff00baar', 'ff22']))
assert_raises_rpc_error(-22, 'TX decode failed', lambda: node.testmempoolaccept(rawtxs=['ff00baar']))
self.log.info('A transaction already in the blockchain')
coin = coins.pop() # Pick a random coin(base) to spend
raw_tx_in_block = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(node.createrawtransaction(
inputs=[{'txid': coin['txid'], 'vout': coin['vout']}],
outputs=[{node.getnewaddress(): 0.3}, {node.getnewaddress(): 49}],
))['hex']
txid_in_block = node.sendrawtransaction(hexstring=raw_tx_in_block, maxfeerate=0)
node.generate(1)
self.mempool_size = 0
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': txid_in_block, 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': '18: txn-already-known'}],
rawtxs=[raw_tx_in_block],
)
self.log.info('A transaction not in the mempool')
fee = 0.00000700
raw_tx_0 = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(node.createrawtransaction(
inputs=[{"txid": txid_in_block, "vout": 0, "sequence": BIP125_SEQUENCE_NUMBER}], # RBF is used later
outputs=[{node.getnewaddress(): 0.3 - fee}],
))['hex']
tx = CTransaction()
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_0)))
txid_0 = tx.rehash()
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': txid_0, 'allowed': True}],
rawtxs=[raw_tx_0],
)
self.log.info('A final transaction not in the mempool')
coin = coins.pop() # Pick a random coin(base) to spend
raw_tx_final = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(node.createrawtransaction(
inputs=[{'txid': coin['txid'], 'vout': coin['vout'], "sequence": 0xffffffff}], # SEQUENCE_FINAL
outputs=[{node.getnewaddress(): 0.025}],
locktime=node.getblockcount() + 2000, # Can be anything
))['hex']
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_final)))
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': True}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
maxfeerate=0,
)
node.sendrawtransaction(hexstring=raw_tx_final, maxfeerate=0)
self.mempool_size += 1
self.log.info('A transaction in the mempool')
node.sendrawtransaction(hexstring=raw_tx_0)
self.mempool_size += 1
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': txid_0, 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': '18: txn-already-in-mempool'}],
rawtxs=[raw_tx_0],
)
self.log.info('A transaction that replaces a mempool transaction')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_0)))
tx.vout[0].nValue -= int(fee * COIN) # Double the fee
tx.vin[0].nSequence = BIP125_SEQUENCE_NUMBER + 1 # Now, opt out of RBF
raw_tx_0 = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(tx.serialize().hex())['hex']
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_0)))
txid_0 = tx.rehash()
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': txid_0, 'allowed': True}],
rawtxs=[raw_tx_0],
)
self.log.info('A transaction that conflicts with an unconfirmed tx')
# Send the transaction that replaces the mempool transaction and opts out of replaceability
node.sendrawtransaction(hexstring=tx.serialize().hex(), maxfeerate=0)
# take original raw_tx_0
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_0)))
tx.vout[0].nValue -= int(4 * fee * COIN) # Set more fee
# skip re-signing the tx
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': '18: txn-mempool-conflict'}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
maxfeerate=0,
)
self.log.info('A transaction with missing inputs, that never existed')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_0)))
tx.vin[0].prevout = COutPoint(hash=int('ff' * 32, 16), n=14)
# skip re-signing the tx
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': 'missing-inputs'}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
self.log.info('A transaction with missing inputs, that existed once in the past')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_0)))
tx.vin[0].prevout.n = 1 # Set vout to 1, to spend the other outpoint (49 coins) of the in-chain-tx we want to double spend
raw_tx_1 = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(tx.serialize().hex())['hex']
txid_1 = node.sendrawtransaction(hexstring=raw_tx_1, maxfeerate=0)
# Now spend both to "clearly hide" the outputs, ie. remove the coins from the utxo set by spending them
raw_tx_spend_both = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(node.createrawtransaction(
inputs=[
{'txid': txid_0, 'vout': 0},
{'txid': txid_1, 'vout': 0},
],
outputs=[{node.getnewaddress(): 0.1}]
))['hex']
txid_spend_both = node.sendrawtransaction(hexstring=raw_tx_spend_both, maxfeerate=0)
node.generate(1)
self.mempool_size = 0
# Now see if we can add the coins back to the utxo set by sending the exact txs again
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': txid_0, 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': 'missing-inputs'}],
rawtxs=[raw_tx_0],
)
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': txid_1, 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': 'missing-inputs'}],
rawtxs=[raw_tx_1],
)
self.log.info('Create a signed "reference" tx for later use')
raw_tx_reference = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(node.createrawtransaction(
inputs=[{'txid': txid_spend_both, 'vout': 0}],
outputs=[{node.getnewaddress(): 0.05}],
))['hex']
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
# Reference tx should be valid on itself
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': True}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
self.log.info('A transaction with no outputs')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout = []
# Skip re-signing the transaction for context independent checks from now on
# tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(tx.serialize().hex())['hex'])))
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': '16: bad-txns-vout-empty'}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
self.log.info('A really large transaction')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vin = [tx.vin[0]] * math.ceil(MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE / len(tx.vin[0].serialize()))
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': '16: bad-txns-oversize'}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
self.log.info('A transaction with negative output value')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout[0].nValue *= -1
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': '16: bad-txns-vout-negative'}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
self.log.info('A transaction with too large output value')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout[0].nValue = 21000000 * COIN + 1
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': '16: bad-txns-vout-toolarge'}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
self.log.info('A transaction with too large sum of output values')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout = [tx.vout[0]] * 2
tx.vout[0].nValue = 21000000 * COIN
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': '16: bad-txns-txouttotal-toolarge'}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
self.log.info('A transaction with duplicate inputs')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vin = [tx.vin[0]] * 2
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': '16: bad-txns-inputs-duplicate'}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
self.log.info('A coinbase transaction')
# Pick the input of the first tx we signed, so it has to be a coinbase tx
raw_tx_coinbase_spent = node.getrawtransaction(txid=node.decoderawtransaction(hexstring=raw_tx_in_block)['vin'][0]['txid'])
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_coinbase_spent)))
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': '16: coinbase'}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
self.log.info('Some nonstandard transactions')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.nVersion = 3 # A version currently non-standard
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': '64: version'}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout[0].scriptPubKey = CScript([OP_0]) # Some non-standard script
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': '64: scriptpubkey'}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vin[0].scriptSig = CScript([OP_HASH160]) # Some not-pushonly scriptSig
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': '64: scriptsig-not-pushonly'}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
output_p2sh_burn = CTxOut(nValue=540, scriptPubKey=CScript([OP_HASH160, hash160(b'burn'), OP_EQUAL]))
num_scripts = 100000 // len(output_p2sh_burn.serialize()) # Use enough outputs to make the tx too large for our policy
tx.vout = [output_p2sh_burn] * num_scripts
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': '64: tx-size'}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout[0] = output_p2sh_burn
tx.vout[0].nValue -= 1 # Make output smaller, such that it is dust for our policy
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': '64: dust'}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout[0].scriptPubKey = CScript([OP_RETURN, b'\xff'])
tx.vout = [tx.vout[0]] * 2
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': '64: multi-op-return'}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
self.log.info('A timelocked transaction')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vin[0].nSequence -= 1 # Should be non-max, so locktime is not ignored
tx.nLockTime = node.getblockcount() + 1
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': '64: non-final'}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
self.log.info('A transaction that is locked by BIP68 sequence logic')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vin[0].nSequence = 2 # We could include it in the second block mined from now, but not the very next one
# Can skip re-signing the tx because of early rejection
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{'txid': tx.rehash(), 'allowed': False, 'reject-reason': '64: non-BIP68-final'}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
maxfeerate=0,
)
def SignatureHash_legacy(script, txTo, inIdx, hashtype):
"""
This method is identical to the regular `SignatureHash` method,
but without support for SIGHASH_RANGEPROOF.
So basically it's the old version of the method from before the
new sighash flag was added.
"""
HASH_ONE = b'\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
if inIdx >= len(txTo.vin):
return (HASH_ONE,
"inIdx %d out of range (%d)" % (inIdx, len(txTo.vin)))
txtmp = CTransaction(txTo)
for txin in txtmp.vin:
txin.scriptSig = b''
txtmp.vin[inIdx].scriptSig = FindAndDelete(script,
CScript([OP_CODESEPARATOR]))
if (hashtype & 0x1f) == SIGHASH_NONE:
txtmp.vout = []
for i in range(len(txtmp.vin)):
if i != inIdx:
txtmp.vin[i].nSequence = 0
elif (hashtype & 0x1f) == SIGHASH_SINGLE:
outIdx = inIdx
if outIdx >= len(txtmp.vout):
return (HASH_ONE,
"outIdx %d out of range (%d)" % (outIdx, len(txtmp.vout)))
tmp = txtmp.vout[outIdx]
txtmp.vout = []
for i in range(outIdx):
txtmp.vout.append(CTxOut(-1))
txtmp.vout.append(tmp)
for i in range(len(txtmp.vin)):
if i != inIdx:
txtmp.vin[i].nSequence = 0
if hashtype & SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY:
tmp = txtmp.vin[inIdx]
txtmp.vin = []
txtmp.vin.append(tmp)
# sighash serialization is different from non-witness serialization
# do manual sighash serialization:
s = b""
s += struct.pack("<i", txtmp.nVersion)
s += ser_vector(txtmp.vin)
s += ser_vector(txtmp.vout)
s += struct.pack("<I", txtmp.nLockTime)
# add sighash type
s += struct.pack(b"<I", hashtype)
hash = hash256(s)
return (hash, None)
def test_doublespend_tree(self):
"""Doublespend of a big tree of transactions"""
initial_nValue = 50*COIN
tx0_outpoint = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], initial_nValue)
def branch(prevout, initial_value, max_txs, tree_width=5, fee=0.0001*COIN, _total_txs=None):
if _total_txs is None:
_total_txs = [0]
if _total_txs[0] >= max_txs:
return
txout_value = (initial_value - fee) // tree_width
if txout_value < fee:
return
vout = [CTxOut(txout_value, CScript([i+1]))
for i in range(tree_width)]
tx = CTransaction()
tx.vin = [CTxIn(prevout, nSequence=0)]
tx.vout = vout
tx_hex = txToHex(tx)
assert(len(tx.serialize()) < 100000)
txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx_hex, True)
yield tx
_total_txs[0] += 1
txid = int(txid, 16)
for i, txout in enumerate(tx.vout):
for x in branch(COutPoint(txid, i), txout_value,
max_txs,
tree_width=tree_width, fee=fee,
_total_txs=_total_txs):
yield x
fee = int(0.0001*COIN)
n = MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT
tree_txs = list(branch(tx0_outpoint, initial_nValue, n, fee=fee))
assert_equal(len(tree_txs), n)
# Attempt double-spend, will fail because too little fee paid
dbl_tx = CTransaction()
dbl_tx.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
dbl_tx.vout = [CTxOut(initial_nValue - fee * n, CScript([1] * 35))]
dbl_tx_hex = txToHex(dbl_tx)
# This will raise an exception due to insufficient fee
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "insufficient fee", self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, dbl_tx_hex, True)
# 1 BTC fee is enough
dbl_tx = CTransaction()
dbl_tx.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
dbl_tx.vout = [CTxOut(initial_nValue - fee * n - 1 * COIN, CScript([1] * 35))]
dbl_tx_hex = txToHex(dbl_tx)
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(dbl_tx_hex, True)
mempool = self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
for tx in tree_txs:
tx.rehash()
assert (tx.hash not in mempool)
# Try again, but with more total transactions than the "max txs
# double-spent at once" anti-DoS limit.
for n in (MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT+1, MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT*2):
fee = int(0.0001*COIN)
tx0_outpoint = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], initial_nValue)
tree_txs = list(branch(tx0_outpoint, initial_nValue, n, fee=fee))
assert_equal(len(tree_txs), n)
dbl_tx = CTransaction()
dbl_tx.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
dbl_tx.vout = [CTxOut(initial_nValue - 2 * fee * n, CScript([1] * 35))]
dbl_tx_hex = txToHex(dbl_tx)
# This will raise an exception
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "too many potential replacements", self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, dbl_tx_hex, True)
for tx in tree_txs:
tx.rehash()
self.nodes[0].getrawtransaction(tx.hash)
def run_test(self):
node = self.nodes[0] # convenience reference to the node
self.bootstrap_p2p() # Add one p2p connection to the node
best_block = self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash()
tip = int(best_block, 16)
best_block_time = self.nodes[0].getblock(best_block)['time']
block_time = best_block_time + 1
self.log.info("Create a new block with an anyone-can-spend coinbase.")
height = 1
blocks = []
for _ in invalid_txs.iter_all_templates():
block = create_block(tip, create_coinbase(height), block_time)
block.nHeight = height
prepare_block(block)
block_time = block.nTime + 1
height += 1
# Save the coinbase for later
blocks.append(block)
tip = block.sha256
node.p2p.send_blocks_and_test([block], node, success=True)
self.log.info("Mature the blocks.")
self.nodes[0].generatetoaddress(
100, self.nodes[0].get_deterministic_priv_key().address)
# Iterate through a list of known invalid transaction types, ensuring each is
# rejected. Some are consensus invalid and some just violate policy.
setup_txs = []
for block, BadTxTemplate in zip(blocks,
invalid_txs.iter_all_templates()):
self.log.info("Testing invalid transaction: %s",
BadTxTemplate.__name__)
template = BadTxTemplate(spend_block=block)
setup_tx = template.get_setup_tx()
if setup_tx is not None:
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([setup_tx], node)
setup_txs.append(setup_tx)
tx = template.get_tx(setup_tx)
else:
tx = template.get_tx()
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test(
[tx],
node,
success=False,
expect_disconnect=template.expect_disconnect,
reject_reason=template.reject_reason,
)
if template.expect_disconnect:
self.log.info("Reconnecting to peer")
self.reconnect_p2p()
# Make two p2p connections to provide the node with orphans
# * p2ps[0] will send valid orphan txs (one with low fee)
# * p2ps[1] will send an invalid orphan tx (and is later disconnected for that)
self.reconnect_p2p(num_connections=2)
self.log.info('Test orphan transaction handling ... ')
# Create a root transaction that we withold until all dependend transactions
# are sent out and in the orphan cache
SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE = CScript([OP_TRUE])
tx_withhold = CTransaction()
tx_withhold.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(blocks[0].vtx[0].txid, 1)))
tx_withhold.vout.append(
CTxOut(nValue=int(SUBSIDY * COIN) - 12000,
scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
pad_tx(tx_withhold)
tx_withhold.calc_txid()
# Our first orphan tx with some outputs to create further orphan txs
tx_orphan_1 = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_1.vin.append(CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_withhold.txid, 0)))
tx_orphan_1.vout = [
CTxOut(nValue=int(0.1 * COIN), scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE)
] * 3
pad_tx(tx_orphan_1)
tx_orphan_1.calc_txid()
# A valid transaction with low fee
tx_orphan_2_no_fee = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_2_no_fee.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_1.txid, 0)))
tx_orphan_2_no_fee.vout.append(
CTxOut(nValue=int(0.1 * COIN),
scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
pad_tx(tx_orphan_2_no_fee)
# A valid transaction with sufficient fee
tx_orphan_2_valid = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_2_valid.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_1.txid, 1)))
tx_orphan_2_valid.vout.append(
CTxOut(nValue=int(0.1 * COIN) - 12000,
scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
tx_orphan_2_valid.calc_txid()
pad_tx(tx_orphan_2_valid)
# An invalid transaction with negative fee
tx_orphan_2_invalid = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_2_invalid.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_1.txid, 2)))
tx_orphan_2_invalid.vout.append(
CTxOut(nValue=int(1.1 * COIN),
scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
pad_tx(tx_orphan_2_invalid)
tx_orphan_2_invalid.calc_txid()
self.log.info('Send the orphans ... ')
# Send valid orphan txs from p2ps[0]
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test(
[tx_orphan_1, tx_orphan_2_no_fee, tx_orphan_2_valid],
node,
success=False)
# Send invalid tx from p2ps[1]
node.p2ps[1].send_txs_and_test([tx_orphan_2_invalid],
node,
success=False)
# Mempool should only have setup txs
assert_equal(len(setup_txs), node.getmempoolinfo()['size'])
# p2ps[1] is still connected
assert_equal(2, len(node.getpeerinfo()))
self.log.info('Send the withhold tx ... ')
with node.assert_debug_log(expected_msgs=["bad-txns-in-belowout"]):
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([tx_withhold], node, success=True)
# Transactions that should end up in the mempool
expected_mempool = {
t.txid_hex
for t in [
tx_withhold, # The transaction that is the root for all orphans
tx_orphan_1, # The orphan transaction that splits the coins
# The valid transaction (with sufficient fee)
tx_orphan_2_valid,
] + setup_txs # The setup transactions we added in the beginning
}
# Transactions that do not end up in the mempool
# tx_orphan_no_fee, because it has too low fee (p2ps[0] is not disconnected for relaying that tx)
# tx_orphan_invaid, because it has negative fee (p2ps[1] is
# disconnected for relaying that tx)
# p2ps[1] is no longer connected
wait_until(lambda: 1 == len(node.getpeerinfo()), timeout=12)
assert_equal(expected_mempool, set(node.getrawmempool()))
self.log.info('Test orphan pool overflow')
orphan_tx_pool = [CTransaction() for _ in range(101)]
for i in range(len(orphan_tx_pool)):
orphan_tx_pool[i].vin.append(CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(i, 333)))
orphan_tx_pool[i].vout.append(
CTxOut(nValue=int(1.1 * COIN),
scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
pad_tx(orphan_tx_pool[i])
with node.assert_debug_log(['mapOrphan overflow, removed 1 tx']):
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test(orphan_tx_pool, node, success=False)
rejected_parent = CTransaction()
rejected_parent.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_2_invalid.txid, 0)))
rejected_parent.vout.append(
CTxOut(nValue=int(1.1 * COIN),
scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
pad_tx(rejected_parent)
rejected_parent.rehash()
with node.assert_debug_log([
'not keeping orphan with rejected parents {}'.format(
rejected_parent.txid_hex)
]):
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([rejected_parent], node, success=False)
def run_test(self):
node = self.nodes[0] # convenience reference to the node
self.bootstrap_p2p() # Add one p2p connection to the node
best_block = self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash()
tip = int(best_block, 16)
best_block_time = self.nodes[0].getblock(best_block)['time']
block_time = best_block_time + 1
self.log.info("Create a new block with an anyone-can-spend coinbase.")
height = 1
block = create_block(tip, create_coinbase(height), block_time)
block.solve()
# Save the coinbase for later
block1 = block
tip = block.sha256
node.p2p.send_blocks_and_test([block], node, success=True)
self.log.info("Mature the block.")
self.nodes[0].generatetoaddress(
100, self.nodes[0].get_deterministic_priv_key().address)
# Iterate through a list of known invalid transaction types, ensuring each is
# rejected. Some are consensus invalid and some just violate policy.
for BadTxTemplate in invalid_txs.iter_all_templates():
self.log.info("Testing invalid transaction: %s",
BadTxTemplate.__name__)
template = BadTxTemplate(spend_block=block1)
tx = template.get_tx()
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test(
[tx],
node,
success=False,
expect_disconnect=template.expect_disconnect,
reject_reason=template.reject_reason,
)
if template.expect_disconnect:
self.log.info("Reconnecting to peer")
self.reconnect_p2p()
# Make two p2p connections to provide the node with orphans
# * p2ps[0] will send valid orphan txs (one with low fee)
# * p2ps[1] will send an invalid orphan tx (and is later disconnected for that)
self.reconnect_p2p(num_connections=2)
self.log.info('Test orphan transaction handling ... ')
# Create a root transaction that we withhold until all dependent transactions
# are sent out and in the orphan cache
SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE = b'\x51\x75' * 15 + b'\x51'
tx_withhold = CTransaction()
tx_withhold.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(block1.vtx[0].sha256, 0)))
tx_withhold.vout.append(
CTxOut(nValue=50 * COIN - 12000,
scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
tx_withhold.calc_sha256()
# Our first orphan tx with some outputs to create further orphan txs
tx_orphan_1 = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_1.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_withhold.sha256, 0)))
tx_orphan_1.vout = [
CTxOut(nValue=10 * COIN, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE)
] * 3
tx_orphan_1.calc_sha256()
# A valid transaction with low fee
tx_orphan_2_no_fee = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_2_no_fee.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_1.sha256, 0)))
tx_orphan_2_no_fee.vout.append(
CTxOut(nValue=10 * COIN, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
# A valid transaction with sufficient fee
tx_orphan_2_valid = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_2_valid.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_1.sha256, 1)))
tx_orphan_2_valid.vout.append(
CTxOut(nValue=10 * COIN - 12000,
scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
tx_orphan_2_valid.calc_sha256()
# An invalid transaction with negative fee
tx_orphan_2_invalid = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_2_invalid.vin.append(
CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_1.sha256, 2)))
tx_orphan_2_invalid.vout.append(
CTxOut(nValue=11 * COIN, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
self.log.info('Send the orphans ... ')
# Send valid orphan txs from p2ps[0]
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test(
[tx_orphan_1, tx_orphan_2_no_fee, tx_orphan_2_valid],
node,
success=False)
# Send invalid tx from p2ps[1]
node.p2ps[1].send_txs_and_test([tx_orphan_2_invalid],
node,
success=False)
assert_equal(0,
node.getmempoolinfo()['size']) # Mempool should be empty
assert_equal(2, len(node.getpeerinfo())) # p2ps[1] is still connected
self.log.info('Send the withhold tx ... ')
with node.assert_debug_log(expected_msgs=["bad-txns-in-belowout"]):
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([tx_withhold], node, success=True)
# Transactions that should end up in the mempool
expected_mempool = {
t.hash
for t in [
tx_withhold, # The transaction that is the root for all orphans
tx_orphan_1, # The orphan transaction that splits the coins
tx_orphan_2_valid, # The valid transaction (with sufficient fee)
]
}
# Transactions that do not end up in the mempool
# tx_orphan_no_fee, because it has too low fee (p2ps[0] is not disconnected for relaying that tx)
# tx_orphan_invaid, because it has negative fee (p2ps[1] is disconnected for relaying that tx)
wait_until(lambda: 1 == len(node.getpeerinfo()),
timeout=12) # p2ps[1] is no longer connected
assert_equal(expected_mempool, set(node.getrawmempool()))
def run_test(self):
node = self.nodes[0]
self.log.info('Start with empty mempool, and 200 blocks')
self.mempool_size = 0
assert_equal(node.getblockcount(), 200)
assert_equal(node.getmempoolinfo()['size'], self.mempool_size)
coins = node.listunspent()
self.log.info('Should not accept garbage to testmempoolaccept')
assert_raises_rpc_error(
-3, 'Expected type array, got string',
lambda: node.testmempoolaccept(rawtxs='ff00baar'))
assert_raises_rpc_error(
-8, 'Array must contain exactly one raw transaction for now',
lambda: node.testmempoolaccept(rawtxs=['ff00baar', 'ff22']))
assert_raises_rpc_error(
-22, 'TX decode failed',
lambda: node.testmempoolaccept(rawtxs=['ff00baar']))
self.log.info('A transaction already in the blockchain')
coin = coins.pop() # Pick a random coin(base) to spend
raw_tx_in_block = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(
node.createrawtransaction(
inputs=[{
'txid': coin['txid'],
'vout': coin['vout']
}],
outputs=[{
node.getnewaddress(): 0.3
}, {
node.getnewaddress(): 49
}],
))['hex']
txid_in_block = node.sendrawtransaction(hexstring=raw_tx_in_block,
maxfeerate=0)
node.generate(1)
self.mempool_size = 0
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': txid_in_block,
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'txn-already-known'
}],
rawtxs=[raw_tx_in_block],
)
self.log.info('A transaction not in the mempool')
fee = Decimal('0.000007')
raw_tx_0 = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(
node.createrawtransaction(
inputs=[{
"txid": txid_in_block,
"vout": 0,
"sequence": BIP125_SEQUENCE_NUMBER
}], # RBF is used later
outputs=[{
node.getnewaddress(): Decimal('0.3') - fee
}],
))['hex']
tx = CTransaction()
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_0)))
txid_0 = tx.rehash()
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': txid_0,
'allowed': True,
'vsize': tx.get_vsize(),
'fees': {
'base': fee
}
}],
rawtxs=[raw_tx_0],
)
self.log.info('A final transaction not in the mempool')
coin = coins.pop() # Pick a random coin(base) to spend
output_amount = Decimal('0.025')
raw_tx_final = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(
node.createrawtransaction(
inputs=[{
'txid': coin['txid'],
'vout': coin['vout'],
"sequence": 0xffffffff
}], # SEQUENCE_FINAL
outputs=[{
node.getnewaddress(): output_amount
}],
locktime=node.getblockcount() + 2000, # Can be anything
))['hex']
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_final)))
fee_expected = coin['amount'] - output_amount
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': True,
'vsize': tx.get_vsize(),
'fees': {
'base': fee_expected
}
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
maxfeerate=0,
)
node.sendrawtransaction(hexstring=raw_tx_final, maxfeerate=0)
self.mempool_size += 1
self.log.info('A transaction in the mempool')
node.sendrawtransaction(hexstring=raw_tx_0)
self.mempool_size += 1
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': txid_0,
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'txn-already-in-mempool'
}],
rawtxs=[raw_tx_0],
)
self.log.info('A transaction that replaces a mempool transaction')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_0)))
tx.vout[0].nValue -= int(fee * COIN) # Double the fee
tx.vin[0].nSequence = BIP125_SEQUENCE_NUMBER + 1 # Now, opt out of RBF
raw_tx_0 = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(
tx.serialize().hex())['hex']
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_0)))
txid_0 = tx.rehash()
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': txid_0,
'allowed': True,
'vsize': tx.get_vsize(),
'fees': {
'base': (2 * fee)
}
}],
rawtxs=[raw_tx_0],
)
self.log.info('A transaction that conflicts with an unconfirmed tx')
# Send the transaction that replaces the mempool transaction and opts out of replaceability
node.sendrawtransaction(hexstring=tx.serialize().hex(), maxfeerate=0)
# take original raw_tx_0
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_0)))
tx.vout[0].nValue -= int(4 * fee * COIN) # Set more fee
# skip re-signing the tx
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'txn-mempool-conflict'
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
maxfeerate=0,
)
self.log.info('A transaction with missing inputs, that never existed')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_0)))
tx.vin[0].prevout = COutPoint(hash=int('ff' * 32, 16), n=14)
# skip re-signing the tx
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'missing-inputs'
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
self.log.info(
'A transaction with missing inputs, that existed once in the past')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_0)))
tx.vin[
0].prevout.n = 1 # Set vout to 1, to spend the other outpoint (49 coins) of the in-chain-tx we want to double spend
raw_tx_1 = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(
tx.serialize().hex())['hex']
txid_1 = node.sendrawtransaction(hexstring=raw_tx_1, maxfeerate=0)
# Now spend both to "clearly hide" the outputs, ie. remove the coins from the utxo set by spending them
raw_tx_spend_both = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(
node.createrawtransaction(inputs=[
{
'txid': txid_0,
'vout': 0
},
{
'txid': txid_1,
'vout': 0
},
],
outputs=[{
node.getnewaddress(): 0.1
}]))['hex']
txid_spend_both = node.sendrawtransaction(hexstring=raw_tx_spend_both,
maxfeerate=0)
node.generate(1)
self.mempool_size = 0
# Now see if we can add the coins back to the utxo set by sending the exact txs again
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': txid_0,
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'missing-inputs'
}],
rawtxs=[raw_tx_0],
)
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': txid_1,
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'missing-inputs'
}],
rawtxs=[raw_tx_1],
)
self.log.info('Create a signed "reference" tx for later use')
raw_tx_reference = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(
node.createrawtransaction(
inputs=[{
'txid': txid_spend_both,
'vout': 0
}],
outputs=[{
node.getnewaddress(): 0.05
}],
))['hex']
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
# Reference tx should be valid on itself
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': True,
'vsize': tx.get_vsize(),
'fees': {
'base': Decimal('0.1') - Decimal('0.05')
}
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
maxfeerate=0,
)
self.log.info('A transaction with no outputs')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout = []
# Skip re-signing the transaction for context independent checks from now on
# tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(tx.serialize().hex())['hex'])))
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'bad-txns-vout-empty'
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
self.log.info('A really large transaction')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vin = [tx.vin[0]] * math.ceil(
MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE / len(tx.vin[0].serialize()))
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'bad-txns-oversize'
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
self.log.info('A transaction with negative output value')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout[0].nValue *= -1
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'bad-txns-vout-negative'
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
# The following two validations prevent overflow of the output amounts (see CVE-2010-5139).
self.log.info('A transaction with too large output value')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout[0].nValue = MAX_MONEY + 1
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'bad-txns-vout-toolarge'
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
self.log.info('A transaction with too large sum of output values')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout = [tx.vout[0]] * 2
tx.vout[0].nValue = MAX_MONEY
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'bad-txns-txouttotal-toolarge'
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
self.log.info('A transaction with duplicate inputs')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vin = [tx.vin[0]] * 2
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'bad-txns-inputs-duplicate'
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
self.log.info('A coinbase transaction')
# Pick the input of the first tx we signed, so it has to be a coinbase tx
raw_tx_coinbase_spent = node.getrawtransaction(
txid=node.decoderawtransaction(
hexstring=raw_tx_in_block)['vin'][0]['txid'])
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_coinbase_spent)))
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'coinbase'
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
self.log.info('Some nonstandard transactions')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.nVersion = 3 # A version currently non-standard
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'version'
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout[0].scriptPubKey = CScript([OP_0]) # Some non-standard script
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'scriptpubkey'
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
key = ECKey()
key.generate()
pubkey = key.get_pubkey().get_bytes()
tx.vout[0].scriptPubKey = CScript(
[OP_2, pubkey, pubkey, pubkey, OP_3,
OP_CHECKMULTISIG]) # Some bare multisig script (2-of-3)
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'bare-multisig'
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vin[0].scriptSig = CScript([OP_HASH160
]) # Some not-pushonly scriptSig
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'scriptsig-not-pushonly'
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vin[0].scriptSig = CScript(
[b'a' * 1648]) # Some too large scriptSig (>1650 bytes)
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'scriptsig-size'
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
output_p2sh_burn = CTxOut(nValue=540,
scriptPubKey=CScript(
[OP_HASH160,
hash160(b'burn'), OP_EQUAL]))
num_scripts = 10000 // len(output_p2sh_burn.serialize(
)) # Use enough outputs to make the tx too large for our policy
tx.vout = [output_p2sh_burn] * num_scripts
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'tx-size'
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout[0] = output_p2sh_burn
tx.vout[
0].nValue -= 1 # Make output smaller, such that it is dust for our policy
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'dust'
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
# Unlike upstream, Xaya allows multiple OP_RETURN outputs. So no test for this.
self.log.info('A timelocked transaction')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vin[
0].nSequence -= 1 # Should be non-max, so locktime is not ignored
tx.nLockTime = node.getblockcount() + 1
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'non-final'
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
)
# FIXME: Enable once Namecoin has BIP68 enabled.
return
self.log.info('A transaction that is locked by BIP68 sequence logic')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vin[
0].nSequence = 2 # We could include it in the second block mined from now, but not the very next one
# Can skip re-signing the tx because of early rejection
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'non-BIP68-final'
}],
rawtxs=[tx.serialize().hex()],
maxfeerate=0,
)
def test_sequence_lock_unconfirmed_inputs(self):
# Store height so we can easily reset the chain at the end of the test
cur_height = self.nodes[0].getblockcount()
# Create a mempool tx.
txid = self.nodes[0].sendtoaddress(self.nodes[0].getnewaddress(), 2)
tx1 = tx_from_hex(self.nodes[0].getrawtransaction(txid))
tx1.rehash()
# Anyone-can-spend mempool tx.
# Sequence lock of 0 should pass.
tx2 = CTransaction()
tx2.nVersion = 2
tx2.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(tx1.sha256, 0), nSequence=0)]
tx2.vout = [CTxOut(int(tx1.vout[0].nValue - self.relayfee*COIN), DUMMY_P2WPKH_SCRIPT)]
tx2_raw = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithwallet(tx2.serialize().hex())["hex"]
tx2 = tx_from_hex(tx2_raw)
tx2.rehash()
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx2_raw)
# Create a spend of the 0th output of orig_tx with a sequence lock
# of 1, and test what happens when submitting.
# orig_tx.vout[0] must be an anyone-can-spend output
def test_nonzero_locks(orig_tx, node, relayfee, use_height_lock):
sequence_value = 1
if not use_height_lock:
sequence_value |= SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_TYPE_FLAG
tx = CTransaction()
tx.nVersion = 2
tx.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(orig_tx.sha256, 0), nSequence=sequence_value)]
tx.vout = [CTxOut(int(orig_tx.vout[0].nValue - relayfee * COIN), DUMMY_P2WPKH_SCRIPT)]
tx.rehash()
if (orig_tx.hash in node.getrawmempool()):
# sendrawtransaction should fail if the tx is in the mempool
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, NOT_FINAL_ERROR, node.sendrawtransaction, tx.serialize().hex())
else:
# sendrawtransaction should succeed if the tx is not in the mempool
node.sendrawtransaction(tx.serialize().hex())
return tx
test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=True)
test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=False)
# Now mine some blocks, but make sure tx2 doesn't get mined.
# Use prioritisetransaction to lower the effective feerate to 0
self.nodes[0].prioritisetransaction(txid=tx2.hash, fee_delta=int(-self.relayfee*COIN))
cur_time = int(time.time())
for _ in range(10):
self.nodes[0].setmocktime(cur_time + 600)
self.generate(self.nodes[0], 1, sync_fun=self.no_op)
cur_time += 600
assert tx2.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=True)
test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=False)
# Mine tx2, and then try again
self.nodes[0].prioritisetransaction(txid=tx2.hash, fee_delta=int(self.relayfee*COIN))
# Advance the time on the node so that we can test timelocks
self.nodes[0].setmocktime(cur_time+600)
# Save block template now to use for the reorg later
tmpl = self.nodes[0].getblocktemplate(NORMAL_GBT_REQUEST_PARAMS)
self.generate(self.nodes[0], 1)
assert tx2.hash not in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
# Now that tx2 is not in the mempool, a sequence locked spend should
# succeed
tx3 = test_nonzero_locks(tx2, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=False)
assert tx3.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
self.generate(self.nodes[0], 1)
assert tx3.hash not in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
# One more test, this time using height locks
tx4 = test_nonzero_locks(tx3, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=True)
assert tx4.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
# Now try combining confirmed and unconfirmed inputs
tx5 = test_nonzero_locks(tx4, self.nodes[0], self.relayfee, use_height_lock=True)
assert tx5.hash not in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
utxos = self.nodes[0].listunspent()
tx5.vin.append(CTxIn(COutPoint(int(utxos[0]["txid"], 16), utxos[0]["vout"]), nSequence=1))
tx5.vout[0].nValue += int(utxos[0]["amount"]*COIN)
raw_tx5 = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithwallet(tx5.serialize().hex())["hex"]
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, NOT_FINAL_ERROR, self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, raw_tx5)
# Test mempool-BIP68 consistency after reorg
#
# State of the transactions in the last blocks:
# ... -> [ tx2 ] -> [ tx3 ]
# tip-1 tip
# And currently tx4 is in the mempool.
#
# If we invalidate the tip, tx3 should get added to the mempool, causing
# tx4 to be removed (fails sequence-lock).
self.nodes[0].invalidateblock(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash())
assert tx4.hash not in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
assert tx3.hash in self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
# Now mine 2 empty blocks to reorg out the current tip (labeled tip-1 in
# diagram above).
# This would cause tx2 to be added back to the mempool, which in turn causes
# tx3 to be removed.
for i in range(2):
block = create_block(tmpl=tmpl, ntime=cur_time)
block.solve()
tip = block.sha256
assert_equal(None if i == 1 else 'inconclusive', self.nodes[0].submitblock(block.serialize().hex()))
tmpl = self.nodes[0].getblocktemplate(NORMAL_GBT_REQUEST_PARAMS)
tmpl['previousblockhash'] = '%x' % tip
tmpl['transactions'] = []
cur_time += 1
mempool = self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
assert tx3.hash not in mempool
assert tx2.hash in mempool
# Reset the chain and get rid of the mocktimed-blocks
self.nodes[0].setmocktime(0)
self.nodes[0].invalidateblock(self.nodes[0].getblockhash(cur_height+1))
self.generate(self.nodes[0], 10, sync_fun=self.no_op)
def run_test(self):
node = self.nodes[0]
self.log.info('Start with empty mempool, and 200 blocks')
self.mempool_size = 0
wait_until(lambda: node.getblockcount() == 200)
assert_equal(node.getmempoolinfo()['size'], self.mempool_size)
self.log.info('Should not accept garbage to testmempoolaccept')
assert_raises_rpc_error(
-3, 'Expected type array, got string',
lambda: node.testmempoolaccept(rawtxs='ff00baar'))
assert_raises_rpc_error(
-8, 'Array must contain exactly one raw transaction for now',
lambda: node.testmempoolaccept(rawtxs=['ff00baar', 'ff22']))
assert_raises_rpc_error(
-22, 'TX decode failed',
lambda: node.testmempoolaccept(rawtxs=['ff00baar']))
self.log.info('A transaction already in the blockchain')
coin = node.listunspent()[0] # Pick a random coin(base) to spend
raw_tx_in_block = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(
node.createrawtransaction(
inputs=[{
'txid': coin['txid'],
'vout': coin['vout']
}],
outputs=[{
node.getnewaddress(): 0.3
}, {
node.getnewaddress(): 49
}],
))['hex']
txid_in_block = node.sendrawtransaction(hexstring=raw_tx_in_block,
allowhighfees=True)
node.generate(1)
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': txid_in_block,
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': '18: txn-already-known'
}],
rawtxs=[raw_tx_in_block],
)
self.log.info('A transaction not in the mempool')
fee = 0.00000700
raw_tx_0 = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(
node.createrawtransaction(
inputs=[{
"txid": txid_in_block,
"vout": 0,
"sequence": BIP125_SEQUENCE_NUMBER
}], # RBF is used later
outputs=[{
node.getnewaddress(): 0.3 - fee
}],
))['hex']
tx = CTransaction()
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_0)))
txid_0 = tx.rehash()
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': txid_0,
'allowed': True
}],
rawtxs=[raw_tx_0],
)
self.log.info('A transaction in the mempool')
node.sendrawtransaction(hexstring=raw_tx_0)
self.mempool_size = 1
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': txid_0,
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': '18: txn-already-in-mempool'
}],
rawtxs=[raw_tx_0],
)
self.log.info('A transaction that replaces a mempool transaction')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_0)))
tx.vout[0].nValue -= int(fee * COIN) # Double the fee
tx.vin[0].nSequence = BIP125_SEQUENCE_NUMBER + 1 # Now, opt out of RBF
raw_tx_0 = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(
bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize()))['hex']
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_0)))
txid_0 = tx.rehash()
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': txid_0,
'allowed': True
}],
rawtxs=[raw_tx_0],
)
self.log.info('A transaction that conflicts with an unconfirmed tx')
# Send the transaction that replaces the mempool transaction and opts out of replaceability
node.sendrawtransaction(hexstring=bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize()),
allowhighfees=True)
# take original raw_tx_0
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_0)))
tx.vout[0].nValue -= int(4 * fee * COIN) # Set more fee
# skip re-signing the tx
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': '18: txn-mempool-conflict'
}],
rawtxs=[bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize())],
allowhighfees=True,
)
self.log.info('A transaction with missing inputs, that never existed')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_0)))
tx.vin[0].prevout = COutPoint(hash=int('ff' * 32, 16), n=14)
# skip re-signing the tx
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'missing-inputs'
}],
rawtxs=[bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize())],
)
self.log.info(
'A transaction with missing inputs, that existed once in the past')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_0)))
tx.vin[
0].prevout.n = 1 # Set vout to 1, to spend the other outpoint (49 coins) of the in-chain-tx we want to double spend
raw_tx_1 = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(
bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize()))['hex']
txid_1 = node.sendrawtransaction(hexstring=raw_tx_1,
allowhighfees=True)
# Now spend both to "clearly hide" the outputs, ie. remove the coins from the utxo set by spending them
raw_tx_spend_both = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(
node.createrawtransaction(inputs=[
{
'txid': txid_0,
'vout': 0
},
{
'txid': txid_1,
'vout': 0
},
],
outputs=[{
node.getnewaddress(): 0.1
}]))['hex']
txid_spend_both = node.sendrawtransaction(hexstring=raw_tx_spend_both,
allowhighfees=True)
node.generate(1)
self.mempool_size = 0
# Now see if we can add the coins back to the utxo set by sending the exact txs again
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': txid_0,
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'missing-inputs'
}],
rawtxs=[raw_tx_0],
)
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': txid_1,
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': 'missing-inputs'
}],
rawtxs=[raw_tx_1],
)
self.log.info('Create a signed "reference" tx for later use')
raw_tx_reference = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(
node.createrawtransaction(
inputs=[{
'txid': txid_spend_both,
'vout': 0
}],
outputs=[{
node.getnewaddress(): 0.05
}],
))['hex']
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
# Reference tx should be valid on itself
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': True
}],
rawtxs=[bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize())],
)
self.log.info('A transaction with no outputs')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout = []
# Skip re-signing the transaction for context independent checks from now on
# tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize()))['hex'])))
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': '16: bad-txns-vout-empty'
}],
rawtxs=[bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize())],
)
self.log.info('A really large transaction')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vin = [tx.vin[0]
] * (MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE // len(tx.vin[0].serialize()))
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': '16: bad-txns-oversize'
}],
rawtxs=[bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize())],
)
self.log.info('A transaction with negative output value')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout[0].nValue *= -1
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': '16: bad-txns-vout-negative'
}],
rawtxs=[bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize())],
)
self.log.info('A transaction with too large output value')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout[0].nValue = 21000000 * COIN + 1
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': '16: bad-txns-vout-toolarge'
}],
rawtxs=[bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize())],
)
self.log.info('A transaction with too large sum of output values')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout = [tx.vout[0]] * 2
tx.vout[0].nValue = 21000000 * COIN
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid':
tx.rehash(),
'allowed':
False,
'reject-reason':
'16: bad-txns-txouttotal-toolarge'
}],
rawtxs=[bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize())],
)
self.log.info('A transaction with duplicate inputs')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vin = [tx.vin[0]] * 2
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': '16: bad-txns-inputs-duplicate'
}],
rawtxs=[bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize())],
)
self.log.info('A coinbase transaction')
# Pick the input of the first tx we signed, so it has to be a coinbase tx
raw_tx_coinbase_spent = node.getrawtransaction(
txid=node.decoderawtransaction(
hexstring=raw_tx_in_block)['vin'][0]['txid'])
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_coinbase_spent)))
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': '16: coinbase'
}],
rawtxs=[bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize())],
)
self.log.info('Some nonstandard transactions')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.nVersion = 3 # A version currently non-standard
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': '64: version'
}],
rawtxs=[bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize())],
)
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout[0].scriptPubKey = CScript([OP_0]) # Some non-standard script
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': '64: scriptpubkey'
}],
rawtxs=[bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize())],
)
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vin[0].scriptSig = CScript([OP_HASH160
]) # Some not-pushonly scriptSig
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': '64: scriptsig-not-pushonly'
}],
rawtxs=[bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize())],
)
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
output_p2sh_burn = CTxOut(nValue=540,
scriptPubKey=CScript(
[OP_HASH160,
hash160(b'burn'), OP_EQUAL]))
num_scripts = 100000 // len(output_p2sh_burn.serialize(
)) # Use enough outputs to make the tx too large for our policy
tx.vout = [output_p2sh_burn] * num_scripts
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': '64: tx-size'
}],
rawtxs=[bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize())],
)
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout[0] = output_p2sh_burn
tx.vout[
0].nValue -= 1 # Make output smaller, such that it is dust for our policy
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': '64: dust'
}],
rawtxs=[bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize())],
)
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vout[0].scriptPubKey = CScript([OP_RETURN, b'\xff'])
tx.vout = [tx.vout[0]] * 2
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': '64: multi-op-return'
}],
rawtxs=[bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize())],
)
self.log.info('A timelocked transaction')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vin[
0].nSequence -= 1 # Should be non-max, so locktime is not ignored
tx.nLockTime = node.getblockcount() + 1
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': '64: non-final'
}],
rawtxs=[bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize())],
)
self.log.info('A transaction that is locked by BIP68 sequence logic')
tx.deserialize(BytesIO(hex_str_to_bytes(raw_tx_reference)))
tx.vin[
0].nSequence = 2 # We could include it in the second block mined from now, but not the very next one
# Can skip re-signing the tx because of early rejection
self.check_mempool_result(
result_expected=[{
'txid': tx.rehash(),
'allowed': False,
'reject-reason': '64: non-BIP68-final'
}],
rawtxs=[bytes_to_hex_str(tx.serialize())],
allowhighfees=True,
)
def test_opt_in(self):
"""Replacing should only work if orig tx opted in"""
tx0_outpoint = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], int(1.1*COIN))
# Create a non-opting in transaction
tx1a = CTransaction()
tx1a.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0xffffffff)]
tx1a.vout = [CTxOut(1 * COIN, CScript([b'a' * 35]))]
tx1a_hex = txToHex(tx1a)
tx1a_txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx1a_hex, True)
# This transaction isn't shown as replaceable
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getmempoolentry(tx1a_txid)['bip125-replaceable'], False)
# Shouldn't be able to double-spend
tx1b = CTransaction()
tx1b.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
tx1b.vout = [CTxOut(int(0.9 * COIN), CScript([b'b' * 35]))]
tx1b_hex = txToHex(tx1b)
# This will raise an exception
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "txn-mempool-conflict", self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, tx1b_hex, True)
tx1_outpoint = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], int(1.1*COIN))
# Create a different non-opting in transaction
tx2a = CTransaction()
tx2a.vin = [CTxIn(tx1_outpoint, nSequence=0xfffffffe)]
tx2a.vout = [CTxOut(1 * COIN, CScript([b'a' * 35]))]
tx2a_hex = txToHex(tx2a)
tx2a_txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx2a_hex, True)
# Still shouldn't be able to double-spend
tx2b = CTransaction()
tx2b.vin = [CTxIn(tx1_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
tx2b.vout = [CTxOut(int(0.9 * COIN), CScript([b'b' * 35]))]
tx2b_hex = txToHex(tx2b)
# This will raise an exception
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "txn-mempool-conflict", self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, tx2b_hex, True)
# Now create a new transaction that spends from tx1a and tx2a
# opt-in on one of the inputs
# Transaction should be replaceable on either input
tx1a_txid = int(tx1a_txid, 16)
tx2a_txid = int(tx2a_txid, 16)
tx3a = CTransaction()
tx3a.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(tx1a_txid, 0), nSequence=0xffffffff),
CTxIn(COutPoint(tx2a_txid, 0), nSequence=0xfffffffd)]
tx3a.vout = [CTxOut(int(0.9*COIN), CScript([b'c'])), CTxOut(int(0.9*COIN), CScript([b'd']))]
tx3a_hex = txToHex(tx3a)
tx3a_txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx3a_hex, True)
# This transaction is shown as replaceable
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getmempoolentry(tx3a_txid)['bip125-replaceable'], True)
tx3b = CTransaction()
tx3b.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(tx1a_txid, 0), nSequence=0)]
tx3b.vout = [CTxOut(int(0.5 * COIN), CScript([b'e' * 35]))]
tx3b_hex = txToHex(tx3b)
tx3c = CTransaction()
tx3c.vin = [CTxIn(COutPoint(tx2a_txid, 0), nSequence=0)]
tx3c.vout = [CTxOut(int(0.5 * COIN), CScript([b'f' * 35]))]
tx3c_hex = txToHex(tx3c)
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx3b_hex, True)
# If tx3b was accepted, tx3c won't look like a replacement,
# but make sure it is accepted anyway
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx3c_hex, True)
def test_doublespend_tree(self):
"""Doublespend of a big tree of transactions"""
initial_nValue = 50 * COIN
tx0_outpoint = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], initial_nValue)
def branch(prevout,
initial_value,
max_txs,
tree_width=5,
fee=0.0001 * COIN,
_total_txs=None):
if _total_txs is None:
_total_txs = [0]
if _total_txs[0] >= max_txs:
return
txout_value = (initial_value - fee) // tree_width
if txout_value < fee:
return
vout = [
CTxOut(txout_value, CScript([i + 1]))
for i in range(tree_width)
]
tx = CTransaction()
tx.vin = [CTxIn(prevout, nSequence=0)]
tx.vout = vout
tx_hex = txToHex(tx)
assert len(tx.serialize()) < 100000
txid = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(tx_hex, 0)
yield tx
_total_txs[0] += 1
txid = int(txid, 16)
for i, txout in enumerate(tx.vout):
for x in branch(COutPoint(txid, i),
txout_value,
max_txs,
tree_width=tree_width,
fee=fee,
_total_txs=_total_txs):
yield x
fee = int(0.0001 * COIN)
n = MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT
tree_txs = list(branch(tx0_outpoint, initial_nValue, n, fee=fee))
assert_equal(len(tree_txs), n)
# Attempt double-spend, will fail because too little fee paid
dbl_tx = CTransaction()
dbl_tx.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
dbl_tx.vout = [CTxOut(initial_nValue - fee * n, DUMMY_P2WPKH_SCRIPT)]
dbl_tx_hex = txToHex(dbl_tx)
# This will raise an exception due to insufficient fee
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "insufficient fee",
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction, dbl_tx_hex,
0)
# 1 PEXA fee is enough
dbl_tx = CTransaction()
dbl_tx.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
dbl_tx.vout = [
CTxOut(initial_nValue - fee * n - 1 * COIN, DUMMY_P2WPKH_SCRIPT)
]
dbl_tx_hex = txToHex(dbl_tx)
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(dbl_tx_hex, 0)
mempool = self.nodes[0].getrawmempool()
for tx in tree_txs:
tx.rehash()
assert tx.hash not in mempool
# Try again, but with more total transactions than the "max txs
# double-spent at once" anti-DoS limit.
for n in (MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT + 1, MAX_REPLACEMENT_LIMIT * 2):
fee = int(0.0001 * COIN)
tx0_outpoint = make_utxo(self.nodes[0], initial_nValue)
tree_txs = list(branch(tx0_outpoint, initial_nValue, n, fee=fee))
assert_equal(len(tree_txs), n)
dbl_tx = CTransaction()
dbl_tx.vin = [CTxIn(tx0_outpoint, nSequence=0)]
dbl_tx.vout = [
CTxOut(initial_nValue - 2 * fee * n, DUMMY_P2WPKH_SCRIPT)
]
dbl_tx_hex = txToHex(dbl_tx)
# This will raise an exception
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "too many potential replacements",
self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction,
dbl_tx_hex, 0)
for tx in tree_txs:
tx.rehash()
self.nodes[0].getrawtransaction(tx.hash)
def run_test(self):
node = self.nodes[0] # convenience reference to the node
self.bootstrap_p2p() # Add one p2p connection to the node
best_block = self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash()
tip = int(best_block, 16)
best_block_time = self.nodes[0].getblock(best_block)['time']
block_time = best_block_time + 1
self.log.info("Create a new block with an anyone-can-spend coinbase.")
height = 1
block = create_block(tip, create_coinbase(height), block_time)
block.solve()
# Save the coinbase for later
block1 = block
tip = block.sha256
node.p2p.send_blocks_and_test([block], node, success=True)
self.log.info("Mature the block.")
self.nodes[0].generate(100)
# Iterate through a list of known invalid transaction types, ensuring each is
# rejected. Some are consensus invalid and some just violate policy.
for BadTxTemplate in invalid_txs.iter_all_templates():
self.log.info("Testing invalid transaction: %s", BadTxTemplate.__name__)
template = BadTxTemplate(spend_block=block1)
tx = template.get_tx()
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test(
[tx], node, success=False,
expect_disconnect=template.expect_disconnect,
reject_reason=template.reject_reason,
)
if template.expect_disconnect:
self.log.info("Reconnecting to peer")
self.reconnect_p2p()
# Make two p2p connections to provide the node with orphans
# * p2ps[0] will send valid orphan txs (one with low fee)
# * p2ps[1] will send an invalid orphan tx (and is later disconnected for that)
self.reconnect_p2p(num_connections=2)
self.log.info('Test orphan transaction handling ... ')
# Create a root transaction that we withhold until all dependent transactions
# are sent out and in the orphan cache
SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE = b'\x51\x75' * 15 + b'\x51'
tx_withhold = CTransaction()
tx_withhold.vin.append(CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(block1.vtx[0].sha256, 0)))
tx_withhold.vout.append(CTxOut(nValue=50 * COIN - 12000, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
tx_withhold.calc_sha256()
# Our first orphan tx with some outputs to create further orphan txs
tx_orphan_1 = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_1.vin.append(CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_withhold.sha256, 0)))
tx_orphan_1.vout = [CTxOut(nValue=10 * COIN, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE)] * 3
tx_orphan_1.calc_sha256()
# A valid transaction with low fee
tx_orphan_2_no_fee = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_2_no_fee.vin.append(CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_1.sha256, 0)))
tx_orphan_2_no_fee.vout.append(CTxOut(nValue=10 * COIN, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
# A valid transaction with sufficient fee
tx_orphan_2_valid = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_2_valid.vin.append(CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_1.sha256, 1)))
tx_orphan_2_valid.vout.append(CTxOut(nValue=10 * COIN - 12000, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
tx_orphan_2_valid.calc_sha256()
# An invalid transaction with negative fee
tx_orphan_2_invalid = CTransaction()
tx_orphan_2_invalid.vin.append(CTxIn(outpoint=COutPoint(tx_orphan_1.sha256, 2)))
tx_orphan_2_invalid.vout.append(CTxOut(nValue=11 * COIN, scriptPubKey=SCRIPT_PUB_KEY_OP_TRUE))
self.log.info('Send the orphans ... ')
# Send valid orphan txs from p2ps[0]
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([tx_orphan_1, tx_orphan_2_no_fee, tx_orphan_2_valid], node, success=False)
# Send invalid tx from p2ps[1]
node.p2ps[1].send_txs_and_test([tx_orphan_2_invalid], node, success=False)
assert_equal(0, node.getmempoolinfo()['size']) # Mempool should be empty
assert_equal(2, len(node.getpeerinfo())) # p2ps[1] is still connected
self.log.info('Send the withhold tx ... ')
with node.assert_debug_log(expected_msgs=["bad-txns-in-belowout"]):
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([tx_withhold], node, success=True)
# Transactions that should end up in the mempool
expected_mempool = {
t.hash
for t in [
tx_withhold, # The transaction that is the root for all orphans
tx_orphan_1, # The orphan transaction that splits the coins
tx_orphan_2_valid, # The valid transaction (with sufficient fee)
]
}
# Transactions that do not end up in the mempool
# tx_orphan_no_fee, because it has too low fee (p2ps[0] is not disconnected for relaying that tx)
# tx_orphan_invaid, because it has negative fee (p2ps[1] is disconnected for relaying that tx)
wait_until(lambda: 1 == len(node.getpeerinfo()), timeout=12) # p2ps[1] is no longer connected
assert_equal(expected_mempool, set(node.getrawmempool()))
def run_test(self):
node = self.nodes[0]
node.add_p2p_connection(P2PDataStore())
# Allocate as many UTXOs as are needed
num_utxos = sum(
len(test_case['sig_hash_types']) for test_case in TESTCASES
if isinstance(test_case, dict))
value = int(SUBSIDY * 1_000_000)
fee = 10_000
max_utxo_value = (value - fee) // num_utxos
private_keys = []
public_keys = []
spendable_outputs = []
executed_scripts = []
utxo_idx = 0
# Prepare UTXOs for the tests below
for test_case in TESTCASES:
if test_case == 'ENABLE_REPLAY_PROTECTION':
continue
for _ in test_case['sig_hash_types']:
private_key = ECKey()
private_key.generate()
private_keys.append(private_key)
public_key = private_key.get_pubkey()
public_keys.append(public_key)
utxo_value = max_utxo_value - utxo_idx * 100 # deduct 100*i coins for unique amounts
if test_case.get('opcodes', False):
opcodes = test_case['opcodes']
redeem_script = CScript(
opcodes + [public_key.get_bytes(), OP_CHECKSIG])
executed_scripts.append(redeem_script)
utxo_script = CScript(
[OP_HASH160,
hash160(redeem_script), OP_EQUAL])
elif test_case.get('is_p2pk', False):
utxo_script = CScript(
[public_key.get_bytes(), OP_CHECKSIG])
executed_scripts.append(utxo_script)
else:
utxo_script = CScript([
OP_DUP, OP_HASH160,
hash160(public_key.get_bytes()), OP_EQUALVERIFY,
OP_CHECKSIG
])
executed_scripts.append(utxo_script)
spendable_outputs.append(CTxOut(utxo_value, utxo_script))
utxo_idx += 1
anyonecanspend_address = node.decodescript('51')['p2sh']
burn_address = node.decodescript('00')['p2sh']
p2sh_script = CScript([OP_HASH160, bytes(20), OP_EQUAL])
node.generatetoaddress(1, anyonecanspend_address)
node.generatetoaddress(100, burn_address)
# Build and send fan-out transaction creating all the UTXOs
block_hash = node.getblockhash(1)
coin = int(node.getblock(block_hash)['tx'][0], 16)
tx_fan_out = CTransaction()
tx_fan_out.vin.append(CTxIn(COutPoint(coin, 1), CScript([b'\x51'])))
tx_fan_out.vout = spendable_outputs
tx_fan_out.rehash()
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([tx_fan_out], node)
utxo_idx = 0
key_idx = 0
for test_case in TESTCASES:
if test_case == 'ENABLE_REPLAY_PROTECTION':
node.setmocktime(ACTIVATION_TIME)
node.generatetoaddress(11, burn_address)
continue
# Build tx for this test, will broadcast later
tx = CTransaction()
num_inputs = len(test_case['sig_hash_types'])
spent_outputs = spendable_outputs[:num_inputs]
del spendable_outputs[:num_inputs]
assert len(spent_outputs) == num_inputs
total_input_amount = sum(output.nValue for output in spent_outputs)
max_output_amount = (total_input_amount -
fee) // test_case['outputs']
for i in range(test_case['outputs']):
output_amount = max_output_amount - i * 77
output_script = CScript(
[OP_HASH160, i.to_bytes(20, 'big'), OP_EQUAL])
tx.vout.append(CTxOut(output_amount, output_script))
for _ in test_case['sig_hash_types']:
tx.vin.append(
CTxIn(COutPoint(tx_fan_out.txid, utxo_idx), CScript()))
utxo_idx += 1
# Keep unsigned tx for signrawtransactionwithkey below
unsigned_tx = tx.serialize().hex()
private_keys_wif = []
sign_inputs = []
# Make list of inputs for signrawtransactionwithkey
for i, spent_output in enumerate(spent_outputs):
sign_inputs.append({
'txid':
tx_fan_out.txid_hex,
'vout':
key_idx + i,
'amount':
Decimal(spent_output.nValue) / COIN,
'scriptPubKey':
spent_output.scriptPubKey.hex(),
})
for i, sig_hash_type in enumerate(test_case['sig_hash_types']):
# Compute sighash for this input; we sign it manually using sign_ecdsa/sign_schnorr
# and then broadcast the complete transaction
sighash = SignatureHashLotus(
tx_to=tx,
spent_utxos=spent_outputs,
sig_hash_type=sig_hash_type,
input_index=i,
executed_script_hash=hash256(executed_scripts[key_idx]),
codeseparator_pos=test_case.get('codesep', 0xffff_ffff),
)
if test_case.get('schnorr', False):
signature = private_keys[key_idx].sign_schnorr(sighash)
else:
signature = private_keys[key_idx].sign_ecdsa(sighash)
signature += bytes(
[test_case.get('suffix', sig_hash_type & 0xff)])
# Build correct scriptSig
if test_case.get('opcodes'):
tx.vin[i].scriptSig = CScript(
[signature, executed_scripts[key_idx]])
elif test_case.get('is_p2pk'):
tx.vin[i].scriptSig = CScript([signature])
else:
tx.vin[i].scriptSig = CScript(
[signature, public_keys[key_idx].get_bytes()])
sig_hash_type_str = self.get_sig_hash_type_str(sig_hash_type)
if sig_hash_type_str is not None and 'opcodes' not in test_case and 'error' not in test_case:
# If we're a simple output type (P2PKH or P2KH) and aren't supposed to fail,
# we sign using signrawtransactionwithkey and verify the transaction signed
# the expected sighash. We won't broadcast it though.
# Note: signrawtransactionwithkey will not sign using replay-protection.
private_key_wif = bytes_to_wif(
private_keys[key_idx].get_bytes())
raw_tx_signed = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithkey(
unsigned_tx, [private_key_wif], sign_inputs,
sig_hash_type_str)['hex']
# Extract signature from signed
signed_tx = CTransaction()
signed_tx.deserialize(
io.BytesIO(bytes.fromhex(raw_tx_signed)))
sig = list(CScript(signed_tx.vin[i].scriptSig))[0]
pubkey = private_keys[key_idx].get_pubkey()
sighash = SignatureHashLotus(
tx_to=tx,
spent_utxos=spent_outputs,
sig_hash_type=sig_hash_type & 0xff,
input_index=i,
executed_script_hash=hash256(
executed_scripts[key_idx]),
)
# Verify sig signs the above sighash and has the expected sighash type
assert pubkey.verify_ecdsa(sig[:-1], sighash)
assert sig[-1] == sig_hash_type & 0xff
key_idx += 1
# Broadcast transaction and check success/failure
tx.rehash()
if 'error' not in test_case:
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([tx], node)
else:
node.p2p.send_txs_and_test([tx],
node,
success=False,
reject_reason=test_case['error'])
