def Origin(url):
"""
Check if the remote web application verifies the Origin before
processing the HTTP request.
"""
verbout(color.RED, '\n +-------------------------------------+')
verbout(color.RED, ' | Origin Based Request Validation |')
verbout(color.RED, ' +-------------------------------------+\n')
# Make the request normally and get content
verbout(O,'Making request on normal basis...')
req0x01 = Get(url)
# Set a fake Origin along with UA (pretending to be a
# legitimate request from a browser)
verbout(GR,'Setting generic headers...')
gen_headers = HEADER_VALUES
gen_headers['Origin'] = ORIGIN_URL
# We put the cookie in request, if cookie supplied :D
if COOKIE_VALUE:
for cookie in COOKIE_VALUE:
gen_headers['Cookie'] = cookie
# Make the request with different Origin header and get the content
verbout(O,'Making request with '+color.CYAN+'Tampered Origin Header'+color.END+'...')
req0x02 = Get(url, headers=gen_headers)
# Comparing the length of the requests' responses. If both content
# lengths are same, then the site actually does not validate Origin
# before processing the HTTP request which makes the site more
# vulnerable to CSRF attacks.
#
# IMPORTANT NOTE: I'm aware that checking for the Origin header does
# NOT protect the application against all cases of CSRF, but it's a
# very good first step. In order to exploit a CSRF in an application
# that protects using this method an intruder would have to identify
# other vulnerabilities, such as XSS or open redirects, in the same
# domain.
#
# TODO: This algorithm has lots of room for improvement
if len(req0x01.content) != len(req0x02.content):
verbout(color.GREEN,' [+] Endoint '+color.ORANGE+'Origin Validation'+color.GREEN+' Present!')
print(color.GREEN+' [-] Heuristics reveal endpoint might be '+color.BG+' NOT VULNERABLE '+color.END+'...')
print(color.ORANGE+' [+] Mitigation Method: '+color.BG+' Origin Based Request Validation '+color.END+'\n')
NovulLogger(url, 'Presence of Origin Header based request Validation.')
return True
else:
verbout(R,'Endpoint '+color.RED+'Origin Validation Not Present'+color.END+'!')
verbout(R,'Heuristics reveal endpoint might be '+color.BY+' VULNERABLE '+color.END+' to Origin Based CSRFs...')
print(color.CYAN+ ' [+] Possible CSRF Vulnerability Detected : '+color.GREY+url+'!')
print(color.ORANGE+' [!] Possible Vulnerability Type: '+color.BY+' No Origin Based Request Validation '+color.END+'\n')
VulnLogger(url, 'No Origin Header based request validation presence.', '[i] Response Headers: '+str(req0x02.headers))
return False
def Analysis():
'''
The main idea behind this is to observe and analyse
the patterns in which the CSRF tokens
are generated by server.
'''
ctr = 0 # Counter variable set to 0
# Checking if the no of tokens is greater than 1
if len(REQUEST_TOKENS) > 1:
verbout(color.RED, '\n +--------------+')
verbout(color.RED, ' | Analysis |')
verbout(color.RED, ' +--------------+\n')
print(GR + 'Proceeding for post-scan analysis of tokens gathered...')
verbout(
G, 'A total of %s tokens was discovered during the scan' %
(len(REQUEST_TOKENS)))
# The idea behind this is to generate all possible combinations (not
# considering permutations) from the given list of discovered tokens
# and generate anti-CSRF token generation pattern.
for tokenx1, tokenx2 in itertools.combinations(REQUEST_TOKENS, 2):
try:
verbout(
GR,
'Analysing 2 Anti-CSRF Tokens from gathered requests...')
verbout(color.CYAN,
' [+] First Token: ' + color.BLUE + tokenx1)
verbout(
color.ORANGE, ' [+] Shannon Entropy: ' + color.GREEN +
'%s' % (calcEntropy(tokenx1)))
verbout(color.CYAN,
' [+] Second Token: ' + color.BLUE + tokenx2)
verbout(
color.ORANGE, ' [+] Shannon Entropy: ' + color.GREEN +
'%s' % (calcEntropy(tokenx2)))
# Calculating the edit distance via Damerau Levenshtein algorithm
m = stringdist.rdlevenshtein(tokenx1, tokenx2)
verbout(
color.CYAN, ' [+] Edit Distance Calculated: ' +
color.GREY + str(m) + '%')
# Now its time to detect the alignment ratio
n = stringdist.rdlevenshtein_norm(tokenx1, tokenx2)
verbout(
color.CYAN,
' [+] Alignment Ratio Calculated: ' + color.GREY + str(n))
# If both tokens are same, then
if len(tokenx1) == len(tokenx2):
verbout(
C, 'Token length calculated is same: ' + color.ORANGE +
'Each %s bytes' % len(byteString(tokenx1)))
else:
verbout(
C, 'Token length calculated is different: ' +
color.ORANGE + 'By %s bytes' %
(len(byteString(tokenx1)) - len(byteString(tokenx2))))
time.sleep(0.5)
# In my experience with web security assessments, often the Anti-CSRF token
# is composed of two parts, one of them remains static while the other one dynamic.
#
# For example, if the Anti CSRF Tokens “837456mzy29jkd911139” for one request, the
# other is “837456mzy29jkd337221”, “837456mzy29jkd” part of the token remains same
# in both requests.
#
# The main idea behind this is to detect the static and dynamic part via DL Algorithm
# as discussed above by calculating edit distance.
p = sameSequence(tokenx1, tokenx2)
tokenx01 = tokenx1.replace(p, '')
tokenx02 = tokenx2.replace(p, '')
if n == 0.5 or m == len(tokenx1) / 2:
verbout(
GR,
'The tokens are composed of 2 parts (one static and other dynamic)... '
)
verbout(
C, 'Static Part : ' + color.GREY + p + color.END +
' | Length: ' + color.CYAN + str(len(p)))
verbout(
O, 'Dynamic Part of Token 0x1: ' + color.GREY +
tokenx01 + color.END + ' | Length: ' + color.CYAN +
str(len(tokenx01)))
verbout(
O, 'Dynamic Part of Token 0x2: ' + color.GREY +
tokenx02 + color.END + ' | Length: ' + color.CYAN +
str(len(tokenx02)))
if len(len(tokenx1) / 2) <= 6:
verbout(
color.RED,
' [-] Post-Analysis reveals that token might be ' +
color.BR + ' VULNERABLE ' + color.END + '!')
print(color.RED +
' [+] Possible CSRF Vulnerability Detected!')
print(color.ORANGE + ' [!] Vulnerability Type: ' +
color.BR + ' Weak Dynamic Part of Tokens ' +
color.END)
print(color.GREY + ' [+] Tokens can easily be ' +
color.RED + 'Forged by Bruteforcing/Guessing' +
color.END + '!\n')
VulnLogger(
'Analysis',
'Tokens can easily be Forged by Bruteforcing/Guessing.',
'[i] Token 1: ' + tokenx1 + '\n[i] Token 2: ' +
tokenx2)
elif n < 0.5 or m < len(tokenx1) / 2:
verbout(
R, 'Token distance calculated is ' + color.RED +
'less than 0.5!')
verbout(
C, 'Static Part : ' + color.GREY + p + color.END +
' | Length: ' + color.CYAN + str(len(p)))
verbout(
O, 'Dynamic Part of Token 0x1: ' + color.GREY +
tokenx01 + color.END + ' | Length: ' + color.CYAN +
str(len(tokenx01)))
verbout(
O, 'Dynamic Part of Token 0x2: ' + color.GREY +
tokenx02 + color.END + ' | Length: ' + color.CYAN +
str(len(tokenx02)))
verbout(
color.RED,
' [-] Post-Analysis reveals that token might be ' +
color.BR + ' VULNERABLE ' + color.END + '!')
print(color.GREEN +
' [+] Possible CSRF Vulnerability Detected!')
print(color.ORANGE + ' [!] Vulnerability Type: ' +
color.BR + ' Weak Dynamic Part of Tokens ' +
color.END)
print(color.GREY + ' [+] Tokens can easily be ' +
color.RED + 'Forged by Bruteforcing/Guessing' +
color.END + '!\n')
VulnLogger(
'Analysis',
'Tokens can easily be Forged by Bruteforcing/Guessing.',
'[i] Token 1: ' + tokenx1 + '\n[i] Token 2: ' +
tokenx2)
else:
verbout(
R, 'Token distance calculated is ' + color.GREEN +
'greater than 0.5!')
verbout(
C, 'Static Part : ' + color.GREY + p + color.END +
' | Length: ' + color.CYAN + str(len(p)))
verbout(
O, 'Dynamic Part of Token 0x1: ' + color.GREY +
tokenx01 + color.END + ' | Length: ' + color.CYAN +
str(len(tokenx01)))
verbout(
O, 'Dynamic Part of Token 0x2: ' + color.GREY +
tokenx02 + color.END + ' | Length: ' + color.CYAN +
str(len(tokenx02)))
verbout(
color.GREEN,
' [+] Post-Analysis reveals that tokens are ' +
color.BG + ' NOT VULNERABLE ' + color.END + '!')
print(color.ORANGE + ' [!] Vulnerability Mitigation: ' +
color.BG + ' Strong Dynamic Part of Tokens ' +
color.END)
print(color.GREY + ' [+] Tokens ' + color.GREEN +
'Cannot be Forged by Bruteforcing/Guessing' +
color.END + '!\n')
NovulLogger(
'Analysis',
'Tokens cannot be Forged by Bruteforcing/Guessing.')
time.sleep(1)
except KeyboardInterrupt:
continue
print(C + 'Post-Scan Analysis Completed!')
def Entropy(req, url, headers, form, m_action, m_name=''):
"""
This function has the work of comparing and
calculating Shannon Entropy and related
POST Based requests' security.
"""
found = 0x00
# The minimum length of a csrf token should be 5 bytes.
min_length = 5
# I have never seen a CSRF token longer than 256 bytes,
# so the main concept here is doubling that and checking
# to make sure we don't check parameters which are
# files in multipart uploads or stuff like that.
#
# Multipart uploads usually have a trailing sequence of
# characters which could be misunderstood as a CSRF token.
# This is a very important step with respect to
# decreasing [[ False Positives ]].
max_length = 256 * 2
# Shannon Entropy calculated for a particular CSRF token
# should be at least 2.4. If the token entropy is less
# than that, the application request can be easily
# forged making the application vulnerable even in
# presence of a CSRF token.
min_entropy = 2.4
# Check for common CSRF token names
_q, para = Token(req, headers)
if (para and _q) == None:
VulnLogger(
url, 'Form Requested Without Anti-CSRF Token.',
'[i] Form Requested: ' + form + '\n[i] Request Query: ' +
req.__str__())
return '', ''
verbout(color.RED, '\n +------------------------------+')
verbout(color.RED, ' | Token Strength Detection |')
verbout(color.RED, ' +------------------------------+\n')
for para in REQUEST_TOKENS:
# Coverting the token to a raw string, cause some special
# chars might fu*k with the Shannon Entropy operation.
value = r'%s' % para
verbout(
color.CYAN,
' [!] Testing Anti-CSRF Token: ' + color.ORANGE + '%s' % (value))
# Check length
if len(value) <= min_length:
print(color.RED + ' [-] CSRF Token Length less than 5 bytes. ' +
color.ORANGE + 'Token value can be guessed/bruteforced...')
print(color.ORANGE + ' [-] Endpoint likely ' + color.BR +
' VULNERABLE ' + color.END + color.ORANGE +
' to CSRF Attacks...')
print(color.RED + ' [!] Vulnerability Type: ' + color.BR +
' Very Short/No Anti-CSRF Tokens ' + color.END)
VulnLogger(url, 'Very Short Anti-CSRF Tokens.', 'Token: ' + value)
if len(value) >= max_length:
print(color.ORANGE + ' [+] CSRF Token Length greater than ' +
color.CYAN + '256 bytes. ' + color.GREEN +
'Token value cannot be guessed/bruteforced...')
print(color.GREEN + ' [+] Endpoint likely ' + color.BG +
' NOT VULNERABLE ' + color.END + color.GREEN +
' to CSRF Attacks...')
print(color.GREEN + ' [!] CSRF Mitigation Method: ' + color.BG +
' Long Anti-CSRF Tokens ' + color.END)
NovulLogger(url, 'Long Anti-CSRF tokens with Good Strength.')
found = 0x01
# Checking entropy
verbout(
O, 'Proceeding to calculate ' + color.GREY + 'Shannon Entropy' +
color.END + ' of Token audited...')
entropy = calcEntropy(value)
verbout(GR, 'Calculating Entropy...')
verbout(color.BLUE,
' [+] Entropy Calculated: ' + color.CYAN + str(entropy))
if entropy >= min_entropy:
verbout(
color.ORANGE, ' [+] Anti-CSRF Token Entropy Calculated is ' +
color.BY + ' GREATER than 2.4 ' + color.END + '... ')
print(color.GREEN + ' [+] Endpoint ' + color.BG +
' PROBABLY NOT VULNERABLE ' + color.END + color.GREEN +
' to CSRF Attacks...')
print(color.GREEN + ' [!] CSRF Mitigation Method: ' + color.BG +
' High Entropy Anti-CSRF Tokens ' + color.END)
NovulLogger(url, 'High Entropy Anti-CSRF Tokens.')
found = 0x01
else:
verbout(
color.RED, ' [-] Anti-CSRF Token Entropy Calculated is ' +
color.BY + ' LESS than 2.4 ' + color.END + '... ')
print(color.RED + ' [-] Endpoint likely ' + color.BR +
' VULNERABLE ' + color.END + color.RED +
' to CSRF Attacks inspite of CSRF Tokens...')
print(color.RED + ' [!] Vulnerability Type: ' + color.BR +
' Low Entropy Anti-CSRF Tokens ' + color.END)
VulnLogger(url, 'Low Entropy Anti-CSRF Tokens.', 'Token: ' + value)
if found == 0x00:
if m_name:
print(color.RED + '\n +---------+')
print(color.RED + ' | PoC |')
print(color.RED + ' +---------+\n')
print(color.BLUE + ' [+] URL : ' + color.CYAN + url)
print(color.CYAN + ' [+] Name : ' + color.ORANGE + m_name)
print(color.GREEN + ' [+] Action : ' + color.ORANGE + m_action)
else: # if value m_name not there :(
print(color.RED + '\n +---------+')
print(color.RED + ' | PoC |')
print(color.RED + ' +---------+\n')
print(color.BLUE + ' [+] URL : ' + color.CYAN + url)
print(color.GREEN + ' [+] Action : ' + color.ORANGE + m_action)
# Print out the params
print(color.ORANGE + ' [+] Query : ' + color.GREY +
urllib.parse.urlencode(result))
print('')
return (_q, para) # Return the query paramter and anti-csrf token
def SameSite(url):
'''
This function parses and verifies the cookies with
SameSite Flags.
'''
verbout(color.RED, '\n +------------------------------------+')
verbout(color.RED, ' | Cross Origin Cookie Validation |')
verbout(color.RED, ' +------------------------------------+\n')
# Some Flags we'd need later...
foundx1 = 0x00
foundx2 = 0x00
foundx3 = 0x00
# Step 1: First we check that if the server returns any
# SameSite flag on Cookies with the same Referer as the netloc
verbout(color.GREY,
' [+] Lets examine how server reacts to same referer...')
gen_headers = HEADER_VALUES
gen_headers['User-Agent'] = USER_AGENT or RandomAgent()
verbout(GR, 'Setting Referer header same as host...')
# Setting the netloc as the referer for the first check.
gen_headers['Referer'] = urlsplit(url).netloc
if COOKIE_VALUE:
for cook in COOKIE_VALUE:
gen_headers['Cookie'] = cook
getreq = Get(url, headers=gen_headers) # Making the request
head = getreq.headers
for h in head:
#if search('cookie', h, I) or search('set-cookie', h, I):
if 'Cookie'.lower() in h.lower():
verbout(G, 'Found cookie header value...')
cookieval = head[h]
verbout(color.ORANGE,
' [+] Cookie Received: ' + color.CYAN + str(cookieval))
m = cookieval.split(';')
verbout(GR, 'Examining Cookie...')
for q in m:
if search('SameSite', q, I):
verbout(
G, 'SameSite Flag ' + color.ORANGE +
' detected on cookie!')
foundx1 = 0x01
q = q.split('=')[1].strip()
verbout(C, 'Cookie: ' + color.ORANGE + q)
break
else:
foundx3 = 0x02
if foundx1 == 0x01:
verbout(
R, ' [+] Endpoint ' + color.ORANGE +
'SameSite Flag Cookie Validation' + color.END + ' Present!')
# Step 2: Now we check security mechanisms when the Referer is
# different, i.e. request originates from a different url other
# than the host. (This time without the Cookie assigned)
verbout(
color.GREY,
' [+] Lets examine how server reacts to a fake external referer...')
gen_headers = HEADER_VALUES
gen_headers['User-Agent'] = USER_AGENT or RandomAgent(
) # Setting user-agents
# Assigning a fake referer for the second check, but no cookie.
gen_headers['Referer'] = REFERER_URL
getreq = Get(url, headers=gen_headers)
head = getreq.headers # Getting headers from requests
for h in head:
# If search('cookie', h, I) or search('set-cookie', h, I):
if 'Cookie'.lower() in h.lower():
verbout(G, 'Found cookie header value...')
cookieval = head[h]
verbout(color.ORANGE,
' [+] Cookie Received: ' + color.CYAN + str(cookieval))
m = cookieval.split(';')
verbout(GR, 'Examining Cookie...')
for q in m:
if search('SameSite', q, I):
verbout(
G, 'SameSite Flag ' + color.ORANGE +
' detected on cookie!')
foundx2 = 0x01
q = q.split('=')[1].strip()
verbout(C, 'Cookie: ' + color.ORANGE + q)
break
else:
foundx3 = 0x02
if foundx1 == 0x01:
verbout(
R, ' [+] Endpoint ' + color.ORANGE +
'SameSite Flag Cookie Validation' + color.END + ' Present!')
# Step 3: And finally comes the most important step. Lets see how
# the site reacts to a valid cookie (ofc supplied by the user) coming
# from a a different site, i.e Referer set to other than host.
# This is the most crucial part of the detection.
#
# TODO: Improve the logic in detection.
verbout(
color.GREY,
' [+] Lets examine how server reacts to valid cookie from a different referer...'
)
gen_headers = HEADER_VALUES
gen_headers['User-Agent'] = USER_AGENT or RandomAgent()
# Assigning a fake referer for third request, this time with cookie ;)
gen_headers['Referer'] = REFERER_URL
if COOKIE_VALUE:
for cook in COOKIE_VALUE:
gen_headers['Cookie'] = cook
getreq = Get(url, headers=gen_headers)
head = getreq.headers
for h in head:
# if search('cookie', h, I) or search('set-cookie', h, I):
if 'Cookie'.lower() in h.lower():
verbout(G, 'Found cookie header value...')
cookieval = head[h]
verbout(color.ORANGE,
' [+] Cookie Received: ' + color.CYAN + str(cookieval))
m = cookieval.split(';')
verbout(GR, 'Examining Cookie...')
for q in m:
if search('samesite', q.lower(), I):
verbout(
G, 'SameSite Flag ' + color.ORANGE +
' detected on cookie on Cross Origin Request!')
foundx3 = 0x01
q = q.split('=')[1].strip()
verbout(C, 'Cookie: ' + color.ORANGE + q)
break
else:
foundx3 = 0x02
if foundx1 == 0x01:
verbout(
R, 'Endpoint ' + color.ORANGE + 'SameSite Flag Cookie Validation' +
color.END + ' is Present!')
if (foundx1 == 0x01 and foundx3 == 0x00) and (foundx2 == 0x00
or foundx2 == 0x01):
print(color.GREEN + ' [+] Endpoint ' + color.BG +
' NOT VULNERABLE to ANY type of CSRF attacks! ' + color.END)
print(color.GREEN + ' [+] Protection Method Detected : ' + color.BG +
' SameSite Flag on Cookies ' + color.END)
NovulLogger(url,
'SameSite Flag set on Cookies on Cross-Origin Requests.')
# If a SameSite flag is set on cookies, then the application is totally fool-proof
# against CSRF attacks unless there is some XSS stuff on it. So for now the job of
# this application is done. We need to confirm before we quit.
oq = input(color.BLUE + ' [+] Continue scanning? (y/N) :> ')
if oq.lower().startswith('n'):
sys.exit('\n' + R + 'Shutting down XSRFProbe...\n')
elif foundx1 == 0x02 and foundx2 == 0x02 and foundx3 == 0x02:
print(color.GREEN + ' [+] Endpoint ' + color.BG + ' NOT VULNERABLE ' +
color.END + color.GREEN + ' to CSRF attacks!')
print(color.GREEN + ' [+] Type: ' + color.BG +
' No Cookie Set while Cross Origin Requests ' + color.END)
NovulLogger(url, 'No cookie set on Cross-Origin Requests.')
else:
verbout(
R, 'Endpoint ' + color.ORANGE + 'Cross Origin Cookie Validation' +
color.END + ' Not Present!')
verbout(
R, 'Heuristic(s) reveal endpoint might be ' + color.BY +
' VULNERABLE ' + color.END + ' to CSRFs...')
print(color.GREEN + ' [+] Possible CSRF Vulnerability Detected : ' +
color.ORANGE + url + '!')
print(color.ORANGE + ' [!] Possible Vulnerability Type: ' + color.BY +
' No Cross Origin Cookie Validation Presence ' + color.END)
VulnLogger(url, 'No Cookie Validation on Cross-Origin Requests.',
'[i] Headers: ' + str(head))
def Engine(): # lets begin it!
os.system('clear') # Clear shit from terminal :p
banner() # Print the banner
banabout() # The second banner
web, fld = inputin() # Take the input
form1 = testFormx1() # Get the form 1 ready
form2 = testFormx2() # Get the form 2 ready
# For the cookies that we encounter during requests...
Cookie0 = http.cookiejar.CookieJar() # First as User1
Cookie1 = http.cookiejar.CookieJar() # Then as User2
resp1 = build_opener(HTTPCookieProcessor(Cookie0)) # Process cookies
resp2 = build_opener(HTTPCookieProcessor(Cookie1)) # Process cookies
actionDone = [] # init to the done stuff
csrf = '' # no token initialise / invalid token
ref_detect = 0x00 # Null Char Flag
ori_detect = 0x00 # Null Char Flags
form = Debugger.Form_Debugger() # init to the form parser+token generator
bs1 = BeautifulSoup(form1).findAll(
'form', action=True)[0] # make sure the stuff works properly
bs2 = BeautifulSoup(form2).findAll('form', action=True)[0] # same as above
init1 = web # First init
resp1.open(init1) # Makes request as User2
resp2.open(init1) # Make request as User1
# Now there are 2 different modes of scanning and crawling here.
# 1st -> Testing a single endpoint without the --crawl flag.
# 2nd -> Testing all endpoints with the --crawl flag.
try:
# Implementing the first mode. [NO CRAWL]
if not CRAWL_SITE:
url = web
response = Get(url).text
try:
verbout(O, 'Trying to parse response...')
soup = BeautifulSoup(response) # Parser init
except HTMLParser.HTMLParseError:
verbout(R, 'BeautifulSoup Error: ' + url)
i = 0 # Init user number
if REFERER_ORIGIN_CHECKS:
# Referer Based Checks if True...
verbout(
O, 'Checking endpoint request validation via ' +
color.GREY + 'Referer' + color.END + ' Checks...')
if Referer(url):
ref_detect = 0x01
verbout(O, 'Confirming the vulnerability...')
# We have finished with Referer Based Checks, lets go for Origin Based Ones...
verbout(
O, 'Confirming endpoint request validation via ' +
color.GREY + 'Origin' + color.END + ' Checks...')
if Origin(url):
ori_detect = 0x01
# Now lets get the forms...
verbout(
O, 'Retrieving all forms on ' + color.GREY + url + color.END +
'...')
for m in Debugger.getAllForms(
soup): # iterating over all forms extracted
verbout(O, 'Testing form:\n' + color.CYAN)
formPrettify(m.prettify())
verbout('', '')
FORMS_TESTED.append('(i) ' + url + ':\n\n' + m.prettify() +
'\n')
try:
if m['action']:
pass
except KeyError:
m['action'] = '/' + url.rsplit('/', 1)[1]
ErrorLogger(url, 'No standard form "action".')
action = Parser.buildAction(
url,
m['action']) # get all forms which have 'action' attribute
if not action in actionDone and action != '': # if url returned is not a null value nor duplicate...
# If form submission is kept to True
if FORM_SUBMISSION:
try:
# NOTE: Slow connections may cause read timeouts which may result in AttributeError
# So the idea here is tp make requests pretending to be 3 different users.
# Now a series of requests will be targeted against the site with different
# identities. Refer to XSRFProbe wiki for more info.
#
# NOTE: Slow connections may cause read timeouts which may result in AttributeError
result, genpoc = form.prepareFormInputs(
m) # prepare inputs as user 1
r1 = Post(
url, action, result
) # make request with token values generated as user1
result, genpoc = form.prepareFormInputs(
m) # prepare inputs as user 2
r2 = Post(
url, action, result
) # again make request with token values generated as user2
# Go for cookie based checks
if COOKIE_BASED:
Cookie(url, r1)
# Go for token based entropy checks...
try:
if m['name']:
query, token = Entropy(
result, url, r1.headers, m.prettify(),
m['action'], m['name'])
except KeyError:
query, token = Entropy(result, url, r1.headers,
m.prettify(),
m['action'])
# Now its time to detect the encoding type (if any) of the Anti-CSRF token.
fnd, detct = Encoding(token)
if fnd == 0x01 and detct:
VulnLogger(
url,
'Token is a string encoded value which can be probably decrypted.',
'[i] Encoding: ' + detct)
else:
NovulLogger(
url,
'Anti-CSRF token is not a string encoded value.'
)
# Go for token parameter tamper checks.
if (query and token):
txor = Tamper(url, action, result, r2.text,
query, token)
o2 = resp2.open(
url).read() # make request as user2
try:
form2 = Debugger.getAllForms(BeautifulSoup(
o2))[i] # user2 gets his form
except IndexError:
verbout(R, 'Form Index Error')
ErrorLogger(url, 'Form Index Error.')
continue # Making sure program won't end here (dirty fix :( )
verbout(GR, 'Preparing form inputs...')
contents2, genpoc = form.prepareFormInputs(
form2) # prepare for form 3 as user3
r3 = Post(
url, action, contents2
) # make request as user3 with user3's form
if (POST_BASED) and ((not query) or (txor)):
try:
if m['name']:
PostBased(url, r1.text, r2.text,
r3.text,
m['action'], result, genpoc,
m.prettify(), m['name'])
except KeyError:
PostBased(url, r1.text, r2.text, r3.text,
m['action'], result, genpoc,
m.prettify())
else:
print(
color.GREEN +
' [+] The form was requested with a Anti-CSRF token.'
)
print(color.GREEN + ' [+] Endpoint ' +
color.BG + ' NOT VULNERABLE ' +
color.END + color.GREEN +
' to POST-Based CSRF Attacks!')
NovulLogger(
url,
'Not vulnerable to POST-Based CSRF Attacks.'
)
except HTTPError as msg: # if runtime exception...
verbout(R, 'Exception : ' +
msg.__str__()) # again exception :(
ErrorLogger(url, msg)
actionDone.append(action) # add the stuff done
i += 1 # Increase user iteration
else:
# Implementing the 2nd mode [CRAWLING AND SCANNING].
verbout(GR, "Initializing crawling and scanning...")
crawler = Crawler.Handler(init1,
resp1) # Init to the Crawler handler
while crawler.noinit(): # Until 0 urls left
url = next(crawler) # Go for next!
print(C + 'Testing :> ' + color.CYAN +
url) # Display what url its crawling
try:
soup = crawler.process(fld) # Start the parser
if not soup:
continue # Making sure not to end the program yet...
i = 0 # Set count = 0 (user number 0, which will be subsequently incremented)
if REFERER_ORIGIN_CHECKS:
# Referer Based Checks if True...
verbout(
O, 'Checking endpoint request validation via ' +
color.GREY + 'Referer' + color.END + ' Checks...')
if Referer(url):
ref_detect = 0x01
verbout(O, 'Confirming the vulnerability...')
# We have finished with Referer Based Checks, lets go for Origin Based Ones...
verbout(
O, 'Confirming endpoint request validation via ' +
color.GREY + 'Origin' + color.END + ' Checks...')
if Origin(url):
ori_detect = 0x01
# Now lets get the forms...
verbout(
O, 'Retrieving all forms on ' + color.GREY + url +
color.END + '...')
for m in Debugger.getAllForms(
soup): # iterating over all forms extracted
FORMS_TESTED.append('(i) ' + url + ':\n\n' +
m.prettify() + '\n')
try:
if m['action']:
pass
except KeyError:
m['action'] = '/' + url.rsplit('/', 1)[1]
ErrorLogger(url, 'No standard "action" attribute.')
action = Parser.buildAction(
url, m['action']
) # get all forms which have 'action' attribute
if not action in actionDone and action != '': # if url returned is not a null value nor duplicate...
# If form submission is kept to True
if FORM_SUBMISSION:
try:
result, genpoc = form.prepareFormInputs(
m) # prepare inputs as user 1
r1 = Post(
url, action, result
) # make request with token values generated as user1
result, genpoc = form.prepareFormInputs(
m) # prepare inputs as user 2
r2 = Post(
url, action, result
) # again make request with token values generated as user2
if COOKIE_BASED:
Cookie(url, r1)
# Go for token based entropy checks...
try:
if m['name']:
query, token = Entropy(
result, url, r1.headers,
m.prettify(), m['action'],
m['name'])
except KeyError:
query, token = Entropy(
result, url, r1.headers,
m.prettify(), m['action'])
ErrorLogger(
url, 'No standard form "name".')
# Now its time to detect the encoding type (if any) of the Anti-CSRF token.
fnd, detct = Encoding(token)
if fnd == 0x01 and detct:
VulnLogger(
url,
'String encoded token value. Token might be decrypted.',
'[i] Encoding: ' + detct)
else:
NovulLogger(
url,
'Anti-CSRF token is not a string encoded value.'
)
# Go for token parameter tamper checks.
if (query and token):
txor = Tamper(url, action, result,
r2.text, query, token)
o2 = resp2.open(
url).read() # make request as user2
try:
form2 = Debugger.getAllForms(
BeautifulSoup(o2))[
i] # user2 gets his form
except IndexError:
verbout(R, 'Form Index Error')
ErrorLogger(url, 'Form Index Error.')
continue # making sure program won't end here (dirty fix :( )
verbout(GR, 'Preparing form inputs...')
contents2, genpoc = form.prepareFormInputs(
form2) # prepare for form 3 as user3
r3 = Post(
url, action, contents2
) # make request as user3 with user3's form
if (POST_BASED) and ((query == '') or
(txor == True)):
try:
if m['name']:
PostBased(
url, r1.text, r2.text,
r3.text, m['action'],
result, genpoc,
m.prettify(), m['name'])
except KeyError:
PostBased(url, r1.text, r2.text,
r3.text, m['action'],
result, genpoc,
m.prettify())
else:
print(
color.GREEN +
' [+] The form was requested with a Anti-CSRF token.'
)
print(color.GREEN + ' [+] Endpoint ' +
color.BG + ' NOT VULNERABLE ' +
color.END + color.GREEN +
' to P0ST-Based CSRF Attacks!')
NovulLogger(
url,
'Not vulnerable to POST-Based CSRF Attacks.'
)
except HTTPError as msg: # if runtime exception...
verbout(
color.RED,
' [-] Exception : ' + color.END +
msg.__str__()) # again exception :(
ErrorLogger(url, msg)
actionDone.append(action) # add the stuff done
i += 1 # Increase user iteration
except URLError as e: # if again...
verbout(R, 'Exception at : ' + url) # again exception -_-
time.sleep(0.4)
verbout(O, 'Moving on...')
ErrorLogger(url, e)
continue # make sure it doesn't stop at exceptions
# This error usually happens when some sites are protected by some load balancer
# example Cloudflare. These domains return a 403 forbidden response in various
# contexts. For example when making reverse DNS queries.
except HTTPError as e:
if str(e.code) == '403':
verbout(R, 'HTTP Authentication Error!')
verbout(R, 'Error Code : ' + O + str(e.code))
ErrorLogger(url, e)
quit()
GetLogger(
) # The scanning has finished, so now we can log out all the links ;)
print('\n' + G + "Scan completed!" + '\n')
Analysis() # For Post Scan Analysis
except KeyboardInterrupt as e: # Incase user wants to exit :') (while crawling)
verbout(R, 'User Interrupt!')
time.sleep(1.5)
Analysis() # For Post scan Analysis
print(R + 'Aborted!') # say goodbye
ErrorLogger('KeyBoard Interrupt', 'Aborted')
GetLogger(
) # The scanning has interrupted, so now we can log out all the links ;)
quit()
def Persistence(url, postq):
'''
The main idea behind this is to check for Cookie
Persistence.
'''
verbout(color.RED, '\n +-----------------------------------+')
verbout(color.RED, ' | Cookie Persistence Validation |')
verbout(color.RED, ' +-----------------------------------+\n')
# Checking if user has supplied a value.
verbout(
GR, 'Proceeding to test for ' + color.GREY + 'Cookie Persistence' +
color.END + '...')
time.sleep(0.7)
found = 0x00
# Now let the real test begin...
#
# [Step 1]: Lets examine now whether cookies set by server are persistent or not.
# For this we'll have to parse the cookies set by the server and check for the
# time when the cookie expires. Lets do it!
#
# First its time for GET type requests. Lets prepare our request.
cookies = []
verbout(
C, 'Proceeding to test cookie persistence via ' + color.CYAN +
'Prepared GET Requests' + color.END + '...')
gen_headers = HEADER_VALUES
gen_headers[
'User-Agent'] = 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/40.0.2214.115 Safari/537.36'
if COOKIE_VALUE:
for cookie in COOKIE_VALUE:
gen_headers['Cookie'] = cookie
verbout(GR, 'Making the request...')
req = Get(url, headers=gen_headers)
if req.cookies:
for cook in req.cookies:
if cook.expires:
print(color.GREEN +
' [+] Persistent Cookies found in Response Headers!')
print(color.GREY + ' [+] Cookie: ' + color.CYAN +
cook.__str__())
# cookie.expires returns a timestamp value. I didn't know it. :( Spent over 2+ hours scratching my head
# over this, until I stumbled upon a stackoverflow answer comment. So to decode this, we'd need to
# convert it a human readable format.
print(color.GREEN + ' [+] Cookie Expiry Period: ' +
color.ORANGE +
datetime.fromtimestamp(cook.expires).__str__())
found = 0x01
VulnLogger(url, 'Persistent Session Cookies Found.',
'[i] Cookie: ' + req.headers.get('Set-Cookie'))
else:
NovulLogger(url, 'No Persistent Session Cookies.')
if found == 0x00:
verbout(
R,
'No persistent session cookies identified on GET Type Requests!')
verbout(
C, 'Proceeding to test cookie persistence on ' + color.CYAN +
'POST Requests' + color.END + '...')
# Now its time for POST Based requests.
#
# NOTE: As a standard method, every web application should supply a cookie upon a POST query.
# It might or might not be in case of GET requests.
if postq.cookies:
for cookie in postq.cookies:
if cookie.expires:
print(color.GREEN +
' [+] Persistent Cookies found in Response Headers!')
print(color.GREY + ' [+] Cookie: ' + color.CYAN +
cookie.__str__())
# So to decode this, we'd need to convert it a human readable format.
print(color.GREEN + ' [+] Cookie Expiry Period: ' +
color.ORANGE +
datetime.fromtimestamp(cookie.expires).__str__())
found = 0x01
VulnLogger(url, 'Persistent Session Cookies Found.',
'[i] Cookie: ' + req.headers.get('Set-Cookie'))
print(color.ORANGE + ' [!] Probable Insecure Practice: ' +
color.BR + ' Persistent Session Cookies ' + color.END)
else:
NovulLogger(url, 'No Persistent Cookies.')
if found == 0x00:
verbout(
R, 'No persistent session cookies identified upon POST Requests!')
print(color.GREEN + ' [+] Endpoint might be ' + color.BG +
' NOT VULNERABLE ' + color.END + color.GREEN +
' to CSRF attacks!')
print(color.GREEN + ' [+] Detected : ' + color.BG +
' No Persistent Cookies ' + color.END)
# [Step 2]: The idea here is to try to identify cookie persistence on basis of observing
# variations in cases of using different user-agents. For this test we have chosen 5 different
# well used and common user-agents (as below) and then we observe the variation of set-cookie
# header under different conditions.
#
# We'll test this method only when we haven't identified requests based on previous algo.
if found != 0x01:
verbout(
C, 'Proceeding to test cookie persistence via ' + color.CYAN +
'User-Agent Alteration' + color.END + '...')
user_agents = {
'Chrome on Windows 8.1':
'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/40.0.2214.115 Safari/537.36',
'Safari on iOS':
'Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 8_1_3 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/600.1.4 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/8.0 Mobile/12B466 Safari/600.1.4',
'IE6 on Windows XP':
'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)',
'Opera on Windows 10':
'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36 OPR/43.0.2442.991',
'Chrome on Android':
'Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 2.3.1; en-us; MID Build/GINGERBREAD) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Mobile Safari/533.1'
}
verbout(GR, 'Setting custom generic headers...')
gen_headers = HEADER_VALUES
for name, agent in user_agents.items():
verbout(C, 'Using User-Agent : ' + color.CYAN + name)
verbout(GR, 'Value : ' + color.ORANGE + agent)
gen_headers['User-Agent'] = agent
if COOKIE_VALUE:
for cookie in COOKIE_VALUE:
gen_headers['Cookie'] = cookie
req = Get(url, headers=gen_headers)
resps.append(req.headers.get('Set-Cookie'))
if checkDuplicates(resps):
verbout(
G,
'Set-Cookie header does not change with varied User-Agents...')
verbout(color.GREEN,
' [+] Possible persistent session cookies found...')
print(color.RED + ' [+] Possible CSRF Vulnerability Detected : ' +
color.ORANGE + url + '!')
print(color.ORANGE + ' [!] Probable Insecure Practice: ' +
color.BY + ' Persistent Session Cookies ' + color.END)
VulnLogger(url, 'Persistent Session Cookies Found.',
'[i] Cookie: ' + req.headers.get('Set-Cookie'))
else:
verbout(G, 'Set-Cookie header changes with varied User-Agents...')
verbout(R, 'No possible persistent session cookies found...')
verbout(
color.GREEN,
' [+] Endpoint ' + color.BG + ' PROBABLY NOT VULNERABLE ' +
color.END + color.GREEN + ' to CSRF attacks!')
verbout(
color.ORANGE, ' [+] Application Practice Method Detected : ' +
color.BG + ' No Persistent Cookies ' + color.END)
NovulLogger(url, 'No Persistent Cookies.')
def Tamper(url, action, req, body, query, para):
'''
The main idea behind this is to tamper the Anti-CSRF tokens
found and check the content length for related
vulnerabilities.
'''
verbout(color.RED, '\n +---------------------------------------+')
verbout(color.RED, ' | Anti-CSRF Token Tamper Validation |')
verbout(color.RED, ' +---------------------------------------+\n')
# Null char flags (hex)
flagx1 = 0x00
flagx2 = 0x00
flagx3 = 0x00
verbout(GR, 'Proceeding for CSRF attack via Anti-CSRF token tampering...')
# First of all lets get out token from request
if para == '':
return True
# Coverting the token to a raw string, cause some special
# chars might fu*k with the operation.
value = r'%s' % para
copy = req
# Alright lets start...
# [Step 1]: First we take the token and then replace a particular character
# at a specific position (here at 4th position) and test the response body.
#
# Required check for checking if string at that position isn't the
# same char we are going to replace with.
verbout(GR, 'Tampering Token by '+color.GREY+'index replacement'+color.END+'...')
if value[3] != 'a':
tampvalx1 = replaceStrIndex(value, 3, 'a')
else:
tampvalx1 = replaceStrIndex(value, 3, 'x')
verbout(color.BLUE, ' [+] Original Token: '+color.CYAN+value)
verbout(color.BLUE, ' [+] Tampered Token: '+color.CYAN+tampvalx1)
# Lets build up the request...
req[query] = tampvalx1
resp = Post(url, action, req)
# If there is a 40x (Not Found) or a 50x (Internal Error) error,
# we assume that the tamper did not work :( But if there is a 20x
# (Accepted) or a 30x (Redirection), then we know it worked.
#
# Or if the previous request has same content length as this tampered
# request, then we have the vulnerability.
#
# NOTE: This algorithm has lots of room for improvement.
if ((str(resp.status_code).startswith('2') and not any(search(s, resp.text, I) for s in TOKEN_ERRORS))
or (len(body) == len(resp.text))):
verbout(color.RED,' [-] Anti-CSRF Token tamper by index replacement returns valid response!')
flagx1 = 0x01
VulnLogger(url, 'Anti-CSRF Token tamper by index replacement returns valid response.', '[i] POST Query: '+req.__str__())
else:
verbout(color.RED,' [+] Token tamper in request does not return valid response!')
NovulLogger(url, 'Anti-CSRF Token tamper by index replacement does not return valid response.')
# [Step 2]: Second we take the token and then remove a character
# at a specific position and test the response body.
verbout(GR, 'Tampering Token by '+color.GREY+'index removal'+color.END+'...')
tampvalx2 = replaceStrIndex(value, 3)
verbout(color.BLUE, ' [+] Original Token: '+color.CYAN+value)
verbout(color.BLUE, ' [+] Tampered Token: '+color.CYAN+tampvalx2)
# Lets build up the request...
req[query] = tampvalx2
resp = Post(url, action, req)
# If there is a 40x (Not Found) or a 50x (Internal Error) error,
# we assume that the tamper did not work :( But if there is a 20x
# (Accepted) or a 30x (Redirection), then we know it worked.
#
# NOTE: This algorithm has lots of room for improvement.
if ((str(resp.status_code).startswith('2') and not any(search(s, resp.text, I) for s in TOKEN_ERRORS))
or (len(body) == len(resp.text))):
verbout(color.RED,' [-] Anti-CSRF Token tamper by index removal returns valid response!')
flagx2 = 0x01
VulnLogger(url, 'Anti-CSRF Token tamper by index removal returns valid response.', '[i] POST Query: '+req.__str__())
else:
verbout(color.RED,' [+] Token tamper in request does not return valid response!')
NovulLogger(url, 'Anti-CSRF Token tamper by index removal does not return valid response.')
# [Step 3]: Third we take the token and then remove the whole
# anticsrf token and test the response body.
verbout(GR, 'Tampering Token by '+color.GREY+'Token removal'+color.END+'...')
# Removing the anti-csrf token from request
del req[query]
verbout(color.GREY, ' [+] Removed token parameter from request!')
# Lets build up the request...
resp = Post(url, action, req)
# If there is a 40x (Not Found) or a 50x (Internal Error) error,
# we assume that the tamper did not work :(. But if there is a 20x
# (Accepted) or a 30x (Redirection), then we know it worked.
#
# NOTE: This algorithm has lots of room for improvement.
if ((str(resp.status_code).startswith('2') and not any(search(s, resp.text, I) for s in TOKEN_ERRORS))
or (len(body) == len(resp.text))):
verbout(color.RED,' [-] Anti-CSRF Token removal returns valid response!')
flagx3 = 0x01
VulnLogger(url, 'Anti-CSRF Token removal returns valid response.', '[i] POST Query: '+req.__str__())
else:
verbout(color.RED,' [+] Token tamper in request does not return valid response!')
NovulLogger(url, 'Anti-CSRF Token removal does not return valid response.')
# If any of the forgeries worked...
if (flagx1 or flagx2 or flagx3) == 0x01:
verbout(color.RED,' [+] The tampered token value works! Endpoint '+color.BR+' VULNERABLE to Replay Attacks '+color.END+'!')
verbout(color.ORANGE,' [-] The Tampered Anti-CSRF Token requested does NOT return a 40x or 50x response! ')
print(color.RED+' [-] Endpoint '+color.BR+' CONFIRMED VULNERABLE '+color.END+color.RED+' to Request Forgery Attacks...')
print(color.ORANGE+' [!] Vulnerability Type: '+color.BR+' Non-Unique Anti-CSRF Tokens in Requests '+color.END+'\n')
VulnLogger(url, 'Anti-CSRF Tokens are not Unique. Token Reuse detected.', '[i] Request: '+str(copy))
return True
else:
print(color.RED+' [-] The Tampered Anti-CSRF Token requested returns a 40x or 50x response... ')
print(color.GREEN+' [-] Endpoint '+color.BG+' NOT VULNERABLE '+color.END+color.ORANGE+' to CSRF Attacks...')
print(color.ORANGE+' [!] CSRF Mitigation Method: '+color.BG+' Unique Anti-CSRF Tokens '+color.END+'\n')
NovulLogger(url, 'Unique Anti-CSRF Tokens. No token reuse.')
return False