def __call__(self, info, request):
# Support running under the same instance for local devleopment and for
# test.pypi.io which will continue to host it's own uploader.
if self.val is None:
return True
return is_same_domain(request.domain, self.val)
def __call__(self, info, request):
# Support running under the same instance for local devleopment and for
# test.pypi.io which will continue to host it's own uploader.
if self.val is None:
return True
return is_same_domain(request.domain, self.val)
def check_csrf_origin(request, trusted_origins=None, raises=True):
"""
Check the ``Origin`` of the request to see if it is a cross site request or
not.
If the value supplied by the ``Origin`` or ``Referer`` header isn't one of
the trusted origins and ``raises`` is ``True``, this function will raise a
:exc:`pyramid.exceptions.BadCSRFOrigin` exception, but if ``raises`` is
``False``, this function will return ``False`` instead. If the CSRF origin
checks are successful this function will return ``True`` unconditionally.
Additional trusted origins may be added by passing a list of domain (and
ports if non-standard like ``['example.com', 'dev.example.com:8080']``) in
with the ``trusted_origins`` parameter. If ``trusted_origins`` is ``None``
(the default) this list of additional domains will be pulled from the
``pyramid.csrf_trusted_origins`` setting.
Note that this function will do nothing if ``request.scheme`` is not
``https``.
.. versionadded:: 1.7
.. versionchanged:: 1.9
Moved from :mod:`pyramid.session` to :mod:`pyramid.csrf`
"""
def _fail(reason):
if raises:
raise BadCSRFOrigin(reason)
else:
return False
if request.scheme == "https":
# Suppose user visits http://example.com/
# An active network attacker (man-in-the-middle, MITM) sends a
# POST form that targets https://example.com/detonate-bomb/ and
# submits it via JavaScript.
#
# The attacker will need to provide a CSRF cookie and token, but
# that's no problem for a MITM when we cannot make any assumptions
# about what kind of session storage is being used. So the MITM can
# circumvent the CSRF protection. This is true for any HTTP connection,
# but anyone using HTTPS expects better! For this reason, for
# https://example.com/ we need additional protection that treats
# http://example.com/ as completely untrusted. Under HTTPS,
# Barth et al. found that the Referer header is missing for
# same-domain requests in only about 0.2% of cases or less, so
# we can use strict Referer checking.
# Determine the origin of this request
origin = request.headers.get("Origin")
if origin is None:
origin = request.referrer
# Fail if we were not able to locate an origin at all
if not origin:
return _fail("Origin checking failed - no Origin or Referer.")
# Parse our origin so we we can extract the required information from
# it.
originp = urlparse(origin)
# Ensure that our Referer is also secure.
if originp.scheme != "https":
return _fail(
"Referer checking failed - Referer is insecure while host is "
"secure.")
# Determine which origins we trust, which by default will include the
# current origin.
if trusted_origins is None:
trusted_origins = aslist(
request.registry.settings.get("pyramid.csrf_trusted_origins",
[]))
if request.host_port not in set(["80", "443"]):
trusted_origins.append("{0.domain}:{0.host_port}".format(request))
else:
trusted_origins.append(request.domain)
# Actually check to see if the request's origin matches any of our
# trusted origins.
if not any(
is_same_domain(originp.netloc, host)
for host in trusted_origins):
reason = (
"Referer checking failed - {0} does not match any trusted "
"origins.")
return _fail(reason.format(origin))
return True
def _callFUT(self, *args, **kw):
from pyramid.util import is_same_domain
return is_same_domain(*args, **kw)
def _callFUT(self, *args, **kw):
from pyramid.util import is_same_domain
return is_same_domain(*args, **kw)
def check_csrf_origin(request, trusted_origins=None, raises=True):
"""
Check the Origin of the request to see if it is a cross site request or
not.
If the value supplied by the Origin or Referer header isn't one of the
trusted origins and ``raises`` is ``True``, this function will raise a
:exc:`pyramid.exceptions.BadCSRFOrigin` exception but if ``raises`` is
``False`` this function will return ``False`` instead. If the CSRF origin
checks are successful this function will return ``True`` unconditionally.
Additional trusted origins may be added by passing a list of domain (and
ports if nonstandard like `['example.com', 'dev.example.com:8080']`) in
with the ``trusted_origins`` parameter. If ``trusted_origins`` is ``None``
(the default) this list of additional domains will be pulled from the
``pyramid.csrf_trusted_origins`` setting.
Note that this function will do nothing if request.scheme is not https.
.. versionadded:: 1.7
"""
def _fail(reason):
if raises:
raise BadCSRFOrigin(reason)
else:
return False
if request.scheme == "https":
# Suppose user visits http://example.com/
# An active network attacker (man-in-the-middle, MITM) sends a
# POST form that targets https://example.com/detonate-bomb/ and
# submits it via JavaScript.
#
# The attacker will need to provide a CSRF cookie and token, but
# that's no problem for a MITM when we cannot make any assumptions
# about what kind of session storage is being used. So the MITM can
# circumvent the CSRF protection. This is true for any HTTP connection,
# but anyone using HTTPS expects better! For this reason, for
# https://example.com/ we need additional protection that treats
# http://example.com/ as completely untrusted. Under HTTPS,
# Barth et al. found that the Referer header is missing for
# same-domain requests in only about 0.2% of cases or less, so
# we can use strict Referer checking.
# Determine the origin of this request
origin = request.headers.get("Origin")
if origin is None:
origin = request.referrer
# Fail if we were not able to locate an origin at all
if not origin:
return _fail("Origin checking failed - no Origin or Referer.")
# Parse our origin so we we can extract the required information from
# it.
originp = urlparse.urlparse(origin)
# Ensure that our Referer is also secure.
if originp.scheme != "https":
return _fail(
"Referer checking failed - Referer is insecure while host is "
"secure."
)
# Determine which origins we trust, which by default will include the
# current origin.
if trusted_origins is None:
trusted_origins = aslist(
request.registry.settings.get(
"pyramid.csrf_trusted_origins", [])
)
if request.host_port not in set(["80", "443"]):
trusted_origins.append("{0.domain}:{0.host_port}".format(request))
else:
trusted_origins.append(request.domain)
# Actually check to see if the request's origin matches any of our
# trusted origins.
if not any(is_same_domain(originp.netloc, host)
for host in trusted_origins):
reason = (
"Referer checking failed - {0} does not match any trusted "
"origins."
)
return _fail(reason.format(origin))
return True